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TRINITY  COLLEGE 
LIBRARY 

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R^’dJAN-1  2 1903 


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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
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https://archive.org/details/generalsheridan01davi 


Great  Commanders 

EDITED  BY  JAMES  GRANT  WILSON 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN 


^I)c  ^rcat  €cimmanbcrs  0cric0. 

Edited  by  General  James  Grant  Wilson. 

Each,  i2ino,  cloth,  gilt  top,  $1.50  net; 
postage,  II  cents  additional. 

Admiral  Farragut.  By  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan,  U.  S.  N. 
General  Taylor.  By  General  O.  O.  Howard,  U.  S.  A. 
General  Jackson.  By  James  Barton. 

General  Greene.  By  General  Francis  V.  Greene. 
General  J.  E.  Johnston. 

By  Robert  M.  Hughes,  of  Virginia. 
General  Thomas.  By  Henry  Coffee,  LL.  D. 

General  Scott.  By  General  Marcus  J.  Wright. 

General  Washington. 

By  General  Bradley  T.  Johnson. 
General  Lee.  By  General  Fitzhugh  Lee. 

General  Hancock.  By  General  Francis  A.  Walker. 
General  Sheridan.  By  General  Henry  E.  Davies. 
General  Grant.  By  General  James  Grant  Wilson. 
General  Sherman.  By  General  Manning  F.  Force. 
Commodore  Paul  Jones. 

By  Cyrus  Townsend  Brady. 
General  Meade.  By  Isaac  R.  Pennyfacker. 

General  McClellan.  By  General  Peter  S.  Michie. 
General  Forrest.  By  Captain  J.  Harvey  Mathes. 

In  preparation. 

Admiral  Porter.  By  James  R.  Soley,  late  Assistant  Secretary 
U.  S.  Navy. 

General  Schofield  : An  Autobiography. 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY,  NEW  YORK. 


B,  Appleton  & Co. 


4 


GREAT  COMMANDERS 


★ ★ ★ ★ 

GENERAL  SHERIDAN 


BY 


General  HENRY  E.  DAVIES 


NEW 

D.  APPLETON 


YORK 

AND  COMPANY 


1902 


Copyright,  1895, 

By  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


All  rights  reserved. 


’ I 

^ s S'  ^ 

PREFACE. 


In’  composing,  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  in 
compiling  this  short  history  of  one  of  our  most  dis- 
tinguished soldiers  (for  no  value  can  attach  to  a 
work  of  this  character  unless  it  be  taken  from  au- 
thoritative sources)  the  writer  has  verified  all  inci- 
dents and  events  connected  with  the  civil  war  by 
reference  to  the  official  records  of  that  conflict.  It 
is  needless  to  say  that  General  Sheridan’s  Personal 
Memoirs  have  been  freely  used,  and  have  furnished 
a large  part  of  the  information  contained  in  these 
pages;  and  the  interesting  work  of  Colonel  Newhall, 
With  Sheridan  in  Lee’s  Last  Campaign,  has  been  of 
great  value  in  writing  the  description  of  the  events 
of  which  it  treats. 

H.  E.  D. 

August,  189^. 

[With'  ’1  a month  of  the  time  when  the  author 
completed  this  work  by  the  writing  of  the  above 
fourteen  lines,  his  highly  honorable  career  of  less 
than  three-score  years  was  closed  by  death.  Henry 
Eugene  Davies,  eldest  son  of  the  well-known  lawyer 
and  jurist  of  that  name,  and  a nephew  of  the  distin- 
guished mathematician  Charles  Davies,  was  born  in 

V 

/ ^ yj  3 ^ 


VI 


TREFACE. 


New  York  in  1836,  and  educated  at  Harvard  and 
Columbia  College,  where  he  was  graduated  in  1857. 
He  then  studied  law,  was  admitted  to  the  bar,  and 
began  practice.  In  April,  1861,  he  entered  the  army 
as  captain  in  the  Fifth  Regiment,  New  York  Infantry, 
became  major  of  the  Second  New  York  Cavalry  in 
the  same  year,  and  subsequently  its  colonel.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1863,  he  was  made  a brigadier  general  and 
served  with  distinction  in  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Sheridan,  his  brigade 
being  present  in  all  that  general’s  numerous  battles. 
It  was  chiefly  for  this  reason  that  General  Davies 
was  selected  by  the  editor  of  this  series,  as  the  biog- 
rapher of  the  hero  of  so  many  victories  in  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley  and  elsewhere  in  Virginia.  In  June, 
1865,  Davies  was  made  a major  general  of  volunteers, 
and  commanded  the  Middle  District  of  Alabama  till 
his  resignation,  in  the  following  January,  when  he 
returned  to  New  York  and  resumed  the  practice  of 
law.  He  was  public  administrator  of  New  York  city 
in  i866-’69,  and  assistant  district  attorney  of  the 
southern  district  of  New  York  in  General 

Davies  was  among  the  earliest  members  of  the  mili- 
tary order  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  having  joined  the 
New  York  Commandery  in  1866.  Owing  to  declin- 
ing health  the  General  retired  from  professional  life, 
spending  the  last  few  years  at  his  country  seat  at 
Fishkill-on-the-Hudson,  which  was  also  for  more 
than  a quarter  of  a century  the  summer  home  of  his 
father.  Judge  Davies. 


Editor.] 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

I. — Early  Life. — West  Point. — Service  in  Texas 
AND  Oregon.  1831-1861.  .... 

II. — Staff  Duty. — Colonel  of  Cavalry. — Briga- 
dier General.  1861-1862  . . . , . 

III. — Army  of  the  Ohio. — Perryville. — Murfrees- 

BOROUGH.  1862-1863 

IV.  — Army  of  the  Cumberland. — Chickamauga.  1863 

V. — Ch.attanooga. — Relief  of  Knoxville.  1863  . 

VI. — Army  of  the  Potomac. — Wilderness. — Rich- 
mond.— Cold  Harbor.  1864  .... 

VII.  — The  Trevilian  Expedition.  — Petersburg. — 

Deep  Bottom.  1864 

VIII.  — Valley  of  the  Shenandoah. — Middle  Mili- 

tary Division. — Battle  of  the  Opequan. 

1864 

IX. — Fisher’s  Hill.  — Woodstock  Races.  — Cedar 

Creek.  1864  

X. — Winter  Quarters. — Clearing  the  Valley. — 
Waynesborough. — Return  to  Army  of  the 

PoTOM.AC.  1864-1865 

XL — Dinwiddie  Court  House. — Five  Forks. — Pur- 
suit OF  Lee. — Sailor’s  Creek. — Appomattox. 

— Surrender.  1865  

XII. — Command  of  Louisiana  and  Texas. — Recon- 
struction.— Administration  of  Civil  Af- 
fairs. 1865-1867  

vii 


P.\GE 

I 

17 

32 

52 

71 

89 

120 

133 

167 

199 

216 

252 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER 

XIII.  — Department  of  the  Missouri. — Indian  Cam- 

paign. — Lieutenant  General.  — Franco- 
Prussian  War. — Commander  in  Chief. — 
Death.  1867-1888  ...... 

XIV.  — Character  and  Personal  Traits  . 


PACE 


285 

306 


Index  . 


• 321 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Portrait  of  Philip  H.  Sheridan  . 

FACING 

PAGE 

Frontispiece 

The  Richmond  Raid  . 

io6 

The  Trevillian  Raid 

122 

The  Shenandoah  Valley 

136 

Battlefield  of  Fisher’s  Hill  . 

169 

Battlefield  of  Cedar  Creek,  . 

igo 

Battlefield  of  Sailor’s  Creek  . 

242 

GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


CHAPTER  I. 

EARLY  LIFE. WEST  POINT. — SERVICE  IN  TEXAS 

AND  OREGON. 

The  history  of  Lieutenant-General  Philip  H. 
Sheridan  will  describe  a career  from  first  to  last  ex- 
clusively that  of  a soldier.  When,  upon  the  retire- 
ment of  General  Sherman,  in  1883,  he  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  he 
was  the  first  to  attain  that  rank  whose  whole  life 
had  been  devoted  to  the  profession  of  arms.  Gen- 
eral Scott  and  all  his  predecessors  had  not  been  edu- 
cated as  military  men,  but  were  appointed  to  the 
army  from  civil  life,  having  been  prepared  for,  and 
in  most  instances  been  engaged  actively  in,  other 
pursuits  before  their  entry  into  service. 

McClellan,  Halleck,  Grant,  and  Sherman  were 
educated  at  West  Point,  and  served  in  the  regular 
army  for  periods  varying  from  eleven  to  fifteen 
years,  but,  with  singular  unanimity,  each  resigned 
from  service  almost  immediately  after  obtaining  the 
grade  of  captain,  and  were  all  engaged  in  various 
peaceful  occupations- until  the  outbreak  of  the  civil 
war  afforded  an  opportunity  of  returning  to  the 


2 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


army,  with  rank  much  higher  than  they  could  possi- 
bly have  attained  through  continuous  service.  With 
several  of  them  political  ambition  was  an  important 
and,  in  some  instances,  controlling  element  in  life, 
and  the  bitterest  disappointment  that  Scott  expe- 
rienced during  life  was  his  failure  in  election  to  the 
presidency.  No  feeling  of  this  nature  ever  affected 
or  influenced  General  Sheridan,  and  through  his  life 
his  energies  and  efforts  were  devoted  to  the  faithful 
discharge  of  his  military  duties  and  to  that  purpose 
alone. 

Sheridan  was  appointed  to  the  army  from  the 
State  of  Ohio ; that  circumstance  caused  it  to  be 
generally  believed  that  his  birthplace  was  in  that 
State,  and  for  many  years  this  impression  prevailed. 
His  autobiography,  however,  sets  this  question  at 
rest,  and  from  it  we  learn  that  his  birthplace  was 
Albany,  in  the  State  of  New  York,  where  he  was  born 
on  March  6,  1831.  His  parents  were  natives  of  Ire- 
land, who  had  come  to  this  country  the  previous  year 
in  search  of  a prosperity  they  could  not  hope  for  in 
their  native  land.  After  spending  some  two  years 
in  Albany  the  family  removed  to  Somerset,  in  Perry 
County,  Ohio,  which  from  that  time  was  their  perma- 
nent home. 

The  interesting  details  of  his  early  life  are  fully 
given  in  the  Personal  Memoirs  before  referred  to ; 
and  in  that  work  he  pays  high  tribute  to  the  affec- 
tionate care  and  wise  counsel  he  received  from  his 
mother  during  his  earlier  years.  The  opportunities 
of  obtaining  instruction  in  what  was  then  a remote 
and  partially  settled  country  were  of  course  few,  but 
he  obtained  in  the  village  schools  such  education  as 
could  be  there  afforded,  and  until  the  age  of  four- 


EARLY  LIFE. 


3 


teen  was  occupied  in  the  study  of  history,  geogra- 
phy, arithmetic,  and  grammar.  This,  as  we  are  told 
by  him,  with  the  addition  of  personal  reading  and 
a few  months  of  special  preparation  for  the  Military 
Academy,  was  all  the  education  he  had  received  until 
he  began  his  course  of  study  at  West  Point. 

At  the  age  of  fourteen  years  he  determined  to  do 
something  for  himself  in  life,  and  obtained  employ- 
ment in  one  of  the  village  stores,  and  before  three 
years  had  passed,  after  some  change  in  his  employers, 
was  occupied  as  clerk  and  bookkeeper  in  the  princi- 
pal dry-goods  shop  of  the  place,  at  a salary  which 
affords  good  evidence  of  his  diligence  and  fidelity  to 
duty.  During  these  three  years  the  war  with  Mexico 
occurred,  and  the  accounts  of  battles  and  of  mill- 
tary  adventure  that  then  occupied  the  public  atten- 
tion inspired  him  with  soldierly  ambition  and  a 
resolution  to  secure  if  possible  an  appointment  as 
cadet  at  West  Point,  and  to  follow  through  life  the 
profession  of  arms. 

He  had  the  good  fortune  to  have  some  personal 
acquaintance  with  Mr.  Ritchie,  then  member  of  Con- 
gress representing  the  district  of  which  Perry  County 
is  a part,  and  was  so  well  esteemed  by  that  gentle- 
man that  a personal  application,  unaided  by  friends 
or  political  influence,  secured  him  the  coveted  posi- 
tion, and  he  was  appointed  to  the  class  of  1848. 

Between  the  date  of  his  appointment  and  that 
fixed  for  entering  upon  his  duties  a few  months 
intervened,  and  these  were  passed  in  diligent  study 
to  prepare  for  the  examination  that  should  precede 
his  entrance  to  the  Academy,  and  with  such  success 
that  on  the  ist  day  of  July,  1848,  he  was  admitted 
to  the  Corps  of  Cadets,  in  a class  of  sixty-three 


4 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


members,  many  of  whom  were  in  the  future  to  be- 
come distinguished  officers  of  our  army  during  the 
civil  war. 

Of  his  life  and  studies  at  AVest  Point  there  is  no 
necessity  to  give  a detailed  account  in  these  pages. 
One  incident,  indeed,  did  occur  that  nearly  resulted 
in  closing  the  career  so  auspiciously  begun.  In  con- 
sequence of  an  affray  with  a cadet  his  superior  in 
military  rank,  caused  by  the  overbearing  conduct  of 
the  latter,  he  incurred  the  censure  of  the  authorities 
and  stood  charged  with  a grave  offense.  Fortunately 
his  previous  excellent  record  was  considered  in  im- 
posing a penalty,  and  he  escaped  with  the  compara- 
tively mild  punishment  of  suspension  for  one  year, 
a sentence  which  at  that  time  he  considered  ex- 
tremely harsh,  but  has  since  admitted  to  have  been 
just,  if  not  lenient. 

After  a year  passed  at  his  home  he  returned  to 
AVest  Point  in  August,  1852,  and  joined  the  class  that 
graduated  in  the  following  year,  and  on  the  ist  day 
of  July,  1853,  he  was  graduated  thirty-fifth  in  a class 
of  fifty-two  members,  and  received  his  first  commis- 
sion as  brevet  second  lieutenant  in  the  First  Regi- 
ment of  United  States  Infantry,  which  was  then 
stationed  in  Texas. 

After  a six  months’  tour  of  duty  at  the  recruiting 
rendezvous  at  Newport  barracks,  Kentucky,  Lieu- 
tenant Sheridan  received  orders  in  March,  1854,  to 
report  for  active  service  at  Fort  Duncan,  Texas,  a 
frontier  post  on  the  Rio  Grande  River,  now  known 
as  Eagle  Pass,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
westward  from  the  coast.  A long  and  tedious  jour- 
ney, involving  a voyage  by  steamboat  to  New  Or- 
leans, thence  by  steamer  and  sailing  vessel  to  Corpus 


EARLY  LIFE. 


5 


Christi,  Texas,  and  by  wagon  train  to  Fort  Duncan, 
was  the  route  pursued,  and  he  finally  reported  there 
and  was  assigned  to  duty. 

He  was  soon  ordered  to  an  outpost  camp,  and  the 
first  summer  of  active  service  was  spent  in  scouting, 
mapping  the  country,  and  in  protecting  the  roads 
and  different  stations  from  the  attacks  of  Indians, 
who  at  that  time  were  numerous  and  hostile.  The 
neighboring  Mexican  frontier,  beyond  which,  of 
course,  our  troops  could  not  follow,  gave  these  ene- 
mies a sure  place  of  refuge,  and  in  several  instances 
when  pursued  they  escaped  punishment  by  taking 
flight  into  the  Mexican  territory. 

In  the  winter  his  company  was  recalled  to  P’ort 
Duncan,  and  he  passed  that  season  in  a hut  con- 
structed by  himself  of  poles  covered  with  condemned 
canvas,  which,  however  primitive,  was,  he  says,  more 
comfortable  in  that  season  than  the  tents  in  which 
other  officers  were  lodged.  The  hardships  of  army 
life,  even  in  time  of  peace,  were  in  those  days  actual 
and  real,  and,  from  the  description  he  gives,  life  could 
have  had  but  few  comforts  at  a frontier  post.  Bar- 
racks for  men  and  officers  did  not  exist;  the  ra- 
tions for  all  were  but  salt  pork,  fresh  beef,  flour, 
and  such  game  as  could  be  secured  by  frequent 
hunting  parties;  no  fresh  vegetables  could  be  had, 
and  constant  precautions  had  to  be  taken  to  pre- 
vent scurvy. 

This  life,  with  the  variety  afforded  by  an  occa- 
sional scout  or  a pursuit  of  hostile  Indians,  con- 
tinued until  the  fall  of  1854,  when  his  promotion  to 
the  rank  of  second  lieutenant  in  the  Fourth  Infantry 
relieved  him  from  duty  in  Texas.  His  orders  re- 
quired him  to  join  his  regiment  at  Fort  Reading,  in 


6 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  northern  part  of  California,  and,  strange  as  it 
may  seem  to-day,  the  most  practicable  as  well  as  the 
quickest  route  to  that  point  was  then  by  way  of  New 
York,  thence  by  the  Pacific  mail  steamers  via  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  to  San  Francisco,  and  then  by 
land  to  the  designated  post. 

On  reaching  New  York  he  was  placed  in  charge 
of  a large  party  of  recruits  at  that  post,  and  kept  on 
that  duty  until  July,  1855,  when  he  started  upon 
his  journey  with  this  detachment,  and  in  due  course 
reached  Fort  Reading.  At  this  post  he  was  met  by 
orders  directing  him  to  relieve  the  officer  in  com- 
mand of  a party  of  mounted  troops,  forming  part  of 
an  exploring  expedition  under  Lieutenant  Williamson, 
of  the  United  States  Engineers,  which  was  ordered 
to  survey  and  lay  out  a railway  route  from  Fort 
Reading  northward  to  Portland,  Ore. 

The  expedition  had  started  some  days  before 
Sheridan  reached  his  post,  and  he  had  some  diffi- 
culty in  prevailing  upon  the  commanding  officer  to 
allow  him  to  follow  on  its  trail,  as  the  country  was 
full  of  hostile  Indians,  and  any  small  party  passing 
through  it  incurred  great  danger  of  being  cut  off. 
Leave  to  proceed  was  finally  granted,  and  with  a 
corporal  and  two  privates  he  started  on  horseback 
to  overtake  Lieutenant  Williamson’s  party,  which  he 
reached  on  the  third  day  of  his  march,  after  a narrow 
escape  from  capture  by  a band  of  Indians  that  was 
following  the  expedition.  On  reaching  Williamson’s 
camp  on  August,  4,  1855,  Sheridan  took  command 
of  the  mounted  force  of  the  party,  relieving  Lieu- 
tenant Hood,  since  prominent  as  a lieutenant  gen- 
eral in  the  Confederate  army,  and  may  thus  be  said 
to  have  begun  his  career  as  a cavalry  officer  with  a 


EARLY  LIFE. 


7 

detachment  of  some  fifty  mounted  men  of  the  First 
Dragoons. 

As  he  mentions  in  his  memoir,  he  found  at  first 
some  diffi-culty  in  controlling  the  men  of  this  com- 
mand, which  was  composed  of  small  detachments 
from  different  companies  of  the  regiment,  and  thus 
lacked  the  regular  organization  that  aids  so  much  in 
securing  discipline.  Besides  this,  the  men  did  not 
like  the  change  that  deprived  them  of  an  officer  of 
their  own  regiment,  and  placed  them  under  the  com- 
mand of  one  from  the  infantry,  a feeling  that  is 
natural,  too,  and  well  recognized  by  all  who  have 
been  in  the  mounted  service. 

This  dissatisfaction,  however,  lasted  but  for  a 
brief  period,  and  strict  discipline,  hard  work,  and 
careful  attention  to  the  needs  and  comfort  of  the 
troopers  soon  brought  them  into  excellent  condi- 
tion, and  for  twelve  months  that  they  remained 
under  his  immediate  command  they  were  all  that  the 
most  exacting  officer  could  desire,  and  their  service 
and  good  conduct  have  received  his  high  commen- 
dation. The  expedition  was  unopposed,  and  in  Octo- 
ber reached  Portland,  Ore.,  having  completed  the 
survey  for  which  it  was  designed. 

After  a short  rest  in  camp  at  Fort  Vancouver, 
Lieutenant  Sheridan,  with  his  dragoons,  was  attached 
to  an  expedition  under  the  command  of  Major  Rains 
that  was  intended  to  operate  against  the  Yakima 
Indians,  who  had  attacked  and  defeated  a small 
force  of  United  States  troops  previously  sent  against 
them.  This  expedition  started  from  camp  on  the 
30th  of  October  and  penetrated  as  far  as  the  Yakima 
River,  in  the  Territory  of  Washington,  but  though 
Indians  were  seen  in  numbers,  and  could  have  been 
2 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


successfully  attacked,  the  excessive  caution  and  stra- 
tegic plans  of  the  commanding  officer  prevented  any 
engagement  with  them,  although  he  was  strongly 
urged  by  his  subordinates  on  several  occasions  to 
authorize  attacks  that  had  every  promise  o'f  success. 

This  movement  resulted  in  nothing  but  hardship 
to  the  troops,  who,  after  entering  the  enemy’s  coun- 
try, were  compelled  by  the  advancing  wunter  to  re- 
turn, and  after  a long  and  difficult  marCh,  w'hich  was 
particularly  severe  upon  the  cavalry,  who  were 
obliged  to  break  a road  for  the  infantry  over  moun- 
tain trails  through  snow  often  six  feet  deep,  the  old 
camps  were  reached,  and  no  further  effort  was  made 
until  the  following  spring.  The  successive  failures 
of  our  troops  to  accomplish  anything  against  the 
Indians  had  added  greatly  to  their  audacity  and  en- 
terprise, and  many  other  tribes  had  been  encouraged 
to  join  those  already  hostile,  so  that  the  whole  coun- 
try on  the  Columbia  River  east  of  the  Cascades  was 
in  a state  of  insurrection,  and  a strong  force  of 
troops  and  active  operations  w'ere  required  to  reduce 
it  to  subjection. 

The  Ninth  Infantry,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Wright,  was  ordered  to  Portland,  and  an  expedi- 
tion under  this  officer  proceeded  in  March,  1856,  up 
the  Columbia  River  by  steamer  as  far  as  the  town 
of  Dalles,  whence  it  was  intended  to  begin  operations 
in  the  field.  Sheridan’s  dragoons,  though  intended 
to  form  a part  of  this  force,  had  not  left  their  camp 
at  Fort  Vancouver,  when  a large  band  of  the  hostile 
Indians  made  an  unexpected  attack  on  the  settle- 
ments at  the  Cascades  of  the  Columbia,  midway  be- 
tw'een  Vancouver  and  the  Dalles,  and,  after  killing 
some  of  the  settlers,  besieged  the  survivors  in  a 


EARLY  LIFE. 


9 


blockhouse  that  had  been  built  at  the  Middle  Cas- 
cade, and  the  few  cabins  that  stood  at  the  Upper 
Cascade.  These  defensive  posts  were  successfully 
held,  but  the  landing  at  the  Lower  Cascades  was 
strongly  occupied  by  the  savages,  and  all  communi- 
cation between  the  troops  at  Dalles  and  Fort  Van- 
couver, their  base  of  supplies,  was  prevented. 

Sheridan  was  immediately  ordered  with  his  de- 
tachment of  dragoons — some  forty  effective  men — 
to  proceed  to  the  relief  of  the  blockhouse  at  the 
Middle  Cascade,  and  at  once  prepared  for  the  en- 
terprise. Knowing  that  he  must  meet  an  enemy 
greatly  superior  in  numbers,  he  felt  the  necessity  of 
having  at  least  one  piece  of  artillery  with  his  small 
force;  but  no  cannon  were  to  be  had  at  Vancouver, 
and  he  would  have  been  compelled  to  proceed  with- 
out one,  but  at  the  last  moment  he  recalled  the  fact 
that  the  steamer  which  plied  between  San  Fran- 
cisco and  Portland,  and  which  happened  then  to  be 
at  the  latter  post,  was  provided  with  a small  iron 
gun,  mounted  on  a wooden  platform,  and  used  in 
firing  salutes.  This  he  succeeded  in  borrowing  for 
the  occasion,  and,  luckily  finding  in  the  arsenal  at  the 
fort  a supply  of  solid  shot,  he  started,  with  his  com- 
mand dismounted  and  carried  upon  a steamer,  up  the 
Columbia  River  in  the  early  morning  of  March  27th. 
On  reaching  the  Lower  Cascades — some  thirty-five 
miles  from  Fort  Vancouver — he  disembarked  his  men 
and  gun  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  and  ap- 
proached the  position  occupied  by  the  Indians,  who 
were  in  strong  force  in  his  front  and  intercepting 
his  road  to  the  blockhouse  at  the  Middle  Cascade, 
also  on  the  northern  bank.  A reconnoissance  soon 
showed  that  the  savages  were  too  numerous  and  too 


lO 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Strongly  posted  to  justify  a direct  attack  upon  their 
position,  while  the  repulse  of  an  attack  by  the  In- 
dians, to  which  the  borrowed  gun  gave  great  assist- 
ance, assured  Sheridan  that  he  could  safely  maintain 
his  ground.  The  remainder  of  the  day  was  passed 
in  desultory  skirmishing  with  no  serious  injury  to 
either  party,  and  during  the  night  a new  plan  was 
developed. 

The  steamer  had  returned  to  Vancouver  to  report 
the  condition  of  affairs,  but  left  with  the  detach- 
ment a large  boat  or  bateau,  of  capacity  sufficient 
to  transport  twenty  men  and  the  gun.  An  island  of 
considerable  size  occupied  the  center  of  the  stream 
and  concealed  the  southern  bank  of  the  river  from 
observation  by  the  Indians,  and  it  was  determined 
that  at  dawn  the  command  should  cross  to  the 
southern  bank,  and,  towing  the  boat  along  the  shore 
through  the  rapids,  ascend  the  river  to  a point  where 
it  would  be  possible  to  cross  to  the  blockhouse  at 
the  Middle  Cascade.  In  the  morning  the  crossing 
was  successfully  made  but  on  attempting  to  tow  the 
boat  along  the  bank  the  stream  was  found  so  rapid 
and  the  shore  so  obstructed  with  rocks  that  no 
progress  could  be  made.  The  bank  of  the  island, 
however,  was  observed  to  be  more  practicable,  and 
Sheridan  therefore,  with  the  boat,  his  piece  of  artil- 
lery, and  ten  men,  recrossed  to  its  southern  shore, 
and,  directing  the  remainder  of  his  men  to  march  up 
the  river  bank,  he  proceeded  to  move  forward  with 
the  boat.  In  this  manner,  protected  from  observa- 
tion by  the  island,  the  boat  was  successfully  brought 
through  the  rapids  into  smooth  water,  and,  rejoining 
the  party  marching  on  the  river’s  bank,  the  entire 
command  was  carried  over  to  the  blockhouse  and 


EARLY  LIFE. 


1 1 

posted  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy  that  had  prevented 
their  progress  on  the  previous  day. 

Soon  after  this  a portion  of  Colonel  Wright’s 
force  arrived  from  Dalles,  whence  it  had  marched 
on  learning  of  the  outbreak,  and  an  attack  on  the 
enemy  was  at  once  begun.  Sheridan,  anticipating 
that  the  island  in  the  river  would  be  used  as  a 
refuge  by  those  of  the  hostiles  who  were  river  Indi- 
ans and  provided  with  canoes,  while  the  Yakimas,  if 
they  fled,  would  return  to  their  own  mountains,  sug- 
gested that  he  be  allowed  to  return  to  the  island 
and  act  against  such  of  the  Indians  as  might  seek 
shelter  there.  This  was  ordered,  and  with  his  forty 
men  and  a mountain  howitzer  he  returned  there.  As 
expected,  a large  body  of  the  river  Indians — men, 
women,  and  children — was  found  on  the  island,  and 
they  had  been  so  alarmed  and  demoralized  by  the 
vigorous  movements  of  our  troops  and  the  deser- 
tion of  their  allies,  the  Yakimas,  who  had  abandoned 
them  in  flying  to  the  mountains,  that  they  surren- 
dered without  a contest.  Among  the  warriors  were 
found  many  who  had  taken  an  active  part  in  the 
murder  of  the  settlers,  and  nine  of  the  ringleaders 
were  soon  afterward  hung  for  their  crime. 

This  prompt  and  vigorous  action  against  the 
hostiles  and  the  punishment  that  followed  had  the 
effect  of  breaking  up  the  confederation  of  the  Indi- 
ans, and  no  further  conflicts  occurred,  though  a por- 
tion of  our  troops  were  for  some  time  occupied  in 
pursuing  an(;J  reducing  to  submission  those  who  had 
been  engaged  in  the  outbreak.  For  his  services  in 
this  affair  Lieutenant  Sheridan  was  specially  men- 
tioned for  gallantry  by  General  Scott  in  orders  from 
Headquarters  of  the  Army. 


12 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


In  the  latter  part  of  April,  1856,  Sheridan  was  or- 
dered with  his  dragoons  to  the  Coast  Indian  Reser- 
vation, near  Dayton,  in  Yam  Hill  County,  Oregon,  to 
establish  a post  and  control  the  Indians,  some  fif- 
teen hundred,  there  collected.  A small  force  of  in- 
fantry was  already  on  the  ground,  and,  as  the  only 
commissioned  officer,  Sheridan  took  command.  He 
devoted  himself  to  the  work  of  putting  up  the  build- 
ings required  for  the  post,  providing  for  his  troops, 
and  guarding  and  keeping  in  order  the  Indians  in 
his  charge,  and  for  some  months  acted  as  comman- 
dant, quartermaster,  and  commissary. 

He  was  relieved  of  the  first  of  these  duties  in 
July  by  the  arrival  at  the  post  of  Captain  D.  A. 
Russell,  Fourth  Infantry,  who  had  been  assigned  to 
the  command,  and  about  this  time  was  deprived  of 
his  detachment  of  dragoons,  which  was  returned  to 
its  own  regiment.  He  has  paid  a high  tribute  of 
praise  to  their  efficient  and  faithful  service,  and 
parted  with  them  with  a regret  that  was  mutual,  lit- 
tle thinking,  as  he  says  in  the  Personal  Memoirs,  that 
in  the  course  of  a few  years  it  would  be  his  fortune 
to  have  another  cavalry  command,  that  in  num- 
bers would  far  exceed  the  then  existing  army  of  the 
United  States.  The  remainder  of  his  service  on  the 
Pacific  coast  was  not  marked  by  events  of  any  strik- 
ing interest,  but  is  a record  of  faithful  and  active 
work  in  many  departments  of  military  duty,  and  is 
remarkable  for  one  fact : that  though  holding  only 
the  rank  of  a second  lieutenant,  Sheridan  was  for 
the  greater  part  of  the  time  exercising  independent 
commands. 

Acting  as  a quartermaster,  he  built  posts  and 
blockhouses  and  laid  out  and  constructed  roads  ; 


EARLY  LIFE. 


13 


as  a commissary  he  was  called  on  to  distribute  to 
troops  and  large  bodies  of  reservation  Indians  sup- 
plies of  every  description  ; and,  as  the  commanding 
officer  of-  small  but  important  posts,  to  preserve  dis- 
cipline among  his  soldiers,  to  keep  in  subjection  and 
under  control  large  numbers  of  recently  hostile  Indi- 
ans, and  frequently  to  repress  and  punish  attempted 
outbreaks  among  them. 

All  these  varied  duties  were  thoroughly  per- 
formed, and,  as  the  records  show,  in  a manner  that 
was  satisfactory  to  his  superior  officers  and  that  de- 
served and  secured  their  approval.  This  life  contin- 
ued until  the  outbreak  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion 
and  the  changes  that  were  caused  by  the  removal  of 
troops  to  the  scene  of  conflict,  the  large  increase  of 
the  regular  army,  and  consequent  promotions  of  offi- 
cers then  in  the  service.  The  Fourth  Infantry  was 
soon  ordered  to  the  East,  and  with  it  went  Sheridan’s 
company,  but  he  was  left  at  Fort  Yam  Hill,  the  post 
he  had  last  occupied,  with  orders  to  remain  until  re- 
lieved by  an  officer  of  the  Ninth  Regiment  of  In- 
fantry, whose  company  was  to  take  the  place  of  the 
former  garrison. 

Having  learned,  however,  that  this  officer  had 
declared  his  sympathy  with  those  engaged  in  rebel- 
lion, and  satisfied  by  his  conduct  on  reaching  the 
post  that  no  confidence  could  be  placed  in  his  loyal- 
ty, Sheridan  refused  to  surrender  to  him  the  com- 
mand, and  continued  in  charge  until  another  officer 
arrived,  by  whom,  on  the  ist  of  September,  1861, 
he  was  relieved,  and,  to  his  great  satisfaction,  en- 
abled to  proceed  to  the  seat  of  war. 

Before  this  date  a large  addition  to  the  regular 
army  had  been  made.  To  fill  vacancies  in  the  new 


14 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


regiments,  rapid  promotions  among  the  officers  al- 
ready in  service  had  occurred,  and  since  April  Sheri- 
dan had  risen  from  second  lieutenant  to  the  rank 
of  captain  of  the  Thirteenth  Infantry,  an  advance- 
ment that  a year  before  could  hardly  have  been 
gained  by  fifteen  years,  of  continuous  service. 

He  was  ordered  to  join  his  new  regiment,  the 
headquarters  of  which  were  at  Jefferson  Barracks, 
near  St.  Louis,  and  on  leaving  his  post  he  went  as 
rapidly  as  possible  through  San  Francisco  and  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  to  New  York,  and  thence  to  St. 
Louis,  stopping  on  the  way  for  twenty  hours  at  his 
home  in  Ohio,  which  he  had  not  visited  since  the 
year  of  his  graduation  in  1855. 

What  has  been  written  completes  the  record  of 
the  service  of  General  Sheridan  in  the  army  previous 
to  his  taking  part  in  the  great  war,  in  which  he  won 
such  high  distinction  ; and,  while  in  contrast  to  fur- 
ther and  far  more  illustrious  actions  of  his,  it  may 
be  thought  that  too  much  time  and  space  has  been 
devoted  to  a narrative  of  service  and  conduct  in 
themselves  of  no  great  import  or  worthy  of  especial 
mention,  this  relation  is  of  value  as  showing  the 
training  his  mind  had  received  in  early  days,  and  the 
development  of  the  qualities  that  particularly  dis- 
tinguished him  as  a great  commander,  while  by  far 
the  youngest  among  those  who  stood  in  the  first 
rank  of  our  leaders. 

The  title  of  veteran  is  an  honorable  one  for  a 
soldier  to  bear,  and  it  is  well  recognized  that  experi- 
ence is  a necessity  to  fit  an  officer  for  the  arduous 
duties  of  a high  command,  but  from  many  disastrous 
lessons  that  were  given  to  our  people  in  the  course 
of  the  civil  war  it  was  learned  that  neither  continu- 


EARLY  LIFE. 


15 


ous  service  nor  long  experience  will  of  itself  de- 
velop an  enterprising,  active,  and  successful  leader. 
On  the  contrary,  bitter  experience  during  the  course 
of  that  war  showed  that  the  officer  who  after  many 
long  years  of  instruction  and  discipline  under  capa- 
ble superiors  had  become  an  efficient  subordinate 
and  able  to  perform  with  credit  the  duties  of  such  a 
position,  often  became,  when  thrown  upon  his  own 
resources  and  called  to  exercise  a command  of  great 
responsibility,  inactive  and  distrustful  of  his  own 
powers.  He  felt  the  want  of  the  immediate  and  di- 
recting authority  to  which  the  habits  of  a lifetime 
had  accustomed  him,  and  was  unable  to  act  with 
vigor  in  affairs  which  demanded  personal  responsi- 
bility and  where  success  depended  on  his  own  in- 
tensity and  force.  It  is  needless  here  to  refer  to 
many  instances  when  officers  of  this  class  placed  in 
high  commands  were  remarkable  for  nothing  intense 
but  inactivity,  and  from  whom  no  movement  or  ac- 
tion could  be  obtained  unless  they  were  spurred  for- 
ward by  the  peremptory  orders  of  a distant  and 
often  misinformed  superior,  or  forced  to  do  some- 
thing for  their  own  protection  by  the  vigorous  at- 
tacks of  an  alert  and  enterprising  enemy. 

The  experience  of  General  Sheridan,  though  of 
course  upon  a limited  scale,  was  large  if  not  long. 
He  had  been  under  fire,  had  commanded  cavalry 
and  infantry,  and  knew  from  actual  observation 
what  could  be  done  with  artillery  in  action ; he  had 
served  as  a quartermaster  and  commissary,  and  was 
thus  familiar  with  the  details  of  furnishing  all  needed 
supplies  to  troops,  and,  while  he  had  never  had  at 
any  time  but  a few  soldiers  under  his  orders,  the 
duty  of  controlling  and  keeping  in  subjection  large 


1 6 GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 

bodies  of  Indians  on  the  different  reservations  in 
his  charge  had  assisted  much  in  giving  him  the 
habit  of  command,  and  of  impressing  the  force  of 
his  own  personality  upon  those  over  whom  he  was 
placed.  It  will  also  be  seen  that  during  these  years 
of  preparation  for  the  greater  efforts  of  his  life  he 
was  generally  in  an  independent  command,  and  for 
whatever  action  he  undertook  obliged  of  necessity 
to  rely  upon  his  personal  judgment  and  his  own 
opinion  of  what  was  best  to  be  done  in  any  existing 
emergency. 


CHAPTER  II. 


STAFF  DUTY. — COLONEL  OF  CAVALRY. — BRIGADIER 
GENERAL. 

The  Thirteenth  Infantry,  to  which  Sheridan  had 
been  promoted,  was  at  the  time  of  his  arrival  at 
headquarters  but  partially  organized,  and  there  was 
little  prospect  of  its  being  soon  ready  to  take  the 
field,  as  the  heavy  calls  for  volunteer  troops  had 
rendered  recruiting  for  the  regular  service  a tedious 
task.  Soon  after  Sheridan’s  arrival  at  Jefferson  Bar- 
racks he  was  selected  by  General  Halleck,  then  in 
chief  command  in  St.  Louis,  as  the  president  of  a 
board  of  officers  whose  duty  it  was  to  audit  the 
confused  mass  of  accounts  and  claims  for  quarter- 
masters’ and  subsistence  supplies  that  had  accumu- 
lated under  the  loose  administration  of  General 
Fremont,  and  had  been  left  to  his  successor  for 
adjustment.  To  a young  and  ardent  soldier  whose 
instincts  and  desires  prompted  him  most  strongly  to 
seek  service  in  the  field,  a duty  of  this  nature  was 
not  very  acceptable,  but,  being  in  the  regular  course 
of  service,  it  was  undertaken  and  thoroughly  per- 
formed. In  this  he  was  engaged  until  December 
26,  1861,  when  he  was  assigned  to  duty  as  Chief 
Commissary  of  the  Army  of  Southwest  Missouri, 
then  at  Rolla,  Mo.,  and  being  organized  for  the 

17 


i8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


campaign  that  was  successfully  closed  by  the  battle 
of  Pea  Ridge. 

With  his  innate  desire  to  accomplish  successfully 
whatever  work  was  intrusted  to  his  charge,  and 
knowing  that  the  army  to  which  he  was  assigned 
would  be  compelled  to  live  off  the  country,  he  fore- 
saw that,  unless  he  had  control  of  the  transportation 
of  subsistence,  there  would  be  great  difficulty  in 
properly  feeding  the  troops;  he  therefore  applied  to 
be  also  assigned  as  chief  quartermaster,  a request 
that  after  explanation  was  granted.  His  duties  in 
this  double  capacity  were  severe,  involving  as  they 
did  not  only  the  supply  of  the  daily  wants  of  an 
army  of  thirteen  thousand  men,  but  the  organization 
on  a systematic  basis  of  arming  troops  in  which  at 
that  time  but  little  discipline  existed  of  a practical 
military  method. 

With  great  difficulty,  and  in  the  face  of  strong 
opposition,  he  at  last  succeeded,  and  secured  suffi- 
cient transportation  for  his  supplies,  and  established 
the  means  of  procuring  and  distributing  them.  To 
feed  the  troops  both  in  camp  and  on  the  march  it 
was  needed  to  collect  beef,  cattle,  and  grain  from 
the  surrounding  country,  and  to  take  possession  of, 
put  in  order,  and  operate  abandoned  mills.  All  this 
work  was  performed,  and  the  army  was  amply  sup- 
plied during  the  march  to  and  the  successful  action 
at  Pea  Ridge,  Ark.,  on  the  5th  of  March,  1862. 

A few  days  after  this  action  differences  that  had 
arisen  between  himself  and  General  Curtis — arising 
from  complaints  of  subordinate  officers,  to  whom 
strict  discipline  and  rigid  accountability  were  dis- 
tasteful— resulted  in  his  application  to  be  relieved, 
and  he  reported  again  to  General  Halleck,  feeling. 


STAFF  DUTY. 


19 


as  he  has  said,  somewhat  discouraged  by  the  uncer- 
tainty of  his  future,  but  found  occupation  for  a few 
weeks  in  another  detail — the  purchase  of  horses  in 
the  Northwest. 

Knowing  that  this  was  but  a temporary  duty,  and 
reluctant  to  be  sent  to  his  regiment,  which  was  still 
recruiting  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  he  made  an  earnest 
application  for  assignment  to  any  duty  that  would 
take  him  into  the  field ; and  shortly  after  the  battle 
of  Shiloh  he  was  ordered  to  report  for  staff  duty  to 
General  Halleck,  who  was  then  cautiously  advanc- 
ing toward  Corinth. 

This  did  not  meet  his  wishes,  but  was  a step  in 
advance,  as  it  at  least  placed  him  in  the  front  and 
nearer  the  scene  of  active  operations.  Nor  were  his 
duties  after  reporting  more  suited  to  his  desire  for 
military  employment,  as  the  first  work  placed  in  his 
charge  was  that  of  building  roads  and  bringing  up 
the  supply  trains  to  the  army  ; and  this  was  followed 
by  an  appointment  as  quartermaster  to  the  head- 
quarters of  General  Halleck.  These  duties  were 
trying  and  laborious,  and  his  best  efforts  in  them 
could  promise  nothing  of  promotion  or  distinction, 
yet  he  discharged  them  with  ability  and  zeal,  at  the 
same  time  anxiously  looking  forward  for  some  better 
opportunity  to  arise. 

At  last,  and  most  unexpectedly  to  him,  the  long- 
desired  opportunity  for  active  service  occurred  ; on 
the  27th  of  May,  1862,  he  was  offered  the  com- 
mand of  a regiment  of  cavalry,  and  his  career  as  a 
leader  in  the  army  of  the  Union  began.  The  Second 
Regiment  of  Michigan  Cavalry,  which  was  in  the 
army  commanded  by  General  Halleck,  had  lost  its 
colonel,  and  had  become  somewhat  demoralized 


20 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


from  dissensions  between  the  officers  and  sickness 
among  the  men.  The  Governor  of  the  State  had  de- 
termined that  the  best  way  to  restore  it  to  efficiency 
would  be  by  the  appointment  of  a stranger,  and,  if 
possible,  a regular  officer,  to  the  command,  who,  un- 
influenced by  any  personal  feeling  and  having  had 
no  part  in  previous  difficulties,  could  exercise  an  im- 
partial authority  and  restore  good  discipline. 

By  whom  the  suggestion  was  made  of  Captain 
Sheridan  as  a suitable  officer  for  this  purpose  is  not 
known,  but  on  the  day  referred  to  two  officers  of 
this  regiment  rode  up  to  the  headquarters  where 
Sheridan  was  on  duty  and  handed  him  a telegraphic 
order  from  the  Governor  of  Michigan,  announcing 
his  appointment  as  colonel  of  the  Second  Michigan 
Cavalry,  and  containing  instructions  for  him  to  im- 
mediately assume  command.  Thus  surprisingly  was 
the  career  he  had  so  long  looked  forward  to  opened 
before  him;  but  even  then,  when  his  foot  might  be 
said  to  be  in  the  stirrup,  an  obstacle  was  presented. 

On  applying  to  General  Halleck  for  leave  to 
accept  the  position  so  unexpectedly  offered,  that 
officer,  possibly  from  an  unwillingness  to  lose  an 
efficient  quartermaster  who  had  contributed  much 
to  his  personal  comfort,  and  also,  doubtless,  from  his 
natural  reluctance  to  do  anything  when  a negative 
line  of  conduct  was  open  to  him,  expressed  himself 
as  unwilling  to  allow  acceptance  of  the  appointment 
until  the  consent  of  the  War  Department  could  be 
obtained. 

As  in'  those  days  the  policy  of  this  department 
was  strongly  opposed  to  the  appointment  of  officers 
in  the  regular  service  to  volunteer  commands,  there 
was  slight  prospect  of  such  an  application  being 


COLONEL  OF  CAVALRY. 


21 


approved,  and  it  seemed  at  first  as  if  the  proffered 
promotion  mast  be  declined.  However,  after  a con- 
sultation with  the  officers  who  had  brought  the  order 
of  appointment,  in  which  the  present  condition  of  the 
regiment  was  explained  and  the  pressing  need  of  a 
capable  commanding  officer  shown,  the  application 
to  General  Halleck  was  renewed  and  the  reasons 
given,  with  the  expression  of  Sheridan’s  earnest  de- 
sire for  active  service,  he  at  length  succeeded  in  pro- 
curing permission  to  accept  the  offered  commission. 
That  same  day  he  turned  over  the  property  for 
which  he  was  responsible  to  his  successor,  and  no 
duty  in  which  he  had  been  engaged  had  ever  been 
performed  with  more  alacrity  than  this  last  official 
act,  which  closed  his  service  as  a staff  officer. 

At  eight  o’clock  that  night  he  appeared  at  the  i 
camp  of  his  regiment,  which  he  found  under  arms 
and  preparing  to  start  out  on  an  expedition,  and  he  I 
had  but  time  to  meet  the  officers  and  assume  com- 
mand when  the  trumpets  sounded  “To  horse,’’  and 
he  led  out  his  men,  whom  he  had  not  had  the  oppor- 
tunity yet  to  see.  Reporting  his  regiment  to  the 
brigade  commander  as  ready  for  duty,  he  set  out  on 
the  march  confidently  and  cheerily. 

He  has  told  us  of  the  manner  in  which  he  started, 
utterly  unprovided,  on  this  his  first  expedition,  with 
personal  equipment,  and  wearing  his  uniform  as  a 
captain  of  infantry,  to  which,  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  his  new  commission,  he  had  added  in  haste 
the  shoulder  straps  of  a colonel  of  cavalry,  loaned 
him  by  an  obliging  friend,  and  for  sole  provision  a 
small  haversack  tied  to  his  saddle,  containing  somm 
coffee,  sugar,  bacon,  and  hard  bread.  At  this  time 
and  under  these  circumstances  he  may  be  said  to 


22 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


have  first  entered  on  the  path  that  led  to  the  highest 
military  rank  that  his  country  could  offer. 

The  war  had  continued  for  more  than  a year  be- 
fore the  opportunity  of  active  service  and  of  exer- 
cising even  the  lowest  command  was  presented,  and 
that  year  had  been  passed  in  hard  and  distasteful 
work,  which,  though  important,  afforded  no  prospect 
of  distinction  and  no  fitting  employment  for  the 
abilities  he  possessed. 

The  officers  with  whom  he  was  now  to  serve  and 
with  whom  he  was  to  be  compared  had  profited  by 
the  active  service  in  which  they  had  been  engaged 
and  the  experience  they  had  acquired,  and  all  of  any 
prominence  with  whom  he  was  now  to  compete,  and 
many  of  whom  he  was  subsequently  to  command, 
were  his  superiors  in  rank. 

The  expedition  on  which  Colonel  Sheridan  so  has- 
tily set  out  was  ordered  to  march  to  the  south  of 
Corinth  and  destroy,  as  far  as  practicable,  the  rail- 
roads and  rolling  stock  that  might  be  of  use  to  the 
Confederate  troops  in  the  retreat  that  it  was  now 
known  they  intended  to  make.  The  force  consisted 
of  a small  brigade  of  cavalry  commanded  by  Colonel 
Elliott  and  comprised  but  two  regiments — that  of 
Sheridan  and  the  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry  ; and  while  the 
duty  to  which  it  was  assigned  was  thoroughly  per- 
formed, there  was  not  much  of  interest  that  requires 
description.  Making  a wide  circuit  to  the  eastward 
of  Corinth,  the  railroad  running  south  from  that 
point  was  reached,  after  a rapid  march  of  some 
sixty  miles,  at  Booneville,  twenty-two  miles  south  of 
Corinth,  and  a small  force  of  the  enemy  was  easily 
driven  away  from  the  road.  A large  section  of  the 
railroad  was  torn  up  and  the  rails  heated  and  bent 


COLONEL  OF  CAVALRY. 


23 


SO  they  could  not  be  relaid,  and  the  Confederates 
were  thus  deprived  of  the  use  of  the  road  in  their 
retreat  from  Corinth.  While  this  work  was  pro- 
gressing it  was  learned  from  prisoners  that  the 
evacuation  of  Corinth  had  already  begun,  and  as  at 
any  time  the  small  force  engaged  might  encounter 
some  of  the  retreating  columns  of  the  enemy,  it  be- 
came necessary  to  abandon  the  work  in  hand. 
Twenty-six  cars,  containing  arms,  ammunition,  and 
clothing,  were  intercepted  at  the  break  in  the  road 
and  destroyed  with  their  contents.  Several  thousand 
prisoners  had  been  taken,  consisting  mainly  of  the 
stragglers  and  the  sick  and  wounded,  who  are  always 
found  in  the  rear  of  an  advancing  army  and  in  the 
front  of  one  that  is  retreating;  but  these  had  to  be 
abandoned,  as  there  was  no  means  of  bringing  them 
into  our  lines  by  the  route  that  must  be  taken  to 
return  to  Halleck’s  command. 

The  troops,  by  another  circuit  around  the  main 
force  of  the  enemy,  returned  to  their  old  camp,  hav- 
ing marched  in  all  about  one  hundred  and  eighty 
miles  in  four  days,  and  though  engaged  in  frequent 
skirmishes  had  sustained  but  slight  loss.  Here  it 
was  learned  that  Corinth  had  been,  as  was  supposed, 
evacuated,  and  after  one  night’s  rest  the  brigade  was 
ordered  to  the  front  to  take  part  in  the  pursuit  of 
the  retreating  army. 

This  operation,  if  it  had  been  conducted  with  en- 
ergy and  skill,  would  have  inflicted  great  loss  upon 
the  enemy  at  a time  when  their  troops  were  much 
disheartened  and  almost  destitute  of  supplies,  but  no 
effort  was  made  to  press  the  enemy  heavily  or  to 
bring  on  an  engagement,  and  all  that  occurred  in  the 
course  of  the  retreat  were  a few  slight  and  unpro- 
3 


24 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ductive  skirmishes  between  the  extreme  advances  of 
the  cavalry  and  the  enemy’s  rear  guards.  Some  strag- 
glers, wounded,  and  deserters,  nearly  all  of  whom 
came  of  their  own  accord  within  our  lines,  were  the 
sole  results  of  what  should  have  been  a serious  and 
important  operation,  and  the  enemy  escaped,  suffer- 
ing no  real  loss  other  than  that  caused  by  the  de- 
struction of  his  cars  and  supplies  at  Booneville  by 
Colonel  Elliott’s  brigade  of  two  regiments.  Promo- 
tion, when  it  once  began,  was  not  slow,  and  on  June 
nth  the  removal  of  Colonel  Elliott  to  other  duties 
was  the  cause  of  placing  Sheridan  in  command  of  the 
brigade,  and  also  giving  him  the  opportunity  of 
knowing  his  men  and  officers  and  preparing  them 
for  future  efforts. 

Throughout  his  military  life  a marked  feature  of 
his  record  in  the  many  commands  he  held  was  the 
confidence  and  trust  reposed  in  him  by  all  who  served 
under  him,  and  the  cheerful  and  prompt  obedience 
that  his  every  order  received.  The  importance  of 
this  feeling  among  troops  he  well  understood,  and  at 
this  period,  and  after,  he  always  sought  to  inspire 
and  maintain  it,  and  the  manner  in  which  this  was 
regarded  by  him  and  the  methods  by  which  he  en- 
deavored to  secure  it  are  well  worthy  of  note,  and 
not  only  present  ideas  that,  acted  on,  contributed 
much  to  his  own  success,  but  furnish  a valuable  les- 
son to  others  who  may  follow  the  profession  of  arms. 

His  Personal  Memoirs,  in  the  portion  that  relates 
to  this  his  first  command,  describes  his  thoughts 
upon  this  subject  and  the  means  adopted  to  this  end, 
and  well  deserves  quotation  : “Although  but  a few 
days  had  elapsed  from  the  date  of  my  appointment 
as  colonel  of  the  Second  Michigan  to  that  of  succeed- 


COLONEL  OF  CAVALRY. 


25 


ing  to  the  command  of  the  brigade,  I believe  I can 
say  with  propriety  that  I had  firmly  established  my- 
self in  the  confidence  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
regiment,-  and  won  their  regard  by  thoughtful  care. 
I had  striven  unceasingly  to  have  them  well  fed  and 
well  clothed,  had  personally  looked  after  the  selec- 
tion of  their  camps,  and  had  maintained  such  a dis- 
cipline as  to  allay  former  irritation. 

“ Men  who  march,  scout,  and  fight,  and  suffer  all 
the  hardships  that  fall  to  the  lot  of  soldiers  in  the 
field,  in  order  to  do  vigorous  w'ork  must  have  the 
best  bodily  sustenance  and  every  comfort  that  can 
be  provided.  I knew,  from  practical  experience  on 
the  frontier,  that  my  efforts  in  this  direction  would 
not  only  be  appreciated,  but  requited  by  personal 
affection  and  gratitude,  and,  further,  that  such  exer- 
tions would  bring  the  best  results  to  me.  Whenever 
my  authority  would  permit  I saved  my  command 
from  needless  sacrifices  and  unnecessary  toil;  there- 
fore, when  hard  or  daring  work  was  to  be  done,  I 
expected  the  heartiest  response  and  always  got  it. 
Soldiers  are  averse  to  seeing  their  comrades  killed 
without  compensating  results,  and  none  realize  more 
quickly  than  they  the  blundering  that  often  takes 
place  on  the  field  of  battle.  They  want  some  tangible 
indemnity  for  the  loss  of  life,  and  as  victory  is  an 
offset,  the  value  of  which  is  manifest,  it  not  only 
makes  them  content  to  shed  their  blood,  but  also 
furnishes  evidence  of  capacity  in  those  who  command 
them.  My  regiment  had  lost  very  few  men  since  com- 
ing under  my  command,  but  it  seemed  in  the  eyes  of 
all  who  belonged  to  it  that  casualties  to  the  enemy, 
and  some  slight  successes  for  us,  had  repaid  every 
sacrifice,  and  in  consequence  I had  gained  not  only 


26 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


their  confidence  as  soldiers,  but  also  their  esteem  and 
love  as  men,  and  to  a degree  far  beyond  what  I then 
realized.” 

Toward  the  end  of  June  he  was  ordered  with  the 
brigade  to  occupy  a position  at  Booneville,  the  scene 
of  his  previous  capture  of  the  enemy’s  trains,  and  to 
cover  the  front  of  the  main  army,  which  was  some 
twenty  miles  in  his  rear.  Appreciating  the  exposed 
and  dangerous  position  occupied  by  his  small  force, 
which  in  all  did  not  exceed  nine  hundred  men,  the 
surrounding  country  was  thoroughly  scouted,  and  he 
utilized  the  instruction  in  drawing  that  the  Military 
Academy  had  furnished  to  prepare  a map  of  the  dis- 
trict around  his  camp  that  gave  details  of  all  feat- 
ures that  would  be  useful  for  attack  or  defense,  and 
of  all  the  approaches  by  which  an  enemy  could  gain 
access  to  his  position.  His  position  was  hazardous, 
as  he  was  entirely  without  support,  and  many  miles 
from  any  point  from  which  a re-enforcement  could 
be  hoped,  and  indications  were  frequent  that  the 
enemy  was  intending  a renewal  of  offensive  opera- 
tions, and  the  event  soon  showed  the  necessity  of 
his  precautions  and  the  value  of  the  preparation  for 
defense  that  he  had  made. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  July  ist  a large  cavalry 
force  advanced  on  Booneville  from  the  westward 
and  struck  Sheridan’s  picket  at  a point  some  three 
and  a half  miles  from  the  camp.  The  outpost  was 
not  surprised,  but  by  overpowering  numbers  was 
forced  back  slowly  while  skirmishing  in  every  avail- 
able position,  until  a point  was  reached  where  a de- 
fensive line  could  be  formed,  and  was  there  met  by 
the  greater  part  of  the  brigade,  which  had  been 
moved  out  from  camp  to  meet  the  enemy.  Two 


COLONEL  OF  CAVALRY. 


27 


direct  attacks  were  repulsed,  and  the  enemy  began 
then  to  take  advantage  of  his  great  superiority  of 
numbers,  making  a flanking  movement  to  our  left 
which,  when  developed,  would  have  exposed  the 
camp  and  trains  and  have  compelled  a retreat 
with  the  loss  of  many  supplies,  and  which  could 
only  be  successfully  prevented  by  a vigorous  offen- 
sive movement. 

In  the  examination  of  the  country  that  had  been 
made  a circuitous  wood  road  had  been  discovered 
that  led  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy’s  position,  and 
Sheridan  at  once  determined  to  send  a mounted  de- 
tachment by  this  path  to  make  an  attack  in  rear, 
while  with  the  main  body  of  his  troops  he  would  at 
the  same  time  advance  with  the  whole  force  at  his 
disposal.  An  hour  was  allowed  for  the  movement 
to  the  rear  to  be  made,  and  during  that  time  the 
enemy  was  held  in  check  by  hard  fighting.  The 
small  force  of  four  companies  sent  to  the  rear  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  the  designated  point,  and  cap- 
tured the  Confederate  headquarters,  following  this 
success  with  a determined  charge  upon  the  rear  of 
the  enemy’s  column.  At  the  same  time  a strong  at- 
tack was  made  from  the  front,  and  as  this  was  com- 
menced, by  a happy  chance,  a locomotive  with  some 
cars  loaded  with  forage  came  into  Booneville  from 
the  depot  at  Corinth.  The  engineer  was  ordered  to 
make  a liberal  use  of  his  whistle,  and  the  impression 
was  given  both  to  our  troops  and,  the  enem}^  that 
trains  were  arriving  with  re-enforcements.  Surprised 
by  the  attack  in  rear  and  heavily  pressed  in  front  by 
what  was  believed  to  be  a much  superior  force,  the 
enemy  soon  gave  way,  and  in  a short  time  his  force 
was  entirely  broken  up  and  flying  over  the  country 


28 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


in  all  directions,  pursued  by  our  troops  for  four 
miles,  and  until  night  prevented  further  movement. 
Sheridan’s  force  engaged  in  this  action  was  in  all 
but  eight  hundred  and  twenty-seven  men,  while  that 
of  the  enemy  was  at  the  least  five  thousand. 

This  victory  was  the  more  gratifying  to  the  suc- 
cessful leader  of  our  troops,  as  when  he  applied  early 
in  the  day  to  his  immediate  superior  for  re  enforce- 
ments he  had  received  instructions  to  retire  from 
Booneville  without  risking  an  engagement  and  de- 
vote all  effort  to  the  saving  of  his  transportation. 
For  his  conduct  and  that  of  his  men  in  this  engage- 
ment he  was  thanked  in  general  orders  by  General 
Rosecrans,  then  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  a successful  skirmish  at  Rienzi  and  an 
important  and  successful  expedition  into  the  enemy’s 
lines  in  search  of  information  during  the  month  of 
July  added  to  his  growing  reputation  as  an  enter- 
prising and  successful  officer;  and  so  well  during  his 
brief  term  of  command  had  he  merited  and  obtained 
the  confidence  of  his  superiors  that  on  July  30, 1862, 
the  following  telegram  was  sent  to  the  Headquarters 
of  the  Army  : 


“Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Mississippi, 
July  JO,  1862. 

“Major-General  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

“ Brigadiers  scarce.  Good  ones  scarcer.  As- 
both  goes  on  the  month’s  leave  you  gave  him  ten 
months  since.  Granger  has  temporary  command. 
The  undersigned  respectfully  beg  that  you  will  ob- 
tain the  promotion  of  Sheridan.  He  is  worth  his 
weight  in  gold.  His  Ripley  expedition  has  brought 
us  captured  letters  of  immense  value,  as  well  as  pris- 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL. 


29 

oners,  showing  the  rebel  plans  and  dispositions,  as 
you  will  learn  from  District  Commander — 

“ W.  S.  Rosecrans,  Brigadier  General. 

“ C.  C.  Sullivan,  Brigadier  General. 

“ G.  Granger,  Brigadier  General. 

“ W.  L.  Elliott,  Brigadier  General. 

“ A.  Asboth,  Brigadier  General.” 

The  records  of  our  armies  show  no  other  instance 
of  so  cordial  and  earnest  a recommendation  of  an 
officer  for  promotion  made  by  those  under  whom  he 
had  served,  and  whose  disinterested  opinions  were 
given  unasked  and  solely  for  the  advantage  of  the 
public  service,  and  such  a request  is  the  best  possible 
commendation  of  the  value  of  Sheridan's  service  in 
this  army.  During  the  period  referred  to,  the  Army 
of  the  Mississippi,  the  headquarters  of  which  had 
been  at  Corinth,  was  being  rapidly  dispersed,  and  the 
enemy  had  reorganized  and  equipped  their  armies  at 
the  West. 

While  our  Army  of  the  Ohio,  under  General  Buell, 
was  slowly  making  its  way  eastward  to  Chattanooga, 
the  Confederate  General  Bragg  had  collected  an 
army  of  sufficient  strength  to  justify  an  effort  to 
obtain  possession  of  Middle  Tennessee  and  Ken- 
tucky, and  w’as  marching  rapidly  toward  the  Ohio 
River  with  the  hope  of  striking  first  at  Louisville, 
and,  if  successful,  to  follow  up  the  blow  by  an  attack 
on  Cincinnati.  To  defend  these  threatened  points 
required  the  concentration  of  a large  force  in  his 
front,  and  while  in  the  eastward  of  his  line  of  march 
Buell  was  pressing  toward  Louisville  by  forced 
marches,  large  detachments  of  troops  were  taken 
from  our  Western  armies  and  ordered  to  that  place. 


30 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Sheridan  was  placed  in  command  of  a force  com- 
prising his  own  regiment,  four  others  of  infantry, 
and  a battery  of  artiller}^  and  was  ordered  to  pro- 
ceed at  once  to  Louisville  or  Cincinnati,  as  necessity 
might  require.  He  marched  with  his  troops  to 
Corinth,  September  6th,  and,  going  by  railroad  to 
Columbus,  Ky.,  embarked  his  command  on  steamers 
and  proceeded  up  the  Ohio  River  until  within  a short 
distance  of  Cincinnati,  when  he  was  ordered  to  re- 
turn to  Louisville  and,  retaining  command  of  his 
infantry  and  such  other  troops  as  might  be  sent  to 
him,  to  report  for  orders  to  General  Nelson,  then  in 
command  of  that  city.  On  reporting  at  Louisville, 
which  he  reached  on  the  14th  of  September,  he  was 
ordered  to  encamp  his  troops  south  of  the  city,  and 
at  the  same  time  received  the  news  that  he  had  been 
appointed  a brigadier  general  of  volunteers,  with 
rank  from  July  i,  1862,  the  date  of  the  battle  of 
Booneville. 

While  in  camp  near  Louisville  his  force  was  in- 
creased by  the  addition  of  eight  recently  organized 
regiments  of  infantry  and  a second  battery  of  artil- 
lery, and  his  regiment  of  cavalry  was  detached  and 
sent  to  a cavalry  division,  a separation  that  was  un- 
avoidable, but  which  caused  a sorrowful  parting  be- 
tween the  troops  which  had  formed  his  first  active 
command  and  with  whom  his  first  success  had  been 
obtained,  and  a leader  whom  they  loved  and  hon- 
ored. The  exigencies  of  an  active  campaign  leave 
little  time  for  the  indulgence  of  sentiment  and  re- 
flection, and  the  equipment,  drill,  and  discipline  of 
the  large  number  of  untrained  troops  now  in  the 
command  required  the  utmost  efforts  of  their  chief. 
Events  moved  rapidly,  and  on  the  25th  of  September 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL. 


31 


General  Buell  with  his  army  reached  Louisville,  a 
winner  in  the  long  and  hotly  contested  race  between 
himself  and  Bragg,  and,  being  then  strongly  re-en- 
forced, vvas  able  to  act  offensively  against  his  com- 
petitor. The  troops  already  at  Louisville  were  im- 
mediately incorporated  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
and  the  force  under  General  Sheridan  was  desig- 
nated as  the  Eleventh  Division  of  that  army,  to  the 
command  of  which  he  was  assigned  four  months 
from  the  date  of  his  appointment  as  a colonel. 


CHAPTER  III. 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. — PERRYVILLE. — MURFREES- 
BOROUGH. 

The  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  under 
General  Buell  exhibit  evidence  of  deficiencies  in  or- 
ganization, discipline,  and  leadership,  and  nothing  can 
go  further  to  show  this  than  the  record  of  the  con- 
nection with  these  operations  of  Captain  Charles  C. 
Gilbert,  First  United  States  Infantry,  who  at  the 
battle  of  Perryville  commanded  the  Third  Corps  of 
the  army.  In  the  summer  of  1862  General  Nelson 
was  from  illness  or  wounds  incapacitated  for  active 
duty  in  command  of  the  troops  collecting  at  Louis- 
ville, and  on  the  application  of  two  officers  of  his 
force,  who  were  next  to  him  in  rank,  and  who  dis- 
trusted their  own  ability  to  exercise  a high  com- 
mand, Major-General  Wright,  then  commanding  the 
department,  issued  on  September  ist  an  extraor- 
dinary general  order  in  which  it  was  announced 
that  “ Captain  C.  C.  Gilbert,  First  Infantry,  U.  S.  A., 
is  hereby  appointed  a major  general  of  volunteers, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  is  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  Kentucky  during  the  temporary  ab- 
sence of  Major-General  Nelson.”  It  appears  now 
hardly  credible,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a fact,  that  in 

32 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


33 


consequence  of  this  authorization,  Captain  Gilbert 
assumed  for  himself  the  uniform  and  rank  of  a 
major  general,  and  with  perfect  gravity  and  self- 
assurance  took  possession  of  General  Nelson’s  va- 
cant command,  which  he  held  for  some  ten  days  or 
two  weeks,  until  relieved  by  the  return  of  that  offi- 
cer to  duty. 

He  apparently  did  not  consider  that  relief  from 
duty  deprived  him  of  the  exalted  rank  to  which  the 
order  of  General  Wright  and  his  own  assumption 
had  raised  him,  and  remained  at  Louisville  for  some 
time  without  active  duty,  appearing  as  an  officer  of 
the  rank  he  claimed  to  hold,  and  signing  official 
documents  with  that  title.  That  he  could  not  have 
been  long  self-deceived  as  to  his  actual  position  in 
the  service  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  on  the  9th 
of  September  he  was  actually  and  legally  appointed 
by  the  President  as  a brigadier  general  of  volun- 
teers, and  a few  days  after  was  as  such,  in  orders  of 
Headquarters  of  the  Army,  ordered  to  report  for 
duty  to  General  Wright  at  Cincinnati.  He  appears 
to  have  been  reluctant,  however,  to  voluntarily  re- 
linquish his  high  estate,  and  upon  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was,  as  a major  gen- 
eral, assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Third  Army 
Corps,  in  which  Sheridan’s  division  was  included, 
and  actually  commanded  that  corps  until  after  the 
battle  of  Perryville,  recognized  as  a major  general 
by  all  interested,  and  signing  himself  officially  by  his 
supposed  rank,  while  at  the  time  a brigadier  general 
only,  and  junior  in  rank  to  five  officers  of  that  grade, 
who  were  placed  under  his  command. 

General  Buell,  in  the  proceedings  of  the  court  of 
inquiry  that  subsequently  investigated  the  conduct 


34 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


of  this  campaign,  admitted  his  responsibility  for  the 
selection  of  this  corps  commander,  which  he  excused 
by  the  existing  need  of  an  officer  of  high  rank  for 
that  position,  and  his  belief  that  General  Gilbert  was 
entitled  to  the  rank  he  had  assumed,  stating  also 
that  as  soon  as  the  facts  were  known  to  him  he  im- 
mediately relieved  him  from  command.  General 
Gilbert’s  career  as  a general  officer,  it  may  be  added, 
was  brief ; the  Senate  having  failed  to  confirm  his 
appointment  as  brigadier  general,  he  was,  in  March, 
1863,  returned  to  his  former  position  in  the  service 
as  a captain  of  infantry. 

Such  was  Sheridan’s  immediate  superior  at  this 
period,  and  under  his  command  he  marched  from 
Louisville  on  October  ist,  when  the  army  moved  to 
meet  the  Confederate  forces  under  General  Bragg, 
who  was  then  believed  to  be  at  Bardstown,  Ky. 
From  this  place  Bragg  withdrew  as  our  troops  ad- 
vanced, but  was  finally  overtaken  at  Perryville,  some 
sixty  miles  southeast  of  Louisville,  which  our  army 
reached  on  the  night  of  October  7th,  after  a slow 
and  tedious  march. 

The  plans  of  the  general  in  command  of  our 
army  were  to  engage  the  enemy  on  the  9th  after 
spending  the  preceding  day  in  advantageously  dis- 
posing his  troops,  but  these  were  frustrated  by  the 
enemy,  who  preferred  to  do  his  fighting  on  the  8th. 
During  the  night  of  the  7th  Sheridan,  who  with  his 
division  formed  the  advance  of  Gilbert’s  corps,  was 
directed  to  push  forward  a portion  of  his  command 
beyond  a small  stream  in  his  front,  called  Doctor’s 
Creek,  possession  of  which  was  required  to  provide 
the  troops  with  water,  for  the  want  of  which  the 
men  were  suffering  greatly. 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


35 


At  dayliglit  on  the  8th,  with  a brigade  and  a bat- 
tery, he  moved  over  the  stream,  driving  off  with 
slight  skirmishing  the  enemy  there  posted,  but  found 
the  ground  could  not  be  held  unless  a range  of  hills 
called  Chaplin  Heights,  still  farther  to  the  front,  was 
occupied.  Bringing  up  the  other  two  brigades  of 
the  division,  two  were  placed  in  line,  and  by  a sharp 
attack  these  heights  were  carried  and  a good  posi- 
tion well  to  the  front  secured,  which  was  immedi- 
ately intrenched  with  a strong  line  of  rifle  pits.  An 
advance  of  one  brigade  still  farther  to  the  front 
developed  the  enemy  in  strong  form  and  evidently 
preparing  for  an  attack  upon  our  lines,  and  the 
advanced  brigade  was  withdrawn  within  the  in- 
trenched line. 

During  the  skirmishing  caused  by  these  move- 
ments he  was  frequently  cautioned  by  signals  from 
his  corps  commander  not  to  bring  on  an  engage- 
ment— an  instruction  often  received  in  the  early 
part  of  the  war  by  energetic  officers  from  superiors 
profoundly  learned  in  strategy — to  which  he  con- 
stantly replied  that  while  he  was  not  bringing  on  an 
engagement,,  the  enemy  evidently  intended  so  to  do, 
and  that  an  attack  in  heavy  force  was  to  be  expected. 
This  condition  of  affairs  in  Sheridan’s  front  contin- 
ued until  about  noon,  when  from  the  high  ground  he 
occupied  he  could  see  on  his  left  the  First  Corps, 
commanded  by  General  A.  McD.  McCook,  advanc- 
ing in  such  form  that  it  appeared  to  be  ignorant  of 
the  strong  force  of  the  enemy  in  our  front. 

An  attempt  was  made  to  inform  them  of  the 
situation  by  signals,  but  this  did  not  succeed,  and  a 
sudden  assault  upon  the  advancing  troops  threw 
them  into  confusion  and  pushed  them  back  a con- 


36 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


siderable  distance,  inflicting  such  loss  of  men  and 
guns  that  the  corps  was  unable  to  resume  the  of- 
fensive during  the  day.  It  was,  however,  soon  re- 
formed in  a defensive  position,  and  during  the  re- 
mainder of  the  day  successfully  resisted  further 
attacks,  which  continued  until  four  in  the  afternoon. 
To  relieve  the  pressure  on  General  McCook’s  front, 
Sheridan  advanced  a battery  and  six  regiments  to 
his  own  left,  which  by  an  enfilading  fire  on  the 
enemy  caused  considerable  loss  and  successfully 
L checked  his  advance. 

This  led  to  an  attack  on  Sheridan’s  front  by  two 
batteries  and  a large  body  of  infantry,  that  caused 
him  to  again  withdraw  his  line  within  the  intrench- 
ments  that  had  been  prudently  constructed  in  the 
' earlier  part  of  the  day,  the  value  of  which  was  now 
evident.  The  Confederates  made  a bold  assault, 
though  exposed  to  the  canister  firing  of  two  bat- 
teries and  the  musketry  of  the  whole  division,  and 
almost  reached  our  lines. 

Our  firing  was,  however,  too  heavy  to  be  re- 
sisted, and  they  were  obliged  to  fall  back.  Sheridan, 
who  by  this  time  had  been  re-enforced  by  a brigade 
from  another  division  of  the  Third  Corps,  immedi- 
ately advanced  and  drove  the  enemy  back  to  Perry- 
ville,  and  again  obtained  a favorable  position  to 
I'  establish  his  batteries  and  use  them  against  the  force 
engaged  with  General  McCook.  This  attack  in  flank 
and  the  stout  resistance  of  McCook’s  troops  were 
more  than  the  enemy  could  support,  and  he  shortly 
withdrew  from  the  field,  the  engagement  ending  at 
ab'out  four  in  the  afternoon. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Perryville,  in  which 
Sheridan  had  been  engaged  more  or  less  actively 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


37 


through  the  day,  and  McCook’s  corps  had  struggled 
against  superior  numbers  and  in  a hotly  contested 
fight  for  over  four  hours.  No  troops  but  these  and 
one  other  brigade  of  the  Third  Corps  took  any  ac- 
tive part  in  the  engagement,  and  not  until  the  ac- 
tion was  over  was  it  known  to  the  greater  part  of 
the  army,  then  fifty-eight  thousand  strong,  or  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  commanding  general,  that  a 
battle  was  going  on  which  seriously  imperiled  the 
safety  of  the  whole  command  and  resulted  in  a loss 
of  forty-five  hundred  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  following  day  the  whole  army  was  placed 
in  position  for  a general  engagement,  but  the  Con- 
federate commander,  who  preferred  to  select  his 
own  time  and  place  for  action,  and  who  by  his  at- 
. tacks  on  the  8th  had  gained  the  object  he  desired 
of  checking  the  pursuit,  quietly  withdrew  his  army 
beyond  the  Cumberland  River  and  moved  into  Ten- 
nessee unmolested  by  any  pursuit  in  force. 

An  interesting  personal  incident  of  this  campaign 
is  that  during  its  progress  General  Sheridan  met,  for 
the  first  time  since  the  dispute  that  caused  his  sus- 
pension at  West  Point,  his  old  antagonist,  who,  as  a 
general  officer,  commanded  a brigade  in  the  First 
Corps.  He  made  overtures  for  a reconciliation, 
which  were  properly  accepted,  but  the  renewed 
friendship  lasted  but  a few  days,  as  General  Terrill 
was  among  those  who  fell  at  Perryville. 

After  a few  days  passed  in  slowly  following  the 
enemy  on  his  retreat  the  army  was  marched  to  Bowl- 
ing Green,  Ky.,  thence  to  proceed  to  Nashville. 
Sheridan  reached  Bowling  Green  November  ist, 
with  his  force  much  reduced  by  the  losses  at  Perry- 
ville and  by  sickness  and  the  fatigues  of  marching. 


38 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


He  had  left  Louisville  on  the  ist  of  October  with 
twelve  regiments  of  infantry  and  two  batteries,  and 
while  his  casualties  in  the  battle  were  not  heavy, 
being  in  all  some  three  hundred  and  fifty,  his  in- 
fantry, and  especially  the  eight  regiments  which  had 
just  been  raised  and  were  entirely  unseasoned  to 
active  service,  suffered  greatly  from  fatigue,  the  dis- 
eases resulting  from  insufficient  rations,  and  the 
heat,  dust,  and  drought  that  prevailed  to  a distress- 
ing extent  throughout  these  movements,  and  more 
than  one  third  had  been  left  in  roadside  hospitals  or 
were  disabled. 

General  Buell  was  relieved  from  command  at 
Bowling  Green  and  succeeded  by  General  Rosecrans, 
and  this  army  was  thereafter  officially  known  as  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  which  title  it  retained  un- 
til the  end  of  the  war.  The  movements  of  the  enemy 
indicating  that  his  next  objective  point  would  be 
Nashville,  the  army  was  ordered  to  that  point  and 
so  placed  as  to  protect  the  city,  and  for  nearly  two 
months  no  movements  of  importance  were  made; 
in  this  interval  a reorganization  of  the  troops  was 
made,  and  Sheridan’s  division  was  from  that  time 
known  as  the  Third  Division  Right  Wing,  and  placed 
under  the  immediate  command  of  General  A.  McD. 
McCook,  to  whom  he  had  furnished  assistance  at 
the  battle  of  Perryville,  and,  as  before,  contained 
three  brigades,  each  of  four  regiments,  and  a third 
battery  was  added  to  the  two  originally  with  the 
division. 

The  period  of  rest  from  active  work  that  now 
occurred  gave  opportunity,  which  was  fully  improved, 
for  drilling,  disciplining,  and  training  to  service  in 
the  field  the  men  of  the  division,  the  larger  part  of 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


39 

whom  had  been  brought  to  the  army  directly  from 
their  recruiting  camps  wholly  uninstructed. 

The  method  pursued  was  one  of  unremitting 
work,  and  its  value  can  be  estimated  from  Sheridan’s 
own  words,  in  which  he  describes  the  duties  he  ex- 
acted and  the  labors  performed  : “ Drills,  parades, 
scouts,  foraging  expeditions,  picket  and  guard  duty 
made  up  the  course  in  this  school  of  instruction, 
supplemented  by  frequent  changes  in  the  locations 
of  the  different  brigades,  so  that  the  division  could 
have  opportunity  to  learn  to  break  camp  quickly  and 
to  move  out  promptly  on  the  march.  Foraging  ex- 
peditions rvere  particularly  beneficial  in  this  respect, 
and  when  sent  out,  though  absent  sometimes  for 
days,  the  men  went  without  tents  or  knapsacks, 
equipped  with  only  one  blanket  and  their  arms,  am- 
munition, and  rations,  to  teach  them  to.  shift  for 
themselves  with  slender  means  in  the  event  of  neces- 
sity. The  number  of  regimental  and  headquarters 
wagons  was  cut  down  to  the  lowest  possible  figure, 
and  everything  made  compact  by  turning  into  the 
supply  and  ammunition  trains  all  surplus  transporta- 
tion and  restricting  the  personal  baggage  of  officers 
to  the  fewest  effects  possible.” 

While  thus  actively  employed.  General  Sheridan 
also  undertook  and  perfected  a systematic  method 
of  obtaining  information  through  scouts  of  the 
movements,  positions,  and  forces  of  the  enemy,  and 
of  the  topography  of  the  country  in  which  his  troops 
would  be  called  upon  to  act;  and  throughout  his 
future  career  in  the  civil  war  he  never  ceased  to  seek 
by  every  means  in  his  power  information  of  this  nature 
— an  effort  in  which,  by  constant  endeavor  and  good 
judgment  in  the  selection  of  agents,  he  rarely  failed. 

4 


40 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


At  this  time  he  selected  for  such  duty  a loyal 
man  from  East  Tennessee,  James  Card,  who  volun- 
teered his  services,  and  was  employed  as  a scout  and 
guide  during  the  whole  period  of  General  Sheridan’s 
service  in  Tennessee.  This  man,  who  had  been  a 
colporteur  of  religious  books  and  occasionally  a local 
preacher,  had  traveled  extensively  through  the  State 
and  was  familiar  with  the  country,  the  roads,  and  the 
inhabitants,  and  his  occupation  gave  him  great  facili- 
ties for  traveling  unsuspected  in  any  part  of  the 
region  where  he  was  known. 

By  this  man,  aided  by  two  of  his  brothers,  who 
were  engaged  for  the  same  work,  information  was 
soon  obtained  of  the  positions  occupied  by  the  dif- 
ferent divisions  of  the  Confederate  army  that  were 
within  the  State  of  Tennessee,  and  of  their  strength 
and  condition,  which  were  accurate  and  proved  to  be 
of  value  in  the  course  of  future  operations. 

Until  December  26th  no  movement  of  importance 
occurred,  and  on  that  day  the  whole  army  marched 
southeastwardly  from  Nashville  in  the  direction  of 
Murfreesborough,  about  thirty  miles  distant,  where 
the  enemy  was  preparing  to  go  into  winter  quarters. 
The  advance  toward  this  place  was  made  with  but 
slight  opposition  from  the  enemy  until  on  the  30th 
our  troops  approached  Stone  River,  a stream  im- 
mediately in  front  of  the  town,  and  the  name  of 
which  is  used  in  the  Confederate  reports  as  desig- 
nating the  battle  which  here  took  place.  The  Con- 
federate troops  were  found  in  an  intrenched  position 
in  advance  of  this  stream,  with  their  front  protected 
by  a picket  line  so  strong  as  to  require  the  deploy- 
ment of  our  columns  ; and  Sheridan,  who  had  the  ad- 
vance of  General  McCook’s  command  and  had  been 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


41 


since  early  morning  driving  back  the  skirmishers  of 
the  enemy,  was  ordered  to  form  line  of  battle  and 
act  in  concert  with  the  division  of  General  Davis, 
which  would  be  formed  upon  his  right,  in  an  attack 
upon  a heavy  belt  of  timber  in  the  front,  which  was 
occupied  by  and  afforded  protection  to  the  enemy’s 
skirmishers.  The  formation  being  completed,  the 
t-wo  divisions  moved  forward  to  the  attack,  inclining 
their  front  to  the  left  as  they  advanced. 

The  movement  began  about  half  past  two  in 
the  afternoon  and  met  with  a stubborn  resistance 
from  the  enemy,  who  opposed  it  with  a considerable 
force  of  infantry  and  a battery  of  artillery,  which 
was  silenced  and  driven  off  the  field  by  the  guns  of 
Sheridan’s  division. 

By  sundown  the  desired  point  was  gained,  and 
McCook’s  lines  were  established  in  the  positions 
they  occupied  during  the  early  part  of  the  battle  of 
the  following  day,  and  in  close  proximity  to  those  of 
the  enemy.  Sheridan,  who  held  the  left  of  McCook’s 
line,  was  facing  nearly  east,  the  right  of  his  di- 
vision occupying  the  timber  which  had  been  gained. 
Davis’s  division  was  posted  to  his  right,  his  troops 
thrown  somewhat  to  the  rear,  forming  nearly  a right 
angle  with  those  of  Sheridan,  and  the  right  division, 
that  of  Johnson,  which  formed  the  extreme  right  of 
our  army,  next  to  Davis  and  somewhat  advanced 
to  the  front. 

The  other  portions  of  the  army,  the  center,  com- 
manded by  General  Thomas,  and  the  left  wing  by 
General  Crittenden,  were  on  the  left  , of  that  of 
McCook,  Thomas  being  in  the  center,  and  the 
whole  army  had  been  thus  formed  in  position  for 
battle,  according  to  the  plans  of  the  command- 


42 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ing  general,  successfully  and  without  very  serious 
opposition. 

It  appears  from  the  report  of  General  Rosecrans 
that  a meeting  of  the  corps  commanders  was  held 
that  night  at  his  headquarters,  and  his  instructions 
for  the  action  of  the  next  day  given,  which  were 
that  McCook  was  to  occupy  the  best  defensive  posi- 
tion he  could  take,  refusing  his  right  as  much  as 
practicable,  and  act  on  the  defensive  against  any 
attack  if  one  should  be  made;  and  if  an  attack  were 
not  made,  then  to  attack  himself  with  strength  suffi- 
cient to  hold  in  his  front  such  part  of  the  enemy’s 
force  as  might  be  opposed  to  him.  The  other 
corps  were  to  act  vigorously  on  the  offensive,  and,  as 
they  were  superior  in  force  to  the  enemy  opposed  to 
them  on  this  part  of  the  line,  there  was  every  pros- 
pect of  success. 

It  was  explained  that  this  combination  required 
for  its  success  that  General  McCook  should  be  able 
to  hold  his  position  for  three  hours,  and  that  if 
necessary  to  recede  he  should  fall  back  slowly  and 
steadily,  refusing  his  right,  while  active  and  offensive 
movements  were  being  made  by  the  center  and  left. 
General  McCook,  who  knew  the  ground  from  pre- 
vious experience,  expressed  himself  as  able  to  hold 
his  present  position  for  three  hours,  but  General 
Rosecrans,  with  excellent  judgment,  criticised  the 
line  he  held  as  facing  too  much  to  the  east,  and 
advised  him  to  change  it  if  he  did  not  consider  it 
the  best  that  could  be  obtained,  and  again  reminded 
him  that  it  was  only  necessary  for  him  to  make 
things  sure.  General  McCook  did  not,  however, 
make  any  change  in  this  disposition  of  his  troops, 
which  General  Rosecrans  thought  and  General  Bragg 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


43 


knew  to  be  faulty  and  greatly  exposed,  and  which 
was  most  probably  the  cause  of  the  great  loss  and 
undecided  result  of  the  battle. 

General  Bragg  was  also  during  this  night  forming 
his  plan  of  battle,  and  this  was  precisely  the  converse 
of  his  opponent.  His  object  was,  if  a victory  could 
be  gained,  the  capture  of  Nashville,  and  to  effect  this 
our  army  must  be  driven  to  the  eastward  to  leave 
the  way  clear  for  his  advance.  He  therefore  also 
determined  to  attack  vigorously  with  his  left,  and  use 
all  his  strength  upon  our  right,  while  keeping  his 
own  strictly  on  the  defensive,  and  ordered  the  move- 
ment to  begin  an  hour  earlier  than  that  at  which 
General  Rosecrans  had  ordered  his  advance. 

General  Sheridan,  who  knew  that  on  the  next 
morning  he  would  be  engaged  in  a desperate  con- 
flict, was  engaged  through  the  night  in  examining 
hi£  position,  placing  his  troops  to  the  best  advan- 
tage, and  closely  observing  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  About  two  in  the  morning,  from  reports  he 
received  of  the  continuous  movement  of  infantry  and 
artillery  within  the  Confederate  lines,  he  was  con- 
vinced that  Bragg  was  massing  on  our  right,  with 
the  purpose  of  attacking  early  in  the  morning.  These 
reports  and  his  own  conclusions  were  to  him  of  so 
much  importance  that  he  went  in  person  to  General 
McCook  and  gave  the  information  he  had  received 
and  the  impression  it  had  made  upon  him. 

That  officer  did  not  seem  to  regard  these  matters 
as  of  much  consequence,  and  after  some  discussion 
concluded  that,  in  view  of  the  defensive  part  he  was  to 
take  in  the  coming  engagement,  there  was  no  neces- 
sity of  any  change  in  the  dispositions  he  had  made. 
He  appeared  confident  that  Johnson’s  division  could 


44 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


protect  his  right,  and  that  the  attack  to  be  made  by 
our  left  would  prevent  any  such  movement  by  the 
enemy  as  had  been  suggested.  This  indifference  of 
his  superior  did  not  relieve  Sheridan  from  anxiety, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  induced  him  to  take  additional 
precautions,  and  after  he  had  returned  to  his  troops 
he  sent  additional  supports  to  the  brigade  that  formed 
the  front  of  his  line  of  battle,  and  prepared  for  im- 
mediate action.  Before  dawn  his  men  had  break- 
fasted and  were  under  arms  and  in  line  of  battle, 
the  guns  in  position  and  cannoneers  at  their  pieces, 
and  all  prepared  for  the  attack  that  was  anticipated, 
and  it  was  well  for  our  army  on  that  day  that  this 
vigilance  had  been  exercised  by  one  of  the  com- 
manders of  the  right  wing. 

Shortly  after  daylight,  and  before  the  movement 
of  our  left  had  begun.  General  Hardee,  with  four 
divisions  of  Confederate  troops,  opened  the  engage- 
ment, as  had  been  predicted,  by  a fierce  attack  on 
Johnson’s  division,  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union 
line,  which  was  not  even  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy, 
one  brigade  not  being  in  line,  the  batteries  not  posted, 
while  the  division  commander  was  at  his  headquar- 
ters, a mile  and  a half  in  rear  of  his  men.  The  divi- 
sion attacked  made  as  good  defense  as  under  such 
circumstances  could  be  expected,  but  was  soon  broken 
up  and  driven  from  the  field  with  heavy  loss  in  men 
and  artillery. 

The  Confederate  troops,  swinging  to  the  right, 
then  rushed  upon  the  division  of  General  Davis, 
and  also  attacked  the  leading  brigade  of  General 
Sheridan,  commanded  by  General  Sill.  This  attack 
was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  but  the  enemy  reformed 
his  lines  and,  being  re-enforced,  again  pressed  for- 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


45 


ward,  and  was  again  driven  back  by  the  heavy  fire 
of  our  troops,  which  at  this  time  was  very  severe, 
Sheridan  having  concentrated  upon  the  assailants  the 
fire  of  his  three  batteries  and  of  his  division  at  short 
range.  The  enemy  for  a time  withstood  the  fire  and 
advanced  within  fifty  yards  of  our  lines,  but  at  that 
distance  wavered,  halted,  and  then  fell  back.  Gen- 
eral Sill’s  brigade  at  once  charged  and  drove  them 
across  the  open  ground  and  into  their  intrenchments. 
In  this  charge,  to  the  sorrow  of  his  commanding  offi- 
cer and  of  his  troops.  General  Sill  was  killed.  He 
was  a friend  and  classmate  of  his  division  commander, 
and  had  been  but  a month  with  the  division,  falling 
in  the  first  action  in  which  he  had  acted  with  it. 

For  an  hour  the  enemy  made  no  further  move- 
ment, and  the  brigade  which  had  so  bravely  charged 
was  drawn  back  to  its  original  position  and  prepara- 
tions made  to  meet  a further  assault,  which  evidently 
would  soon  be  made. 

By  this  time  nothing  remained  of  the  two  divisions 
that  had  in  the  morning  stood  upon  Sheridan’s  right 
but  one  brigade,  and  when  the  expected  attack  was 
made,  though  it  was  repulsed  and  driven  back  in 
front  of  the  center  of  Sheridan’s  division,  this  brigade 
on  his  right  was  driven  from  the  field,  and  with  it 
two  regiments  on  the  right  of  the  division,  which 
were  rallied  on  the  reserve  that  had  been  placed  in 
Sill’s  rear  before  daylight. 

The  troops  on  the  right  being  driven  from  the 
field  and  closely  pursued  by  the  enemy,  whose  col- 
umns, as  they  advanced,  were  constantly  bearing  to 
the  right  on  a line  that  would  soon  bring  them  in 
his  rear,  Sheridan  saw  that  an  immediate  change  of 
his  position  was  demanded,  and,  covering  the  with- 


46 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


drawal  of  his  troops  with  a charge  by  one  of  his  bri- 
gades, which  successfully  checked  and  for  the  time 
held  the  advancing  enemy,  he  moved  to  the  right  and 
rear  and  placed  his  command  at  nearly  a right  angle 
to  the  line  first  held  and  facing  southward,  forming 
it  with  the  center  projecting  toward  the  enemy,  and 
his  batteries  occupying  high  ground  immediately  in 
the  rear  of  the  center. 

This  new  position  was  for  some  time  held,  but  the 
Confederate  troops  continued  the  extension  and  ad- 
vance of  their  turning  movement,  and  it  was  evident 
that  our  right  would  be  soon  again  attacked  in  flank 
by  an  overwhelming  force.  Orders  were  received 
from  General  McCook  to  again  change  position,  and 
the  division,  marching  by  the  left  flank  under  a heavy 
fire,  took  up  new  ground  and  was  reformed,  the  left 
brigade  communicating  with  Negley’s  division  of  the 
center,  and  facing  to  the  south,  in  front  and  within 
range  of  the  enemy’s  intrenched  lines,  while  the 
other  two  brigades  in  the  right  were  formed  facing 
westward,  and  opposing  the  enemy  that  had  success- 
fully driven  from  the  field  the  two  divisions  that 
early  in  the  day  formed  the  extreme  right. 

This  formation  was  but  just  completed  when  the 
whole  front  of  the  division  was  simultaneously  at- 
tacked by  a force  of  three  of  the  enemy’s  divisions 
and  the  heaviest  contest  of  the  day  occurred.  The 
opposing  lines  were  close,  little  more  than  two  hun- 
dred yards  intervening,  and  on  both  sides  great  losses 
were  sustained  by  artillery  fire,  especially  by  the 
enemy,  whose  advancing  masses  moved  constantly 
exposed  to  volleys  of  shell  and  canister  from  our 
guns  ; and  though  at  this  time  General  Hardee,  who 
commanded  the  Confederate  attack,  had  under  his 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


47 


orders  two  fifths  of  Bragg’s  army,  he  could  make  no 
impression  upon  the  divisions  of  Sheridan  and  Neg- 
ley,  that  now  formed  the  right  of  our  army. 

As  the  enemy  fell  back  from  the  first  assault  a 
message  from  General  Rosecrans  was  received  stat- 
ing that  he  was  making  the  new  dispositions  that 
were  required  to  meet  the  unexpected  movements  of 
the  enemy,  and  that  the  position  now  occupied  must 
under  any  hazards  be  maintained  until  his  new  lines 
were  formed.  From  this  it  appeared  that  the  sacri- 
fice of  the  whole  command  might  be  required  to  in- 
sure the  safety  of  the  remainder  of  the  army  ; but 
officers  and  men  were  determined  to  do  their  duty  to 
the  utmost,  and,  having  so  far  successfully  resisted 
every  attack,  had  confidence  in  their  leader  and  them- 
selves. Though  they  had  lost  heavily  they  knew 
they  had  inflicted  more  serious  injury  on  their  foes, 
and  the  only  cause  of  doubt  in  finally  maintaining 
their  ground  arose  from  the  want  of  ammunition, 
which  was  now  beginning  to  be  scarce,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  order  the  troops  to  use  the  utmost  cau- 
tion in  expending  what  remained. 

A second  and  third  assault  followed,  which  were 
as  vigorously  pressed  as  the  first.  Both  were  de- 
feated and  driven  back,  but  with  terrible  loss  to  our 
troops.  In  these  Colonel  Roberts,  who  commanded 
the  Third  Brigade,  was  killed,  and  Colonel  Harring- 
ton, who  succeeded  him  in  command,  was  a few  mo- 
ments afterward  mortally  wounded. 

After  the  third  assault  the  enemy  appeared  satis- 
fied that  the  position  could  not  be  carried,  and  for  a 
time  there  was  no  movement  in  the  lines.  Examina- 
tion showed  that,  with  the  exception  of  a few  rounds 
in  one  brigade,  the  ammunition  had  been  entirely 


48 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


exhausted,  and  there  was  little  hope  of  further  suc- 
cessful resistance,  but  fortunately  at  this  juncture 
the  new  lines  of  the  army  had  been  established,  and 
Sheridan  was  permitted  to  withdraw  his  division. 
\ In  this  long  and  desperate  struggle  he  had  lost  one 
third  of  his  command  in  killed  and  wounded,  among 
whom  were  to  be  counted  three  brigade  command- 
ers, and  the  greater  part  of  his  artillery  horses  had 
/ been  killed  or  disabled.  The  guns  of  one  battery,  in 
which  eighty  horses  had  been  lost,  were  left  on  the 
field,  the  ground  being  so  difficult  that  it  was  impos- 
sible to  draw  them  off  by  hand,  and  for  the  same 
reasons  two  guns  of  another  battery  were  left  be- 
hind. The  remainder,  though  almost  unprovided 
with  horses,  were  saved  by  the  exertions  of  the  men. 

The  division,  with  unbroken  formation,  retired 
under  a heavy  fire,  though  not  actively  pursued, 
and  fell  back  behind  that  portion  of  the  new  line 
that  had  been  formed  to  the  right  and  rear.  Here  a 
supply  of  ammunition  was  procured,  and,  after  some 
unimportant  movements  of  detachments,  Sheridan 
was  ordered  to  move  to  the  left  and  relieve  the 
division  of  General  Wood,  that  was  engaged  with  a 
heavy  force  of  the  enemy.  Moving  as  directed,  he 
found  that  officer  resisting  a strong  attack  along  his 
whole  front,  and  under  a heavy  artillery  fire  formed 
line  on  his  right  and  attacked  vigorously.  This 
re-enforcement  seemed  to  dishearten  the  enemy, 
who  soon  abandoned  his  attack  on  Wood’s  front 
and  retired,  after  causing  some  loss  to  our  troops. 
Among  those  who  fell  at  this  point  was  Colonel 
Schaefer,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade,  who  was 
instantly  killed — the  fourth  brigade  commander  in 
the  division  who  lost  his  life  on  that  day.  Falling 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


49 


back  from  this  position  for  a short  distance  to  take 
position  in  the  formation  of  the  new  lines,  Sheridan 
received  orders  from  General  Rosecrans  to  prepare 
to  make  a charge  in  the  event  of  a further  attack 
by  the  enemy,  and  therefore  massed  his  men  in  close 
column,  and,  ordering  them  to  lie  down,  remained 
for  more  than  an  hour  exposed  to  a heavy  cannon- 
ade that  caused  great  loss. 

No  further  engagement  occurred  during  the  short 
remainder  of  the  day,  and  at  night  the  division  with- 
drew and  took  up  a position  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Nashville  turnpike,  some  four  miles  north  of  Mur- 
freesborough,  where  it  formed  the  right  of  the  new 
line  established  by  General  Rosecrans. 

At  nightfall  th^  labors  of  the  day  were  ended 
for  this  division,  and  its  commander  for  the  first 
time  during  the  engagement  had  the  opportunity  of 
learning  the  extent  of  his  loss  and  the  service  that 
had  been  performed.  The  day  had  been  one  of  great 
responsibility,  constant  anxiety,  and  unremitting  ex- 
ertion, and  while  he  could  not  but  be  satisfied  with 
the  conduct  of  his  troops  and  the  success  that  had 
attended  the  operations  of  his  individual  command 
the  heavy  loss  that  had  thinned  his  ranks  and  the 
unfavorable  result  of  the  movements  of  the  army 
were  sufficient  causes  of  sorrow  and  disappointment. 
Seldom,  if  ever,  do  we  find  a record  of  more  gallant 
conduct  and  unyielding  tenacity  by  any  body  of 
troops  than  was  presented  by  this  division  during 
the  long  hours  of  this  day.  In  a combat  commenc- 
ing at  dawn  and  lasting  until  night,  it  was  continu- 
ously under  fire,  and  constantly  engaged  with  largely 
superior  forces  of  the  enemy.  Early  in  the  day  the 
troops  upon  the  right  flank  had  been  driven  off  the 


50 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


field,  and  that  flank  was  frequently  attacked  and  the 
rear  ever  in  peril.  Five  vigorous  and  determined 
assaults,  made  by  powerful  columns  of  the  enemy, 
had  been  successfully  repulsed,  and  three  times  bri- 
gades of  the  division  had  charged  and  driven  back 
the  advancing  foe.  Five  times  had  the  exigencies 
of  the  engagement  required  a change  of  position  to 
be  made,  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  and  the  last 
hour  of  daylight  was  passed  in  the  situation  that  is 
of  all  most  trying  to  soldiers — that  of  being  held  in 
position  inactive  and  exposed  to  heavy  artillery  fire. 
All  this  toil,  danger,  and  the  terrible  loss  resulting 
from  such  exposure  had  been  endured,  and  through 
all  there  had  been  no  rout  of  any  part  of  the  troops 
or  disorganization  in  the  command;  and  at  the  end 
of  the  day,  although  with  ranks  sadly  thinned,  Sheri- 
dan still  had  under  his  orders  a disciplined  and 
effective  force.  He  was  not  again  called  on  during 
these  operations  for  any  important  work,  for  while 
during  that  night  and  the  following  day  the  enemy 
made  some  slight  demonstrations  of  attack,  on  his 
part  they  were  so  easily  repulsed  that  they  require 
no  extended  mention. 

This  campaign  closed  on  January  2,  1863,  with  an 
attack  made  upon  the  left  of  our  army  which  met  a 
disastrous  defeat,  and  on  the  night  of  January  3d 
Bragg  withdrew  his  forces  and  moved  southward 
toward  Chattanooga,  leaving  in  our  hands  this 
bloody  battlefield,  and  the  right  to  claim  a success 
that  would  not  probably  have  been  ours  but  for  the 
determined  courage  and  energy  with  which  the  ex- 
posed right  of  our  army  was  held  during  the  long 
time  required  to  reform  its  lines.  The  strength  of 
Sheridan’s  division  on  the  morning  of  the  battle  was 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 


51 


4,164,  and  the  casualties  numbered  1,633 — within  a 
fraction  of  forty  per  cent  of  the  force  engaged  ; and 
in  this  connection  he  remarks  that,  though  afterward 
engaged  in  very  many  severe  contests,  he  never  in 
any  of  his  commands  experienced  so  high  a rate  of 
casualties. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. CHICKAMAUGA. 

After  the  battle  of  Murfreesborough  a long  in- 
terval of  rest  was  enjoyed  by  the  army  of  General 
Rosecrans,  which  remained  encamped  in  the  vicinity 
of  that  town  until  the  24th  of  June,  1863,  though 
from  time  to  time  during  this  period  detachments 
were  sent  out  on  reconnoissances,  for  forage,  or  to 
act  against  parties  of  the  enemy  engaged  in  similar 
work.  The  great  loss  of  men  and  material  sustained 
in  the  battle  of  the  31st  of  December  imperatively 
required  re-enforcements,  new  supplies,  and  a reor- 
ganization of  the  troops.  Thirty  per  cent  of  the 
effective  force  of  the  army  had  been  lost  on  that 
day,  many  guns  had  been  taken  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  casualties  to  horses  of  the  artillery  rendered  it 
impossible  to  move  the  batteries.  The  time  thus 
passed  in  camp  was  sufficient  to  remedy  all  these 
deficiencies,  and  when  the  army  again  took  the  field 
it  was  more  numerous  and  better  supplied  and 
equipped  than  at  any  previous  period  of  its  history. 

At  the  time  and  since  there  has  been  much  dis- 
cussion and  criticism  concerning  the  inactivity  of 
General  Rosecrans;  and  General  Halleck,  who  was 
then  at  Washington  acting  as  general  in  chief  of 
the  army,  and  who  since  his  elevation  to  that  com- 

52 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


53 


mand  had  become  an  earnest  advocate  for  vigorous 
movements  in  the  field,  was  constant  in  urging  that 
active  operations  should  begin  ; while  General  Rose- 
crans — for  reasons  that  were  in  part  strategic,  and 
also  based  upon  questions  of  supply — was  equally 
satisfied  that  the  proper  time  for  an  advance  in 
force  had  not  yet  been  presented.  Fortunately  for 
the  reader  as  well  as  the  writer  of  these  pages,  the 
discussion  or  settlement  of  this  still  vexed  question 
is  not  here  required.  To  Sheridan  this  long  delay 
was  of  value  for  refitting,  recruiting,  and  disciplin- 
ing his  division. 

On  the  6th  day  of  January,  1863,  he  encamped 
his  men  south  of  the  town  of  Murfreesborough,  and 
then  resumed  and  continued  for  nearly  six  months 
the  system  of  instruction  of  his  men  that  had  pre- 
ceded the  last  campaign.  His  gallantry  and  good 
service  in  the  battle  of  Murfreesborough  had  ob- 
tained for  him  the  confidence  of  General  Rosecrans, 
who  in  the  report  of  the  battle  spoke  in  the  highest 
terms  of  his  conduct,  and  recommended  him  for 
well-deserved  promotion  ; and  in  April,  in  less  than 
twelve  months  from  the  time  when  he  was  acting 
as  captain  and  quartermaster,  Sheridan  received  his 
commission  as  major  general  of  volunteers,  with 
rank  from  December  31,  1862. 

In  addition  to  the  strictly  military  duties  of  the 
division,  the  system  of  scouting,  foraging,  and  ob- 
taining information  of  the  enemy’s  position  and 
numbers  and  of  the  surrounding  country  was  kept 
up  with  results  that  proved  of  value  when  active 
operations  were  resumed  ; but  in  the  course  of  this 
work  one  of  the  three  brothers  Card,  upon  whom 
as  scouts  Sheridan  placed  his  chief  confidence,  was 


54 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


unfortunately  lost,  being  captured  by  guerrillas  and 
hung  while  on  a short  visit  to  his  father’s  home. 
The  elder  brother,  the  chief  of  scouts  employed  by 
Sheridan,  was  so  incensed  at  this  act  of  brutality 
that  he  determined  at  once  to  leave  the  service  and 
devote  himself  to  avenging  his  brother’s  death,  and 
the  general  had  great  difficulty  in  persuading  him  to 
remain.  This  at  last  he  consented  to  do,  and  con- 
tinued in  service  and  proved  of  great  value  until 
the  following  winter,  when,  at  Knoxville,  he  resigned 
his  post  as  scout  and — collecting  a party  of  some 
thirty  men  from  East  Tennessee  who  had  suffered  in 
person  or  in  their  families  for  their  loyalty  to  the 
Union — started  off  to  the  mountains  to  wage  a per- 
sonal war  against  those  by  whom  his  family  and 
friends  had  been  persecuted. 

Frequent  attacks  by  the  enemy  upon  the  railroad 
running  north  to  Nashville  and  thence  to  Louis- 
ville, which  were  the  depots  of  supply  for  the  army, 
and  consequent  interruption  of  transportation,  pro- 
duced great  scarcity  of  forage,  and  for  this  the 
troops  were  compelled  to  rely  upon  what  might  be 
collected  in  the  country  to  the  south  and  southwest 
of  Murfreesborough,  where,  fortunately,  corn  was 
abundant.  It  soon  became  the  custom  in  the  division 
to  send  out  every  week  a brigade  with  a large  train 
of  wagons  to  procure  forage  in  places  where  the 
scouts  had  found  it  to  have  been  collected ; and  as 
these  expeditions  generally  encountered  detachments 
of  the  enemy,  a skirmish  of  more  or  less  severity 
was  an  incident  of  their  excursions,  which,  in  addi- 
tion to  accomplishing  their  main  purpose,  gave  exer- 
cise to  the  men,  accustomed  them  to  the  presence  of 
an  enemy  and  the  use  of  their  arms,  and  proved  a 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


55 


needed  relief  to  the  depressing  monotony  that  often 
injures  the  spirits  and  health  of  men  who  are  long 
confined  in  a stationary  camp  and  to  routine  duty. 

An  amusing  incident  of  one  of  these  expeditions 
was  the  discovery  on  the  return  march  to  camp  of 
the  presence  of  two  women  with  a detachment  that 
was  sent  from  the  division  headquarters  as  part  of 
the  forces.  These  Amazons,  as  General  Sheridan 
aptly  styles  them,  had  indulged  too  freely  in  apple- 
jack while  foraging,  and  falling  into  Stone  River, 
were  nearly  drowned,  but,  being  fished  out,  in  the 
course  of  steps  taken  to  restore  them  to  conscious- 
ness their  true  sex  was  discovered.  Inquiry  showed 
that  they  were  refugees  who  had  been  driven  out 
of  East  Tennessee,  and.  who,  finding  themselves  in 
Louisville  entirely  without  support,  had  adopted 
men’s  clothing  and  sought  Government  employ — one 
as  a teamster  in  the  quartermaster’s  department, 
and  the  other  enlisting  as  a trooper  in  a company  of 
cavalry  that  did  escort  duty  at  Sheridan’s  headquar- 
ters. Both  had  served  for  nearly  a year  without 
exciting  suspicion,  and,  while  known  to  each  other 
for  what  they  really  were,  none  among  their  asso- 
ciates had  any  idea  of  the  truth  concerning  them. 
They  were  as  promptly  as  possible  sent  out  of  the 
lines,  and  there  is  no  record  of  their  future;  but  it 
would  be  interesting  to  know  in  what  manner  their 
experience  of  a soldier’s  life  affected  their  after- 
career in  the  stations  to  which  it  had  pleased  Provi- 
dence to  call  them. 

Early  in  March,  Sheridan,  in  command  of  his 
division  and  Minty’s  brigade  of  cavalry,  was  ordered 
to  Franklin  to  assist  in  some  operations  of  General 
Granger  against  a part  of  the  Confederate  army 
5 


56 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Stationed  near  that  place  commanded  by  Van  Dorn. 
As  the  country  through  which  his  line  of  march 
extended  was  well  supplied  with  forage,  he  took 
with  him  a large  train  of  wagons  in  which  to  col- 
lect supplies.  Finding  that  a considerable  force  of 
Confederate  cavalry  was  posted  near  the  town  of 
Eagleville,  he  so  arranged  his  column  as  to  give 
the  impression  to  the  enemy  that  his  command  was 
but  an  ordinary  foraging  expedition,  protected  by  a 
small  infantry  force. 

When  the  attack  upon  the  wagons  and  their 
small  apparent  escort,  thus  invited,  was  made,  the 
cavalry  brigade  was  suddenly  brought  to  the  front, 
and  by  a spirited  charge,  saber  in  hand,  drove  off 
the  enemy,  capturing  some  wagons  and  mules  and 
about  fifty  prisoners.  As  a result  of  this  action  the 
wagon  train  was  loaded  up  with  corn  and  sent  back 
undisturbed  to  the  camps,  and  on  the  next  day  Gen- 
eral Granger  was  met  at  Franklin.  An  advance  was 
then  made  against  Van  Dorn,  but  he  declined  an  en- 
gagement and  fell  back  before  our  troops  until  they 
were  compelled  to  abandon  the  pursuit  by  the 
heavy  rains  which  at  that  season  rendered  the  many 
streams  intersecting  the  country  impassable,  and  the 
command  returned  by  way  of  Franklin  to  its  former 
camp  at  Murfreesborough. 

From  this  time  on  until  the  latter  part  of  June 
Yio  operations  of  any  consequence  were  attempted, 
and  the  troops  remained  inactive,  except  the  occa- 
sional skirmishes  attending  the  movement  of  scout- 
ing or  foraging  parties.  The  force  was  largely  in- 
creased by  the  return  to  duty  of  sick  and  wounded 
men  and  the  addition  of  recruits;  discipline  had 
improved,  the  material  lost  at  Murfreesborough  had 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


57 

been  replaced,  and  supplies,  if  not  abundant,  were 
considered  sufficient. 

During  this  period  the  authorities  at  Washington 
were  incessantly  urging  General  Rosecrans  to  ad- 
vance, and  he,  in  return,  was  endeavoring  to  show 
that  such  movement  at  the  time  would  be  unwise. 
In  support  of  his  views  he  urged  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  was  largely  his  superior  in  cavalry,  and  that 
he  was  not  sufficiently  provided  with  that  arm  to 
undertake  an  offensive  campaign  in  a hostile  region 
and  complained  that  no  attention  had  been  given 
to  his  repeated  applications  for  an  increase  of  his 
mounted  force,  and  for  breech-loading  arms,  which 
he  considered  essential  to  their  proper  equipment. 
In  addition,  he  strongly  insisted  on  the  fact  that  the 
presence  of  our  army  in  the  position  it  then  occu- 
pied obliged  the  Confederates  to  maintain  in  its 
front  their  largest  available  force  to  protect  the  line 
of  the  Tennessee,  and  their  most  important  railway 
base  at  Chattanooga;  that  Grant  was  then  occu- 
pied with  the  siege  of  Vicksburg,  and  that  it  was 
of  vital  importance  to  the  success  of  that  operation 
to  keep  the  enemy  so  occupied  that  re-enforcements 
could  not  be  sent  to  that  point;  and  that,  if  an  ad- 
vance by  our  army  in  force  should  meet  with  suc- 
cess, Bragg  would  be  forced  back  to  a position 
whence  he  could  rapidly  transport  all  his  troops 
by  rail  to  Vicksburg  and  seriously  injure  if  not 
wholly  defeat  our  efforts  at  that  place. 

Preparations  were,  however,  made  and  supplies 
collected  for  an  advance ; but  the  question  of  the 
advisability  of  the  movement  was  of  so  much  impor- 
tance that  General  Rosecrans  issued  to  his  corps 
commanders  and  to  many  of  the  division  generals 


58 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


in  whose  judgment  he  had  confidence  a confidential 
circular  in  which  he  desired  their  opinions  upon  the 
three  following  questions: 

“ I.  From  the  fullest  information  in  your  pos- 
session, do  you  think  the  enemy  in  front  of  us  has 
been  so  materially  weakened,  by  detachments  to 
Johnston  or  elsewhere,  that  this  army  could  advance 
on  him  at  this  time  with  strong  reasonable  chances 
of  fighting  a great  and  successful  battle? 

“ 2.  Do  you  think  an  advance  of  our  army  at 
present  likely  to  prevent  additional  re-enforcements 
being  sent  agains't  General  Grant  by  the  enemy  in 
our  front  ? 

“3.  Do  you  think  an  immediate  or  early  advance 
of  our  army  advisable?” 

The  officers  consulted  all  disapproved  of  an  im- 
mediate advance  of  our  army,  some  objecting  that 
an  attack  made  upon  the  Confederate  army  in  a 
selected  and  fortified  position  could  only  be  made 
with  severe  loss,  and  the  result  would  be  doubtful. 
All  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  a success  on  our 
part  would  place  it  in  the  power  of  the  retreating 
enemy  to  join  the  forces  opposed  to  General  Grant 
long  before  re-enforcements  could  be  sent  him;  and 
all  expressed  their  judgment  against  the  suggested 
movement  at  that  time.  Among  those  expressing 
the  two  latter  opinions  is  found  General  Thomas, 
whom  history  has  shown  as  one  of  the  bravest  and 
most  reliable  of  our  great  commanders. 

General  Sheridan,  in  his  reply,  did  not  allude  to 
detachments  that  had  been  previously  sent  from 
Bragg’s  army,  but  furnished  his  estimate  of  the 
infantry  force  at  that  time  in  our  front  as  being 
about  thirty  thousand  men,  and  gave  it  as  his 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


59 


opinion  that  if  we  advanced  the  enemy  would  not 
risk  a general  engagement,  but  would  fall  back  to 
the  Tennessee  River,  and  thus  be  in  a position  to 
send  re-enforcements  against  General  Grant.  He  did 
not  approve  of  an  immediate  advance;  and  also 
alluded  to  the  difficulties  that  would  be  met  in  a 
direct  pursuit  of  Bragg  to  the  Tennessee  River 
through  the  country  that  must  be  passed  over. 

His  estimate  of  Bragg’s  force  was  afterward 
found  to  be  correct,  and  when  our  army  moved,  as 
he  predicted,  Bragg  abandoned  his  position  and 
moved  to  Chattanooga,-  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Tennessee,  which  fortunately  he  did  not  reach  until 
Vicksburg  had  been  taken,  and  he  then  kept  strict- 
ly on  the  defensive  until  the  arrival  of  Longstreet’s 
corps  from  Virginia,  about  September  17th,  and  other 
re-enforcements  from  Mississippi  gave  him  sufficient 
force  to  resume  active  operations. 

It  was  finally  determined,  late  in  June,  that  the 
army  should  advance,  and  while  threatening  an  at- 
tack in  force  on  the  center  of  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion at  Shelbyville,  the  strongest  part  of  the  line, 
the  actual  movement  should  be  on  the  enemy’s  right, 
with  the  object  of  occupying  the  town  of  Tulla- 
homa,  where  an  important  depot  of  supplies  had 
been  placed,  and  where  General  Bragg,  if  decided  to 
risk  an  engagement,  would  be  obliged  to  fight  out- 
side of  his  fortified  lines  and  on  ground  selected  by 
his  adversary.  The  command  of  General  McCook, 
which  was  now  known  as  the  Twentieth  Corps,  and 
of  which  Sheridan’s  division,  as  formerly,  was  the 
Third,  moved  out  on  June  24th,  from  Murfrees- 
borough,  some  nine  miles,  where  the  enemy’s  out- 
posts were  met,  and  General  Sheridan  then  marched 


6o 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


to  the  left  to  reach  the  turnpike  running  from  Mur- 
freesborough  to  Manchester,  through  Hoover’s  Gap, 
a pass  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Heavy  rains,  v^hich 
fell  continuously  at  this  time  and  rendered  the  coun- 
try roads  almost  impassable,  impeded  the  march, 
and  the  division  did  not  reach  Hoover’s  Gap  until 
the  morning  of  June  27th,  having  marched  not  more 
than  thirty-five  miles  in  that  time. 

The  enemy  had  abandoned  the  Gap  before  the 
arrival  of  our  troops,  -who  continued  moving  south- 
ward through  the  day,  and  at  Fairfield  met  and 
drove  off  a small  force  of  the  rebels.  The  next 
morning  Sheridan  moved  to  Manchester,  and  on  the 
29th  occupied  a position  within  six  miles  of  Tulla- 
homa,  where  he  remained  until  the  other  portions  of 
the  army,  whose  march  had  been  much  delayed  by 
the  heavy  rains,  could  be  concentrated.  This  was 
done  op  the  night  of  June  30th,  and  on  July  ist 
Sheridan  advanced  on  Tullahoma,  which  had  been 
evacuated,  meeting  only  a strong  rear  guard  of  the 
enemy,  with  which  his  advance  had  the  usual  skir- 
mishes that  attend  the  pursuit  of  a retreating  foe. 
The  town  was  soon  occupied,  but  the  enemy  had 
succeeded  in  removing  all  the  supplies  that  had  been 
there  accumulated,  and  but  three  siege  guns,  a few 
stores,  and  a small  number  of  prisoners  were  taken 
in  the  place.  Early  the  next  morning  the  pursuit 
was  resumed,  but  on  reaching  a stream  known  as 
Elk  River  it  was  found  so  swollen  by  the  recent 
rains  as  to  be  impassable,  and  a detour  to  the  left 
was  made  to  reach  a ford  higher  up  the  stream  that 
a scout  had  reported  to  be  practicable. 

A small  force  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  were  guard- 
ing it  and  were  sopn  driven  off,  but  the  stream  was 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


6l 


SO  high  and  the  current  so  rapid  that  footmen  un- 
assisted could  not  cross  it.  This  difficulty  was  over- 
come by  stretching  a strong  cable  over  the  stream, 
by  which  the  men  could  support  themselves  against 
the  current,  and  then  the  division  formed  in  sets  of 
fours,  with  their  cartridge  boxes  on  their  shoulders, 
holding  tightly  to  one  another,  and,  assisted  by  the 
line,  crossed  rapidly  and  safely. 

Then  turning  to  the  right,  Sheridan  marched 
down  the  left  bank  of  the  Elk,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  3d  reached  the  village  of  Winchester  with  but 
slight  opposition,  the  small  parties  of  the  enemy  who 
were  met  falling  back  with  slight  resistance,  and 
thence  moved  to  Cowan,  a station  on  the  line  of  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  road,  where  he  went  into 
camp.  Here  being  joined  by  a mounted  force  of 
twelve  hundred  men,  and  having  learned  that  Whar- 
ton’s brigade  of  Confederate  cavalry  was  posted  at 
a place  known  as  the  University,  for  the  purpose  of 
covering  the  retreat  of  a body  of  the  enemy’s  in- 
fantry, he  advanced  to  that  point  on  July  5th  with 
the  cavalry  and  a brigade  of  infantry,  but  found  on 
arriving  there  that  the  enemy  had  retreated,  and  a 
pursuit  by  the  cavalry  ascertained  that  the  whole 
force  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  River  at  Bridge- 
port, burning  the  bridge  at  that  place. 

This  and  other  reconnoissances  showed  that  the 
enemy  had  abandoned  Middle  Tennessee,  and  that 
his  whole  army  was  now  south  of  the  Tennessee 
River  and  concentrated  about  Chattanooga  in  a very 
strong  and  advantageous  position,  protected  on  his 
front  by  the  River  and  the  Cumberland  Mountains, 
close  to  his  bases  of  supply  and  connected  by  several 
interior  lines  of  railway  with  the  other  Confederate 


62 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


armies,  from  which  he  could  be  rapidly  re-enforced. 
These  new  conditions  required  the  beginning  on  our 
part  of  a new  campaign,  of  which  Chattanooga  should 
be  the  objective  point,  and  under  greater  difficulties 
than  had  previously  existed. 

The  country  where  our  army  was  now  placed  was 
almost  destitute  of  supplies,  having  been  foraged 
over  by  both  armies  for  the  past  twelve  months,  and 
until  the  ripening  of  new  crops  could  furnish  noth- 
ing. Nashville,  the  nearest  depot,  was  distant  more 
than  eighty  miles,  and  it  was  impossible  to  haul  sup- 
plies by  wagons  sufficient  for  the  army  from  that 
point  and  the  railroad,  upon  which  dependence  must 
be  placed,  had  been  badly  broken  up  by  the  Confeder- 
ates in  their  retreat.  The  first  work  in  hand  was  to 
restore  this  to  usefulness  and  accumulate  supplies 
for  a further  advance;  and  the  usual  discussion  be- 
tween the  authorities  in  Washington — elated  by  the 
victories  of  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg — and  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans  as  to  the  necessity  of  immediate 
movement  was  resumed  with  more  than  former  bit- 
terness. For  two  months,  however,  none  but  pre- 
paratory marches  were  made,  in  the  course  of  which 
Sheridan  was  ordered  early  in  July  to  occupy  Steven- 
son, an  important  railway  junction  within  five  miles 
of  the  river  and  forty  miles  east  of  Chattanooga, 
where  he  remained  until  July  29th,  when  with  two 
brigades  he  occupied  Bridgeport,  where  the  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga  Railroad  crosses  the  Tennessee, 
and  which  had  been  selected  as  one  of  the  points 
for  crossing  the  river. 

On  the  i6th  of  August  General  Rosecrans  began 
a series  of  movements  by  which  the  enemy  was  en- 
tirely deceived  concerning  his  actual  plans  for  cross- 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


63 


ing  the  river  and  attacking,  and  was  led  to  believe 
that  an  advance  would  be  in  front  of  and  to  the 
west  of  Chattanooga.  These  demonstrations  and  the 
opening  of  a heavy  artillery  fire  upon  the  town 
from  the  north  bank  of  the  river  caused  Bragg  to 
concentrate  his  troops  to  the  south  of  Chattanooga 
and  abandon  the  positions  he  had  held  along  the 
river  bank,  and  our  army  passed  the  Tennessee  at 
four  points  entirely  unopposed.  Sheridan  was  in- 
formed on  the  30th  of  August  that,  as  the  supply  of 
pontoons  with  the  army  was  insufficient,  he  would  be 
required  to  build  a bridge  at  Bridgeport,  where  he 
had  been  posted,  and  a battalion  of  engineer  troops 
were  given  him  for  that  purpose.  He  sent  fifteen 
hundred  of  his  men  with  axes  and  teams  into  the 
woods  which  skirted  the  river,  and  by  night  had 
procured  all  the  heavy  timber  needed  for  a trestle 
bridge.  Some  flooring  had  been  supplied,  but  not 
in  sufficient  quantity,  and  the  remainder  was  obtained 
by  using  the  planks  and  weather-boarding  of  the 
neighboring  houses  and  barns.  In  two  days  the 
bridge  was  completed,  and  on  the  2d  and  3d  of 
September  the  division  passed  over  the  river,  being 
the  advance  of  McCook’s  corps,  which  was  on  the 
right  of  the  army 

From  the  4th  to  the  loth  of  September  these 
troops  were  engaged  in  a difficult  and  toilsome 
march  to  the  southward,  crossing  three  ranges  of 
mountains,  and  on  that  day  Sheridan  reached  the 
town  of  Alpine  and  was  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
army,  which  at  that  time  held  a line  of  more  than 
forty  miles,  the  left  being  at  or  near  Chattanooga. 
These  dispositions  were  made  upon  the  assumption 
that  the  Confederates  were  in  full  retreat,  with  no 


64 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


intention  of  engaging  our  army,  and  the  extension 
of  our  right  was  intended  to  threaten  his  communi- 
cations with  the  forces  known  to  be  in  Mississippi. 
General  Bragg  had,  however,  already  been  re-en- 
forced  by  fifteen  thousand  men  from  that  quarter, 
and,  knowing  that  Longstreet’s  corps  was  moving 
toward  him  from  the  east  as  rapidly  as  the  railway 
could  transport  it,  was  preparing  for  action  and  se- 
lecting the  position  in  which  he  could  act  to  the  best 
advantage,  which  proved  to  be  a line  in  front  and  to 
the  west  of  Chickamauga  Creek. 

General  Sheridan  became  uneasy  at  the  extended 
condition  of  our  army  and  the  insecurity  of  his  own 
position,  and  on  the  evening  of  September  loth  sent 
one  of  his  scouts  into  the  enemy’s  lines,  who,  after  a 
perilous  trip,  during  which  he  had  once  been  captured 
but  succeeded  in  escaping,  returned  with  intelligence 
that  the  Confederates  were  preparing  for  an  engage- 
ment, and  were  expecting  the  arrival  of  Longstreet’s 
corps  within  a few  days. 

This  information  made  an  immediate  concentra- 
tion of  our  troops  necessary,  and  a general  move- 
ment to  the  left  was  at  once  begun.  Sheridan,  after 
a march  lasting  from  the  13th  to  the  i6th,  in  the 
course  of  which  he  was  obliged  to  cross  the  Lookout 
Mountain  range  by  passes  where  it  was  often  neces- 
sary to  drag  up  and  lower  the  artillery  and  wagons 
by  hand,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  main  body  of  the 
army.  On  the  next  two  days,  following  the  move- 
ments of  the  other  troops,  he  marched  still  farther  to 
the  left,  and  on  the  19th  for  some  hours  continued 
that  movement  and  went  into  line  of  battle  at  Craw- 
fish Springs  to  protect  the  right  and  rear.  The 
movement  of  the  army  to  the  left  still  continuing,  he 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 


65 


again  advanced  and  took  possession  of  the  ford  of 
Chickamauga  Creek,  at  Lee  and  Gordon’s  Mills,  and 
re-established  his  communications,  being  actively 
engaged  while  doing  so  by  the  skirmishers  of  the 
enemy’s  cavalry,  and  obliged  to  drive  from  the  ford 
a force  of  Confederates  which  had  occupied  it  in  the 
absence  of  our  troops. 

Hardly  had  the  ford  been  secured  when  he  was 
ordered  again  to  the  left,  to  assist  General  Critten- 
den, who  was  heavily  engaged  and  leaving  one  of 
his  brigades  at  the  ford,  with  the  other  two  he  moved 
as  directed  for  about  a mile  and  a half,  and,  reaching 
the  left  of  Crittenden’s  troops,  found  one  divisional- 
ready  driven  back  with  the  loss  of  one  of  its  batter- 
ies. Hastily  forming  the  First  Brigade  as  it  reached 
the  field,  it  was  at  once  thrown  forward,  and  by  a 
successful  charge  drove  back  the  enemy  and  recov- 
ered the  captured  guns.  The  Second  Brigade  on  its 
arrival  was  also  formed  and  put  in  action,  and  at  the 
close  of  a short  but  severe  contest  the  lost  ground 
was  recovered  and  the  position  held  by  the  defeated 
division  regained,  though  wdth  a heavy  loss,  in  which 
was  included  Colonel  Bradley,  the  officer  command- 
ing Sheridan’s  Third  Brigade.  The  brigade  that  had 
been  left  at  the  ford  soon  arriving,  Sheridan,  with  his 
usual  energy,  suggested  to  Crittenden  that  a counter- 
attack be  made  upon  the  enemy;  but  as  that  officer 
found  that  his  troops,  which  had  been  engaged  all 
day,  were  not  in  condition  for  such  a movement,  this 
idea  could  not  be  acted  on. 

The  whole  of  the  army  had  been  engaged  during 
the  day  in  a series  of  disconnected  actions,  in  which 
first  one  side  and  then  the  other  had  met  with  partial 
successes  or  reverses;  but,  while  heavy  losses  had 


66 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


been  sustained  by  our  troops,  the  enemy  had  also 
suffered  severely,  and  had  made  no  impression  on 
our  lines. 

The  force  displayed  on  the  Confederate  side  con- 
firmed the  reports  of  his  having  been  re-enforced  to 
an  extent  that  gave  him  a superiority  in  numbers, 
and  his  movements  indicated  his  intention  of  renew- 
ing an  offensive  battle  on  the  next  day,  in  which  his 
principal  effort  would  be  made  to  crush  the  left  of 
our  army  and  drive  it  westward  from  Chattanooga. 

At  nightfall  Sheridan,  who  continued  on  the  ex- 
treme right  of  the  army,  moved  again  to  the  left  and 
rear,  and  after  the  troops  were  posted  rode  over  to 
army  headquarters  to  learn  the  events  of  the  day 
and  the  movements  intended  for  that  succeeding. 
He  met  there  many  of  the  higher  officers  of  the  army 
and  was  unpleasantly  affected  by  the  general  depres- 
sion and  lack  of  confidence  that  was  evident  among 
them.  Though  all  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  had 
been  successfully  resisted,  the  opinion  prevailed  that 
defeat  was  to  be  expected  ; and  when  the  commanders 
of  an  army  are  looking  for  disaster  it  is  scarcely 
possible  that  any  success  can  be  hoped  for. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th  a heavy  fog  covered 
the  positions  of  the  troops,  and  the  lines  were  quiet 
until  about  nine  o’clock,  when  the  attack  on  our  left, 
commanded  by  General  Thomas,  was  resumed  with 
energy.  Sheridan  was  meantime  moved  still  farther 
to  the  left,  and  about  eleven  o’clock  discovered  that 
the  movements  of  the  troops  on  his  left  had  caused  a 
wide  interval  between  himself  and  the  main  army. 
This  was  closed  by  one  of  his  brigades  and  two  of  the 
brigades  of  General  Davis,  and,  the  enemy  beginning 
an  attack  on  this  force,  Sheridan  rode  back  to  bring  up 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  6/ 

his  other  two  brigades.  These  he  found  in  motion, 
they  having  been  ordered  by  the  corps  commander  to 
march  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  extreme  left  of 
the  army  to  the  support  of  General  Thomas  s troops, 
which  were  heavily  pressed.  As  this  movement  was 
begun  a fierce  attack  by  the  enemy  drove  back  the 
two  brigades  of  General  Davis,  and  then  that  of 
Sheridan,  which  had  charged  in  their  support.  For- 
tunately, the  troops  ordered  to  the  left  were  at  this 
moment  passing  in  rear,  and,  facing  to  the  right,  were 
formed  in  line  of  battle  under  a heavy  fire.  Scarcely 
had  the  line  been  formed  when  the  victorious  Con- 
federates, pressing  forward  in  much  superior  force, 
attacked  and  drove  our  men  to  the  rear  with  fearful 
loss.  They  were  rallied  and  reformed  and  by  a bold 
charge  drove  back  the  enemy,  capturing  the  colors 
of  one  of  his  regiments,  but  the  ground  regained 
could  not  be  held,  and  again  they  fell  back,  losing 
heavily.  General  Lytle,  commanding  the  First  Bri- 
gade, being  among  the  killed.  This  retreat  continued 
until  a range  of  low  hills  half  a mile  to  the  rear  of 
the  last  position  was  reached,  where  line  was  reformed 
and  the  advancing  enemy  checked.  By  this  time,  i 
about  one  in  the  afternoon,  Generals  Rosecrans  and  j 
McCook  had  left  the  field  and  were  on  their  way  to  ; 
Chattanooga,  leaving  no  orders  or  instructions,  and  j 
General  Sheridan  with  his  badly  shattered  division  i 
was  left  unsupported  to  do  as  best  he  could  for  him-  ' 
self.  The  enemy  had  now  ceased  to  attack  on  his 
front,  but  was  moving  around  to  the  left  of  the  divi- 
sion, cutting  it  off  from  the  remainder  of  the  army 
and  endeavoring  to  occupy  the  line  of  retreat. 

Sheridan  therefore  fell  back  to  the  south  face  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  where  he  found  and  was  joined  by 


68 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


a brigade  of  Davis’s  division  that  had  become  sepa- 
rated from  its  proper  command,  and,  finding  the 
enemy  still  between  him  and  the  force  of  General 
Thomas,  he  moved  still  farther  back  to  Rossville, 
whence  he  hoped  to  open  communications.  He 
reached  Rossville  about  five  o’clock,  bringing  with 
him  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  forty-six  caissons,  and  a 
large  train  of  ammunition  wagons  that  had  been 
found  on  the  march  abandoned  and  in  confusion. 

Passing  through  Rossville  and  turning  to  the 
right,  Sheridan  cut  through  the  extreme  right  of  the 
enemy’s  line,  capturing  several  of  his  field  hospitals, 
and  reached  the  left  of  General  Thomas’s  command 
at  six  o’clock.  Here,  reporting  to  General  Thomas, 
Sheridan  asked  for  orders.  He  was  informed  that 
while  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  throughout  the  day 
had  been  repulsed,  the  troops  had  suffered  so  heavily 
and  the  lines  were  so  disorganized  that  no  offensive 
movement  could  be  undertaken  on  our  part,  and  in- 
structed to  return  to  Rossville  and,  making  that 
point  secure,  assist  in  covering  the  withdrawal  of  the 
remainder  of  the  army  to  that  place.  General  Thomas, 
the  general  in  chief  being  at  Chattanooga,  eight  miles 
from  the  field,  had  been  since  early  in  the  day  in 
command  of  all  the  troops  engaged  on  the  left,  and 
had  steadily,  though  with  great  loss,  maintained  his 
position  and  saved  our  army  from  an  overwhelming 
defeat.  Generals  Thomas  and  Sheridan  returned 
together  to  Rossville,  and  the  latter  soon  placed  his 
division  in  a position  that  would  cover  the  arrival 
and  disposition  of  the  other  troops  as  they  were  with- 
drawn from  the  field. 

General  Sheridan  describes  the  night  that  fol- 
lowed as  one  of  the  most  cheerless  and  depressing 


ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  69 

periods  of  his  military  service.  Resting  on  the 
ground,  with  his  saddle  for  a pillow,  he  was  in- 
debted to  the  kindness  of  a soldier  for  a cup  of 
coffee  and  a piece  of  hard  bread — his  only  meal  in 
twenty-four  hours.  As  he  reviewed  the  events  of 
the  day  and  the  prospect  of  the  future,  he  has  con- 
fessed that  he  was  for  once  discouraged  and  had 
little  hope  for  any  improvement  in  the  condition  of 
affairs;  the  situation  must  have  been  grave  indeed 
to  have  thus  affected  a soldier  m whom  character, 
enterprise,  courage,  and  persistent  effort  against  ad- 
verse circumstances  were  leading  features. 

He  had  been  obliged  to  engage  his  men  under 
the  most  adverse  circumstances,  disconnected  from 
and  unsupported  by  other  troops,  without  oppor- 
tunity to  select  positions  or  make  proper  forma- 
tions, at  a most  critical  period  abandoned  in  the 
field  by  his  corps  commander,  and  at  one  time  op-  1 
posing  four  divisions  of  the  enemy.  In  the  battle, 
out  of  five  thousand  effective  men  he  had  lost  fifteen 
hundred  and  seventeen  officers  and  men,  including  1 
the  commanders  of  two  of  his  brigades.  The  condi-  ^ 
tion  of  the  army,  which  had  lost  very  heavily  and 
was  much  broken  up,  the  retreat  that  was  being 
made  in  the  presence  of  a successful  enemy,  and 
the  conduct  of  officers  holding  the  highest  responsi- 
ble positions,  who  evidently  despaired  of  success, 
all  presaged  further  and  more  serious  disaster 
should  the  enemy  continue  to  act  with  the  spirit  and 
boldness  he  had  exhibited. 

Fortunately,  however,  the  losses  of  the  Confeder- 
ates during  these  two  days  of  battle,  which  were 
greater  than  our  army  had  sustained,  had  rendered 
movement  on  their  part  impossible,  and  no  further 


70 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


attack  was  made  upon  our  lines.  During  the  day 
that  followed  the  battle  the  army  in  and  about 
Rossville  was  reorganized,  stragglers  and  detached 
bodies  of  troops  were  collected  and  returned  to  their 
proper  commands,  and,  as  supplies  and  ammunition 
were  plentiful,  hope  began  to  revive,  and  it  was 
found  that  the  disaster  suffered  was  neither  crush- 
ing nor  conclusive.  On  the  night  of  the  21st  the 
army,  with  Sheridan’s  division  as  a rear  guard,  fell 
back  from  Rossville,  and  on  the  22d  was  established 
within  a heavy  line  of  intrenchments  about  the  town 
of  Chattanooga.  No  attempt  was  made  by  the  ene- 
my to  prevent  or  impede  these  movements,  as  he  was 
in  no  condition  to  resume  the  offensive  ; and  had  our 
troops  been  held  at  Rossville,  there  is  little  doubt 
but  that  Bragg  would  have  been  compelled  to  retire 
from  our  front  and  allow  us,  as  at  Murfreesborough, 
through  the  occupation  of  the  field  of  battle,  to  claim 
the  honors  of  the  day. 


CHAPTER  V. 


CHATTANOOGA. — RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE. 

Twelve  months  had  now  passed  since  Sheridan 
had  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the  division  of  in- 
fantry which  he  still  commanded.  In  that  time  he 
had  so  disciplined  and  instructed  this  command  of 
raw  troops  and  the  thousands  of  recruits  that  were 
from  time  to  time  added  to  his  division  to  supply 
the  losses  caused  by  battle  and  disease  that  he  had 
always  under  his  control  the  steadiest  and  most 
reliable  division  attached  to  the  army  in  which  he 
served.  The  year  had  been  to  him  and  to  his  men  a 
period  of  steady  labor  and  of  unvaried  success  in 
the  minor  operations  in  which  they  had  acted  inde- 
pendently, and  of  development  in  efficiency  and 
reputation.  He-  had  passed  through  three  great 
battles — those  of  Perryville,  Murfreesborough,  and 
Chickamauga — in  each  of  which  he  had  been  engaged 
from  dawn  until  night,  generally  unsupported  by 
other  troops,  and  obliged  to  act  on  his  own  respon- 
sibility. In  two  of  these  engagements — Murfrees- 
borough and  Chickamauga — it  had  been  his  fortune 
with  his  single  division  to  protect  and  hold  the  right 
flank  of  our  army  on  occasions  when  his  failure  to 
perform  that  duty  would  have  caused  very  serious  if 
not  fatal  disaster  to  our  troops. 

6 71 


72 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


In  all  he  was  engaged  with  forces  of  the  enemy 
greatly  outnumbering  his  own,  and  while  the  condi- 
tions under  which  he  performed  his  part  in  these 
battles  were  such  that  he  was  unable  to  inflict  a 
crushing  defeat  upon  his  enemy  or  obtain  a brilliant 
and  decisive  victory,  the  determined  courage  with 
which  he  fought  and  the  cool  and  clear  judgment 
he  displayed  in  the  movement  and  disposition  of  his 
troops  in  the  constantly  changing  incidents  of  long 
and  stubborn  conflicts  were  invaluable  to  the  cause 
he  served.  The  losses  sustained  in  these  three  en- 
gagements were  appalling,  and  alone  would  show 
the  severity  and  obstinacy  of  the  contests  in  which 
he  was  employed. 

In  each  of  these  battles  the  division  went  into 
action  with  an  average  strength  of  four  thousand 
men,  and  when  the  sun  went  down  at  the  close  of 
the  day  of  our  misfortune  at  Chickamauga  General 
Sheridan  had  lost  from  his  single  division  in  the  en- 
gagements named  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing, 
3,483  men,  and  in  this  loss  were  to  be  counted  six 
commanders  of  brigades — five  killed  and  one  badly 
wounded.  Three  hundred  and  fifty  of  these  fell  at 
Perryville,  and  in  the  other  two  battles  the  remain- 
der was  lost  in  almost  equal  number  in  each  engage- 
ment. With  all  this  the  troops  and  their  leader  had 
never  lost  heart  nor  lacked  the  power  to  defend 
themselves  or  attack  the  enemy.  They  had  never 
been  routed,  panic-stricken,  nor  driven  in  confusion; 
but  if  retreat  was  necessary  or  advance  to  be  made, 
each  movement  was  performed  under  orders  and  with 
a purpose,  and  at  the  close  of  the  severest  engage- 
ment they  were  always  found  organized,  formed,  and 
ready  for  any  further  service  that  might  be  required. 


CHATTANOOGA. 


73 


This  twelvemonth  was  an  eventful  epoch  in  the 
life  of  General  Sheridan,  and  he  gained  in  it  an  ex- 
perience of  the  greatest  value.  He  had  become  ac- 
customed, according  to  an  old  Scotch  saying,  “ to 
fight  for  his  own  hand,”  and  had  learned  that  it  was 
possible  to  'succeed  at  times,  and  that  it  was  always  in 
the  power  of  an  officer  having  command  of  reliable 
troops  to  seriously  injure  an  enemy,  preserve  and 
keep  in  hand  his  own  men,  and  render  valuable  serv- 
ice even  when  opposed  to  an  adversary  superior  in 
numbers.  It  was  his  good  fortune  that  with  Chicka- 
mauga  his  experience  of  desperate  and  indecisive 
battles  closed,  and  from  that  time  on  he  was  to  take 
part  or  be  the  leader  in  operations  that  were  de- 
signed for  and  obtained  victory. 

On  the  morning  of  September  226.  the  army  of 
General  Rosecrans  had  been  withdrawn  from  the 
field  and  was  established  in  fortified  lines  in  and 
around  the  town  of  Chattanooga.  The  enemy  soon 
followed,  and,  establishing  a line  of  earthworks  par- 
allel to  those  of  our  army  and  occupying  Lookout 
Mountain  and  valley  on  our  right  and  Missionary 
Ridge  on  our  front  and  left,  held  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  virtually  in  a state  of  siege;  and  as  it 
was  cut  off  from  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  to 
Nashville  and  compelled  to  procure  supplies  by 
means  of  wagons  over  a difficult  road  sixty  miles  in 
length,  the  troops  soon  began  to  suffer  for  want  of 
rations,  and  great  numbers  of  animals  were  lost  for 
want  of  forage.  General  Sheridan  relates  that  he 
was  able  to  provide  his  division  with  more  abundant 
food  and  forage  than  was  received  by  other  com- 
mands, as  he  sent  out  a company  of  cavalry,  guided 
by  his  scout  Card,  into  the  enemy’s  country,  and 


74 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


these  men,  acting  with  great  caution  and  keeping 
themselves  carefully  hidden,  were  successful  in  ob- 
taining a quantity  of  food  and  forage  w’hich,  added 
to  the  scanty  supplies  received  from  the  regular 
sources,  kept  his  men  and  animals  in  fair  condition. 

For  tw'O  months  the  army  remained  in  this  posi- 
tion, doing  little  but  such  work  as  was  connected 
with  the  protection  of  supply  trains  and  the  con- 
struction of  additional  defensive  works.  The  enemy 
were  equally  inactive,  limiting  their  operations  to 
attacks  by  cavalry  upon  our  w’agon  trains  and  an 
irregular  and  generally  harmless  artillery  fire  upon 
our  lines.  This  interval  of  quiet  wms  again  used, 
as  had  been  others  succeeding  important  engage- 
ments of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  to  reorganize 
the  troops  and  effect  changes  of  commanders. 

Generals  McCook  and  Crittenden,  commanding 
respectively  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Corps, 
were  relieved  of  command  and  ordered  awmy,  and 
their  corps  were  consolidated  into  a new  organiza- 
tion, which  was  designated  as  the  Fourth  Corps  and 
placed  under  the  orders  of  General  Gordon  Granger. 
General  Sheridan  commanded  the  Second  Division 
of  this  corps,  retaining  his  old  troops  and  thirteen 
regiments  from  other  commands  wmre  added  to  his 
force;  but  all  had  been  so  cut  up  in  the  recent  bat- 
tle that,  though  now  having  nominally  twenty-five 
regiments,  his  effective  strength  w'as  not  much 
greater  than  it  was  previous  to  Chickamauga. 

On  the  19th  of  October  General  Rosecrans  was 
relieved  from  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland and  replaced  by  General  Thomas,  whose 
courage  and  ability,  so  well  displayed  at  Chicka- 
mauga and  previous  fields,  had  won  for  him  the 


CHATTANOOGA. 


75 


confidence  and  regard  of  the  troops.  Before  this 
change  of  commanders  was  made,  the  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under 
General  Hooker,  had  arrived  in  Tennessee,  and,  re- 
porting to  General  Rosecrans,  this  force  was  ordered 
to  protect  the  Nashville  Railroad  and  the  roads  by 
which  supplies  were  procured  ; and  this  work  being 
effectively  performed,  the  wants  of  the  army  were 
more  fully  supplied. 

General  Grant,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the 
command  of  all  troops  operating  in  Tennessee,  ar- 
rived at  Chattanooga  on  the  23d  of  October,  and,  the 
lines  of  supply  having  been  completely  re-established, 
the  army  was  actively  employed  in  refitting  and  pre- 
paring for  active  operations,  which  were  to  be  re- 
sumed as  soon  as  General  Sherman,  who  was  march- 
ing from  West  Tennessee  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
should  reach  Chattanooga.  While  these  active  ef- 
forts for  attacking  the  enemy  with  an  increased 
force  were  being  made.  General  Bragg  weakened 
his  army  by  sending  Longstreet’s  corps — containing 
his  most  reliable  troops — to  Knoxville,  to  aid  in  the 
siege  of  that  place. 

By  November  i8th  Sherman  had  arrived,  our 
preparations  were  complete,  and  General  Grant  gave 
his  orders  for  the  intended  movement.  Sherman, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  left  flank  of  the  army, 
posted  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River, 
was  directed  to  cross  by  a pontoon  bridge,  attack 
the  enemy’s  right  on  the  northern  extremity  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  and  drive  the  opposing  force  south- 
ward. The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  the  center, 
was  to  hold  its  lines  in  front  of  the  ridge,  and  was 
intended  to  be  kept  in  reserve  to  co-operate  with 


76 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  attack  of  General  Sherman,  while  General 
Hooker,  on  the  right,  should  hold  Lookout  Valley 
and  act  against  the  enemy  in  such  manner  as  cir- 
cumstances connected  with  movements  of  the  other 
forces  should  indicate.  According  to  this  plan 
as  it  was  originally  proposed,  the  main  attack  and 
the  task  of  dislodging  the  enemy  from  his  strong 
position  on  Missionary  Ridge  was  in  charge  of 
General  Sherman,  whose  force  consisted  of  five 
divisions,  and  who  was  directed  against  the  most 
assailable  part  of  the  enemy’s  lines,  while  the  com- 
mands of  Generals  Thomas  and  Hooker  were  to 
hold  the  intrenched  lines  and  either  act  in  sup- 
port of  General  Sherman  or  so  occupy  the  attention 
of  the  Confederates  as  to  prevent  the  concentration 
of  too  large  a force  against  the  assaulting  column. 
Indeed,  but  little  service  was  expected  from  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  for  General  Sherman,  in 
his  Memoirs,  relates  that  in  the  consultation  that 
preceded  the  movement  General  Grant  remarked 
“ that  the  men  of  Thomas’s  army  had  been  so  de- 
moralized by  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  that  he 
feared  they  could  not  be  got  out  of  their  trenches  to 
assume  the  offensive,”  and  that  “the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  so  long  been  in  the  trenches  that 
he  wanted  my  troops  to  take  the  offensive  first,  after 
which  he  had  no  doubt  the  Cumberland  Army  would 
fight  well.” 

The  route  by  which  Sherman  moved  to  his  se- 
lected position  was  difficult,  and  delay  was  caused 
by  the  time  needed  to  construct  the  bridge,  so  that 
his  column  did  not  succeed  in  crossing  the  river 
and  reaching  the  position  from  which  to  attack  until 
the  morning  of  November  23d,  by  which  time  the 


CHATTANOOGA. 


77 


enemy  was  fully  informed  of  our  movement.  Sher- 
man moved  forward,  driving  the  enemy’s  skirmish- 
ers, and  in  the  afternoon  repulsed  a heavy  attack  on 
his  lines,  but  did  not  make  much  progress.  To  re- 
lieve him  as  much  as  possible,  Thomas  was  ordered 
to  make  a demonstration  against  the  forces  in  his 
front,  and  sent  forward  two  divisions — Sheridan’s 
and  Wood’s — which  drove  back  the  pickets  of  the 
enemy  and  advanced  our  lines  as  far  as  Orchard 
Knobb  and  close  to  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
where  the  enemy  held  a strongly  fortified  line. 
These  troops  immediately  intrenched  the  new  line 
they  had  gained  and  remained  there,  exposed  to 
artillery  fire,  but  otherwise  unmolested.  On  the 
24th  occurred  General  Hooker’s  battle  among  the 
clouds,  when,  being  ordered  to  make  a demonstra- 
tion on  our  right,  with  ten  thousand  men  he  stormed 
and  took  Lookout  Mountain,  driving  off  two  di- 
visions of  the  enemy  by  which  it  was  held.  During 
the  early  part  of  the  25th  General  Sherman,  with 
the  troops  engaged  in  the  main  attack,  was  en- 
deavoring to  advance  and  met  with  so  strong  an 
opposition  that  he  could  make  little  progress,  and 
about  two  o’clock  General  Thomas  was  ordered  to 
move  forward  four  of  his  divisions,  of  which  Sheri- 
dan’s was  one,  and  capture  the  line  of  rifle  pits  held 
by  the  enemy  at  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and, 
these  taken,  to  halt  and  await  further  orders.  This 
required  an  advance  over  open  ground  for  some 
five  hundred  yards,  until  the  foot  of  the  ridge  was 
reached,  from  wLich  there  was  a steep  ascent  to  the 
summit  of  five  hundred  yards.  At  the  foot  of  the 
ridge  was  the  enemy’s  first  line  of  rifle  pits,  a second 
line  about  half  way  up  the  face,  and  at  the  summit 


78 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


a third  line,  in  which  the  Confederates  had  massed 
their  artillery. 

Our  preparations  for  this  attack  were  made  in 
full  view  of  the  enemy,  who,  from  his  elevated  posi- 
tion, could  observe  every  movement  in  our  lines, 
and  he  could  be  seen  bringing  up  additional  troops 
from  the  left  and  preparing  for  a vigorous  defense. 
It  was  evident  to  Sheridan’s  quick  perception  that 
the  position  our  troops  would  hold  if  they  should 
cease  advancing  after  capturing  the  first  line  of  rifle 
pits  would  be  untenable  under  the  fire  that  could 
be  brought  to  bear  from  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and 
that  safety  as  well  as  success  depended  upon  con- 
tinuing the  attack  and  carrying  the  works  at  the 
summit  and  sending  back  an  aid  to  communicate  this 
opinion  to  the  corps  commander.  When  the  signal  for 
assault  was  given  he  advanced,  determined  to  con- 
tinue the  attack,  and  if  possible,  to  gain  the  summit. 

The  advance  on  the  first  line  of  rifle  pits  was 
gallantly  made  by  our  troops,  who,  without  firing  a 
shot,  charged  over  the  open  ground  under  a heavy 
fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  and,  sweeping  over  the 
line  of  works  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  completely 
routed  the  defending  force,  killing  and  capturing 
them  in  large  numbers.  The  works  were  taken  and 
the  men  were  ordered  to  lie  down,  as  well  to  obtaiiT 
a brief  rest  as  for  protection  from  the  heavy  fire  that 
was  plunging  upon  them  from  the  works  above. 

After  a short  pause  the  advance  up  the  ridge 
began,  and,  as  the  troops  moved  forward,  the  aid 
who  had  been  sent  to  the  corps  commander  re- 
turned with  the  information  that  the  movement  was 
limited  to  carrying  the  first  line  of  rifle  pits,  but  the 
men  were  now  gallantly  climbing  the  hill  with  a 


CHATTANOOGA. 


79 


courage  and  spirit  that  promised  complete  success. 
On  the  steep  and  broken  ground  regular  lines  could 
not  be  maintained,  but  each  regiment,  with  its  colors 
in  advance,  pressed  onward  and  upward,  now  one 
leading,  and  then  another,  until  the  second  line  of 
works  was  carried. 

Pausing  but  a moment  to  collect  the  men,  the 
troops  again  charged  forward  under  a very  heavy 
fire,  but  the  steepness  of  the  ascent  wms  such  that 
the  artillery  could  not  be  sufficiently  depressed  ; 
the  casualties  were  fewer  than  might  have  been  ex- 
pected, and  without  a check  the  men  reached  the 
summit  and  leaped  over  the  works,  which  the  greater 
part  of  the  enemy’s  force  had  abandoned.  A short 
distance  in  the  rear  the  headquarters  of  General 
Bragg  had  been  established,  and  at  this  point  a 
small  Confederate  force  with  a battery  opened  fire 
upon  our  troops,  but  they  were  soon  overpowered 
and  driven  off,  with  the  loss  of  their  guns.  Generals 
Bragg  and  Breckinridge,  with  some  other  distin- 
guished Confederate  leaders,  barely  escaped  capture 
at  this  point.  By  this  time  troops  from  the  other 
divisions  that  had  taken  part  in  the  first  attack  and 
who  had  felt  the  impulse  that  urged  Sheridan  to 
win  a victory  without,  and  even  against,  orders,  had 
reached  difficult  points  of  the  summit,  and  by  night 
the  Confederate  army  was  in  full  retreat. 

The  victory  was  complete.  The  Confederate  army 
was  driven  in  confusion  from  the  field,  losing  heavily 
in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  and  abandoning 
many  of  its  guns.  Seldom,  if  ever,  has  a battle  been 
won  by  operations  that  were  not  only  so  inconsist- 
ent with,  but  opposed  to  the  plans  of  the  command- 
ing general. 


8o 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


The  main  attack,  that  had  been  actively  pressed 
for  t\tm  days  on  the  right  of  the  Confederate  army, 
had  accomplished  nothing,  and  the  diversion  in  its 
support  made  by  troops  of  whom  doubts  had  been 
expressed  w'hether  they  could  be  got  out  of  their 
trenches  for  an  offensive  movement  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  the  enemy’s  strongest  position,  drove 
back  the  center  of  his  line  of  battle,  and  compelled 
a hasty  and  confused  retreat  of  his  whole  army. 

To  no  one  wms  this  result  of  the  action  of  our 
troops  more  surprising  than  to  General  Grant,  who, 
as  he  observed  that  the  demonstration  was  converted 
into  a serious  attack  and  the  men  were  ascending 
the  ridge,  inquired  of  General  Thomas  “by  wdiose 
orders  those  troops  were  going  up  the  hill  ? ’’  and  on 
being  answered  that  the  movement  had  not  been 
ordered,  remarked  that  “ it  was  all  right  if  it  turned 
out  all  right;  if  not,  some  one  w'ould  suffer.”  Fortu- 
nately for  the  actors  in  this  stirring  scene,  the  suc- 
cess they  obtained  was  sufficient  to  excuse  the  im- 
prudent zeal  that  incited  them  to  exceed  the  orders 
that  had  been  given,  and  the  Confederate  army  wms 
the  only  sufferer  by  the  taking  of  Missionary  Ridge. 

After  the  crest  of  the  ridge  wms  taken,  and  Gen- 
eral Sheridan’s  division  had  been  reformed,  he,  with- 
out orders,  pushed  forw’ard  in  pursuit  of  the  retreat- 
ing columns  of  the  enemy.  He  had  studied  the 
topography  of  the  country  and  followed  a road  that 
led  to  Chickamauga  station,  the  main  depot  of  sup- 
plies for  the  Confederate  army.  His  twm  advanced 
brigades  soon  overtook  the  rear  guard,  and  after  a 
slight  skirmish  routed  it,  capturing  nine  more  guns 
and  a large  wagon  train.  The  division  continued  to 
advance,  and  at  a distance  of  a mile  and  a half  from 


CHATTANOOGA. 


Missionary  Ridge  the  enemy  was  again  overtaken, 
but  this  time  in  stronger  force,  posted  on  a second 
ridge  with  eight  guns  in  position,  and  resolved,  if 
possible,  to  check  our  pursuit.  The  first  attack 
made  on  this  position  was  repulsed,  but  two  flank- 
ing parties  were  ordered  on  the  right  and  left  of  the 
Confederate  lines,  and,  these  acting  with  the  main 
line,  a second  assault  was  given,  which  drove  the 
enemy,  who  abandoned  his  lines,  leaving  two  more 
guns  and  a number  of  wagons  in  our  possession. 

After  taking  this  ridge,  Sheridan  found  himself 
two  miles  in  advance  of  the  line  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  learned  that  his  division  was  the  only 
body  of  troops  engaged  in  pursuing  the  enemy.  The 
line  of  march  he  was  following  would  bring  him  to 
Chickamauga  station,  where  it  would  be  possible  to 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Confederate  troops  that 
had  been  resisting  General  Sherman’s  advance  dur- 
ing the  day,  but  his  own  force  was  not  sufficient  for 
so  important  an  object,  and  he  rode  back  to  Mis- 
sionary Ridge  to  procure  re-enforcement. 

He  explained  the  situation  to  the  commander  of 
his  corps,  whom  he  found  in  occupation  of  Bragg’s 
deserted  headquarters,  and  earnestly  urged  that  the 
other  divisions  should  depressed  forward;  but  that 
officer  declined  to  make  any  further  movement,  and 
expressed  himself  as  fully  satisfied  with  what  had 
been  already  accomplished.  Permission  was  at  last 
obtained  that  Genera!  Sheridan  might  advance  with 
his  division  to  the  crossing  of  Chickamauga  Creek, 
and  if  the  enemy  should  be  met,  troops  would  be 
ordered  to  his  support. 

Dissatisfied  with  this  very  slight  concession  to 
his  plans,  but  still  hopeful,  he  rode  back  to  his 


82 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


troops,  whom  he  reached  about  midnight,  and  again 
moved  forward,  and  at  two  o’clock  reached  the  cross- 
ing of  the  creek,  about  half  a mile  below  the  station, 
which  was  his  objective  point.  The  enemy  m re- 
treating had  destroyed  the  bridge,  but  the  stream 
could  be  forded.  The  enemy  was  not  met  in  any 
force,  but  a single  division  was  too  weak  to  take 
and  hold  a position  where  it  would  be  compelled  to 
engage  the  large  force  that  held  Sherman’s  troops  at 
bay  for  two  days.  In  the  hope  of  bringing  up  sup- 
port, and  as  a last  appeal  to  troops  inactive  in  the 
rear,  two  regiments  were  directed  to  open  a heavy 
fire,  which  was  maintained  for  some  time,  but  though 
heard  at  headquarters,  these  sounds  of  apparent  con- 
flict were  not  sufficient  to  obtain  the  needed  assist- 
ance, and  the  opportunity  of  largely  increasing  our 
success  was  lost. 

This  failure  to  reap  the  fruits  of  our  victory  to 
the  utmost  was  a disappointment  to  General  Sheri- 
dan, notwithstanding  all  the  success  he  had  ob- 
tained, and  it  was  equally  so  to  his  superiors  when 
on  the  following  day  it  was  learned  that  his  plans 
were  correctly  laid  and  that  if  he  had  been  supported 
as  he  desired  the  troops  confronting  Sherman  would 
have  been  captured  or  destroyed,  as  they  did  not 
pass  through  Chickamauga  station  in  their  retreat 
until  after  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  26th. 

In  this  engagement,  for  the  first  time  since  his 
connection  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Sheri- 
dan enjoyed  the  opportunity  of  acting  vigorously 
and  prominently  in  an  offensive  movement  against  a 
strongly  intrenched  enemy,  and  he  improved  this  to 
the  fullest  extent,  as  appears  from  the  history  of 
that  battle.  As  in  previous  engagements,  his  troops 


RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE. 


83 


took  the  leading  part  in  the  contest,  and  suffered 
more  than  any  other  division  engaged,  but  the  suc- 
cess obtained  was  well  worth  the  cost. 

His  division,  larger  than  ever  before,  contained 
6,000  men  as  it  went  into  action;  and  of  these,  123 
officers  and  i,i8i  men  were  killed  or  wounded.  The 
injury  that  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy  was  sufficient, 
however,  to  compensate  for  the  losses  sustained,  and 
17  guns  and  1,762  prisoners  were  taken  on  the  field 
by  Sheridan’s  command.  It  was  the  first  to  reach 
the  crest  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  there  captured 
the  headquarters  of  the  enemy,  and  was  the  only 
force  that  ventured  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  foe. 

There  is  one  penalty  that  soldiers  who  are  enter- 
prising and  courageous  must  pay  in  return  for  such 
success  as  they  have  gained,  and  that  is  found  in  the 
calls  that  are  always  made  upon  them  for  service 
that  is  especially  arduous  and  requires  the  greatest 
effort.  General  Burnside,  who  had  been  for  some 
time  at  Knoxville,  had  reported  his  troops  in  a state 
of  siege,  as  unprovided  with  subsistence,  and  in  a 
most  perilous  position,  and  the  first  duty  undertaken 
by  General  Grant  after  Bragg’s  defeat  was  to  send 
relief  to  that  threatened  city. 

The  Fourth  Corps,  under  General  Granger,  and 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  General  Sherman, 
were  ordered  for  this  duty  on  the  day  succeeding 
the  battle,  and  Sheridan,  falling  back  from  his  ad- 
vanced position,  returned  to  Chattanooga,  and  on 
the  29th  of  November  started  on  the  march  to  Knox- 
ville. The  troops  were  in  no  condition  to  march  or 
to  endure  a campaign  in  the  winter  season  that  had 
now  set  in.  On  leaving  Murfreesborough  in  June,  as 
the  weather  was  warm  and  celerity  in  movement  im- 


84 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


portant,  knapsacks,  heavy  clothing,  overcoats,  and 
tents  had  been  left  behind ; no  opportunity  had  offered 
to  send  these  necessaries  to  the  army,  and  as  the 
whole  transportation  of  the  army  had  been  taxed  to 
its  greatest  powers  to  furnish  rations  and  forage  in 
quantities  barely  sufficient  to  support  the  men,  no 
additional  supplies  of  clothing  had  been  obtained, 
and  the  men  had  no  clothing  other  than  that  with 
which  they  had  begun  a summer  campaign,  in  light 
marching  order,  and  which  had  suffered  from  five 
months’  wear  and  exposure  to  the  weather  and  the 
damage  caused  by  severe  service.  A few  overcoats 
and  rubber  blankets  were  procured  at  Chattanooga, 
but  in  number  quite  insufficient  to  supply  the  wants 
of  the  command,  and  it  was  impossible  to  obtain 
shoes,  which  were  greatly  needed.  Thus  poorly 
equipped,  the  troops  marched  out  to  undertake  a 
journey  of  one  hundred  miles,  with  the  prospect  at 
its  close  of  being  actively  engaged  with  the  force 
that  under  Longstreet  was  in  front  of  Knoxville, 
and  having  no  supplies  beyond  four  days’  rations 
carried  by  the  men  and  a small  quantity  of  food  car- 
ried on  a steamer  that  accompanied  the  troops  on 
the  Tennessee  River,  along  which  their  line  of  march 
extended.  Near  Knoxville  Granger’s  corps  was 
united  with  the  troops  under  Sherman  that  had 
hitherto  marched  by  a different  road,  and  on  the 
5th  of  December  the  whole  relieving  force  reached 
Marysville,  some  fifteen  miles  southwest  of  Knox- 
ville. It  was  here  learned  that  Longstreet  had  a 
few  days  before  been  signally  defeated  in  an  assault 
upon  the  works  defending  the  city,  and  had  raised 
the  siege  and  retreated  eastwardly  toward  the  Vir- 
ginia line. 


RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE.  85 

General  Sherman,  in  his  Memoirs,  mentions  the 
visit  he  made  to  Knoxville  on  this  occasion  and  his 
surprise  at  finding  the  besieged  troops  for  whose  re- 
lief he  had  been  dispatched  far  better  equipped  and 
supplied  than  those  who  had  come  to  their  assist- 
ance. He  was  especially  surprised  at  the  excellent 
dinner  to  which  he  was  invited — to  use  his  own 
words,  “ embracing  roast  turkey  ” — and  which  was 
supplied  with  such  luxuries  as  tablecloth,  dishes,  and 
other  appliances  to  which  he  and  his  men  had  long 
been  strangers.  Upon  his  remarking  that  he  had 
been  hastily  dispatched  to  Knoxville  under  the  im- 
pression that  had  prevailed  that  the  troops  there 
were  starving,  it  was  explained  that  at  no  time  had 
the  enemy  completely  invested  the  place,  and  that 
communication  with  the  country  to  the  south  had  at 
all  times  been  open,  from  which  a good  supply  of 
beef,  corn,  and  bacon  had  been  obtained.  In  fact, 
the  relieving  army  was  suffering  more  from  want 
and  hardship  than  the  one  it  had  marched  so  hur- 
riedly to  assist,  and  which  had,  unaided,  been  able, 
when  put  to  the  proof,  to  defeat  and  drive  off  the 
enemy.  General  Sherman,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  troops  from  Chattanooga,  concluded  to  leave  at 
Knoxville  General  Granger,  with  two  divisions,  to 
co-operate  with  Burnside  in  an  effort  to  drive  Long- 
street  out  of  Tennessee,  and  with  his  own  force 
marched  back  to  Chattanooga. 

From  this  time  nothing  of  moment  occurred  that 
is  worthy  of  record  in  detail  in  connection  with  the 
troops  in  and  about  Knoxville.  During  the  months 
of  December  and  January  the  troops  were  moved 
about  the  country,  engaged  in  useless  marches  and 
futile  expeditions  that  neither  promised  nor  produced 


86 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


results,  badly  supplied,  suffering  from  want  of  food 
and  clothing,  and  exposed  without  shelter  of  any 
kind  to  severe  cold  and  violent  storms.  The  enemy 
was  never  met  in  force,  and  the  few  skirmishes  that 
occurred  were  of  no  importance  or  value  to  either 
side.  At  length,  after  two  toilsome  and  trying 
months  of  such  adventure.  General  Sheridan  with 
his  troops  was  ordered  to  encamp  at  Loudon,  thirty 
miles  south  of  Knoxville,  where  he  would  be  in  com- 
munication by  railroad  with  Chattanooga,  and  could 
rest  and  supply  his  men.  This  place  was  reached  on 
January  27,  1864,  and  tents  and  clothing,  with  abun- 
dant rations,  were  procured,  the  division  was  again 
equipped,  and  the  hardships  and  trials  of  the  previ- 
ous year  forgotten. 

When  his  troops  had  been  settled  with  comfort 
in  their  camps,  and  due  arrangement  made  for  sup- 
plying their  wants.  General  Sheridan,  who  had  suf- 
fered much  in  health  and  strength  from  the  severe 
labors  he  had  performed,  availed  himself  of  this 
period  of  quiet  to  take  a short  leave  of  absence,  the 
first  he  had  enjoyed  since  his  entry  into  service  in 
1853.  This  was  passed  at  the  North,  and  mostly  at 
his  home  in  Ohio,  and  the  rest  and  relief  from  care 
soon  restored  him  to  his  usual  vigorous  health.  In 
March  he  returned  to  Loudon  and  took  command  of 
his  troops,  expecting  soon  to  take  part  in  the  spring 
campaign  of  the  Western  army. 

The  plans  he  had  formed  were,  however,  soon 
disturbed,  and  on  the  23d  of  March  he  received 
from  Chattanooga  a telegram  in  which  he  was  di- 
rected by  General  Grant  to  proceed  at  once  to 
Washington  and  report  to  the  adjutant  general  of 
the  army.  He  was  not  informed  of  the  intention 


RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE. 


87 


with  which  this  order  was  given,  or  what  change  in 
his  duties  or  station  would  result  from  it,  but  as- 
sumed that  it  would  separate  him  from  the  troops 
he  had  commanded  so  long,  whom  he  had  led 
through  many  dangers  and  perils,  who  had  bravely 
and  faithfully  followed  him  wherever  duty  called, 
and  to  whose  conduct  and  gallantry  he  felt  himself 
indebted  for  the  success  that  had  attended  his 
career.  He  took  no  formal  leave  of  his  command, 
fearing  that  he  could  not  control  the  feelings  of 
deep  regret  that  such  a parting  would  occasion ; 
but  as  it  was  learned  that  he  was  leaving,  the  whole 
division,  officers  and  men,  wdthout  orders,  collected 
near  the  station  to  have  one  last  glance  at  the  chief 
they  were  about  to  lose,  and  whom  in  the  fortunes 
of  war  many  would  see  for  the  last  time ; and  with 
abundant  evidence  of  good  will  and  affection  he 
thus  severed  his  relations  with  “Sheridan’s  division.” 
They  were  peculiarly  his  own  men,  as  the  greater 
part  had  come  to  him  as  untrained  recruits,  and 
none  had  more  than  slight  experience  of  the  duties 
of  a soldier  when,  in  September,  1862,  the  division 
was  organized,  and  from  that  time  to  the  day  of  his 
departure  he  had  been  constantly  with  them — in 
camp,  on  the  march,  and  in  the  most  fiercely  con- 
tested battles  of  the  war. 

The  men  had  knowm  and  appreciated  the  con- 
stant care,  forethought,  and  diligence  their  general 
had  exercised  in  supplying  their  needs,  insuring 
them  all  possible  comforts  that  could  be  obtained, 
and  sparing  them  from  needless  fatigue  and  peril. 
They  had  witnessed  and  honored  his  gallantry  in 
action,  and  knew  that  under  his  command  they 
could  expect  success  as  the  result  of  their  efforts, 
7 


88 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


and  that  it  would  be  gained  at  the  least  possible 
cost  of  life  or  suffering.  On  his  part,  the  feeling  of 
regard  toward  the  troops  was  equally  warm.  Their 
duty  had  always  been  faithfully  performed  and 
his  every  order  had  been  promptly  and  cheerfully 
obeyed.  Though  in  battle  they  sustained  the  heavi- 
est losses,  and  were  again  and  again  engaged  iwith 
overpowering  numbers  of  the  enemy,  they  had  al- 
ways been  steady  and  retained  their  discipline,  had 
never  been  routed  or  driven  from  the  field,  and 
equally  in  misfortune  or  victory  had  been  distin- 
guished for  courage,  steadiness,  and  fidelity;  and  he 
felt  that  much  of  his  personal  success  and  rapid  ad- 
vance in  rank  and  fame  was  due  to  the  conduct  and 
services  of  these  gallant  men  from  whom  he  was 
now  to  part. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. WILDERNESS. RICHMOND. 

COLD  HARBOR. 

At  Chattanooga,  General  Sheridan,  much  to  his 
surprise,  learned  that  he  was  ordered  to  Washing- 
ton with  the  intention  that  he  should  take  command 
of  the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
This  new  duty,  though  it  gave  a larger  command, 
was  not  altogether  welcome,  as,  in  addition  to  the 
heavier  responsibilities  involved,  he  was  called  to 
serve  in  a part  of  the  country  of  which  he  had  no 
knowledge,  with  officers  to  whom  he  was  entirely  a 
stranger,  and  in  a different  arm  of  the  service  from 
that  in  which  his  experience  as  a general  officer  had 
been  acquired,  and,  personally,  he  would  have  much 
preferred  to  have  continued  in  his  late  position. 
The  situation,  however,  existed,  and  must  be  ac- 
cepted ; he  therefore  proceeded  to  Washington  and, 
in  the  absence  of  General  Grant,  reported  at  the 
headquarters  of  General  Halleck,  under  whom  he 
had  served  at  the  West  and  by  whom  he  was  pre- 
sented to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton,  and 
subsequently  to  the  President,  both  of  whom  he  saw 
on  this  occasion  for  the  first  time,  and  after  some 
formal  conversation  as  to  his  past  service  and  the 
new  duties  he  was  to  assume,  he  left  Washington 

89 


90 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


and  proceeded  to  join  his  new  command,  the  head- 
quarters of  which  were  at  Brandy  Station,  Va.,  sixty- 
two  miles  southwest  from  Washington,  and  on  arriv- 
ing, on  April  5,  1864,  he  at  once  assumed  command. 

The  command  that  General  Sheridan  was  now 
called  to  exercise  was,  as  his  predecessors  had 
found,  trying,  and  presented  many  features  that 
were  embarrassing  to  the  officer  to  whom  it  was 
confided.  The  organization  of  the  cavalry  as  a 
corps  was  comparatively  recent,  and  that  had  been 
accomplished  with  much  difficulty  and  under  dis- 
couraging circumstances,  and  at  no  time  had  the 
officers  in  command  possessed  exclusive  authority 
over  these  troops  or  had  any  power  of  independent 
action.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  Lieutenant- 
General  Scott,  then  in  command  of  our  armies,  had 
no  belief  in  the  utility  of  mounted  troops,  and  to  the 
extent  of  his  power  opposed  the  enlistment  or  or- 
ganization of  cavalry  regiments,  and  those  that  were 
first  called  into  service  were  raised  under  the  direct 
authority  of  the  President  and  contrary  to  the  advice 
and  wishes  of  the  officers  who  held  high  commands. 

The  officers  of  the  old  army  who  had  been  in  the 
mounted  service  had  no  experience  in  the  handling 
or  control  of  any  large  body  of  cavalry,  as  for  many 
years  past  a squadron  had  been  the  largest  unit  with 
which  they  were  familiar  ; no  attention  from  any 
competent  authority  was  given  to  the  drill,  disci- 
pline, or  organization  of  these  troops,  and  they  were 
dependent  for  their  vital  necessities  upon  such  efforts 
as  could  be  made  by  their  regimental  officers.  Dur- 
ing the  first  year  of  the  war  no  attempt  at  even  bri- 
gade organization  was  made,  but  the  rule  of  service 
adopted  was  to  assign  one  or  more  regiments  of 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


91 


cavalry  to  each  division  of  infantry,  and  leave  them 
to  such  duties  as  each  division  commander  might 
impose.  As  a consequence  of  such  a disposition  heavy 
work  and  much  hardship  were  sustained  and  effects 
produced  injurious  to  the  discipline,  morale,  and  value 
of  the  troops.  There  being  no  officer  of  rank  or 
authority  charged  with  the  duty  of  providing  sup- 
plies or  equipments,  these  were  always  deficient, 
and  in  any  distributions  the  other  arms  of  the  serv- 
ice were  preferred.  The  regiments  were  broken 
up  in  small  detachments  to  furnish  orderlies  and  es- 
corts for  general  officers,  guards  for  division  wag- 
on trains,  and  pickets  to  protect  the  fronts  of  in- 
fantry lines,  and  were  rarely  united  for  drill  or  for 
any  service  as  an  organized  body.  In  the  summer 
of  1862  the  necessities  of.  severe  service  compelled 
the  organization  of  some  brigades  of  cavalry,  and 
as  such,  attached  to  different  corps  of  the  army,  they 
were  able  to  do  some  effective  work  in  the  field 
and  provided  for  the  safety  of  the  infantry  when 
that  was  at  rest,  but  still  suffered  from  the  want  of 
a compact  organization  and  of  a responsible  chief. 

It  was  not  the  least  of  the  services  that  General 
Hooker  rendered  when,  early  in  1863,  he  authorized 
the  formation  of  a cavalry  corps,  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  the  various  regim'ents  and  brigades 
scattered  through  the  army  were  at  last  united  in 
divisions  and  placed  in  a separate  command.  A 
great  improvement  in  these  troops  was  at  once  made, 
and  from  that  time  till  the  close  of  the  war  the  cav- 
alry constantly  developed  in  effective  strength  and 
value  of  the  service  it  rendered.  Its  strength  was 
not  available  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  as  dur- 
ing that  engagement  the  whole  corps,  with  the  ex- 


92 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ception  of  one  brigade,  was  scattered  in  a series  of 
desultory  raids  and  operations  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy,  which,  while  in  some  instances  executed  with 
dash  and  brilliancy,  produced  no  result  of  impor- 
tance. A change  in  the  commander  of  the  corps 
followed,  and  General  Pleasonton — who,  at  a critical 
period  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  with  a bri- 
gade of  cavalry  and  a few  field  pieces,  gallantly  re- 
pulsed an  attack  of  the  enemy’s  infantry  that,  if  suc- 
cessful, would  have  routed  our  army — was  selected 
for  the  position.  His  services  to  the  corps  were  of 
great  value,  and  he  perfected  the  organization  that 
had  been  commenced;  and  to  his  influence  were 
due  changes  among  the  higher  officers  that  added 
greatly  to  its  efficiency.  He  believed  strongly  in 
the  capacity  of  young  and  enterprising  men  as 
leaders  of  cavalry,  and  was  of  the  opinion  that  the 
experience  that  had  been  acquired  in  the  present 
war  was  that  which  best  fitted  officers  for  command. 
In  a short  time  after  assuming  command  his  divi- 
sion and  brigade  officers  were  all  young  men,  and 
all  had  grown  up  with  and  had  been  developed  by 
hard  service  in  cavalry  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
That  his  plans  were  good  and  his  views  correct  is 
apparent  from  the  service  his  corps  performed;  and 
in  a few  months  after  taking  command  he  had  with 
it  three  times  met  and  defeated  in  the  open  field  the 
whole  of  the  enemy’s  mounted  force,  and  had  taken 
an  important  part  in  many  other  engagements. 

Even  his  success  and  the  proofs  he  had  given  of 
the  value  of  cavalry,  when  properly  used  and  led, 
were  not  sufficient  to  overcome  the  force  of  tradi- 
tions and  customs,  and  among  higher  authorities  the 
idea  still  prevailed  that  the  mounted  force  was 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


93 


secondary  to,  and  should  be  used  for,  the  protection, 
convenience,  and  relief  of  the  infantry.  The  corps 
was  not  united  as  a body  except  in  occasional  in- 
stances, and  the  different  divisions  were  scattered, 
while  the  commanding  general  was  expected  to  re- 
main at  the  headquarters  of  the  army  and  perform 
duty  more  as  a staff  officer  in  transmitting  orders 
than  as  the  actual  commander  of  a body  of  combat- 
ant troops.  Serious  differences  of  opinion  on  these 
questions  between  Generals  Meade  and  Pleasonton 
had  from  time  to  time  occurred,  and  at  last  had  gone 
so  far  that  the  latter  officer  could  no  longer  retain 
his  command,  and  the  vacancy  occurred  which  Gen- 
eral Sheridan,  at  the  suggestion  of  General  Halleck, 
was  selected  to  fill. 

It  has  been  generally  believed  that  General  Grant 
had  himself  chosen  Sheridan  as  the  leader  of  cavalry 
for  the  Eastern  army,  but  in  his  autobiography  we 
are  told  that  he  had  no  preference  for  any  individual 
for  that  position,  and  that  in  consulting  with  Gen- 
eral Halleck  upon  filling  the  existing  vacancy,  he 
had  remarked  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  replace 
Pleasonton  with  some  officer  of  the  Western  army. 
General  Halleck  at  once  suggested  Sheridan  as  the 
most  competent  officer  for  the  place,  and  the  orders 
for  him  to  report  for  new  duties  were  issued  upon 
that  advice. 

When  the  orders  appeared  that  announced  the 
appointment  of  General  Sheridan  as  commander  of 
the  cavalry  corps,  it  must  be  said  that  they  were  not 
received  with  much  cordiality,  or  that  the  troops 
affected  by  them  were  pleased  by  the  changes  made. 
The  corps  had  developed  and  improved  by  a system 
of  evolution  and  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  all  the 


94 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


leaders  it  had  ever  had  under  whom  it  had  gained 
success  or  established  reputation  had  been  selected 
from  its  own  ranks,  and  had  served  in  it  throughout 
the  war.  General  Sheridan  had  commanded  with 
distinction  a division  of  infantry  in  the  Western 
army  ; but  in  those  days  men  engaged  in  active  serv- 
ice had  few  opportunities  of  learning  the  history  or 
career  of  officers  with  whom  they  were  not  closely 
associated,  and  very  little  was  known  of  the  details 
of  his  service  and  the  gallant  conduct  for  which  he 
had  been  noted.  It  was  not  known  that  he  had  ever 
served  with  or  in  command  of  cavalry,  and  the  prej- 
udice that  has  always  existed,  and  will  always  exist, 
among  mounted  troops  against  being  placed  under  the 
orders  of  an  officer  whose  experience  has  been  ob- 
tained in  other  arms  of  the  service,  affected  to  some 
extent  his  reception  by  his  new  command.  Again, 
some  experiences  from  which  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac had  previously  suffered  had  not  induced  the 
belief  that  the  West  was  the  point  of  the  compass 
from  which  the  advent  of  wise  men  bringing  the 
rich  gifts  of  success  and  victory  was  to  be  confi- 
dently expected. 

His  appearance  at  that  time  to  a casual  observer 
or  as  seen  under  circumstances  that  did  not  call  for 
the  exhibition  of  the  qualities  that  distinguished  him 
when  actively  discharging  his  more  arduous  duties 
was  not  impressive  and  did  not  in  any  degree  indi- 
cate the  man  he  was.  Short  and  very  slight  in  figure, 
looking  much  younger  than  his  actual  age,  which 
was  then  thirty-three,  reticent,  and  entirely  without 
self-assertion  in  speech  and  manner,  he  was  not 
known  to  or  appreciated  by  his  men  and  officers 
until  the  active  service  in  the  field  which  soon  be- 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


95 

gan  displayed  his  many  excellent  qualities  as  a 
cavalry  leader. 

On  inspecting  his  new  command  he  found  the 
men  to  be  in  good  condition  and  well-disciplined  and 
equipped,  but  badly  supplied  with  horses,  and  these 
were  thin  and  much  run  down  by  excessive  work. 
In  the  past  winter,  as  before,  while  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery had  been  at  rest  and  enjoying  opportunities 
for  refitting  and  replacing  the  losses  caused  by  field 
service,  the  work  of  the  cavalry  had  been  more  labo- 
rious and  exacting  than  that  required  in  active  service, 
and  in  all  times,  and  under  the  severest  conditions 
of  the  weather,  a continuous  picket  line  of  mounted 
troops,  about  sixty  miles  in  length,  had  been  main- 
tained around  the  entire  army;  and  to  furnish  these 
outposts  with  sufficient  men  required  the  constant 
service  of  one  third  of  the  effective  cavalry  force, 
and  occasionally  of  one  half. 

While  hard  for  men  to  support  this  work,  the 
effect  upon  the  horses  was  most  injurious,  as,  taken 
from  their  camps  when  they  were  at  the  best  poorly 
supplied  with  forage,  they  were  at  the  outposts  dur- 
ing tours  of  duty  each  of  three  consecutive  days, 
obliged  to  be  kept  constantly  saddled,  entirely  un- 
protected from  storm  and  cold,  at  work  day  and 
night,  and  receiving  about  a half  ration  of  grain, 
without  hay  or  long  forage  of  any  kind.  The  effect 
of  this  hard  work  was  soon  apparent,  and  no  other 
service  could  be  had  from  the  animals  whose  few 
days  of  rest  in  camp,  in  the  intervals  of  this  work, 
were  not  sufficient  to  restore  their  condition,  and 
mounted  drills  and  proper  training  of  men  and 
horses  became  impossible. 

The  injurious  effect  of  this  use  of  cavalry  was 


96 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


but  too  evident,  and  the  first  effort  made  by  General 
Sheridan  after  assuming  command  was  to  insist  upon 
the  abandonment  of  this  excessive  picket  duty,  and 
in  this,  after  much  discussion  and  against  strong 
opposition,  he  succeeded,  and,  collecting  his  men  in 
their  division  camps,  he  obtained  for  them  and  their 
horses  a rest  of  some  two  weeks,  in  which  they 
could  be  brought  into  condition  to  take  an  effective 
part  in  the  campaign  that  was  soon  to  open.  It 
' need  not  be  said  how  grateful  this  relief  from  har- 
’ assing,  injurious,  and  useless  labor  was  to  the  com- 
j mand,  and  this  effort  of  their  new  commander  for 
j the  welfare  of  his  troops  was  cordially  appreciated, 
i This  change  in  the  duties  of  the  cavalry  of  the  army 
j was  but  the  first  of  many  changes  in  their  methods 
! of  service  and  employment  that  General  Sheridan 
. saw  were  necessary,  and  which  caused  frequent  dis- 
cussions between  General  Meade,  who  was  much  at- 
tached to  the  old  system,  and  himself. 

General  Sheridan  maintained  that  the  functions 
of  a large  body  of  cavalry  attached  to  an  active  army 
were  not  limited  to  the  guarding  of  wagon  trains,  the 
furnishingof  advanced  guards  and  flankers  to  columns 
of  infantry,  and  the  protection  by  heavy  lines  of 
pickets  of  the  repose  and  tranquillity  of  infantry 
and  artillery  at  rest,  and,  above  all,  he  strongly  in- 
sisted that  his  duties  as  commander  of  a corps  of 
cavalry  could  not  be  performed  by  his  attendance  at 
the  headquarters  of  the  commanding  general,  and 
transmitting  to  different  detachments  of  the  force 
such  orders  as  might  be  given  him. 

\ It  was  his  belief  that  trains  and  the  flanks  and 
I rear  of  an  army  could  be  best  protected  from  attacks 
j of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  by  seeking  out  and  fighting 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


97 


that  force  in  the  field,  that  the  fronts  of  infantry 
columns  and  lines  should  protect  themselves  and 
leave  cavalry  free  for  independent  operations,  and 
that  a large  force  of  cavalry,  properly  organized  and 
led,  acting  as  a unit,  could  be  used  effectively  and  with 
good  results  against  both  the  cavalry  and  infantry 
of  the  enemy,  while  the  same  force  broken  into  de- 
tachments, and  operating  at  different  points,  with- 
out plan  or  combined  action,  would  be  almost,  if  not 
entirely  useless. 

These  differences  of  opinion  continued,  and  the 
cavalry  corps  was  to  some  extent  hampered  by  a 
partial  continuance  of  the  old  system,  until  the  time 
of  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness,  when  General  Meade 
saw  fit  to  withdraw  his  opposition  to  the  views  of 
General  Sheridan,  and  thenceforth  the  cavalry  corps 
became  in  fact  an  organized,  compact,  and  actually 
existent  force,  with  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of 
other  army  corps,  and  was  consequently  able  to  per- 
form better  service  and  accomplish  greater  results 
than  at  any  previous  period  of  its  history. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1864  the  cav- 
alry corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  contained  an 
effective  force  of  ten  thousand  officers  and  men  who 
could  be  put  in  line  of  battle.  The  men  were  well 
disciplined,  and  a majority  had  seen  from  two  to 
three  years  of  active  service;  all  were  well  armed 
and  equipped  and  fairly  mounted,  as  the  two  weeks 
of  relief  from  picket  duty  that  had  been  obtained, 
and  more  abundant  forage,  had  done  much  to  restore 
the  condition  of  the  horses.  It  was  organized  in 
three  divisions,  about  equal  in  strength,  which  were 
commanded  by  Generals  Torbert,  Gregg,  and  Wilson, 
in  the  order  named. 


98 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


On  May  4,  1864,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  moved 
out  of  the  lines  it  had  occupied  through  the  past 
winter,  and,  crossing  the  Rapidan  River,  entered  the 
Wilderness  country  on  the  south  bank  of  that  river, 
where  it  was  expected  that  the  enemy  would  be  met, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  General  Sheridan, 
with  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  of  his  corps,  was 
in  position  at  Chancellorsville,  in  front  of  and  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  army. 

The  Third  Division,  under  General  Wilson,  had 
been  detached,  and  at  the  crossing  of  the  river  had 
preceded  the  right  of  the  army,  and  on  the  5th  re- 
ceived orders  direct  from  General  Meade  to  make  an 
extended  reconnoissance  in  his  front.  In  the  execu- 
tion of  this  order  General  Wilson  met  a large  force 
of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  m his  front,  and  as  he  at- 
tempted to  fall  back  found  that  the  infantry  of  the 
enemy,  advancing  against  our  army,  had  occupied 
the  roads  in  his  rear.  The  first  known  of  this  condi- 
tion of  affairs  was  learned  by  a message  from  General 
Meade,  who  reported  that  Wilson  had  been  cut  off, 
and  ordered  that  troops  be  sent  to  his  relief.  Gen- 
eral Wilson,  after  a brisk  fight,  succe'eded  in  getting 
around  the  right  flank  of  the  cavalry  in  his  front  and 
fell  back  on  the  road  to  Todd’s  Tavern,  being  severe- 
ly pressed  by  the  enemy  as  he  retreated. 

Presuming  this  road  would  be  that  on  which  he 
would  retire.  General  Sheridan  sent  the  Second  Divi- 
sion, under  Gregg,  to  Todd’s  Tavern,  where  the  Third 
was  met,  and  this  fresh  force  attacking  briskly,  the 
enemy  was  soon  driven  back  and  pursued  until  night 
put  an  end  to  the  engagement. 

On  the  6th  the  cavalry,  after  successfully  holding 
its  lines  against  an  attack,  was  ordered  to  the  rear  to 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


99 


protect  the  trains,  which  were  erroneously  supposed 
to  be  in  danger,  and  on  the  7th  were  heavily  engaged 
with  the  enemy’s  cavalry  at  Todd’s  Tavern  and  lost 
many  men  in  retaking  the  position  abandoned  the 
day  before. 

The  infantry  of  the  army  had  during  these  three 
days  been  engaged  in  the  actions  that  are  known  as 
the  battles  of  the  Wilderness,  and  no  decisive  result 
having  been  obtained,  a general  movement  to  the  left 
was  ordered,  with  the  intention  of  occupying  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House  and  thus  turning  the  right 
flank  of  the  Confederate  army. 

This  movement  of  the  infantry  commenced  on  the 
night  of  the  7th,  and  General  Sheridan  gave  orders 
to  his  cavalry  to  commence  operations  at  daylight 
on  the  8th,  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  the  roads 
clear  and  protecting  the  march  of  the  infantry  col- 
umns from  interference  by  the  enemy.  The  First  and 
Second  Divisions,  then  at  Todd’s  Tavern,  were  by 
different  roads  to  advance  to  Snell’s  bridge  over  the 
Po  River,  about  two  miles  in  front  of  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,  being  joined  there  by  the  Third  Di- 
vision, that  had  been  ordered  to  occupy  the  Court 
House,  and  then  move  out  to  the  bridge  to  hold  that 
point  until  the  infantry  had  occupied  the  new  posi- 
tions and  established  its  lines.  Had  these  orders 
been  executed,  there  is  but  little  doubt  that  the 
enemy  could  have  been  held  in  check  for  a sufficient 
time  to  have  permitted  our  infantry,  marching  on  a 
clear  and  unobstructed  road,  to  have  reached  Spott- 
sylvania Court  House  in  advance  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  series  of  costly  struggles  that  were  afterward 
requisite  to  occupy  that  point  would  have  been  un- 
necessary. 


lOO 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


But  one  division  (the  Third),  however,  was  able  to 
act  on  the  orders  it  received,  for  on  the  night  of  the 
7th,  as  the  infantry  were  moving  through  Todd’s 
Tavern,  General  Meade  arrived  there  some  time  be- 
fore daylight,  and  in  the  absence  of  General  Sheri- 
dan, whose  headquarters  were  at  a remote  point  where 
he  could  be  in  communication  with  the  Third  Divi- 
sion, gave  orders  to  the  commanders  of  the  First  and 
Second  Divisions  that  prevented  the  execution  of  the 
intended  plan  and  exposed  the  Third  Division  to 
serious  and  unexpected  danger. 

The  First  Division  was  ordered  to  take  the  advance 
of  the  infantry  column  on  the  direct  road  to  the  Court 
House,  and  the  Second  Division,  instead  of  proceed- 
ing to  Snell’s  bridge,  was  ordered  to  the  front  to  es- 
tablish a picket  line  to  protect  the  infantry  column 
in  its  march.  These  changes  of  instructions  and  the 
movements  that  followed  them  were  the  cause  of 
great  delay  and  loss  of  life,  and  defeated  the  opera- 
tion in  which  the  troops  were  then  engaged.  The 
moving  column  of  infantry  was  halted  for  a long  time 
to  allow  the  First  Division  to  pick  its  way  through  the 
ranks  and  get  to  the  front,  and  as  this  had  to  be  done 
in  an  intensely  dark  night  and  on  a narrow  road 
bordered  on  both  sides  by  the  almost  impenetrable 
thickets  that  cover  the  AVilderness  country,  great 
confusion  was  caused  in  both  infantry  and  cavalry, 
and  much  valuable  time  consumed  that  was  of  vital 
importance  in  an  operation  the  success  of  which  de- 
pended upon  rapidity  of  movement.  When  at  last 
the  march  was  resumed  the  advance  was  slow,  as  the 
road  was  narrow  and  the  woods  on  all  sides  prevented 
any  formation  of  cavalry  lines  or  the  deployment  of 
mounted  skirmishers  or  flankers. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


lor 

The  cavalry  of  necessity  were  dismounted,  and 
the  long  columns  of  led  horses  that  could  be  placed 
only  on  the  roads  were  an  embarrassment  and  incum- 
brance to  all  the  troops.  The  Second  Division  was 
uselessly  employed  and  saw  no  enemy  to  attack,  as 
the  Confederate  army,  as  soon  as  the  movement  of  , 
ours  was  known,  was  pressed  as  rapidly  as  possible 
to  the  point  for  which  we  aimed,  and  succeeded,  in 
the  absence  of  opposition,  in  first  reaching  it. 

The  Third  Division  alone  executed  the  orders  of 
the  previous  night,  and,  driving  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
before  it,  reached  Spottsylvania  Court  House  before 
9 A.  M,,  and  was  advancing  out  to  Snell’s  bridge  when 
it  encountered  the  columns  of  the  enemy’s  infantry 
and  was  compelled  to  fall  back  with  some  loss.  By 
the  time  the  troops  moving  from  Todd’s  Tavern 
reached  the  Court  House  it  was  occupied  in  force  by 
Longstreet’s  corps,  upon  whom  neither  our  cavalry 
nor  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  assaulted  the  position, 
could  make  any  impression. 

Later  in  the  day,  when  Generals  Meade  and 
Sheridan  met,  a very  serious  discussion  as  to  these 
movements  of  the  cavalry  arose,  and  the  former,  who 
on  trying  occasions  was  not  always  temperate  in  lan- 
guage or  just  in  criticism,  severely  blamed  the  cav- 
alry for  alleged  inefficiency,  and  charged  particularly 
that  it  had  impeded  the  march  of  the  infantry  on  the 
road  to  Spottsylvania.  General  Sheridan  warmly  de- 
fended the  conduct  of  his  troops,  justly  remarking 
that  he  was  not  responsible  for  placing  the  First 
Division  in  front  of  the  infantry,  for  the  inaction  of 
the  Second,  and  the  exposure  of  the  Third  to  disaster, 
as  these  had  resulted  from  orders  given  without  his 
knowledge,  and  overruling  those  which  he  had  issued. 


102 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


He  added  that  operations  of  the  nature  he  had 
been  engaged  in  and  the  interference  of  higher  au- 
thority with  his  plans  and  orders  without  his  knowl- 
edge would  soon  render  the  best  troops  worthless  ; 
that  if  allowed  to  exercise  his  proper  authority  and 
control  over  the  troops  under  his  orders,  he  was  sat- 
isfied that  he  could  defeat  the  Confederate  cavalry, 
and  in  that  way  best  protect  the  army  and  trains 
from  attacks  or  surprises  by  that  force;  but  if  the 
practice  of  giving  orders  to  the  troops,  or  directing 
movements  without  advice  or  notice  to  him,  was  con- 
tinued, he  would  decline  any  further  responsibility 
for  the  corps,  or  any  part  in  its  direction. 

The  result  of  this  conversation  was  more  fortu- 
nate than  that  which  generally  attends  a sharp  con- 
troversy between  a superior  and  a subordinate  officer, 
for  when  General  Meade  shortly  afterward  reported 
this  interview  to  General  Grant,  and  mentioned  that 
Sheridan  had  expressed  himself  as  confident  of  beat- 
ing the  Confederate  cavalry.  General  Grant  quietly 
remarked : “ Did  he  say  so  ? Then  let  him  go  out 
and  do  it.”  And  from  the  day  this  brief  but  important 
order  was  given  the  last  of  the  obstructions  that 
had  prevented  the  full  development  of  the  cavalry 
corps  ceased  to  exist. 

On  the  same  day  orders  were  given  to  concen- 
trate the  corps  and  to  operate  against  the  enemy’s 
cavalry,  with  further  instructions  that  when  supplies 
were  exhausted  the  troops  should  march  to  Haxall’s 
Landing  on  the  James  River,  after  communicating 
with  General  Butler,  who  was  then  carrying  on  his 
campaign  against  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  and, 
procuring  supplies,  return  to  the  army. 

On  the  night  of  the  8th  of  May  the  three  divi- 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


103 


sions  of  the  cavalry  corps  were  brought  together  at 
the  Aldrich  House,  in  rear  of  the  lines  of  the  army, 
and  there  supplied  as  far  as  practicable  from  the 
stores  with  the  trains.  Sufficient  ammunition  and 
three  days’  rations  for  the  men  were  obtained,  but 
of  forage  only  half  of  one  day’s  supply  could  be 
procured,  and  there  was  little  prospect  of  any  addi- 
tional supply  for  many  days. 

The  intended  movement  that  would  deprive  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  of  the  presence  of  the  bulk 
of  its  mounted  force  at  a time  when  it  was  about  to 
engage  in  a series  of  severe  engagements  has  been 
criticised  as  a strategic  error  by  some  who  hold 
that  an  army  should  under  all  circumstances  be  held 
together  in  face  of  the  enemy,  but  many  reasons  con- 
curred to  render  it  desirable.  The  country  in  which 
the  army  was  then  operating  was  peculiarly  unsuit- 
able for  the  operations  of  cavalry,  covered  as  it  was 
for  miles  in  every  direction  with  dense  thickets  that 
were  impenetrable  to  horsemen,  and  intersected  by 
few  and  narrow  paths  which  permitted  of  movement 
only  in  long-extended  and  thin  columns,  which  could 
not  be  deployed.  The  question  of  forage  for  the 
animals  was  also  a controlling  one,  for  this  country, 
which  for  three  years  had  been  constantly  occupied 
by  one  or  th^  other*  of  the  contending  armies,  had 
been  stripped  of  all  resources,  and  the  wagon  trains 
of  the  army,  which  were  now  its  sole  dependence  for 
supplies,  were  utterly  unable  to  provide  and  dis- 
tribute the  forage  required  for  the  wants  of  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  horses,  amounting  to  nearly  one 
hundred  tons  each  day.  As  has  been  seen,  at  the 
end  of  four  days’  field  service  but  one  half  day’s  ra- 
tion of  forage  could  now  be  supplied,  and  by  that 


104 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  stores  were  exhausted.  The  best  answer  to 
such  objections,  however,  is  the  practical  one — that 
the  intended  operation  was  in  all  respects  successful, 
and  obtained,  at  slight  cost  in  men  or  material,  every 
result  for  v/hich  it  was  designed. 

At  a conference  with  his  division  commanders 
General  Sheridan  explained  the  plan  of  proposed 
operations  and  the  route  he  expected  to  follow,  and 
laid  particular  stress  upon  the  fact  that  the  expedi- 
tion was  not  to  be  a simple  raid  through  the  enemy’s 
country  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  supplies  and 
cutting  communications,  but  was  in  the  fullest  sense 
a hostile  movement,  the  main  purpose  of  which  was 
to  meet,  engage,  and  make  every  effort  to  defeat 
the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  wherever  it  could  be  found. 

Though  General  Sheridan  had  been  but  a short 
time  with  his  command,  he  had  studied  and  appreci- 
ated its  qualities,  and  was  satisfied  that  he  had  un- 
der his  orders  a disciplined  and  reliable  force,  that 
only  needed  opportunity  to  render  efficient  service, 
and  that  was  in  every  way  equal,  if  not  superior,  to 
the  enemy  he  expected  to  encounter,  and  in  the  en- 
gagements that  had  occurred  since  crossing  the 
Rapidan  his  troops  had  on  every  occasion  been  suc- 
cessful when  engaged  with  the  Confederate  cavalry. 

In  the  early  periods  of  the  war,  and  while  the 
Federal  cavalry  was  new  to  the  field,  their  enemies 
were  undoubtedly  better  mounted  and  individually 
better  horsemen,  and  these  circumstances,  together 
with  their  knowledge  of  the  country,  gave  them 
great  advantages  in  the  scouts,  skirmishes,  raids,  and 
actions  by  small  detachments  that  for  nearly  two 
years  comprised  the  operations  of  the  cavalry.  As 
time  went  on,  the  progress  of  organization  and  dis- 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


105 


cipline  and  constant  service  in  the  field  rapidly- 
trained  and  developed  our  horsemen,  and  early  in 
1863  they  proved  themselves  to  be  as  effective  sol- 
diers as  their  antagonists,  possessed  of  better  drill 
and  discipline,  and  their  superiors  in  all  actions 
where  large  bodies  of  troops  were  massed  and  en- 
gaged in  actual  personal  conflict. 

The  troops  also  had  already  acquired  confidence 
in  their  leader,  and  anticipated  success  under  his 
command.  They  had  observed  and  appreciated  his 
efforts  to  relieve  them  of  useless  and  wearing  toil ; 
they  even  perceived  that  they  were  better  supplied 
and  cared  for  than  at  any  previous  period,  and 
while  no  engagements  of  great  importance  or  seri- 
ous consequence  had  yet  occurred,  the  success  that 
attended  every  operation,  and  the  constant  and  in- 
spiriting presence  on  the  field  of  their  leader  on  all 
occasions  where  active  and  dangerous  service  was 
required,  gave  promise  of  vigorous  and  successful 
campaigns  in  the  future. 

On  the  morning  of  May  9,  1864,  the  cavalry  corps 
began  the  expedition  into  the  country  of  the  enemy. 
The  three  divisions,  after  some  detachments  were 
made  to  remain  with  the  main  army  and  the  horses 
unfit  for  hard  service  were  weeded  out,  contained 
nine  thousand  men,  and  were  accompanied  by  seven 
batteries  of  horse  artillery  and  a train  of  ammuni- 
tion wagons.  For  forage  and  rations  other  than 
those  the  men  carried  on  their  persons,  dependence 
was  placed  on  what  might  be  taken  from  the  enemy, 
and  from  this  source  the  needed  supplies  were 
readily  obtained.  The  corps  in  one  long  column, 
nearly  twelve  miles  in  length,  marched  eastward 
until  the  telegraph  road  leading  southwardly  from 


io6 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Fredericksburg  was  reached,  and'thence,  turning  to 
the  south,  pursued  that  road  through  Thornburg  to 
Anderson’s  crossing  of  the  North  Anna  River,  which 
was  reached,  after  a march  of  thirty-three  miles,  just 
as  the  sun  went  down. 

The  right  flank  of  Lee’s  army,  which  was  then 
occupying  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  engaged 
with  our  infantry,  w'as  passed  without  any  contest, 
and  nothing  was  heard  of  the  enemy  until  the  rear 
of  the  column  had  crossed  the  Ta  River  at  Thorn- 
burg, where  a strong  attack  was  made  by  Gordon’s 
brigade  of  Confederate  cavalry.  General  Stuart, 
the  commander  of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  did  not 
learn  of  this  movement  until  a large  portion  of  our 
column  had  reached  a point  south  of  the  position  he 
was  occupying  in  rear  of  the  Confederate  army,  and 
he  therefore  marched  with  the  greater  part  of  his 
force  directly  southward  to  Davenport’s  bridge  over 
the  North  Anna,  intending  thence  to  proceed  to  Beaver 
Dam  Station,  on  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  where 
was  placed  an  important  depot  of  supplies,  and  then 
oppose  the  head  of  our  column.  He  ordered  a strong 
and  continued  attack  to  be  made  on  the  rear  of  our 
column  in  the  hope  that  he  could  succeed  in  so  delay- 
ing our  march  as  to  reach  the  threatened  point  in 
advance  of  our  troops.  A brigade  of  the  Second 
Division  which  acted  as  rear  guard  of  the  column 
was  able  to  resist  every  attack  from  the  pursuing 
force  and  prevent  any  interruption  of  the  march,  so 
that  the  advance  of  the  main  column  reached  the 
station  at  Beaver  Dam  without  meeting  the  enemy 
in  any  force  and  found  it  entirely  unprotected.  Gen- 
eral Custer,  who  was  in  command  of  the  leading 
brigade,  on  reaching  the  station  rescued  four  hun- 


,1 

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ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


107 


dred  of  our  men  who  had  been  captured  in  the  Wil- 
derness battles  and  who  were  on  their  way  to  Rich- 
mond in  charge  of  a guard.  Two  locomotives,  three 
trains  of  cars,  eight  miles  of  railroad  and  telegraph 
lines,  a million  rations,  a large  quantity  of  forage, 
and  nearly  all  the  medical  stores  of  the  Confederate 
army  were  destroyed,  reserving  only  what  was  neces- 
sary to  furnish  full  supplies  to  our  own  troops. 

That  night  the  First  Division  was  encamped  on 
the  south  bank  of  the  river,  the  other  two  on  the 
north  side,  and  the  Second  Division  was  engaged 
until  a late  hour  with  the  enemy  that  had  been  fol- 
lowing the  rear  guard.  In  the  morning  the  Second 
and  Third  Divisions  were  again  attacked  while  cross- 
ing the  river,  but  repulsed  the  enemy  with  small 
loss,  and  the  First  Division  encountered  the  skir- 
mishers of  Stuart’s  force,  which  was  approaching  the 
station  from  Davenport’s  bridge. 

At  Beaver  Dam  Station,  where  our  troops  were 
soon  massed,  they  were  between  Stuart  and  Rich- 
mond, and  could  reach  that  city  by  a march  of  thirty 
miles  over  a good  and  unobstructed  road,  and  Stu- 
art— who  was  much  perplexed  by  the  movements  of 
our  force,  which  did  not,  as  on  previous  raids  made 
by  the  cavalry  of  both  armies,  seek  to  avoid  an  en- 
gagement with  a pursuing  force — at  last  determined 
to  throw  his  troops  between  our  columns  and  Rich- 
mond, and,  passing  around  our  rear  with  all  his  com.- 
mand,  he  pressed  forward  toward  Richmond  by  a cir- 
cuitous and  much  longer  road  than  that  followed 
by  his  adversary,  who,  after  an  easy  march  of  eight- 
een miles,  crossed  the  South  Anna  River  at  Ground 
Squirrel  bridge  on  the  afternoon  of  May  loth  and 
went  into  camp  on  the  south  bank,  where  a plentiful 


io8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


supply  of  forage  was  obtained.  No  considerable 
body  of  the  enemy  was  met  during  the  day,  and  the 
few  skirmishers  that  hung  about  the  head  and  rear 
of  the  column  for  purposes  of  observation  were  not 
in  sufficient  strength  to  cause  any  delay  and  but  a 
trifling  loss. 

At  three  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  May  iith  a 
brigade  from  the  Second  Division  marched  to  Ash- 
land Station,  on  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad,  some 
eight  miles  east  from  the  camp  of  the  past  night, 
and,  driving  off  a small  force  of  the  enemy  which 
occupied  the  place,  destroyed  the  station,  some  sup- 
plies, a locomotive  and  train,  and  did  considerable 
injury  to  the  roadbed.  While  this  work  was  going 
on,  the  head  of  Stuart’s  column,  which  was  pushing 
forward  to  Richmond,  reached  Ashland,  and  a brisk 
skirmish  occurred,  attended  with  heavy  loss  to  both 
sides.  Our  troops  fell  back,  as  ordered  in  the  event 
of  meeting  a superior  force  of  the  enemy,  and,  march- 
ing southward  along  the  railway,  burning  such 
bridges  as  were  met  and  skirmishing  with  a pursu- 
ing force,  joined  the  main  column  at  Allen’s  Station, 
where  the  road  from  Ground  Squirrel  bridge  to 
Richmond  intersects  the  railway. 

This  unexpected  appearance  of  what  he  believed 
to  be  a large  force  of  our  troops  at  Ashland  had  the 
effect  of  making  General  Stuart  so  uncertain  as  to 
our  movements  that  he  detached  two  brigades  to 
follow  and  observe  this  brigade,  while,  with  the  rest. 
of  his  command,  he  hurried  on  toward  Richmond 
and  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Yellow  Tavern  on  the 
Brook  turnpike,  nine  miles  north  of  the  city,  in 
advance  of  our  troops,  and  there,  placing  his  men  in 
a defensive  position,  awaited  our  attack. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC.  log 

Sheridan’s  First  Division,  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Merritt,  led  the  attack,  and  the  enemy  were 
driven  back  several  hundred  yards  to  the  east  of  the 
turnpike,  but  there  rallied,  and  for  some  time  firmly 
held  the  ground.  The  Third  Division  and  a brigade 
of  the  Second  were  formed  on  Merritt’s  right,  and 
a general  assault  by  the  whole  line  was  made.  On 
our  left  were  two  brigades  of  the  First  Division  dis- 
mounted, and  the  right  consisted  of  the  brigades  of 
Generals  Custer  of  the  First  and  Chapman  of  the 
Third  Division  mounted,  and  supported  by  another 
brigade  of  the  Third.  The  mounted  troops  charged 
into  and  through  the  left  of  the  enemy  and  his  artil- 
lery, capturing  two  pieces  and  many  prisoners,  and 
the  dismounted  brigades,  advancing  at  the  same  time 
and  pouring  in  a heavy  fire,  drove  back  and  put  to 
flight  the  remainder  of  the  enemy.  General  Gregg 
at  the  same  time  charged  and  routed  the  force  that 
had  been  sent  from  Ashland  to  attack  our  rear,  and 
when  the  engagement  was  concluded  early  in  the 
afternoon  the  road  to  Richmond  was  clear,  and  not 
an  enemy  was  to  be  seen  in  front  of  any  portion  of 
our  lines.  The  losses  on  both  sides  were  heavy,  but 
those  of  the  Confederates,  who  left  most  of  their 
dead  and  wounded  on  the  field,  exceeded  ours,  and 
they  also  lost  many  prisoners.  General  Stuart,  the 
commander  of  their  cavalry  corps,  was  mortally 
wounded,  and  General  Gordon,  commanding  a bri- 
gade in  the  force  that  attacked  our  rear,  was  killed. 

A reconnoissance  toward  Richmond  drove  from 
the  outer  line  of  the  intrenchments  about  that  city 
the  small  force  by  which  it  was  occupied,  and  within 
this  line  a road  was  found  by  wdiich  it  was  thought 
the  command  could  be  marched  to  Fair  Oaks,  a few 


I lO 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


miles  east  of  Richmond — a desirable  point  to  occupy 
if  the  reports  that  had  been  received  from  inhabit- 
ants were  true,  that  General  Butler  had  with  his  army 
reached  a point  on  the  south  side  of  the  James  River, 
within  four  miles  of  Richmond.  About  midnight  the 
troops  moved  from  the  Yellow  Tavern,  and,  march- 
ing down  the  Brook  turnpike,  passed  through  the 
first  line  of  intrenchments  and  were  formed  in  a large 
open  field  in  front  of  the  second  line  and  within 
three  miles  of  the  city. 

No  opposition  was  met  in  this  movement,  but 
on  reaching  the  ground  where  the  troops  were  to  be 
formed  it  appeared  that  the  enemy,  anticipating  such 
a change  in  our  position,  had  placed  there  a large 
number  of  torpedoes  or  loaded  shells  connected  by 
wires  or  cords  attached  to  friction  tubes  inserted  in 
the  shells,  which  would  explode  when  these  connec- 
tions were  entangled  about  the  feet  of  horses  or  men- 

Some  horses  were  killed  and  men  wounded  by 
these  devices,  which  in  the  darkness  it  was  difficult 
to  avoid,  so  the  prisoners  who  had  been  taken  were 
brought  to  the  front,  and,  under  a strong  guard  and 
with  some  compulsion,  they  v/ere  placed  at  work  to 
search  out  and  remove  the  weapons  their  comrades 
had  prepared  for  their  enemy.  Before  daylight  the 
torpedoes  were  all  discovered  and  removed,  and  for 
safe  keeping  were  carefully  stored  in  the  cellar  of 
the  owner  of  the  property,  v/ho  had  actively  assisted 
in  the  preparation  of  what  he  had  called  “Yankee 
traps.” 

The  presence  of  our  troops  in  so  threatening  a 
position  caused  great  excitement  and  alarm  in  Rich- 
mond, where  an  assault  was  hourly  expected,  and 
every  possible  exertion  was  made  to  defend  the  city. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


1 1 r 


The  second  line  of  works  was  well  supplied  with 
artillery  and  four  to  five  thousand  irregular  troops 
were  placed  in  the  intrenchments  commanded  by 
General  Bragg,  and  during  the  night  these  were  re- 
enforced by  three  brigades  of  infantry  from  the 
army  that  was  opposing  General  Butler  on  the 
James  River.  The  main  body  of  the  cavalry  force 
that  had  been  defeated  at  the  Yellow  Tavern,  now 
under  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  had  retreated  to  Ash- 
land, and  thence  moved  to  Mechanicsville,  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  where  it  partially 
destroyed  the  Meadow  bridges  over  that  stream,  and, 
holding  a position  in  rear  of  the  left  of  our  cavalry, 
hoped  to  prevent  any  movement  toward  the  James 
River,  w'hile  one  brigade  still  hung  upon  our  right 
and  rear  to  close  the  road  by  which  we  had  ad- 
vanced. The  night  was  very  dark,  and  this  and 
heavy  rains  made  the  march  from  Yellow  Tavern 
slow  and  tedious,  but  by  daylight  of  the  12th  the 
troops  were  in  position,  and  the  Third  Division  was 
advancing  toward  Fair  Oaks.  An  assault  was  made 
upon  the  enemy’s  works,  which  were  found  to  be 
strongly  defended.  Our  troops  were  here  repulsed, 
and  before  the  attack  could  be  renewed  it  was 
learned  that  the  reports  of  the  presence  of  But- 
ler’s forces  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Richmond 
were  untrue,  and  no  useful  purpose  would  be  served 
by  pursuing  the  Fair  Oaks  road.  The  First  Division 
was  now  ordered  to  attack  and  force  a crossing  at 
the  Meadow  bridges,  and  so  repair  them  that  they 
could  be  used  by  the  troops.  The  flooring  of  the 
bridges  had  been  destroyed,  but  the  heavy  rains  of 
the  previous  night  and  continued  showers  during 
the  morning  had  prevented  their  being  burned,  and 


I 12 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  stringpieces  and  cross  ties  were  not  injured.  A 
working  party  was  at  once  engaged  in  making  a new 
flooring  with  fence  rails  and  such  boards  and  other 
timber  as  could  be  obtained  from  neighboring  barns 
and  houses,  and  protected  as  far  as  possible  by  the 
fire  of  the  remainder  of  the  division.  This  work  was 
difficult  and  dangerous,  as  it  was  performed  under 
the  fire  of  the  enemy,  who  swept  the  bridge  with 
their  artillery  and  small  arms.  Two  regiments  dis- 
mounted, crossed  over  on  the  stringpieces,  and  at- 
tacked the  defending  force,  but  were  driven  back 
after  a spirited  struggle.  While  this  was  going  on 
the  work  had  been  rapidly  pressed,  and  in  a short 
time  General  Merritt,  with  his  entire  division,  was 
able  to  cross  dismounted,  and  again  attacking  the 
Confederate  force,  drove  it  from  the  line  of  tempo- 
rary breastworks  it  had  thrown  up  to  cover  the 
bridge,  and  after  putting  it  to  flight  pursued  in  the 
direction  of  Gaines’s  Mill. 

While  the  First  Division  was  thus  engaged  a large 
body  of  Confederate  infantry  moved  out  from  their 
intrenchments  and,  supported  by  the  fire  of  their 
artillery,  attacked  the  lines  of  the  Second  and  Third 
Divisions.  This  attempt  met  with  some  success 
against  the  Third  Division,  which  held  our  left,  but 
the  enemy  soon  came  in  front  of  a heavy  line  of  dis- 
mounted men  of  the  Second  Division,  armed  with  re- 
peating carbines,  which  General  Gregg  had  posted  in 
a thickly  wooded  ravine  in  his  front,  and  this  une.x- 
pected  and  destructive  fire  with  the  shot  and  shell 
from  five  batteries  of  horse  artillery  which  had  been 
concentrated  in  a favorable  position  soon  brought 
the  attacking  force  to  a halt;  and  while  they  were 
hesitating,  the  Third  Division,  which  had  been  rallied. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


II3 

made  a bold  dash  on  their  right  flank,  and  they  were 
driven  back  to  their  intrenchments  after  suffering 
severe  loss.  This  conflict  had  scarcely  ended  when 
the  body  of  cavalry  that  for  two  days  had  been 
hanging  about  the  rear  of  our  column  made  an  at- 
tack down  the  Brook  turnpike,  but  was  evidently 
dispirited,  and  did  not  act  with  much  vigor.  They 
were  quickly  repulsed  and  driven  off  by  one  brigade 
of  the  Second  Division,  and  this  proved  their  last 
effort.  By  twelve  o’clock  the  fighting  in  front  of 
Richmond  was  ended,  and  for  several  hours  the  Sec- 
ond and  Third  Divisions  remained  undisturbed  in  the 
field,  in  view  of  the  enemy’s  lines,  resting  and  graz- 
ing their  horses,  while  the  wagons  and  artillery  were 
being  passed  over  the  bridges  in  rear  of  the  First 
Division,  which  was  pressing  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
tow'ard  Gaines’s  Mill.  About  four  o’clock  they  with- 
drew and  marched  toward  Gainesville,  whence  Gen- 
eral Merritt  had  sent  word  that  he  had  again  met 
the  enemy,  but  before  the  other  troops  arrived  he 
had  driven  off  the  opposing  force,  and  the  corps 
passed  the  night  in  camp  undisturbed. 

This  engagement  of  the  12th  of  May  was  a severe 
blow  to  the  enemy,  for  not  only  did  their  cavalry 
sustain  a second  and  severe  defeat,  but  their  in- 
fantry force  defending  Richmond  was  beaten  in  the 
open  field  with  heavy  loss. 

The  troops  under  General  Sheridan,  after  an  un- 
disturbed march  from  Gaines’s  Mill,  reached  Haxall’s 
Landing,  on  the  James  River,  on  the  14th  of  May, 
and  communicated  with  General  Butler,  whose  army 
occupied  Bermuda  Hundred,  on  the  south  bank.  Here 
the  wounded  and  prisoners  were  sent  North,  and 
supplies  of  rations,  forage,  and  ammunition  obtained, 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


I 14 

and  on  the  night  of  the  17th  the  corps  started  on  its 
return  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Some  demon- 
strations were  made  on  the  return  march  to  convey 
the  impression  that  another  movement  on  Richmond 
was  intended,  which  served  to  give  time  to  repair 
the  bridge  over  the  Pamunkey  River  at  White  House 
and  inflict  further  damage  to  the  enemy’s  railroads. 
On  the  22d  the  whole  corps  was  united  at  White 
House  and  crossed  the  river  on  that  day,  and  on  the 
25th  reached  Chesterfield  Station,  on  the  North  Anna 
River,  to  which  point  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
advanced  after  the  severe  battles  at  Spottsylvania 
Court  House. 

Thus  ended  the  first  expedition  made  by  the 
cavalry  since  it  had  been  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Sheridan,  and  the  result  was  highly 
commended  by  Generals  Grant  and  Meade.  The 
movement  had  been  a complete  success,  and  all  the 
purposes  for  which  it  was  intended  had  been  accom- 
plished. For  two  weeks  at  a critical  time  our  sup- 
ply departments  had  been  relieved  from  the  heavy 
work  of  subsisting  more  than  ten  thousand  men  and 
horses,  and  for  the  same  time  the  Confederate  cavalry 
had  been  so  occupied  that  it  could  make  no  attempts 
to  impede  or  interfere  with  our  trains  or  the  regular 
supply  of  the  army.  Twenty  days’ supplies  for  Lee's 
army  had  been  destroyed,  his  railroad  communica- 
tions with  Richmond  had  been  several  times  broken, 
and  his  power  for  aggressive  movement  seriously 
impaired  by  anxiety  and  uncertainty  concerning  the 
safety  of  the  rear  of  his  army.  The  Confederate 
cavalry  had  been  kept  incessantly  moving  to  protect 
Richmond  or  defend  itself  and  compelled  to  make 
marches  far  longer  and  more  exhausting  than  those 


ARMY  OF  TFIE  POTOMAC. 


II5 

of  our  troops,  and  wherever  met  had  suffered  de- 
cisive defeat  and  severe  loss,  which  included  the 
death  of  the  most  prominent  and  successful  cavalry- 
general  of  the  Southern  armies.  The  good  results 
of  this  operation  were  not  confined  to  those  ob- 
tained during  the  time  it  continued,  but  had  a last- 
ing effect  upon  the  future  conduct  of  the  Confed- 
erate cavalry,  as  from  that  time  until  the  close  of 
the  war  it  ceased  to  be  distinguished  for  the  enter- 
prise and  boldness  in  aggressive  movement  for 
which  it  was  formerly  remarkable,  and  in  place  of 
the  frequent  and  successful  raids  upon  our  trains 
and  communications  to  which  it  had  been  accus- 
tomed, it  now  found  full  occupation  in  defending 
itself  from  attack  or  attempting  to  check  hostile 
demonstrations  made  by  the  Federal  cavalry  against 
the  enemy’s  lines. 

Our  cavalry  returned  in  excellent  spirits,  and 
though  considerable  loss  had  been  sustained,  the 
success  that  followed  more  than  compensated  for  it. 
The  men  were  confident  in  their  leader,  and  fully 
satisfied  of  their  own  ability  to  meet  and  conquer 
their  opponents  in  the  field  and  to  move  at  will 
through  the  enemy’s  country,  and  while  for  two 
weeks  they  had  been  constantly  at  work,  their 
marches  had  not  been  fatiguing,  their  success  had 
been  decisive,  all  their  wants  had  been  abundantly 
supplied,  and  men  and  horses  returned  in  better 
condition  than  that  which  existed  when  the  move- 
ment began. 

On  the  26th  of  May  a further  movement  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  left  was  ordered,  and  Gen- 
eral Sheridan,  with  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  of 
his  corps,  had  the  advance.  The  Third  Division  was 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


1 16 

sent  to  the  right  of  the  army,  and  then  continued 
practically  detached  from  the  cavalry  corps  and 
acting  under  the  direct  orders  of  General  Meade 
for  a period  of  nearly  two  months.  After  moving 
down  the  north  bank  of  the  Pamunkey  River,  and 
during  the  night  demonstrating  at  several  crossings, 
the  two  divisions,  supported  by  a division  of  infantry, 
were  massed  at  daylight  of  the  27th,  and  a canvas 
pontoon  bridge  was  thrown  over  the  river.  The  First 
Division  soon  passed  the  river  and  vigorously  at- 
tacked a force  of  Confederate  cavalry,  which  was 
driven  back  on  Hanovertown,  and  the  Second  Di- 
vision also  crossing,  the  way  was  clear  for  our  in- 
fantry, which  crossed  on  the  28th  and  took  up  a 
position  in  rear  of  the  cavalry  lines. 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th,  as  much  uncertainty 
existed  concerning  the  position  occupied  by  the  ene- 
my, the  Second  Division  of  cavalry  was  ordered  south- 
ward toward  Mechanicsville,  and  about  a mile  beyond 
Hawes’s  Shop  discovered  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  which 
was  dismounted  and  holding  a line  in  thick  woods, 
defended  by  a breastwork  of  logs  and  fence  rails. 
The  force  found  here  consisted  of  Hampton’s  and 
Fitzhugh  Lee’s  divisions  and  a brigade  of  South 
Carolina  cavalry  armed  with  long-range  rifles,  who 
were  at  first  taken  for  infantry.  Our  men  were 
rapidly  dismounted  and  attacked  the  enemy,  and 
from  noon  until  sunset  a long,  stubborn  and  bloody 
contest  continued,  in  which  neither  side  was  able  to 
obtain  any  decisive  advantage.  The  First  Division, 
that  was  on  the  extreme  right  of  our  lines,  was  or- 
dered to  assist  that  engaged,  but  the  infantry  was  so 
slow  m relieving  it  from  the  lines  it  held  that  but 
one  brigade,  that  of  General  Custer,  came  up  in 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOxMAC. 


II7 

time  to  take  part  in  the  action.  This  was  formed 
in  column  at  the  center  of  General  Gregg’s  line 
and  between  his  two  brigades  ; then  the  whole  force 
charged  together,  and  after  a severe  struggle  car- 
ried the  works  of  the  enemy,  who  retreated,  leaving 
his  dead  and  wounded  in  our  hands,  together  with 
a number  of  prisoners,  from  whom  it  was  learned 
that  the  Confederate  infantry  were  occupying  a line 
about  four  miles  in  rear  of  this  battlefield.  From 
the  prisoners  it  was  also  learned  that  much  of  the 
very  stubborn  resistance  exhibited  in  this  action  was 
due  to  the  presence  in  the  field  of  the  troops  from 
South  Carolina  that  have  been  referred  to.  This 
brigade,  raised  in  South  Carolina  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  had  never  before  left  that  State  or  had  seen 
any  active  service,  and  when  with  full  ranks,  and 
weapons  and  uniforms  all  fresh  and  untarnished  by 
war  or  service,  they  joined  the  veterans  who  had  been 
for  three  years  exposed  to  the  losses  and  trials  of 
active  duty  in  the  field,  their  reception  was  not  of 
the  warmest,  and  it  was  not  thought  that  much 
could  be  expected  from  them. 

The  existence  of  this  prejudice  and  their  own 
desire  to  show  themselves  at  least  the  equals  of  their 
comrades  caused  them  to  exhibit  a desperate  cour- 
age in  this  their  first  engagement,  and,  as  was  said 
by  veterans  on  both  sides,  they  were  too  inexpe- 
rienced to  know  when  they  had  suffered  defeat,  and 
continued  to  resist  long  after  it  was  apparent  that 
the  position  they  held  was  turned  and  efforts  to 
maintain  it  were  hopeless. 

The  army  now  began  the  movements  that  placed 
it  in  position  to  engage  in  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor, 
and  as  White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey  River,  had  been 


ii8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN, 


selected  as  the  base  of  supply  and  the  point  where 
re-enforcements  from  the  Army  of  the  James  were 
to  be  landed,  the  cavalry  under  General  Sheridan  on 
the  left  was  occupied  in  protecting  that  important 
position  and  keeping  open  the  roads  between  it  and 
the  main  body  of  our  troops. 

On  the  30th  of  May  the  First  Division  had  a hard 
but  finally  successful  contest  with  the  enemy’s  cav- 
alry, and  drove  it  to  within  a mile  and  a half  of 
Cold  Harbor.  On  the  31st  the  First  Division  again 
attacked  the  enemy,  his  force  now  consisting  of  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee’s  division  of  cavalry  and  a brigade  of  in- 
fantry, and  after  a brisk  engagement  were  again 
successful,  driving  the  enemy  from  the  intrench- 
ments  that  had  been  made  around  Cold  Harbor,  and 
occupied  that  important  point.  The  force  that  had 
gained  this  success  was  increased  by  the  arrival  on 
the  field  after  the  action  of  one  brigade  of  the  Second 
Division  ; but  it  was  known  that  the  enemy  was  mov- 
ing a division  of  infantry  in  this  direction,  and  that 
another  division  was  between  the  cavalry  and  our 
infantry  columns,  of  which  the  nearest  was  nine 
miles  distant.  It  appears  that  at  headquarters  of 
the  army  there  had  been  no  expectation  that  the 
cavalry  could  succeed  in  capturing  this  place,  and 
no  preparation  had  been  made  to  take  advantage  of 
such  a possible  success.  General  Sheridan  did  not 
consider  it  prudent  to  remain  with  his  small  force  in 
the  isolated  position  in  which  he  found  himself,  and 
informed  General  Meade  of  his  intention  to  with- 
draw during  the  night. 

The  last  of  the  troops  were  leaving  the  lines 
when  orders  were  received  that  the  place  was  too 
important  to  be  abandoned  and  must  be  held  at  all 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


II9 

hazards,  and  that  the  Sixth  Corps  would  be  at  once 
sent  by  a forced  march  to  relieve  the  cavalry.  Upon 
these  orders  being  received,  the  cavalry,  already  on 
the  march,  was  ordered  back,  and  Cold  Harbor  re- 
occupied without  opposition,  the  movement  in  retreat 
having  fortunately  escaped  the  attention  of  the  ene- 
my. Before  daylight  our  troops  were  in  position 
and  had  fortified  their  line  by  using  the  breastworks 
from  which  the  Confederates  had  been  driven  on  the 
previous  day,  and  the  men,  dismounted  and  well 
supplied  with  ammunition,  were  ranged  in  a long 
thin  line  behind  the  improvised  intrenchment,  with 
orders  that  the  position  must  be  held.  Two  assaults 
were  made  by  Kershaw’s  division  of  Confederate 
infantry,  but  both  were  driven  back  with  severe  loss 
by  the  fire  of  the  repeating  carbines  of  the  cavalry 
and  our  batteries  of  horse  artillery,  and  by  nine 
o’clock  in  the  morning  the  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
relieved  the  mounted  troops  in  the  exposed  position 
they  had  secured  and  held  against  a largely  supe- 
rior force  of  the  enemy.  During  several  succeeding 
days,  and  while  the  infantry  were  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  these  two  divisions  of  cavalry 
were  occupied  in  guarding  the  left  flank  of  the  army, 
while  the  Third  Division,  under  General  Wilson,  did 
similar  duty  on  the  right,  and,  except  for  some  unim- 
portant skirmishes,  were  not  actively  engaged. 


9 


CHAPTER  VII. 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. PETERSBURG. 

DEEP  BOTTOM. 

After  the  failure  of  our  army  in  the  assaults 
made  on  the  lines  of  the  enemy  at  Cold  Harbor  it 
was  determined  to  continue  the  movement  to  the 
left  and  placfe  our  forces  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
James  River,  there  to  renew  the  movements  against 
the  enemy’s  capital.  In  effecting  this  flank  move- 
ment through  a very  difficult  and  much  obstructed 
country,  and  to  secure  the  safe  passage  of  the  large 
trains  attached  to  the  army,  it  was  of  great  impor- 
tance to  avoid  obstruction  or  attacks  by  the  enemy’s 
cavalry,  and  a second  expedition  was  planned  that 
would  keep  the  Confederate  mounted  troops  fully 
occupied  during  the  time  our  infantry  was  marching 
to  and  crossing  the  James. 

Besides  this  primary  object  of  the  movement. 
General  Hunter,  who  had  about  this  time  been  en- 
gaged in  an  advance  southwardly  through  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley,  had  been  directed  to  move  on  Char- 
lottesville, and  there  unite  his  troops  with  those 
of  General  Sheridan,  to  whom  this  had  been  indicated 
as  the  objective  point  of  his  expedition.  From  that 
place  the  united  force  was  directed  to  return  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  destroying  on  its  way  the 

120 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. 


I2I 


Virginia  Central  Railroad  and  also  damaging  the 
James  River  Canal. 

Two  divisions  of  the  cavalry  corps  were  ordered 
to  make  this  expedition,  and  one  remained  with  the 
main  army,  which  it  should  accompany  on  the  march. 
General  Sheridan  concentrated  the  First  and  Sec- 
ond Divisions  of  his  corps,  which  he  selected  for  the 
expedition  at  Newcastle  Ferry,  on  the  Pamunkey,  and 
there  fitted  them  out.  These  two  divisions,  which 
since  the  opening  of  the  campaign  had  been  con- 
stantly on  the  march  and  under  fire,  had  suffered 
considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  and  in 
horses  that  had  been  killed  in  action  or  worn  out  in 
service,  and  now  could  not  present  more  than  six 
thousand  effective  mounted  men.  The  troops  were 
well  supplied  with  rations  and  forage,  and  a light 
canvas  pontoon  train  formed  part  of  the  equipment, 
which  was  of  great  use  in  passing  the  rivers  that 
crossed  the  line  of  march.  The  expedition  moved 
out  on  the  morning  of  the  yth  of  June,  and  for  three 
days  followed  the  north  bank  of  the  North  Anna, 
crossing  that  river  to  the  south  bank  on  the  after- 
noon of  June  loth,  and  encamping  on  the  road 
leading  to  Trevilian  Station.  During  this  and  the 
previous  day  scouting  parties  of  the  enemy  were 
frequently  met,  and  their  activity  and  enterprise  in- 
dicated the  presence  of  a large  force  of  the  enemy 
in  the  immediate  vicinity. 

From  prisoners  it  was  learned  that  Hampton, 
with  his  men  and  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  divisions  of  cav- 
alry, had  left  the  Confederate  lines  as  soon  as  infor- 
mation of  the  movement  of  our  cavalry  had  been  re- 
ceived, and,  marching  by  a much  shorter  line,  had 
gained  a position  in  advance,  and  that  Breckin- 


122 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ridge’s  division  of  infantry,  which  had  been  de- 
tached to  oppose  the  movements  of  General  Hunter, 
had  passed  up  the  railroad  and  was  now  somewhere 
near  Gordonsville. 

At  daylight  on  the  iith  the  march  to  Trevilian 
Station  was  resumed,  and  the  first  division  soon 
found  the  enemy  in  force,  posted  behind  a strong- 
line  of  breastworks  about  three  miles  north  of  the 
depot.  An  attack  on  their  front  was  at  once  made 
by  two  brigades,  and  a third — that  of  General  Cus- 
ter— was  sent  to  the  right  and  rear  of  the  enemy’s 
line,  which  was  found  to  consist  of  Hampton’s  divi- 
sion. General  Custer  succeeded  in  reaching  the  rear 
of  the  Confederate  line,  and  at  once  charged  upon 
the  led  horses,  wagons,  and  caissons  which  were 
there  collected,  and  of  which  he  captured  a great 
number  and  succeeded  in  reaching  and  holding  Tre- 
vilian Station.  While  thus  engaged  he  was  attacked 
by  a brigade  of  Hampton’s  division  and  by  the 
troops  of  Fitzhugh  Lee,  who  were  that  morning  on 
the  march  from  Louisa  Court  House  to  join  forces 
with  Hampton.  A desperate  fight  now  occurred, 
and  the  captured  property  was  retaken  by  the  ene- 
my, as  General  Custer,  who  was  for  the  time  almost 
surrounded,  was  obliged  to  act  entirely  in  his  own 
defense,  and  did  not  have  within  his  lines  sufficient 
space  in  which  to  keep  it  collected. 

As  soon  as  the  heavy  firing  showed  that  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  had  been  attacked  the  movement 
against  his  front  was  renewed,  and  the  Confederate 
troops  were  driven  from  their  position.  Hampton’s 
force  was  driven  through  and  westward  from  Tre- 
vilian Station,  and,  a portion  of  his  troops  in  their 
rout  falling  into  Custer’s  lines,  about  five  hundred 


\ 


\ 


U„  '■ ' ' •;  • 


■ A 


‘ y>A''v 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. 


123 


prisoners  were  taken.  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  division  was 
also  defeated  and  was  driven  back  in  the  road  to 
Louisa  Court  House,  and  many  miles  now  separated 
the  two  divisions,  which  were  not  reunited  until  noon 
of  the  following  day,  when  Fitzhugh  Lee,  by  a 
march  around  our  position,  succeeded  in  joining 
General  Hampton. 

This  engagement,  which  lasted  for  the  greater 
part  of  the  day,  was  a very  severe  one,  and  the  losses 
of  both  sides  were  heavy.  The  most  serious  injury 
that  the  Federal  troops  sustained  consisted  in  the 
great  expenditure  of  ammunition  that  was  needed  to 
secure  the  success  they  had  gained  and  which  could 
not  be  supplied  or  replaced  in  the  enemy’s  country. 

During  the  night  and  the  following  day  the  men 
were  employed  in  destroying  the  railroad,  which  was 
effectually  broken  up  between  Louisa  Court  House 
and  Trevilian  Station.  It  was  learned  that  General 
Hunter  had  not  marched  toward  Charlottesville,  as 
was  expected,  but  was  moving  toward  Lynchburg, 
and  so  increasing  the  distance  between  himself  and 
the  cavalry  as  to  render  a junction  of  the  two  com- 
mands scarcely  possible.  In  addition  to  the  two 
divisions  of  cavalry  in  front  of  Sheridan,  Brecken- 
ridge’s  division  .of  infantry  was  at  Gordonsville,  and 
would  be  one  of  the  many  obstacles  to  overcome  be- 
fore General  Hunter’s  army  could  be  reached.  The 
number  of  our  wounded — five  hundred  in  all — and 
the  same  number  of  prisoners,  also  affected  the  ques- 
tion of  a further  advance,  as  all  of  these  must  be 
abandoned  if  the  forward  movement  was  continued. 

General  Sheridan  concluded  that  as  the  plan  for 
joining  the  army  of  General  Hunter  could  not  be 
carried  out  it  would  be  best  to  return  to  the  Army 


124 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


of  the  Potomac  by  slow  and  easy  marches,  which 
would  compel  the  attention  of  Hampton’s  cavalry, 
and,  keeping  him  engaged  in  attendance  upon  our 
column  and  watching  our  movements  the  army 
would  have  ample  time  to  cross  the  James  River  un- 
molested by  any  mounted  force.  As  events  proved, 
the  decision  to  abandon  further  effort  to  join  Hunter 
was  eminently  correct,  as  that  officer,  after  a feeble 
demonstration  against  Lynchburg,  where  he  ar- 
rived before  our  cavalry,  even  if  unopposed,  could 
have  caught  up  with  him,  retreated  to  the  westward, 
and,  leaving  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  open  to 
the  Confederates,  marched  up  the  Kanawha  Valley 
of  West  Virginia  to  the  Ohio  River. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  an  attack  was  made 
upon  Hampton’s  lines,  which  had  been  reformed  two 
miles  west  of  Trevilian  Station,  by  the  First  Division 
and  a brigade  of  the  Second.  The  purpose  of  this 
movement  was  to  gain  possession  of  Mallory’s  ford, 
over  the  North  Anna  River,  from  which  ran  a direct 
road  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  which  gave 
a shorter  and  less  exposed  line  for  returning  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  than  that  by  which  the  ad- 
vance had  been  made. 

The  enemy  was  found  in  a strong  position  and 
well  intrenched,  and  a severe  engagement  followed, 
which  continued  until  night,  with  heavy  losses  and 
no  advantage  gained  by  either  side,  and,  as  it  was 
apparent  that  the  battle  must  be  renewed  on  the.  fol- 
lowing day  and  a severe  contest  would  ensue,  in- 
volving a great  expenditure  of  the  now  scanty  am- 
munition, General  Sheridan  resolved  to  fall  back  by 
the  road  on  which  he  had  advanced.  This  move- 
ment was  made  without  interference  from  the  enemy, 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. 


125 


and  before  daylight  on  the  13th  the  whole  force  had 
recrossed  the  North  Anna  at  Carpenter’s  ford.  Such 
of  our  wounded  as  could  not  be  moved — ninety  in 
number — and  the  wounded  Confederate  prisoners 
were  left  on  the  field,  but  four  hundred  of  our 
wounded  and  five  hundred  Confederate  prisoners 
accompanied  the  column.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
13th  the  march  was  resumed,  and  continued  from 
day  to  day,  until  on  the  20th  the  troops  reached 
White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey  River.  During  all 
this  time  no  encounter  was  had  with  the  enemy,  who 
marched  on  a line  parallel  with  that  pursued  by  our 
force,  and  kept  so  close  a watch  upon  the  move- 
ments that  the  scouts  and  skirmishers  of  both  par- 
ties were  frequently  in  sight  of  each  other.  The  line 
of  march  pursued  led  through  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  crossed  the  head  waters  of  the  Mattapony 
River,  and  thence  extended  southeastwardly  along 
the  north  bank  of  that  stream. 

The  necessities  of  the  wounded  men  and  the  in- 
ability of  the  Confederate  prisoners  (who  were  all 
on  foot)  to  move  rapidly  compelled  slow  and  short 
marches,  and  the  whole  command  was  dependent 
upon  the  country  for  all  supplies.  All  the  carts, 
carriages,  and  wagons  that  could  be  found  were  im- 
pressed into  the  service  of  transporting  the  wounded, 
and  the  corn,  bacon,  hogs,  sheep,  and  cattle  that 
could  be  gathered  were  collected  by  foraging  parties 
and  used  for  food.  Fortunately,  at  this  season  grass 
was  plentiful,  and  this  and  the  stalks  of  the  growing 
corn  were  the  only  forage  that  could  be  obtained 
for  the  horses.  Through  the  whole  of  this  period 
the  weather  was  intensely  hot ; no  rain  had  fallen  for 
more  than  two  weeks,  the  roads  and  fields  were  deep 


126 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


with  dust,  and  there  was  great  suffering  among  all 
who  made  the  journey. 

In  passing  through  Spottsylvania  Court  House 
and  the  country  around  the  battlefields  at  that  point 
more  than  a hundred  of  our  wounded  were  found  who 
had  been  too  severely  injured  for  removal  when  the 
army  had  advanced,  and  had  since  been  cared  for  in 
the  houses  of  the  inhabitants.  These  were  brought 
away  with  our  troops,  and  it  is  but  right  to  say  that 
not  one  made  complaint  of  neglect  or  ill  treatment 
while  the  involuntary  guest  of  an  enemy.  On  the 
i8th  King  and  Queen  Court  House  was  reached,  and 
there  was  obtained  the  first  reliable  information  con- 
cerning our  army  that  had  been  received  in  nine  days. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  passed  the  James 
River  and  was  beginning  the  siege  of  Petersburg, 
but  a large  train  of  wagons  had  been  left  at  White 
House  Landing,  which  General  Sheridan  was  ordered 
to  escort  and  protect  in  a march  across  the  country 
to  the  James  River.  The  prisoners,  wounded,  and 
some  two  thousand  negroes  that  had  followed  the 
march  of  the  troops  were  on  the  19th  sent  under 
an  escort  to  West  Point,  on  the  York  River,  where 
water  transportation  could  be  had  to  take  them 
North,  and  the  cavalry,  freed  from  these  impedi- 
ments, marched  rapidly  back  to  Dunkirk,  the  nearest 
point  at  which  the  river  was  sufficiently  narrow  to 
be  spanned  by  the  pontoon  bridge. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th  the  march  to  White 
House  began,  and  on  the  way  it  was  learned  that 
Hampton's  forces  had  attacked  the  troops  that  were 
holding  the  position  at  White  House,  but  had  not 
succeeded  in  causing  any  serious  injury.  In  the 
afternoon  White  House  was  reached,  and  the  cavalry, 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. 


127 


crossing  the  Pamunkey  the  next  morning,  after  a 
slight  engagement  drove  off  the  enemy’s  troops  and 
forced  them  to  fall  back  beyond  the  Chickahominy. 
Supplies  in  abundance  were  found  at  White  House, 
and  for  the  first  time  in  two  weeks  regular  issues  of 
forage  and  rations  were  distributed. 

On  the  22d  the  depot  at  White  House  was 
broken  up  and  the  troops  found  there — consisting  of 
some  fragments  of  infantry  regiments  and  the  long 
train  of  wagons,  nine  hundred  in  number,  and  ex- 
tending for  eight  mdes  along  the  road  when  in  mo- 
tion— were  marched  toward  the  James  River,  pre- 
ceded by  the  First  Division  of  cavalry  and  pro- 
tected on  the  right  flank  by  the  Second.  The  wag- 
ons were  safely  passed  over  the  Chickahominy,  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  24th  reached  Charles  City 
Court  House;  but  the  indications  of  the  presence  of 
a strong  force  of  the  enemy  in  our  front  showed 
that  It  would  be  impossible,  encumbered  as  our 
troops  were,  to  pass  through  Malvern  Hill  to  Deep 
Bottom,  where  a pontoon  bridge  had  been  placed 
over  the  James  River.  The  trains  were  therefore 
directed  to  go  into  park  at  Wilcox  Landing,  where 
they  could  be  guarded  by  the  First  Division,  and 
the  Second  Division  was  ordered  to  take  position  at 
St.  Mary’s  Church  and  hold  that  position  at  all  haz- 
ards until  sufficient  time  had  been  obtained  for  all 
the  wagons  to  pass  through  Charles  City  Court 
House  and  reach  the  landing. 

Hampton  early  in  the  day  began  concentrating 
his  forces  to  resist  an  advance  on  our  part  or  attack 
our  column  when  on  the  march,  and  General  Gregg^ 
observing  this,  employed  the  morning  in  constructing 
such  defensive  works  as  could  be  improvised  in  front 


128 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


of  his  lines.  About  four  in  the  afternoon  Hampton, 
with  two  divisions,  attacked  these  lines,  and  a stub- 
born and  hotly  contested  engagement  followed  that 
lasted  until  night.  For  more  than  two  hours  Gen- 
eral Gregg  maintained  his  position  and  drove  back 
every  assault,  and  it  was  not  until  he  had  lost  nearly 
one  fourth  of  his  men  and  found  his  left  exposed  to 
attack  by  two  brigades  of  the  enemy  that  he  de- 
termined upon  a retreat.  He  was  satisfied  that  suf- 
ficient time  had  been  given  to  assure  the  safety  of 
the  train,  and  was  embarrassed  by  the  absence  of  any 
instructions  from  General  Sheridan,  to  whom  he  had 
during  the  day  sent  repeated  messengers  explaining 
his  situation.  All  of  these  couriers  were  either 
killed  or  captured,  for  not  one  reached  the  head- 
quarters of  the  corps,  and  it  was  not  until  after 
nightfall,  and  the  end  of  the  battle,  that  General 
Sheridan  learned  that  the  division  had  been  engaged. 
General  Gregg  fell  back  about  three  miles  to  Hope- 
well  Church,  where  he  established  a new  line,  and  at 
dusk  beat  off  the  enemy,  who  had  followed  up  his  re- 
treating troops.  From  this  point,  later  in  the  night, 
he  moved  to  Charles  City  Court  House,  and  rejoined 
the  other  division.  The  cavalry  and  train  thence 
marched  to  Douthard’s  Landing,  and  were  carried 
over  the  river  by  ferryboats. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th  the  last  of  the  caval- 
ry had  crossed  the  river,  and  on  the  evening  of  the 
same  day  marched  out  toward  Reams’s  Station,  on 
the  left  of  the  army,  to  relieve  General  Wilson,  who 
had  been  attacked  at  that  place,  on  his  return  from  an 
expedition  into  the  enemy’s  lines,  made  with  his  own 
and  Kautz’s  division  of  cavalry.  This  movement 
was  made  too  late  to  benefit  General  Wilson,  who, 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. 


129 


however,  succeeded  in  bringing  his  command  into 
the  lines  by  a detour  to  the  eastward.  On  the  2d  of 
July  the  cavalry  corps  was  marched  back  to  Light 
House  Point,  on  the  James  River,  and  good  camps 
were  selected  in  which  the  men  and  animals  could 
obtain  the  rest  that  was  greatly  needed,  and  an  op- 
portunity be  had  of  refitting  the  command. 

For  the  past  two  months,  since  the  crossing  of 
the  Rapidan  River,  the  cavalry  corps  had  been  in- 
cessantly occupied  in  marching  and  fighting,  and 
daily  in  contact  with  the  enemy.  The  occasions  had 
been  rare  in  which  any  portion  of  the  force  had  oc- 
cupied the  same  camp  for  two  consecutive  nights, 
and  no  supplies  beyond  ammunition  and  occasional 
issues  of  forage  and  subsistence  had  been  received. 
For  a period  of  forty-seven  days — from  June  3d  to 
July  19th — no  rain  had  fallen  in  any  part  of  the  coun- 
try occupied  or  traveled  over  by  our  troops,  and 
during  all  this  time  the  weather  was  intensely  hot. 
The  dust  was  many  inches  deep  on  all  the  roads  and 
rose  in  suffocating  clouds  when  disturbed  by  march- 
ing columns,  causing  great  suffering  to  men  and 
animals  and  very  serious  embarrassment  to  prompt 
or  active  movements.  The  heat,  dust,  want  of  water, 
and  scanty  food  had  caused  a greater  loss  in  horses 
than  that  sustained  in  action,  and  the  roads  over 
which  the  cavalry  had  marched  were  strewn  with  the 
bodies  of  horses  that  had  broken  down  on  the  march 
or  had  been  shot  to  prevent  their  falling  into  the 
possession  of  the  enemy. 

Every  effort  had  been  made  to  supply  these  losses 
by  captures  from  the  enemy  and  by  animals  picked 
up  by  scouts  or  foraging  parties,  but  these  were  in- 
sufficient to  replace  the  missing  animals,  and  when 


130 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  corps  was  collected  at  Light  House  Point  the 
dismounted  men  numbered  nearly  two  thousand. 

For  nearly  a month  perfect  quiet  continued  about 
the  lines  at  Petersburg.  Both  armies  had  suffered 
so  severely  during  the  past  campaign  that  an  oppor- 
tunity for  rest  and  re-equipment  was  equally  neces- 
sary and,  as  if  by  mutual  consent,  active  movements 
were  suspended.  During  this  period  the  cavalry 
corps  commander  was  fully  occupied  in  restoring  his 
command  to  a condition  of  efficiency,  and  in  a short 
time,  with  good  food,  fresh  supplies  of  clothing,  and 
fifteen  hundred  new  horses,  the  corps,  except  in  num- 
bers, was  as  competent  for  work  as  at  the  opening  of 
the  campaign. 

On  July  26th  a mine  that  had  been  constructed 
under  the  Confederate  lines  in  front  of  Peter.sburg 
was  completed  and  in  a condition  for  immediate  use, 
it  being  intended  that  upon  the  explosion  of  the  mine 
an  assault  should  be  made  upon  the  enemy’s  works. 
As  a diversion  in  support  of  this  operation,  and  to 
draw  from  the  point  of  attack  as  many  as  possible 
of  Lee’s  army,  an  expedition  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  James  was  ordered,  consisting  of  the  Second 
Corps,  under  General  Hancock,  and  the  First  and 
Second  Divisions  of  the  cavalry  corps,  commanded 
by  General  Sheridan. 

Leaving  their  camps  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  the 
troops  crossed  tke  James  at  Deep  Bottom  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th,  and  a portion  of  the  Second 
Corps,  supported  by  the  cavalry,  drove  the  enemy 
from  his  advanced  works  and  captured  four  pieces  of 
artillery.  On  the  28th  the  two  cavalry  divisions  ad- 
vanced toward  Newmarket,  but  encountered  a strong 
force  of  infantry,  by  which  their  advance  was  checked. 


THE  TREVILIAN  EXPEDITION. 


13  I 

The  men  were  drawn  back  until  a favorable  position 
was  reached,  and  then  dismounted  and  formed  in  line. 
Kershaw’s  division  of  Confederate  infantry,  encour- 
aged by  the  falling  back  of  our  troops,  advanced  to 
attack  this  line,  but  met  so  strong  and  determined 
resistance  that  it  was  driven  back  in  confusion  by 
the  dismounted  cavalry,  losing  two  hundred  and  fifty 
prisoners  and  two  stands  of  colors. 

The  event  of  this  engagement  and  information 
had  from  prisoners  showed  that  General  Lee  regarded 
this  movement  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James  as  a 
serious  effort  to  turn  his  left  flank,  and  was  moving 
large  bodies  of  troops  to  meet  the  threatened  attack. 
During  the  night  of  the  28th  and  the  morning  of  the 
29th  the  lines  of  our  forces  were  extended,  and  dif- 
ferent movements  of  troops  were  made  to  produce 
the  belief  that  re-enforcements  were  being  constantly 
added.  After  dark  on  the  28th  the  Second  Division 
of  cavalry  crossed  the  pontoon  bridge,  which  had 
been  previously  covered  with  hay  to  prevent  any 
sound  of  the  horses’  hoofs,  and  after  daylight  the 
next  morning  w’as  marched  back  on  foot  in  full  sight 
of  the  enemy.  Active  skirmishing  wdth  the  enemy 
was  kept  up  during  the  day,  and  these  efforts  were  so 
successful  that  by  the  evening  of  the  29th  General 
Lee  had  brought  all  his  army,  except  three  divisions 
of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  remaining  in  the  lines 
in  front  of  Petersburg,  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
James.  The  explosion  of  the  mine  and  the  conse- 
quent assault  upon  the  lines  of  the  enemy  had  been 
arranged  to  take  place  before  daylight  of  the  30th, 
and  thus  far  our  preparatory  movements  had  been 
skillfully  executed  and  wmre  completely  successful. 

Early  in  the  night  of  the  29th  General  Hancock’s 


132 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


corps  was  withdrawn  and  moved  back  to  rejoin  the 
main  army,  and  until  daylight  the  two  divisions  of 
cavalry  were  alone  in  charge  of  the  lines.  Fortu- 
nately this  condition  of  affairs  was  not  observed,  and 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  30th  the  cavalry  was 
safely  withdrawn  and  hurrying  toward  the  lines 
around  Petersburg,  only  to  learn  that  by  a series  of 
inexcusable  blunders  the  assault  that  followed  the 
explosion  of  the  mine  had  met  with  a disastrous  and 
bloody  repulse,  and  that  an  operation  that  had  every 
prospect  of  success  had  resulted  in  nothing  but  an 
appalling  list  of  casualties  and  a singularly  decisive 
and  dispiriting  defeat. 

On  August  I,  1864,  General  Sheridan  was  re- 
lieved from  the  command  of  the  cavalry  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  ordered  to  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley,  thus  closing  the  second  period  of  his 
war  history  as  a commander  of  cavalry  within  four 
months  from  the  day  of  his  assuming  this  command, 
and  in  that  time  having  accomplished  the  most  suc- 
cessful and  brilliant  campaign  in  which  these  troops 
had  ever  been  engaged. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. MIDDLE  MILITARY 

DIVISION. BATTLE  OF  THE  OPEQUAN. 

The  new  command  to  which  General  Sheridan 
now  found  himself  assigned  was  one  of  great  impor- 
tance to  the  country  at  large  and  to  the  successful 
conduct  of  the  armies  that  were  engaged  in  the  cam- 
paign against  Richmond,  as  it  covered  the  country 
through  which  passed  convenient,  protected,  and 
well-supplied  roads,  leading  directly  from  the  heart 
of  Virginia  to  the  city  of  Washington.  In  the  past 
three  years  the  Confederate  forces  had  on  four  oc- 
'casions  made  use  of  this  natural  avenue  of  approach 
to  our  capital,  and  had  entirely  defeated  all  Union 
troops  that  attempted  to  oppose  them  at  any  point 
south  of  the  Potomac  River,  had  captured  or  de- 
stroyed vast  quantities  of  supplies,  had  taken  many 
prisoners,  had  seriously  threatened  the  safety  of 
Washington,  had  invaded  the  territory  of  the  North- 
ern States,  and  completely  paralyzed  all  offensive 
operations  of  our  forces  in  Virginia.  In  addition  to 
the  actual  losses  that  resulted  from  these  attacks, 
the  moral  effect  produced  by  their  constant  repeti- 
tion and  almost  unvaried  success  was  depressing 
upon  our  troops  and  dispiriting  to  the  people  of  the 
North,  who  could  not  but  be  doubtful  of  the  efficient 

133 


134 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


management  of  the  contest  by  those  to  whose  charge 
it  was  committed,  when,  year  after  year,  they  saw 
Confederate  armies  invading  their  territory  and 
threatening  their  capital,  and  our  troops  compelled 
to  abandon  aggressive  movements  and  concentrated 
to  engage  in  defensive  battles  in  which  our  defeat 
might  have  been  fatal  to  the  national  existence. 

The  command  was  also  one  that  was  embarrass- 
ing to  any  officer  by  whom  it  might  be  held,  as  its 
vicinity  to  Washington  exposed  him  to  constant  in- 
terference in  the  performance  of  his  duties  from 
superior  officers  at  that  point.  He  was  held  immedi- 
ately responsible  for  the  safety  of  that  city,  and  any 
failure  in  attaining  that  most  important  object  was 
sure  to  meet  with  prompt  official  and  public  censure. 
No  one  of  the  many  officers  who  had  up  to  this  time 
held  the  command  had  escaped  disaster,  and  all  had 
failed  in  defending  the  positions  they  held  or  in  pre- 
venting- the  approach  of  the  enemy  to  the  capital 
whenever  the  Confederates  saw  fit  to  make  an  ad- 
vance in  that  direction. 

At  the  time  of  the  general  movement  of  the 
Union  armies,  in  May,  1864,  General  Sigel  had  at- 
tempted to  march  southwardly  through  the  valley 
of  the  Shenandoah,  but,  meeting  the  enemy  at  New- 
market, was  defeated  and  forced  to  fall  back  to 
Cedar  Creek.  He  was  succeeded  in  command  by 
General  Hunter,  who  with  a considerable  force 
penetrated  as  far  as  Lynchburg — an  expedition  with 
which,  it  will  be  remembered.  General  Sheridan  was 
expected  to  co-operate  in  the  movement  he  made  to 
Trevilian  Station  shortly  after  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor.  At  Lynchburg  the  enemy  was  found  in 
strong  force,  the  Second  Corps  of  Lee’s  army,  under 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.  135 

Early,  having  been  sent  to  re-enforce  the  troops 
holding  that  position,  and  Hunter  was  compelled  to 
retreat— a movement  he  effected  by  directing  his 
course  to  the  northwest  and  falling  back  to  the 
Ohio  River  through  the  Kanawha  Valley,  leaving 
the  direct  road  to  Washington  and  the  North  open 
and  undefended. 

This  opportunity  was  at  once  seized  by  the  vigi- 
lant leaders,  who  so  often  had  seen  offensive  opera- 
tions of  our  armies  checked  by  a bold  attack  upon 
the  national  capital,  or  upon  Northern  territory, 
and  General  Early  was  at  once  directed  to  move 
into  Maryland,  and  from  thence  to  demonstrate 
against  Washington.  Without  giving  in  detail  his 
movements,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  he  advanced 
into  Maryland,  easily  defeating  such  troops  as  at- 
tempted to  impede  his  movements,  and  after  threat- 
ening an  attack  on  Baltimore  and  defeating  General 
Wallace  at  Monocacy,  who  fell  back  with  his  routed 
troops  on  Baltimore,  Early  turned  the  head  of  his 
column  toward  Washington,  and  at  noon  of  July  nth 
attacked  the  fortifications  protecting  the  northerly 
side  of  the  city.  . The  only  troops  that  at  first  were 
available  to  meet  this  assault  were  a motley  col- 
lection of  heavy  artillery,  convalescents,  invalids, 
sailors  and  marines  from  the  navy  yard,  dismounted 
cavalry,  militia,  quartermasters’  clerks,  and  other  Gov- 
ernment employees,  hastily  collected  and  equipped, 
and,  without  training  or  organization,  thrown  into 
the  works  to  make  the  best  defense  they  could. 

Fortunately,  however,  at  the  critical  moment, 
when  Early  was  ready  to  advance  his  lines,  twm  di- 
visions of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  a brigade  of  the  Nine- 
teenth, which  had  been  dispatched  from  the  Army  of 
10 


136 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  Potomac  upon  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  Wal- 
lace’s defeat,  arrived  upon  the  field.  The  arrival  of 
this  re-enforcement  of  veterans  checked  the  desire 
of  the  enemy  to  attack,  and  on  the  following  day, 
after  a short  but  severe  engagement.  Early  withdrew 
from  Washington  and,  marching  westwardly,  fell 
back  on  the  line  of  the  Potomac. 

From  this  time  on  Washington  itself  was  in  no 
immediate  danger ; but  Early,  with  his  troops,  con- 
tinued to  remain  in  its  vicinity,  easily  evading  the 
futile  efforts  that  were  made  to  pursue  or  bring  him 
to  an  engagement,  and  with  his  cavalry  plundering 
the  towns  and  farms  of  Maryland  and  southern 
Pennsylvania. 

The  then  existing  condition  of  military  affairs  is 
well  described  in  a telegram  of  Charles  A.  Dana, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  addressed  to  General 
Grant  on  July  12th  : “ Nothing  can  possibly  be  done 
here  toward  pursuing  or  cutting  off  the  enemy  for 
want  of  a commander.  Augur  commands  the  de- 
fenses of  Washington,  with  McCook  and  a lot  of 
brigadiers  under  him,  but  he  is  not  allowed  to  go 
outside.  Wright  commands  his  own  corps;  Gillmore 
has  been  assigned  to  the  temporary  command  of 
those  troops  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  in  the  city  of 
Washington;  Ord,  to  command  the  Eighth  Corps 
and  all  other  troops  in  the  Middle  Department,  leav- 
ing Wallace  to  command  the  city  of  Baltimore  alone; 
but  there  is  no  head  to  the  whole,  and  it  seems  indis- 
pensable that  you  should  at  once  appoint  one.  . . . 
General  Halleck  will  not  give  orders,  except  as  he 
receives  them ; the  President  will  give  none ; and 
until  you  direct  positively  and  explicitly  what  is  to 
be  done  everything  will  go  on  in  the  deplorable 


o 


I Williamsport 


Shepherdstd^\'Il 


Mai-tiiishurgr 


^arper^  Ferry 


Halltow 


Summit  Poiut 


Clifton 


Winchestej 


Battle  of  the 
Opequan 


;:Kernsto\\'nj 


Upperville 


^e^vto^^'u- 


■Jl/tanassas  Gap 


Strasburgr 


Front  Royal, 


/ iBattfc  of 
fFWier's  BiU' 


Chester  Gap 


Woodstoe; 


Milford 


Mt. Jackson 


o Luray 


Xew  JIarWt 


[^Mt. Crawford 


^ort  Republic 


MAP  OF  THE 


SHENANDOAH 

VALLEY 


SCALE  OF  MILES 


CliaT\o^ 


ne^bro 


I Staunton 


liaiii/tqf 


■ftbckfisp'Gap 


Bradley  PcKitee^  Engr'a,  X I* 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


137 

and  fatal  way  in  which  it  has  gone  for  the  past 
week.” 

That  the  military  system  then  existing  in  and 
about  Washington  fully  justified  the  strong  expres- 
sions used  in  this  dispatch  may  readily  appear  when 
within  fifty  miles  of  that  city  could  be  found  four 
independent  military  departments,  dependent  for  in- 
struction, orders,  and  control  upon  the  constituted 
military  authorities  that  were  assembled  at  and 
around  the  War  Department. 

The  Department  of  West  Virginia  included  that 
State,  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  western  Mary- 
land; the  Department  of  the  Susquehanna  consisted 
of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  and  three  counties  of 
Ohio ; the  Department  of  Washington  comprised  the 
District  of  Columbia  and  portions  of  Maryland  and 
Virginia;  and  the  so-called  Middle  Department  was 
formed  from  Delaware  and  a part  of  Maryland. 

The  troops  in  these  commands  were  generally 
recruits,  recently  organized  regiments,  or  such  as 
were  thought  to  be  of  the  least  value  to  the  armies 
engaged  in  active  service,  and  many  of  the  officers 
in  the  higher  commands  were  those  whom  it  had 
been  found  inexpedient  to  employ  in  actual  hostile 
operations,  and  who  yet  had  claims  upon  the  Admin- 
istration sufficient  to  prevent  their  entire  retirement 
from  the  .service.  The  army  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Hunter  was  the  only  force  that  could  be  con- 
sidered a valuable  military  factor  in  these  four  de- 
partments, and  at  the  moment  of  Early’s  first  move- 
ment upon  the  capital  these  troops,  suffering  from 
the  losses  of  the  Lynchburg  campaign,  were  slowly 
making  their  way  eastwardly  along  the  Ohio  River 
to  the  field  of  operations. 


138 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


The  information  that  General  Grant  possessed 
of  this  condition  of  affairs,  and  the  unsatisfactory 
results  of  the  operations  conducted  by  these  various 
commands  against  Early  after  his  repulse  from  the 
capital,  convinced  him  that  the  four  departments 
must  be  merged  into  one,  and  that  one  commander 
should  control  all  troops  opposing  any  movement 
of  the  enemy  toward  Maryland  or  Pennsylvania. 

He  first  suggested  Major-General  Franklin  as 
his  choice  for  this  command,  and  this  selection  not 
meeting  the  approval  of  the  President,  he  then 
named  General  Meade,  in  whom,  from  association 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  had  great  con- 
fidence. This  proposal  met  with  no  greater  favor 
than  the  first,  probably  from  the  fact  that  it  was  not 
deemed  expedient  or  proper  to  remove  General 
Meade  from  the  army  he  had  so  long  commanded, 
and  with  which  his  active  military  career  had  been 
identified,  to  another  command  which  gave  no  prom- 
ise of  a greater  field  of  usefulness. 

In  these  suggestions  the  days  passed  until  the 
unfortunate  result  of  the  explosion  of  the  Peters- 
burg mine  showed  that  a long  siege  would  be  re- 
quired to  gain  possession  of  that  town,  and  that  a 
large  force  of  cavalry  was  not  required  at  that  time. 

On  the  31st  of  July  General  Grant  sent  for  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  and  told  him  that  he  had  been  selected 
to  command  the  troops  that  were  to  operate  against 
Early,  and  that  he  should  proceed  immediately  to 
his  new  field  of  duty.  While  General  Grant  had  deter- 
mined to  thus  confide  the  future  operations  intended 
to  protect  Washington  and  ultimately  defeat  the  force 
under  Early’s  command,  he  found  that  the  Adminis- 
tration was  still  reluctant  to  reconstruct  or  consoli- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


139 


date  the  different  departments,  and  apparently  un- 
willing to  take  any  active  steps  toward  relieving  Gen- 
eral Hunter  from  the  nominal  command  he  held. 

This  difficulty  was  at  the  time  avoided  by  the 
assignment  of  General  Sheridan  to  the  command  of 
all  troops  that  were  to  be  actively  employed  in  the 
field,  and  he  was  informed  that,  in  addition  to  the 
troops  properly  belonging  in  his  new  sphere  of  duty, 
he  would  have  under  his  orders  the  Sixth  Corps, 
then  temporarily  serving  in  the  defense  of  Washing- 
ton, the  Nineteenth  Corps,  which  was  being  trans- 
ported from  New  Orleans  to  Washington,  and  a divi- 
sion of  the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
that  should  at  once  be  sent  to  report  to  him. 

On  the  ist  of  August  General  Sheridan  received 
his  orders,  but  so  little  was  anticipated  of  the  w'ork 
that  he  was  to  undertake,  the  magnitude  of  the  task 
before  him,  and  the  time  required  to  accomplish  the 
intended  operations,  that  Sheridan  was  only  tem- 
porarily relieved  from  immediate  duty  with  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  but  not  from  command  of  the  cavalry 
as  a corps  organization. 

On  the  4th  of  August  General  Sheridan  reached 
Washington,  and  on  the  following  day  was  instructed 
by  General  Halleck  to  report  to  General  Grant,  who 
was  then  at  Monocacy  Junction,  having  gone  directly 
there  to  give  personal  supervision  to  the  prepara- 
tions for  movement  of  the  troops,  being  urged  to 
take  that  step  by  a dispatch  from  the  President,  who 
expressed  his  disgust  with  the  helplessness  and  dis- 
order prevailing  along  the  upper  Potomac,  and  his 
belief  that  nothing  would  be  done,  or  attempted,  un- 
less forced  by  the  general  in  person. 

Before  leaving  Washington,  in  company  with  the 


140  GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 

Secretary  of  War,  General  Sheridan  called  upon  the 
President,  whom  he  now  met  for  the  second  time,  and 
during  the  conversation  that  followed  the  meeting 
Mr.  Lincoln  informed  the  general  that  the  secretary 
had  objected  to  his  assignment  to  Hunter’s  com- 
mand, as  he  was  thought  to  be  too  young ; that  he 
himself  had  agreed  with  him,  but  had  finally  con- 
cluded to  assent  to  the  views  of  General  Grant  and 
“ hope  for  the  best.” 

In  his  autobiography  General  Sheridan  speaks 
of  this  interview  and  observes : “ Mr.  Stanton  re- 
mained silent  during  these  remarks,  never  once  indi- 
cating whether  he  too  had  become  reconciled  to  my 
selection  or  not;  and  although  after  we  left  the 
White  House  he  conversed  with  me  freely  in  regard 
to  the  campaign  I was  expected  to  make,  seeking  to 
impress  on  me  the  necessity  for  success,  from  the 
political  as  well  as  from  the  military  point  of  view, 
yet  he  utterly  ignored  the  fact  that  he  had  taken  any 
part  in  disapproving  the  recommendation  of  the  gen- 
eral in  chief.” 

On  the  6th  of  August  Sheridan  reported  to  Gen- 
eral Grant  at  Monocacy,  and  there  learned  that 
General  Hunter  had  that  day  asked  to  be  wholly  re- 
lieved from  duty;  not  that  he  found  fault  with  the 
assignment  of  Sheridan  to  the  control  of  the  active 
forces  of  the  command,  but  because  he  believed  that 
his  fitness  for  the  position  he  was  filling  was  dis- 
trusted by  General  Halleck,  and  that  his  continu- 
ance in  nominal  command  would  be  an  embarrass- 
ment to  the  officer  charged  with  active  operations  by 
removing  him  one  degree  from  immediate  communi- 
cation with  the  headquarters  of  the  army.  On  the 
following  day  Hunter’s  request  was  granted  and  an 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


141 

order  was  issued  by  the  President  consolidating  the 
Middle  Department,  the  Department  of  Washington, 
the  Department  of  the  Susquehanna,  and  the  De- 
partment of  West  Virginia  into  one  homogeneous 
command,  which  was  designated  as  the  Middle  Mili- 
tary Division,  and  to  the  command  of  this  General 
Sheridan  was  temporarily  assigned. 

In  pursuance  of  orders  previously  given.  General 
Hunter  had  already  directed  the  concentration  of  all 
his  troops  available  for  field  service  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Potomac  River  at  Halltown,  some  four 
miles  in  front  of  Harper’s  Ferry,  and  all,  with  the 
exception  of  Averill’s  cavalry,  then  engaged  in  pur- 
suit of  a raiding  party  of  the  enemy,  were  on  the  6th 
of  August  moving  to  their  designated  station. 

This  movement  of  our  troops  was  an  indication 
to  the  enemy  that  offensive  movements  were  at  last 
to  be  begun  in  earnest,  and  he  at  once  prepared  to 
meet  them  by  calling  in  his  scattered  detachments 
and  concentrating  his  army  in  our  front  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Martinsburg,  occupying  positions  from  which 
he  could  continue  to  obstruct  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  and  yet  secure  a retreat  up  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley  at  any  time  found  necessary.  From 
the  day  these  dispositions  were  commenced  no  or- 
ganized body  of  Confederate  troops  crossed  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Potomac  or  stood  upon  the  terri- 
tory of  the  loyal  States,  with  the  exception  of  a few 
small  raiding  parties. 

The  instructions  that  had  been  prepared  for 
Hunter  were  turned  over  to  Sheridan  for  his  guid- 
ance, and,  apart  from  details  unnecessary  to  be 
given,  contained  the  following  paragraph,  which  in- 
dicated the  manner  in  which  operations  in  the  Shen- 


142 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


andoah  Valley  were  thereafter  to  be  conducted,  and 
which  produced  important  results  : 

“ ...  In  pushing  up  the  Shenandoah  A^alley,  as 
it  is  expected  you  will  have  to  go  there  first  or  last, 
it  is  desirable  that  nothing  should  be  left  to  invite 
the  enemy  to  return.  Take  all  provisions,  forage, 
and  stock  wanted  for  the  use  of  your  command. 
Such  as  can  not  be  consumed  destroy.  It  is  not  de- 
sirable that  the  buildings  should  be  destroyed — they 
should  rather  be  protected;  but  the  people  should 
be  informed  that  so  long  as  an  army  can  subsist 
among  them  recurrences  of  these  raids  must  be  ex- 
pected, and  we  are  determined  to  put  a stop  to  them 
at  all  hazards.  Bear  in  mind  the  object  is  to  drive 
the  enemy  south,  and  to  do  this  you  want  to  keep 
him  always  in  sight.  Be  guided  in  your  course  by 
the  course  he  takes.  . . . 

U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutena7it  General.” 

The  value  of  these  instructions,  and  the  necessity 
for  strictly  conforming  to  them,  are  apparent  when 
the  character  and  resources  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
are  examined.  At  the  time  of  these  operations,  and 
for  many  years  previously,  it  had  been  the  richest, 
the  most  fertile,  and  the  most  highly  cultivated  agri- 
j cultural  section  of  Virginia.  Unlike  the  eastern 
' parts  of  the  State,  the  lands  had  not  been  exhausted 
! by  the  excessive  cultivation  of  tobacco  and  the  un- 
thrifty and  wasteful  system  of  slave  labor  upon 
i large  plantations,  but,  in  the  methods  of  cultivation 
I and  the  uses  to  which  they  were  devoted,  resembled 
i the  thriving  farming  regions  of  the  more  northern 
' States.  The  lands  lay  high  above  sea  level,  and  en- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


143 


joyed  a cool  and  temperate  climate  ; the  soil  was  gen- 
erally underlaid  with  limestone,  and  was  abundant- 
ly watered  by  the  Shenandoah  River,  its  branches 
and  affluents,  and  the  whole  country  was  adapted  to 
the  raising  of  grain  and  the  rearing  of  live  stock, 
which  was  everywhere  found  in  abundance. 

At  all  times  the  Confederate  armies  which  had 
advanced  or  retreated  through  this  region  had  been 
abundantly  supplied,  and  had  been  able  to  collect 
large  quantities  of  stores  and  animals  to  supply  the 
inhabitants  and  the  troops  in  other  less  fertile  por- 
tions of  their  territory ; and  to  prevent  further  incur- 
sions to  the  north  of  the  character  of  those  which 
had  hitherto  so  seriously  threatened  the  safety  of 
the  capital  and  interfered  with  active  operations 
elsewhere,  it  was  most  important  that  this  granary 
and  constant  source  of  supply  to  the  enemy  should 
no  longer  exist. 

While  his  troops  were  being  massed  at  Halltown 
General  Sheridan  applied  himself  diligently  to  the 
study  of  the  geography  and  the  topographical  fea- 
tures of  the  country  in  which  his  future  movements 
were  to  be  made,  information  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance to  him  as  he  was  now  to  depend  entirely  upon 
his  own  resources,  and,  having  an  independent  com- 
mand, the  entire  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of 
the  campaign  rested  upon  him  alone.  He  was  for- 
tunate in  having  upon  his  staff  an  officer  of  engi- 
neers, Lieutenant  John  R.  Meigs,  whose  skill  and 
ability  he  has  highly  commended.  This  officer  for  a 
year  past  had  served  in  the  valley,  and  was  familiar 
with  every  road  and  stream  as  well  as  with  the  dif- 
ferent positions  suitable  for  attack  and  defense, 
either  by  the  Northern  or  Southern  armies. 


144 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


The  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  in  which  the  op- 
erations of  the  campaign  to  be  described  were  con- 
ducted, extends  from  the  Potomac  River,  the  north- 
ern boundary,  to  Staunton,  distant  southwesterly 
about  one  hundred  and  fifteen  miles.  On  the  east 
it  is  bounded  by  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains  and 
on  the  west  by  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Allegha- 
nies,  there  called  North  Mountains,  the  country  be- 
tween these  two  ranges  being  generally  open  and 
undulating,  with  occasional  bodies  of  heavy  timber, 
none  of  any  great  extent.  At  the  upper  end  this 
valley  is  some  forty  miles  wide,  while  at  Strasburg, 
about  fifty  miles  south  of  the  Potomac,  the  extreme 
width  is  but  twenty-five.  Southeast  of  this  town 
and  in  the  middle  of  the  valley  is  found  an  abrupt 
range  of  mountains,  called  Massanutten,  extending 
southerly  between  the  north  and  south  forks  of  the 
Shenandoah  River,  and  extending  some  forty  miles 
to  Harrisonburg,  where  these  hills  again  merge  into 
the  plain.  The  two  beautiful  valleys  formed  by  this 
range,  with  the  eastern  and  western  boundaries  of 
the  main  valley,  are  respectively  called — that  on  the 
east  the  Luray,  while  that  on  the  west  retains  the 
name  of  Shenandoah. 

A broad  macadamized  road  runs  southerly 
through  the  whole  extent  of  the  valley  from  Wil- 
liamsport to  Staunton,  and  beyond  and  along  this 
road  are  found  the  principal  towns  and  villages  of 
the  region,  with  lateral  roads  extending  east  and 
west  to  the  mountain  boundaries.  The  roads  ex- 
tending toward  the  Blue  Ridge  are  generally  mac- 
adamized, and  the  principal  ones  connect  through 
various  gaps  with  the  railroads  of  eastern  Virginia. 

These  gaps  are  low  and  wide  and  can  be  readily 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


145 


passed  by  troops  marching  from  the  east,  and  a 
Union  army  operating  in  the  valley  was  always 
exposed  to  flank  attacks  from  the  Confederates,  who 
could  readily  be  brought  by  rail  to  Gordonsville  or 
Charlottesville,  from  which  points  they  could  rapidly 
move  to  such  positions  as  were  found  reiost  desira- 
ble, and  movements  of  this  character  had  frequently 
in  the  past  resulted  in  great  injury  and  loss  to  our 
troops  acting  in  the  valley. 

The  surface  of  the  valley,  between  the  ranges  by 
which  it  was  bounded,  was  well  adapted  for  the  move- 
ment and  manoeuvring  of  troops.  The  country  was 
open  and  generally  unobstructed  by  hills  or  steep 
declivities,  the  streams  were  small  and  easily  forded, 
and  it  was  possible  to  handle  large  bodies  of  troops 
in  such  a manner  that  their  operations  were  con- 
ducted immediately  under  the  eye  of  their  com- 
mander. The  wide  and  level  fields  were  well  suited 
for  the  employment  of  cavalry,  and  the  opportunity 
afforded  by  this  favorable  ground  of  making  use  of 
his  large  force  of  disciplined  cavalry  proved  of  great 
value  to  General  Sheridan  in  the  engagements  that 
followed.  In  contrast  to  the  system  of  fighting  dis-  ' 
mounted  that  the  swamps,  thickets,  and  heavily 
wooded  country  of  eastern  Virginia  often  imposed 
upon  our  mounted  troops,  here  the  cavalry  could  be  ■ 
put  to  its  proper  use,  and,  mounted,  could  be  moved 
at  speed  and  at  all  times  thrown  upon  an  enemy  with 
force  and  effect,  as  favorable  opportunity  or  neces- 
sity might  require. 

The  forces  under  the  command  of  General  Sheri- 
dan with  which  he  began  his  operations  in  the  valley, 
and  which  during  the  campaign  and  since  has  been 
designated  and  known  as  the  Army  of  the  Shenan- 


146 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


doah,  consisted  of  the  Sixth  Corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  under  Major-General  H.  G.  Wright; 
one  division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  under  Major- 
General  W.  H.  Emory ; two  small  divisions  of  the 
Army  of  West  Virginia,  commanded  by  Major-Gen- 
eral George  Crook  ; the  First  Cavalry  Division  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Brigadier-General  W. 
Merritt  in  command;  and  a division  of  cavalry  of 
the  Army  of  West  Virginia,  commanded  by  Brigadier- 
General  W.  W.  Averill.  Brigadier-General  A.  T. 
Torbert  had  been  appointed  chief  of  cavalry,  and 
had  command  of  the  entire  force  of  that  arm.  To 
this  force  were  subsequently  added  the  Third  Cav- 
alry Division  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under 
Brigadier-General  James  H.  Wilson,  which  joined  the 
army  on  August  17th,  and  a second  division  of  the 
Nineteenth  Army  Corps,  commanded  by  Brigadier- 
General  Cuvier  Grover,  reporting  at  the  same  time. 

The  Confederate  forces  at  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  were  General  Early’s  three  divisions, 
among  whom  were  to  be  found  many  of  the  troops 
who,  under  “Stonewall”  Jackson,  had  in  previous 
years  been  successful  in  expeditions  through  the  val- 
ley, an  infantry  corps  under  General  Breckinridge, 
and  a division  of  cavalry  commanded  by  General 
Lomax.  This  force  was  from  time  to  time  re-enforced, 
and  these  additions  to  the  Confederate  strength 
will  be  referred  to  in  course  as  they  occurred. 
At  this  date  the  Confederates  under  Early  num- 
bered about  twenty  thousand  effective  men  for  field 
service,  and  that  commanded  by  Sheridan  when  his 
troops  were  finally  collected  contained  about  twenty- 
six  thousand  effectives,  this  number  being  in  the 
course  of  the  campaign  largely  reduced  by  the  cas- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


147 


ualties  incident  to  active  service  in  the  field  and 
losses  sustained  in  battle,  as  no  re-enforcements  or 
additional  troops  were  at  any  time  received  during 
the  campaign.  The  whole  force  within  the  limits  of 
the  military  division  was  nominally  much  greater, 
but  the  necessities  of  providing  garrisons  for  the 
many  cities  and  important  strategic  points  that  had 
to  be  protected,  the  strong  detachments  required  to 
guard  and  keep  open  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  and 
other  railroads,  and  the  large  escorts  needed  to  pro- 
tect the  supply  trains  in  passing  through  a hostile 
country,  absorbed  so  many  men  that  no  greater 
force  than  that  given  could  be  collected  for  active 
and  offensive  movements. 

In  addition  to  the  advantage,  possessed  by  the 
Confederate  commander  of  operating  in  a friendly 
country  where  he  could  at  any  point  be  abundantly 
supplied,  and  where  he  had  nothing  to  apprehend 
from  raids  upon  his  trains  or  bases  of  supply,  he  was 
well  served  by  the  guerrilla  bands  of  Mosby,  Gilmore, 
and  other  partisan  leaders,  nearly  all  of  whom  were 
natives  of  the  valley  and  familiar  with  every  road 
and  defensible  position  within  its  limits.  These  men 
generally  lived  at  their  houses,  often  within  our 
lines,  and,  except  on  such  occasions  as  they  were 
absent  on  plundering  expeditions,  pretended  to  be 
and  were  often  mistaken  for  honest  citizens.  It  was 
difficult  to  make  any  movement  of  the  Union  troops 
that  could  escape  the  observation  of  the  hundreds 
of  these  spies ; every  unprotected  wagon  was  plun- 
dered and  all  stragglers  or  small  detached  parties 
were  in  hourly  danger,  and  were  in  most  cases  killed 
or  captured  by  these  guerrillas.  However,  as  the 
campaign  progressed  means  were  adopted  to  remedy 


148 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


these  evils,  and  before  it  closed  these  bands  had 
been  swept  out  of  existence. 

On  the  morning  of  the  loth  of  August  General 
Sheridan  moved  his  columns  southwardly,  the  enemy 
falling  back  as  he  advanced,  and  only  opposing  him 
by  outposts  and  cavalry,  creating  the  impression 
that  he  was  intending  to  occupy  some  defensible 
position  or  expecting  to  meet  re-enforcements  that 
would  allow  him  to  take  the  offensive.  These  move- 
ments continued  until  the  13th,  when  a reconnois- 
sance  developed  that  Early  with  his  infantry  had 
taken  position  at  Fisher’s  Hill,  a short  distance  south 
of  Strasburg,  and  there,  having  a strong  position 
protected  by  earthworks,  extending  across  the  nar- 
row valley  between  the  Massanutten  and  North 
Mountains,  appeared  to  invite  an  attack,  his  cavalry 
being  so  dispersed  as  to  act  on  the  flank  of  any  at- 
tacking force.  Information  had  been  received  that 
a Confederate  column  was  advancing  to  Early’s  as- 
sistance from  Culpeper  Court  House  by  the  road 
leading  through  Chester  Gap  and  Front  Royal — a 
movement  that  would  seriously  threaten  the  left 
flank  and  rear  of  our  army,  which,  as  General  Wil- 
son’s division  of  cavalry  and  the  Second  Division  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  had  not  yet  joined,  would  be  largely 
outnumbered. 

This  intelligence  was  confirmed  by  a dispatch 
from  General  Grant  received  on  the  14th,  stating 
that  re-enforcements  had  been  sent  by  Lee  to  Early, 
and,  as  the  event  proved,  General  Anderson,  in  com- 
mand of  a division  of  infantry,  a battalion  of  artil- 
lery, and  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  division  of  cavalry,  was 
then  moving  rapidly  to  effect  a junction  with  Early. 
The  orders  of  General  Grant  instructed  Sheridan  to 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


149 


act  with  extreme  caution  and  on  the  defensive  in  the 
presence  of  forces  now  outnumbering  his  own  until 
future  movements  would  strengthen  him  or  weaken 
the  enemy. 

After  examining  carefully  the  situation,  General 
Sheridan  concluded  that  the  best,  and  indeed  only, 
really  defensible  position  in  the  valley  that  would 
be  secure  from  flanking  operations  of  the  enemy 
was  at  Halltown,  whence  he  had  lately  advanced,  as 
at  any  more  southerly  position  his  left  and  rear  were 
constantly  exposed  to  attacks  through  the  numerous 
gaps  that  intersect  the  Blue  Ridge.  Another  advan- 
tage of  this  movement  to  the  rear  would  be  the  more 
speedy  junction  with  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  and 
the  Division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  that  were  now 
on  the  march  from  Washington  to  the  valley. 

On  the  15th  and  i6th  the  movement  to  the  rear 
was  commenced,  and  the  infantry  columns,  unmo- 
lested, fell  back  to  Winchester,  and  thence  to  Clifton, 
still  farther  to  the  north.  General  Merritt,  with  his 
cavalry,  had  previously  been  sent  to  Front  Royal 
and  Chester  Gap  to  observe  and  obstruct  as  far  as 
possible  Anderson’s  column.  On  the  afternoon  of 
the  i6th  Merritt  met  the  enemy  near  Front  Royal 
and  handsomely  repulsed  an  attack  made  upon  his 
front  by  a division  of  infantry  and  two  brigades  of 
cavalry,  capturing  from  the  enemy  two  battle  flags 
and  three  hundred  prisoners. 

While  this  movement  in  retreat  was  in  progress 
General  Torbert,  in  command  of  the  cavalry,  was 
instructed  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  General  Grant, 
under  date  of  August  5th,  to  destroy  or  remove  all 
subsistence  stores  and  animals  that  were  found  in 
the  valley  south  of  Winchester.  The  object  of  this 


150 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


was  not  only  to  provide  subsistence  for  our  troops 
— which  had  hitherto  and  in  all  future  movements 
in  the  valley  were,  as  far  as  possible,  provided  for 
from  the  resources  of  the  country — but  to  deprive 
the  Confederates  of  supplies  that  until  this  time 
largely  supported  their  armies  in  Virginia.  The 
houses,  and  the  families  that  occupied  them,  were 
not  molested,  but  the  loss  of  supplies  and  the  general 
flight  to  the  North  of  all  negroes  engaged  on  the 
farms  and  in  domestic  service  that  were  encountered 
by  our  troops,  prevented  thereafter  any  material  ad- 
ditions from  that  region  to  the  strength  of  the  Con- 
federate army. 

The  necessity  of  providing  by  their  own  labor 
for  the  support  of  their  families  kept  at  home  many 
who  would  otherwise  have  filled  Lee’s  ranks,  and 
did  much  to  bring  back  those  who  were  in  service 
and  to  restrain  the  activities  of  the  guerrillas  who, 
deprived  of  horses  and  compelled  to  work  for  daily 
bread,  had  little  time  or  inclination  to  indulge  in  their 
former  predatory  exploits.  This  policy  once  begun 
was  continued  throughout  the  whole  campaign,  and 
the  consequences  of  war  were  at  last  realized  by  a 
people  who  before  had  known  little  of  its  horrors. 

From  Winchester  the  army  continued  to  fall 
back,  meeting  successively  the  expected  cavalry  and 
the  Nineteenth  Corps,  and  with  but  slight  interfer- 
ence from  the  enemy,  and  by  the  zzd  was  estab- 
lished in  and  about  Halltown  in  a secure  and  de- 
fensible position. 

On  the  25th  the  cavalry,  which  was  moving  on 
the  right  of  our  army,  encountered  Breckinridge’s 
corps  marching  north  toward  Shepherdstown,  on  the 
bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  drove  it  back  some  dis- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


15  I 

tance,  until  re-enforced  by  three  divisions  of  infan- 
try, when  our  troops  were  in  turn  compelled  to  re- 
treat. The  large  Confederate  force  engaged  and 
the  direction  and  persistency  of  the  movement  indi- 
cated an  intention  on  Early’s  part  to  cross  the  Po- 
tomac into  Maryland;  but  if  such  were  the  case  our 
prompt  dispositions  caused  him  to  abandon  the 
enterprise,  and  on  the  following  day  he  fell  back  to 
Bunker  Hill,  on  the  west  side  of  the  Opequan  Creek. 
During  the  next  two  or  three  days  constant  skir- 
mishing occurred,  and  our  lines  were  advanced  to  a 
position  between  Clifton  and  Berryville. 

On  the  3d  of  September  the  left  of  our  line  at 
Berryville  was  heavily  attacked,  and  at  first  the  im- 
pression prevailed  that  Early  was  about  to  hazard  a 
general  engagement,  but  it  finally  appeared  that  the 
attack  was  made  by  Anderson’s  troops.  As  was 
subsequently  learned.  General  Lee  had  become  so 
disturbed  by  the  aggressive  operations  of  our  army 
in  front  of  Petersburg  that  he  had  sent  orders  for 
the  immediate  return  of  Anderson  and  his  force  to 
that  point.  On  the  march  from  Winchester  toward 
Ashby’s  Gap,  by  which  he  expected  to  cross  the 
Blue  Ridge,  Anderson  fell  in  with  the  left  of  Sheri- 
dan’s army,  which  had  just  taken  position  at  Berry- 
ville. A short  conflict  followed,  in  which  the  Con- 
federates were  driven  back  toward  Winchester. 
General  Early  during  the  night  moved  to  Anderson’s 
assistance,  but,  finding  that  the  Union  troops  had 
taken  a new  and  strong  position,  he  deterrnined  that 
Anderson  must,  for  the  present  at  least,  postpone 
his  intended  march  to  Petersburg,  and  withdraw  his 
whole  army  to  Winchester  and  vicinity. 

Succeeding  this  repulse  of  Anderson  some  minor 

II 


152 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


operations  of  the  cavalry  and  skirmishes  of  infantry 
outposts  occurred,  with  the  general  result  favorable 
to  the  Union  troops;  but  no  engagement  of  impor- 
tance occurred  before  the  19th  of  September,  though 
the  men  were  actively  employed  in  scouting  and 
guarding  the  lines,  during  which  some  changes  in 
position  were  made. 

While  the  army  was  falling  back  from  Strasburg 
to  Halltown,  and  during  the  period  of  comparative 
inactivity  that  followed  that  movement.  General 
Sheridan  became  the  object  of  considerable  criti- 
cism from  the  Northern  press,  which  had  been  much 
excited  by  the  former  bold  efforts  of  the  Confeder- 
ates to  attack  the  capital.  It  was  not,  of  course, 
known  that  for  the  time  being  the  enemy  was  his 
superior  in  force,  and  that  he  acted  under  the  di- 
rect instructions  of  the  general  in  chief  of  the 
Army.  In  addition  to  this,  if  further  reasons  for 
his  conduct  were  required,  he  was  in  receipt  almost 
daily  from  the  authorities  at  Washington  of  orders 
to  use  the  greatest  caution,  and  in  no  possible  man- 
ner to  incur  the  risk  of  any,  even  the  slightest,  dis- 
aster to  his  troops.  The  approaching  presidential 
election  and  the  effect  that  the  defeat  of  an  army 
charged  with  the  duty  of  protecting  the  capital 
might  have  upon  the  popular  mind  were  considered 
of  such  high  importance  that  even  mistakes  com- 
mitted in  the  interest  of  safety  were  preferable  to 
incurring  the  least  risk  of  misfortune.  While  not 
acting  aggressively,  Sheridan  watched  every  move- 
ment of  his  enemy,  and  was  prepared  to  take  advan- 
tage of  any  opening  he  might  afford  for  an  attack, 
and  one  of  his  hopes  was  that  Early  would  again 
move  north  and  cross  the  Potomac,  in  which  event 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


153 


his  destruction  was  considered  inevitable.  As  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  at  the  time  informed  General  Grant, 
he  had  purposely  left  everything  in  that  direction 
open  to  the  enemy,  but,  as  has  been  seen,  Early, 
after  demonstrating  in  that  direction,  finally  fell 
back  to  the  lines  about  Winchester.  During  the 
movements  that  have  been  described  since  the  time 
he  took  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah, 
General  Sheridan  had  been  embarrassed  and  disap- 
pointed by  the  unsatisfactory,  and  often  contradicto- 
ry, intelligence  of  the  enemy’s  movements,  position, 
and  strength  that  he  had  received  from  the  scouts 
and  other  parties  employed  for  this  purpose.  These 
men  as  he  found  them  were  seldom  reliable,  being 
either  Confederate  deserters  or  Southern  citizens  of 
such  character  as  rendered  them  ineligible  for  serv- 
ice even  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  all  willing 
to  tell  any  story  that  they  imagined  would  please 
their  employer  or  procure  a reward,  and  their  occu- 
pation, of  necessity,  gave  them  such  information  of 
important  facts  in  relation  to  our  troops  that,  if  so 
disposed,  they  could  do  great  injury  to  the  cause  they 
assumed  to  serve.  He  finally  concluded  that  the  best 
service  of  this  nature  could  be  obtained  from  men  in 
our  own  ranks  who  would  volunteer  for  such  duty, 
and  decided  that  a battalion  should  be  raised  for  this 
purpose,  the  organization  and  command  of  which 
were  intrusted  to  Major  H.  K.  Young,  of  the  First 
Rhode  Island  Infantry.  The  men  were  furnished 
with  Confederate  uniforms  for  use  when  needed,  and 
were  well  paid  from  secret-service  funds  in  propor- 
tion to  the  value  of  the  information  they  furnished. 
A body  of  men  to  whom  the  excitement  and  adven- 
ture of  such  duty  were  a welcome  relief  from  the 


154 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ordinary  routine  of  service  in  the  ranks  was  soon 
collected,  all  of  whom  were  distinguished  for  capaci- 
ty and  fitness  for  the  work  they  undertook.  For  the 
remainder  of  the  war  they  served  with  Sheridan’s  head- 
quarters, and  he  and  all  the  officers  who  had  occa- 
sion for  their  service  spoke  in  the  highest  terms  of 
their  value.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  not  one  of 
these  men  was  ever  found  unfaithful  to  the  trust 
reposed  in  him,  and  also  remarkable  that,  notwith- 
standing the  hazardous  nature  of  their  duties,  mor- 
tality among  them  was  much  less  than  among  those 
employed  in  any  other  branch  of  the  service. 

While  the  army  was  inactive  every  preparation 
was  made  to  fit  it  for  immediate  work  and  to  collect 
all  information  concerning  the  movements  of  the  ene- 
my. Early  in  September  rumors  (many  coming  from 
Washington)  were  circulated  that  large  detachments 
had  been  made  from  the  Confederate  army  in  the 
valley,  and  now  a pressure  was  brought  upon  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  to  induce  an  immediate  advance. 
This  he  resisted,  as  he  had  other  efforts  to  control 
his  action,  and  would  take  no  step  until  he  felt  fully 
justified  in  his  own  mind  as  to  the  proper  course  to 
be  pursued. 

On  the  i6th  of  September  he  received  from  a re- 
liable source  information  that  the  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery that  Anderson  had  brought  in  August  to 
Early’s  aid  had  been  recalled  and  was  on  the  march 
to  Petersburg  through  Chester  Gap;  he  at  once  de- 
termined to  attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as  these  troops 
had  got  sufficiently  distant  from  the  main  body  to 
prevent  their  being  recalled  in  time  to  take  part  in 
the  intended  battle.  Before  he  could  give  the  orders 
for  movement  of  his  troops  he  was  called  to  Charles- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


155 


town  to  meet  General  Grant,  who  had  arrived  there 
from  the  lines  before  Petersburg  for  the  purpose  of 
consulting  as  to  future  operations  of  this  army. 

Sheridan  explained  to  his  chief  the  existing  situa- 
tion, and  presented  and  developed  his  plans  with  so 
much  intelligence  and  confidence  that  Grant  prompt- 
ly adopted  his  views  and  authorized  him  at  once  to 
resume  the  offensive  and  attack  Early  at  the  earliest 
favorable  moment,  conducting  the  operations  in  the 
manner  he  had  already  determined. 

General  Grant  refers  to  this  interview  in  his 
Memoirs,  and  on  this  subject  remarks  ; “ Before  start- 
ing I had  drawn  up  a plan  of  campaign  for  Sheridan 
which  I had  brought  with  me,  but,  seeing  that  he  was 
so  clear  and  so  positive  in  his  views  and  so  confident 
of  success,  I said  nothing  about  this,  and  did  not  take 
it  out  of  my  pocket.”  Thus  supported  by  his  su- 
perior and  confident  in  himself  and  the  troops  he 
commanded.  General  Sheridan  returned  to  his  army 
and  at  once  prepared  to  attack  his  opponent  with 
every  prospect  of  success. 

The  plan  of  attack  that  General  Sheridan  had 
formed,  and  which  on  the  17th  he  communicated  to 
General  Grant,  involved  a march  to  the  south  of 
Winchester,  about  which  town  the  bulk  of  the  ene- 
my’s force  was  then  stationed,  after  crossing  the 
Opequan  Creek  and  passing  through  the  village  of 
Newtown,  turning  to  the  left  and  attacking  in  such 
a direction  that  a defeat  would  compel  the  enemy  to 
retreat  to  the  north,  or  to  cross  the  North  Mountains, 
either  of  which  movements  would  deprive  him  of  his 
only  sources  of  supply  or  re-enforcement,  and  cut  him 
off  from  his  only  true  line  of  retreat  toward  the  south. 

Circumstances,  however,  changed  this  plan,  for 


156 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Early,  it  was  found,  had  detached  on  the  17th  two 
of  his  infantry  divisions  and  one  division  of  cavalry 
in  the  direction  of  Martinsburg,  with  the  intention 
of  breaking  up  and  driving  off  working  parties  that 
were  engaged  in  repairing  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad.  These  troops  were  met  by  and  skirmished 
with  Averill’s  cavalry,  and  the  news  of  this  move- 
ment was.  at  once  sent  to  Sheridan,  who  immediately 
changed  his  plans  and  resolved  to  attack  directly  on 
the  troops  in  front  of  Winchester,  trusting  to  defeat 
the  force  remaining  at  that  point  before  the  two 
Confederate  divisions  that  had  been  detached  could 
return  to  the  main  army,  and  thus  overpower  the 
several  bodies  of  the  enemy  in  detail. 

However,  while  dispositions  were  being  made  for 
this  movement  General  Early,  who  was  at  Martins- 
burg, learned,  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th,  of  the 
meeting  that  had  taken  place  on  the  preceding  day 
between  the  Union  generals,  and,  rightly  judging 
that  it  was  held  for  the  object  of  arranging  for  im- 
mediate active  movements,  at  once  ordered  his  de- 
tached troops  back  to  Winchester,  and  after  a forced 
march  got  them  within  supporting  distance  of  the 
main  body  of  his  army. 

The  lines  of  the  Confederate  army  as  it  was 
finally  posted  to  meet  the  expected  attack  extended 
from  the  right,  which  lay  on  the  Berryville  pike, 
two  miles  east  of  Winchester,  northwardly  toward 
Stephenson’s  Depot,  at  which  point  the  two  divisions 
which  had  been  detached  were  posted  on  the  night 
of  the  i8th.  One  division  of  cavalry  was  on  the 
right  and  rear  of  the  Confederate  infantry  on  the 
Berryville  pike,  and  the  other  protected  the  left  of 
the  line  near  Stephenson’s  Depot. 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


157 


The  plan  which  General  Sheridan  had  now  formed 
consisted  in  a strong  and  vigorous  attack  upon  the 
right  of  the  enemy  on  the  Berryville  pike,  in  the 
hope  of  crushing  that  force  before  the  Confederate 
army  could  be  concentrated  in  sufficient  strength  to 
offer  a strong  defense,  and,  successful  in  this,  to 
gradually  extend  his  force  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
the  enemy  and  cut  him  off  from  a retreat  to  the 
south,  while,  moving  in  any  other  direction,  he  would 
be  exposed  to  attack  by  the  strong  cavalry  force 
that  was  posted  on  the  right  of  our  army. 

By  three  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  September 
19th  our  troops  were  in  motion  and  proceeded  in  the 
following  order:  On  the  extreme  left  General  Wilson 
with  his  division  of  cavalry  had  the  advance,  and 
was  followed  by  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps. 
His  orders  were  to  move  up  the  Berryville  pike,  carry 
the  crossing  of  the  Opequan  on  that  road,  charge 
through  the  gorge  on  the  road  west  of  the  stream, 
and  occupy  the  open  ground  at  the  head  of  this  de- 
file. The  two  infantry  corps  were  expected  to  follow 
closely  and  to  occupy  the  open  ground  which  Wilson 
was  ordered  to  seize,  and,  this  being  accomplished, 
Wilson  was  directed  to  move  to  the  left  and  front  to 
protect  that  flank  of  the  army  and  to  intercept  any 
movement  of  the  enemy  to  the  southward.  The  two 
divisions  of  the  Eighth  Corps  under  General  Crook, 
which  on  the  night  of  the  i8th  had  encamped  to  the 
northward  at  Summit  Point,  were  directed  to  follow 
the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  across  the  Opequan, 
and  it  was  intended  to  hold  them  in  reserve  until  the 
time  for  their  service  should  arrive,  and  then,  mov- 
ing them  to  the  south  and  west,  they  were  to  be  used 
as  a turning  column,  with  the  assistance  of  the  cavalry 


158 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


under  Wilson,  to  prevent  the  retreat  of  the  enemy 
southward  from  Winchester.  On  the  right  General 
Torbert,  with  Merritt’s  division  of  cavalry,  was  to 
advance  westwardly  from  Summit  Point  to  Stephen- 
son’s Depot,  and  there,  uniting  his  command  with 
General  Averill’s  division,  moving  on  that  point  from 
the  north,  to  attack  vigorously  on  the  left  of  the 
enemy  and  drive  any  opposing  force  he  might  meet 
toward  Winchester. 

On  the  left  of  our  army  the  cavalry  at  dawn 
forced  the  crossing  of  the  Opequan,  and,  pressing 
rapidly  forward  through  the  Berryville  gorge,  cap- 
tured a small  earthwork  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  main 
line,  making  prisoners  of  the  garrison.  The  position 
thus  taken  was  held  by  the  cavalry,  who  repulsed 
several  attacks  of  the  enemy’s  infantry,  and  was 
finally  turned  over  to  the  Sixth  Corps,  which,  pre- 
ceded by  General  Sheridan,  began  to  arrive  on  the 
ground  at  8 a.  m.  and  was  deployed  into  line  of  battle 
under  a heavy  artillery  fire  from  the  enemy  as  the 
divisions  successively  arrived  on  the  ground,  while 
the  cavalry  marched  to  the  left  and  cleared  the 
ground  for  further  movements.  The  Nineteenth 
Corps  followed  as  closely  as  possible,  but  the  delays 
inseparable  from  marching  a long  column  consisting  of 
two  corps  of  infantry  upon  a single  narrow  road,  ford- 
ing a stream,  and  the  obstructions  to  the  march  caused 
by  the  ammunition  trains  and  artillery,  had  consumed 
much  time,  and  it  was  nearly  noon  before  the  Nine- 
teenth Corps  was  upon  the  ground  and  formed,  upon 
the  right  of  the  Sixth.  The  position  occupied  by  our 
troops  was  east  of  Winchester  and  about  two  miles 
from  the  outskirts  of  the  town.  The  ground  on 
which  the  Union  forces  were  formed  was  open,  and 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


159 


neither  army  was  protected  in  any  degree  by  earth- 
works, but  the  Confederate  lines  were  formed  in  a 
belt  of  timber  and  partially  concealed  from  view. 

At  the  time  when  General  Sheridan,  at  the  head 
of  his  column,  first  arrived  upon  the  field,  but  one 
division  of  Confederate  infantry  was  in  position  to 
oppose  his  advance,  supported  on  the  right  by  a 
division  of  cavalry,  but  the  slow  movement  of  our 
infantry  gave  the  Confederate  commander  an  equal 
opportunity  of  concentrating  his  force,  and  by  the 
time  our  troops  were  formed  for  the  attack  they  were 
confronted  by  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  infantry, 
which,  marching  on  interior  lines,  was  more  rapidly 
brought  to  the  threatened  point. 

At  noon  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  were  in 
line  and  ready  to  attack,  with  the  cavalry  division  on 
the  left  and  Crook’s  troops,  which  had  begun  to 
reach  the  field,  massing  in  the  rear,  and  a general 
advance  was  ordered.  A severe  engagement  at  once 
began,  and  continued  throughout  the  day.  On  the 
extreme  left  the  cavalry  encountered  that  of  the 
enemy,  and  after  a sharp  and  spirited  engagement 
drove  it  back  toward  Winchester.  The  two  divisions 
of  the  Sixth  Corps,  engaged  on  the  left,  after  a severe 
struggle  forced  back  the  infantry  in  their  front,  and 
the  division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  on  their  right, 
attacked  and  drove  in  confusion  the  troops  it  en- 
countered, which  formed  the  left  of  the  Confederate 
infantry  line.  This  division,  however,  advancing  too 
rapidly  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  enemy,  became 
exposed  to  a heavy  fire  from  Early’s  reserve  artillery, 
and  their  movement  separated  them  from  the  right 
of  the  Sixth  Corps.  In  the  interval  thus  caused  two 
of  the  enemy’s  divisions  were  placed  and  a portion 


l6o  GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 

of  the  right  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  the 
hitherto  successful  division  of  the  Nineteenth  were 
driven  back,  while  the  advance  of  other  portions  of 
the  line  was  temporarily  checked. 

General  Sheridan,  who  personally  directed  the 
operations  on  this  line,  at  once  ordered  Russell’s 
division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  had  been  held  in 
reserve,  to  move  to  the  front  and,  occupying  the  gap 
caused  in  the  lines  by  the  Confederate  charge,  to  ad- 
vance and  attack  the  enemy.  This  movement,  which 
struck  the  advancing  enemy  in  the  flank,  supported, 
by  the  Are  of  a battery,  soon  turned  the  tide  and 
drove  the  Confederates  back  to  their  original  ground, 
and  the  right  of  our  line  was  again  re-established 
and  in  a position  in  advance  of  that  occupied  earlier 
in  the  day.  Behind  the  successful  division  which 
now  retained  a position  in  the  front  line  the  troops 
that  had  been  broken  wmre  rallied  and  reformed,  and 
the  Second  Division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was 
brought  to  the  front  and  replaced  that  which  had 
been  driven  back. 

The  charge  of  Russell’s  division  restored  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Union  lines  and  caused  severe  loss  to 
the  enemy  ; but  this  success  was  gained  at  a heavy 
cost  in  killed  and  wounded,  among  the  former  of 
whom  was  the  gallant  leader,  whp  at  the  moment 
of  victory  fell,  shot  through  the  heart — a death  that, 
as  Sheridan  has  well  said,  ‘-brought  sadness  to  every 
heart  in  the  army.” 

It  was  now  long  past  midday,  and  as  yet  no  in- 
telligence had  been  received  from  General  Torbert’s 
column  of  cavalry  that  had  been  ordered  to  attack 
on  the  enemy’s  extreme  right  at  Stephenson’s  Depot. 
The  strength  that  the  enemy  had  developed  showed 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH.  i6l 

that  a strong  effort  would  be  required  to  drive  him 
from  the  position  he  held,  and  General  Sheridan 
reluctantly  abandoned  his  original  intention  of  using 
the  command  of  General  Crook  to  operate  on  the 
left  of  the  enemy  and  cut  off  his  retreat  to  the 
south,  and  ordered  these  two  divisions  to  the  front 
and  placed  them  on  the  right  of  his  line  as  formed, 
with  directions  to  move  forward  at  once. 

This  new  line  of  fresh  troops  outflanked  the  Con- 
federate right,  and,  wheeling  to  the  left  as  they  ad- 
vanced, drove  everything  before  them  in  confusion. 
After  directing  the  movements  of  General  Crook’s 
troops.  General  Sheridan  rode  back  to  the  left  and 
ordered  an  advance  of  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth 
Corps,  which  was  made  with  equal  success,  and  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  was  soon  in  full  retreat. 

While  Crook’s  troops  were  advancing  to  the 
charge  Torbert  arrived  on  the  right  with  his  two 
divisions  of  cavalry,  driving  before  him  two  bri- 
gades of  infantry  and  a division  of  cavalry  that  dur- 
ing the  day  had  been  vainly  striving  to  impede  his 
advance  from  Stephenson’s  Depot.  Reaching  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  lines  at  the  mo- 
ment of  the  general  advance  of  the  Union  army, 
these  troops,  with  the  assistance  of  infantry  from 
Breckinridge’s  corps,  made  one  last  rally  ; but  the 
ground  was  favorable  for  a cavalry  charge,  and  our 
mounted  troops  swept  down  upon  them  with  irre- 
sistible force,  capturing  five  guns  and  twelve  hun- 
dred prisoners,  and  utterly  destroying  the  remainder 
as  an  organized  body. 

The  movements  of  the  infantry  were  equally 
successful  along  the  whole  front,  and  the  enemy  was 
rapidly  driven  back  to  Winchester.  The  routed  Con- 


i62 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


federates  attempted  to  rally  behind  some  earthworks 
that  had  been  constructed  around  the  turn  in  the 
early  days  of  the  war,  but,  attacked  in  front  by  our 
infantry,  now  exulting  in  their  success,  and  threat- 
ened on  their  right  by  the  victorious  cavalry,  their 
resistance  was  but  momentary ; they  soon  broke 
from  their  ranks,  and  disorganized  and  scattered 
fugitives  fled  through  Winchester  and  down  the 
roads  that  led  southerly  from  the  town.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  first  division  of  Confederate  infantry 
that  left  the  field  retired  in  good  order,  and  with 
sufficient  strength  to  prevent  the  cavalry  on  the  left 
of  our  army  from  gaining  the  turnpike  leading  south, 
thus  giving  a free  road  to  the  beaten  enemy.  Gen- 
eral Sheridan,  with  Crook’s  troops,  continued  in 
pursuit  for  about  three  miles,  but  night  and  the  ex- 
hausted condition  of  the  men,  who  had  been  continu- 
ously marching  and  fighting  for  more  than  eighteen 
hours,  compelled  a halt. 

The  news  of  this  great  success — which  was  an- 
nounced to  the  general  in  chief  by  a brief  dispatch 
which  told  the  story  in  saying,  “We  have  just  sent 
them  whirling  through  Winchester,  and  we  are  after 
them  to-morrow;  this  army  behaved  splendidly” — 
was  flashed,  with  all  the  speed  that  electricity  could 
give,  throughout  the  North  and  to  the  other  armies 
in  the  field ; and  at  this  day  it  is  hardly  possible  to 
conceive  the  effect  produced  on  public  opinion  and 
the  feeling  of  confidence  and  hope  for  the  future 
that  was  aroused. 

Though  the  battle  was  not  to  be  regarded  as  one 
of  the  first  importance — so  far  as  the  number  of 
troops  engaged  or  the  immediate  results  of  the  ac- 
tion were  considered — it  was  a signal  and  first  sue- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


163 


cess,  obtained  in  a field  where  our  troops  had  hitherto 
been  always,  and  often  ignominiously,  defeated,  and 
it  was  one  of  the  very  few  victories  gamed  by  a 
Northern  army  in  the  long  course  of  the  war  in 
which  the  enemy’s  forces  had  been  entirely  broken 
up  and  in  the  course  of  the  engagement  driven  in 
disorderly  rout  from  the  field. 

Our  losses  were  heavy,  as  the  fighting  was  hard 
and  continuous  through  the  day,  showing  a total 
of  over  forty-five  hundred,  among  whom  were  many 
officers  of  rank  and  distinction.  The  Confederates 
sustained  losses  equal  to  those  we  suffered,  and,  as 
substantial  evidence  of  victory,  left  in  our  hands  five 
guns,  nine  battle  flags,  and  two  thousand  prisoners. 

Congratulations  from  every  quarter  were  received 
by  General  Sheridan,  among  the  first  being  one  from 
the  President,  who,  on  the  day  following  the  battle, 
at  the  suggestion  of  General  Grant,  gave  him  the 
appointment  of  brigadier  general  in  the  regular  army, 
converting  his  temporary  assignment  to  command 
the  Middle  Military  Division  into  a permanent  ap- 
pointment; and  there  is  no  record  that  he  or  any 
other  officer  of  the  Administration  on  this  occasion 
raised  any  question  of  the  extreme  youthfulness  of 
the  recipient  of  these  high  honors. 

This  battle  of  the  Opequan — for  so  it  was  desig- 
nated by  General  Sheridan  to  distinguish  it  from 
actions  that  had  previously  occurred  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Winchester — had  results  of  far  higher 
importance  than  the  defeat  and  rout  of  a hostile 
army.  It  restored  the  whole  of  the  valley  north  of 
Winchester  to  the  control  of  the  Union,  from  which 
it  was  never  again  separated;  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal 


164 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


were  once  more  opened,  and  thereafter  kept  in  use 
for  the  benefit  of  the  loyal  States ; Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania  were  from  that  time  freed  from  any 
further  apprehension  of  the  invasions  to  which  for 
three  years  they  had  been  subjected;  and  the  safety 
of  the  national  capital  was  permanently  assured. 

At  the  time  it  occurred  a victory  of  this  striking 
character  was  of  great  value  to  inspirit  those  who  at 
the  North  were  watching  the  progress  of  the  war 
and  patiently  and,  as  it  were  sometimes,  almost 
hopelessly  looking  for  its  successful  close.  During 
the  whole  of  the  past  year  the  two  great  armies  of 
the  East  and  the  West  had  been  slowly  and  painfully 
pressing  forward  on  their  appointed  paths.  No  sig- 
nal victories,  brilliant  trophies,  or  rapid  conquests  of 
territory  had  rewarded  their  efforts;  but  at  vast  cost 
of  life  and  treasure  they  had  daily  gained,  after  bitter 
struggles,  some  steps  forward,  but  ever  found  their 
advance  disputed  by  a vigorous,  active,  unconquered, 
and  seemingly  indomitable  foe.  Like  a rainbow  of 
promise  this  signal  success  suddenly  beamed  upon 
a people  who  by  long  disappointment  had  almost 
ceased  to  hope  for  victory,  and  furnished  a substan- 
tial ground  for  bright  anticipations  of  the  future. 

So  far  as  known,  but  one  person  within  the  limits 
of  our  country  has  injuriously  criticised  or  cen- 
sured the  manner  in  which  the  battle  of  the  Ope- 
quan  was  fought,  or  the  results  of  that  victory.  Sin- 
gularly enough,  that  critic  is  found  in  the  person  of 
General  Early,  who  some  years  after  the  close  of 
the  war,  in  one  of  the  many  articles  which  he  was  in 
the  habit  of  furnishing  to  Southern  papers  and  maga- 
zines illustrative  of  his  own  prowess  and  of  the 
errors,  mistakes,  and  weaknesses  of  Northern  gen- 


VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 


165 

erals,  bitterly  complains  that  General  Sheridan  did 
not  sufficiently  defeat  him  at  the  battle  of  the  Ope- 
quan,  and  that  to  that  officer’s  incapacity  he  owes  his 
escape  from  total  destruction.  He  asserts  that  “ in- 
stead of  being  promoted,  Sheridan  ought  to  have 
been  cashiered  for  this  battle”;  and  that  “ a skill- 
ful and  energetic  commander  of  the  enemy’s  forces 
would  have  crushed  Ramseur  before  any  assistance 
could  have  reached  him,  and  thus  insured  the  de- 
struction of  my  whole  force;  and  later  in  the  day, 
when  the  battle  had  turned  against  us,  with  the 
minimum  superiority  in  cavalry  which  Sheridan  had 
and  the  advantage  of  the  open  country,  would  have 
destroyed  my  whole  force  and  captured  everything 
I had.” 

It  is  certainly  a difficult  matter  to  satisfy  an  an- 
tagonist so  exacting  as  General  Early,  but  on  subse- 
quent occasions  General  Sheridan  exerted  himself  to 
remedy  and  correct  any  omissions  in  his  duty  that 
occurred  at  the  Opequan,  and  we  have  no  evidence 
to  show  that  at  the  subsequent  engagements  of 
Fisher’s  Hill,  Cedar  Creek,  and  Waynesborough  Gen- 
eral Early  had  any  occasion  to  complain  of  want  of 
energy,  skill,  or  thoroughness  on  the  part  of  his  ad- 
versary. The  battle  of  the  Opequan  was  emphatical- 
ly General  Sheridan’s  own  battle,  and  his  alone,  and, 
being  the  first  engagement  in  which  he  exercised  an 
independent  command,  is  particularly  worthy  of  no- 
tice in  examining  his  military  career. 

It  appears,  from  his  correspondence  with  General 
Grant,  that,  on  a careful  examination  of  the  field  of 
operations  and  full  knowledge  of  the  force  of  his 
enemy,  he  had  fully  determined  that  an  engage- 
ment was  inexpedient  until  such  time  as  the  army 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


1 66 

opposed  to  him  should  be  diminished  in  strength, 
and  to  this  decision  he  adhered  in  spite  of  many 
efforts  made  by  those  in  high  authority  to  force  him 
to  immediate  action.  When  the  detachment  from 
Early’s  force  that  he  had  anticipated  was  made  he 
immediately,  and  without  instructions,  prepared  to 
strike  the  blow  he  had  meditated,  and  General 
Grant’s  action  at  the  Charlestown  interview  was 
confined  to  a hearty  approval  of  the  plans  of  his 
subordinate.  Nor  were  these  plans,  as  those  of 
many  generals,  fixed  and  incapable  of  variation  to 
meet  changing  circumstances,  for  on  the  i8th  of 
September  alterations  in  the  positions  of  Early’s 
troops  required  their  entire  reconstruction  and  new 
movements,  which  were  successfully  carried  out;  and 
again  on  the  day  of  battle,  and  at  a critical  moment, 
when  for  an  instant  the  contest  was  uncertain,  a 
new  and  further  modification  that  affected  the  whole 
conduct  of  the  engagement  and  the  possible  results 
of  success  was  at  once  determined  on,  and  executed 
with  such  rapidity  and  vigor  as  to  contribute  mate- 
rially to  the  victory  that  was  gained. 

In  addition  to  the  planning  and  ordering  of  the 
movements  of  the  engagement,  General  Sheridan,  as 
was  always  his  custom,  was  on  the  lines  with  and  in 
the  presence  of  his  troops,  supervising  and  at  times 
taking  personal  charge  of  the  movements  that  he 
ordered,  and  which  resulted  so  happily.  From  that 
day  no  soldier  could  be  found  under  his  command 
who  had  not  the  most  perfect  confidence  in  the  abil- 
ity and  fortune  of  his  commander,  and  none  who 
would  not  enthusiastically  follow  wherever  he  led, 
with  the  assured  conviction  that  his  efforts  would  be 
rewarded  by  success. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


fisher’s  hill. — WOODSTOCK  RACES. — CEDAR  CREEK. 

On  the  night  of  September  19th  Sheridan  was  not 
content  to  rest  after  the  victory  he  had  gained,  but, 
after  sending  intelligence  of  the  result  of  the  day’s 
battle  to  General  Grant,  gave  orders  for  immediate 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  at  daylight  on  the  morning 
of  the  20th  the  whole  army  marched  southwardly 
from  Winchester  along  the  valley  pike,  the  Sixth 
Corps  on  the  left,  the  Nineteenth  on  the  right,  and 
the  Eighth  bringing  up  the  rear.  The  cavalry  pre- 
ceded the  infantry,  Averill’s  division  moving  on 
w'hat  was  known  as  the  back  road  to  the  right  of 
the  valley  pike,  Merritt  on  the  pike,  and  Wilson’s 
division  bearing  to  the  left  on  the  road  to  Front 
Royal.  The  enemy,  having  marched  in  retreat 
throughout  the  night  of  the  19th,  was  not  encoun- 
tered until  overtaken  by  the  cavalry  in  the  after- 
noon, when  he  was  found  posted  at  Fisher’s  Hill, 
about  fifteen  miles  south  of  Winchester  and  two 
miles  south  of  Strasburg,  and  occupying  the  position 
to  which  Early  had  retreated  on  General  Sheridan’s 
first  advance  in  the  month  of  August. 

The  position  at  Fisher’s  Hill  was  naturally  strong, 
and  was  protected  by  earthworks  that  were  now 
being  strengthened  to  such  an  extent  that  a direct 
12  167 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


1 68 

assault  upon  them  would  certainly  result  in  great 
loss  of  life  if  not  in  defeat.  At  this  point  the  main 
valley,  twenty  miles  wide  a short  distance  farther 
north,  is  divided  by  the  Massanutten  range,  and 
the  width  of  the  western  division,  in  which  Fish- 
er’s Hill  is  found,  is  barely  four  miles.  This  line 
was  held  by  the  Confederate  infantry,  which  occu- 
pied commanding  positions  well  protected  by  strong 
earthworks  and  apparently  secure  against  a direct 
assault.  The  left  of  this  line  was  covered  by  one 
division  of  cavalry  dismounted,  and  the  other  cav- 
alry division  was  sent  to  the  right,  across  the  Massa- 
nutten range,  and  posted  at  Milford,  in  the  Luray 
Valley,  to  prevent  a flank  attack  from  that  quarter. 

After  reconnoitering  the  position  of  the  enemy 
and  appreciating  the  danger  of  a direct  attack  upon 
his  front,  General  Sheridan  determined  that  the  most 
feasible  plan  for  driving  thewenemy  from  his  position 
was  to  turn  his  left  flank  by  a strong  attacking  col- 
umn and  then  support  this  movement  by  a demon- 
stration on  the  front.  During  the  afternoon  of  the 
20th  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  arrived  at 
Cedar  Creek,  and,  crossing  that  stream,  occupied  the 
heights  in  front  of  Strasburg  and  covered  the  road 
to  Front  Royal  on  the  east;  Merritt’s  division  of 
cavalry  was  moved  to  the  righc,  and  with  Averill’s 
covered  and  held  the  back  road  near  the  North 
Mountain,  and  Crook’s  two  divisions  were  held  on 
the  north  bank  of  Cedar  Creek.  At  nightfall,  as  this 
arrangement  of  the  lines  was  completed,  the  Union 
pickets  held  the  northern  part  of  the  town  of  Stras- 
burg and  the  Confederate  pickets  the  southern. 

The  movement  and  placing  in  position  of  the 
column  intended  to  attack  the  left  flank  and  rear  of 


^:4.> 


Bradley  ^ Poates,  Engr%  H.  Y. 


FISHER’S  HILL. 


169 


the  enemy,  and  which  to  effect  this  object  must  be 
stationed  on  the  eastern  face  of  the  North  Mountain, 
was  a difficult  task,  and  of  course  had  to  be  effected 
in  such  a manner  that  the  movement  should  be  con- 
cealed from  the  other  side.  The  enemy  occupied  a 
signal  station  on  Three  Top  Mountain,  from  which 
all  movements  of  our  troops  could  be  observed  in 
daylight.  Therefore,  on  the  night  of  the  20th,  Gen- 
eral Crook’s  troops,  that  were  intended  to  form  the 
flanking  force,  were  moved  into  some  heavy  timber 
on  the  north  bank  of  Cedar  Creek,  and  lay  concealed 
there  through  the  next  day.  During  the  21st  the 
Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  were  advanced,  and, 
moving  through  Strasburg,  compelled  the  enemy’s 
skirmishers  to  fall  back  to  the  intrenched  lines  on 
Fisher’s  Hill.  After  some  severe  fighting  two  good 
positions  for  our  artillery  were  captured  and  the  lines 
of  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  established  se- 
curely within  seven  hundred  yards  of  the  Confeder- 
ate defenses. 

On  the  night  of  the  21st  Crook’s  troops  were 
brought  across  Cedar  Creek  and  were  hidden  in 
some  heavy  timber  in  rear  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
and  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  pro- 
tected from  observation  by  ravines  and  woods,  he 
marched  westwardly  and  gained  a point  protected 
from  observation  near  the  back  road  and  the  base 
of  North  Mountain.  While  this  movement,  which 
occupied  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  was  conducted 
with  perfect  silence,  the  attention  of  the  enemy  was 
diverted  with  demonstrations  on  his  front,  and  the 
right  of  our  line,  which  was  to  co-operate  with  Crook 
when  his  attack  should  be  made,  was  advanced  and 
strengthened,  Averill’s  division  of  cavalry  was  moved 


170 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


to  the  right  of  the  infantry  line,  and  General  Early 
prepared  for  assault  from  this  portion  of  our  front, 
though  with  little  hope  of  ultimate  success,  for  he 
states  that  after  seeing  this  advance  “orders  were 
given  for  my  troops  to  retire  after  dark,  as  I knew 
my  force  was  not  strong  enough  to  resist  a deter- 
mined attack.” 

The  execution  of  these  orders,  most  appropriate 
to  the  situation,  was,  however,  anticipated  by  Gen- 
eral Crook,  who,  late  in  the  afternoon,  having  gained 
a position  in  rear  of  the  enemy’s  left  flank,  faced  his 
troops  to  the  east,  and  just  at  sunset  charged  down 
upon  the  troops,  exposed  without  protection  to  his 
assault.  A feeble  effort  was  made  to  resist  his  ad- 
vance, but  sufficient  troops  could  not  be  obtained 
for  the  purpose,  and  our  men  swept  along  the  line, 
driving  everything  before  them  in  confusion. 

As  General  Crook  advanced  he  was  joined  at  the 
proper  time  by  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  which 
had  been  held  in  readiness  to  move  at  the  proper 
moment,  and  as  the  troops  advanced,  the  movement 
was  successively  taken  up  by  the  different  divisions  of 
our  infantry  that  were  in  front  of  the  Confederate 
lines,  and  between  sunset  and  dark  the  whole  of 
Early’s  army  was  driven  in  confusion  from  the 
strong  position  at  Fisher’s  Hill  and  fled  panic- 
stricken  from  the  field,  abandoning  the  artillery  and 
other  property  in  the  works.  All  discipline  and  or- 
ganization was  lost,  and  the  retreating  mass  was 
scattered  over  the  fields  and  roads  toward  Wood- 
stock,  with  our  infantry  in  pursuit. 

About  five  miles  south  of  Fisher’s  Hill,  on  some 
high  ground,  a few  of  the  enemy  rallied,  and  with  two 
pieces  of  artillery  endeavored  to  check  the  pursuit. 


FISHER’S  HILL. 


171 

but  the  troops  were  swept  away  and  the  guns  cap- 
tured. At  this  point  the  only  available  brigade  of 
cavalry  was  sent  to  the  front,  and  through  the  night 
the  pursuit  was  continued  to  Woodstock,  ten  miles 
from  Fisher’s  Hill,  which  our  infantry  reached  at  day- 
light of  the  23d,  when  a necessary  halt  was  made  to 
allow  for  rest  and  food  and  to  reorganize  the  troops, 
which  had  been  thrown  into  some  confusion  by  the 
rapid  movements. 

The  success  obtained  was  great,  involving  as  it 
did  the  capture  of  a strongly  fortified  position  and 
the  total  rout  of  the  hostile  army,  but  it  did  not  pro- 
duce all  of  the  results  that  General  Sheridan  had 
hoped  to  accomplish.  On  the  21st  General  Torbert 
had  been  sent  with  Wilson’s  cavalry  division  and 
two  brigades  of  Merritt’s  to  the  Luray  Valley,  with 
the  expectation  that  he  would  drive  the  cavalry  of 
the  enemy  that  was  posted  at  Milford  and,  moving 
south,  cross  the  Massanutten  Mountain  near  New- 
market and  gain  a position  that  would  allow  him  to 
act  in  Early’s  rear.  Had  this  work  been  accomplished 
as  intended,  it  is  probable  that  the  greater  part  of 
Early’s  army  would  have  been  captured  after  the 
rout  at  Fisher’s  Hill,  but  Torbert,  after  an  ineffectual 
effort  to  drive  the  enemy’s  cavalry  from  Milford,  fell 
back,  and  on  the  23d,  while  at  Woodstock,  General 
Sheridan,  to  his  astonishment,  learned  that  nothing 
had  been  done  by  this  cavalry  force.  The  orders  to 
push  on  to  Newmarket  at  any  cost  were  reiterated, 
but  it  may  be  here  said  that  the  renewed  movement 
was  made  too  late ; General  Early  had  passed  south 
and  was  perfectly  safe  from  pursuit  before  our  cav- 
alry reached  Newmarket. 

Another  misfortune  occurred  in  the  neglect  of 


172 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


General  Averill  to  join  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
as  he  retreated  from  Fisher’s  Hill,  as  that  officer, 
after  the  capture  of  the  works,  placed  his  division  of 
cavalry  in  camp  and  left  General  Sheridan  to  follow 
the  retreating  army  through  the  night  with  the  in- 
fantry and  one  small  cavalry  brigade.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  Averill  was  sent  forward  to  follow  the  enemy, 
but,  in  the  opinion  of  Sheridan,  he  failed  to  display 
the  energy  and  activity  that  were  required  and  was 
on  the  same  day  relieved  by  Colonel  William  H. 
Powell  from  command. 

While  all  the  results  expected  from  the  victory  at 
Fisher’s  Hill  were  not  obtained,  it  was  a most  en- 
couraging success  for  the  Union  army  and  a crush- 
ing defeat  to  the  Confederate  commander,  who  was 
for  a time  compelled  to  abandon  the  whole  valley  of 
the  Shenandoah  to  his  opponent,  and  was  unable  to 
rally  his  army  or  use  it  for  any  practical  purpose 
until  it  had  been  re-equipped  and  largely  re-enforced. 
The  Union  loss  was  slight,  not  exceeding  some  four 
hundred  killed  and  wounded.  No  record  exists  of 
the  losses  sustained  by  the  Confederates,  but  twelve 
hundred  prisoners  and  twenty  pieces  of  artillery  were 
captured  by  our  troops.  The  condition  of  Early’s 
army  after  this  his  second  defeat  is  described  in  a 
letter  from  that  officer  to  General  Lee  written  a few 
days  after  the  event ; 

“ The  enemy’s  immense  superiority  in  cavalry  and 
the  inefficiency  of  mine  has  been  the  cause  of  all  my 
disasters.  In  the  affair  at  Fisher’s  Hill  the  cavalry 
gave  way,  but  it  was  flanked.  This  would  have  been 
remedied  if  the  troops  had  remained  steady,  but  a 
panic  seized  them  at  the  idea  of  being  flanked,  and 
without  being  defeated  they  broke,  many  of  them 


FISHER’S  HILL. 


173 


fleeing  shamefully.  The  artillery  was  not  captured 
by  the  enemy,  but  abandoned  by  the  infantry.  My 
troops  are  very  much  shattered,  the  men  much  ex- 
hausted, and  many  of  them  without  shoes.” 

The  effect  of  this  second  decisive  victory  was 
most  encouraging  to  the  whole  country,  and  the  be- 
lief became  general  that  it  was  not  only  possible  for 
our  armies  to  meet  and  successfully  resist  those  of 
the  South,  but  that  from  this  time  on  it  was  in  the 
power  of  the  Union  troops  to  inflict  crushing  defeats 
upon  their  adversaries  and  inflict  blows  and  cause 
losses  that  were  irreparable,  and  which,  if  continued, 
promised  a speedy  close  of  the  war. 

The  failure  of  the  cavalry  to  pursue  or  cut  off  the 
retreat  of  Early  gave  him  time  to  collect  some  of  his 
scattered  forces,  and  he  took  position  on  the  night 
of  the  23d  at  Rood’s  Hill,  some  two  miles  south  of 
Mount  Jackson.  As  soon,  however,  as  our  troops 
appeared  on  the  24th  the  retreat  was  again  com- 
menced; the  Confederates,  without  offering  any  re- 
sistance, kept  in  advance  of  our  forces,  and,  passing 
through  Newmarket  in  advance  of  Torbert’s  cavalry, 
which  had  not  yet  reached  that  point,  left  the  valley 
pike  and  continued  their  flight  on  a road  inclining  to 
the  Blue  Ridge.  The  flight  and  pursuit  were  kept 
up  until  night,  when  it  became  necessary  to  give  the 
troops  some  rest,  and  both  armies  encamped — the 
Confederates  some  five  miles  in  front  of  our  lines. 
Here  Early  collected  ail  his  cavalry  and  then  fell 
back  through  Runn’s  Gap,  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  to  a 
point  where  he  expected  to  meet  supplies  and  re-en- 
forcements from  Richmond. 

The  forces  of  the  enemy  had  thus  been  entirely 
driven  from  the  valley,  which,  in  its  whole  extent, 


174 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


was  now  in  the  possession  of  Northern  troops. 
General  Sheridan  moved  his  infantry  to  Harrisonburg 
and  occupied  his  cavalry  with  expeditions  for  the 
destruction  of  bridges  and  the  gathering  of  supplies 
through  an  extent  of  country  ranging  from  Waynes- 
borough  and  Staunton  on  the  south  to  Port  Republic 
on  the  east.  This  position  of  the  troops  was  main- 
tained for  several  days,  changes  of  station  or  move- 
ments of  small  importance  being  of  daily  occurrence. 
While  at  Port  Republic,  Merritt  encountered  Ker- 
shaw’s division  of  infantry  and  Cutshaw’s  battalion 
of  artillery,  sent  from  Richmond  to  re-enforce  Early, 
and  an  effort  was  made  to  bring  on  a general  en- 
gagement, but  the  Confederate  General  declined  the 
challenge  and  withdrew  his  troops  to  the  east  of 
the  Blue  Ridge.  The  main  body  of  our  army  re- 
mained in  and  about  Mount  Crawford  and  Harris- 
onburg until  the  6th  of  October,  the  cavalry  cover- 
ing the  country  to  the  Blue  Ridge  on  the  east  and 
Staunton  on  the  south,  and  destroying  such  supplies 
as  could  not  be  removed. 

While  occupying  these  positions  General  Sheri- 
dan was  strongly  urged  by  Generals  Grant  and  Hal- 
leck  to  continue  southward  and  pursue  the  Confed- 
erates toward  Charlottesville  and  Gordonsville,  break 
up  those  important  railroad  centers,  and  thence  effect 
a junction  with  the  forces  that  were  besieging  Rich- 
mond. To  this  plan  his  own  judgment  was  opposed, 
as  he  would  at  every  stage  of  his  progress  be  met 
by  a force  that  now,  as  it  had  been  re-enforced, 
equaled  his  own,  and  that  could  be  constantly  in- 
creased by  detachments  from  Richmond,  while  he 
could  obtain  nothing  in  the  way  of  additions  to  his 
strength.  In  addition  to  this,  it  was  absolutely  im- 


FISHER’S  HILL. 


175 


possible  to  provide  an  army  of  infantry  and  cavalry 
in  large  force  with  supplies  either  of  ammunition 
or  provisions  in  the  country  through  which  he  was 
expected  to  move.  In  the  position  he  was  occupy- 
ing— some  one  hundred  miles  from  Martinsburg,  the 
nearest  depot  of  supplies — it  was  impossible  to  suf- 
ficiently provide  his  troops  by  wagon  transportation, 
and  the  resources  of  the  valley  upon  which  he  was 
now  depending  were  being  rapidly  exhausted. 

It  had  been  proposed  to  relay  and  open  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  as  a means  of  sup- 
plying him  while  on  the  proposed  expedition,  but, 
apart  from  the  delay  that  the  completion  of  such  a 
work  would  require,  the  large  force  of  infantry 
needed  to  protect  a railroad  running  through  seventy 
miles  of  hostile  country  infested  with  guerrillas,  and 
everywhere  open  to  attacks  by  raiding  parties,  would 
take  all  the  effective  force  of  that  arm  in  his  com- 
mand. His  own  opinion,  which  finally  prevailed,  was 
that  the  southwardly  campaign  should  now  termi- 
nate and  that  the  army  should  return  up  the  valley, 
removing  or  destroying  all  crops  and  supplies  of 
every  description  that  still  remained,  thus  making  it 
untenable  for  the  Confederates ; and  when  it  ap- 
peared that  the  valley  was  safe  from  further  hostile 
invasions,  the  troops  not  needed  for  further  service 
there  could  be  readily,  swiftly,  and  safely  transferred 
to  the  armies  operating  against  Richmond. 

General  Grant  finally  acceded  to  the  views  of 
General  Sheridan,  and  left  him  free  to  act  as  his 
own  judgment  should  determine.  Accordingly,  on 
the  6th  of  October  the  army  commenced  its  north- 
ward march,  the  infantry  marching  on  the  valley 
pike  and  preceding  the  cavalry,  which  was  stretched 


176 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


across  the  country  from  the  Blue  Ridge  to  the  North 
Mountain,  driving  off  all  live  stock  and  destroying 
other  army  supplies. 

For  the  first  two  days  of  the  march  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  followed  our  troops,  making  no  hostile 
demonstrations,  but  on  the  8th  of  October  became 
more  enterprising  and  gave  considerable  trouble  to 
the  cavalry  that  covered  the  rear.  The  enemy’s 
mounted  force  was  now  commanded  by  General 
Rosser,  who  a few  days  before  had  joined  Early, 
bringing  with  him  a fresh  brigade  of  cavalry  from 
Richmond.  This  officer,  who  came  to  take  command 
of  troops  that  had  not  in  the  past  been  distinguished 
for  success,  had,  on  his  arrival,  been  generally  pro- 
claimed as  the  “ Savior  of  the  Valley,”  and  the  troops 
he  brought  with  him  had  ornamented  their  caps  with 
laurel  branches  in  anticipation  of  the  honors  they 
expected  to  gather  in  this  new  field.  General  Sheri- 
dan, who  had  been  somewhat  annoyed  and  impeded 
in  his  movements  by  the  attacks  his  rear  guard  had 
sustained,  told  General  Torbert  on  the  evening  of 
the  8th  that  he  was  expected  to  give  battle  with  his 
cavalry  to  Rosser  on  the  following  day,  and  inflict 
on  him  a defeat  that  would  render  him  harmless  for 
the  future  ; that  until  the  affair  was  over  the  in- 
fantry would  be  halted,  and  that  he  proposed  to  wit- 
ness the  affair  from  Round  Top  Mountain.  The 
main  body  of  our  army  was  in  camp  near  Fisher’s 
Hill,  and  the  cavalry  was  formed  for  this  action  on 
the  line  of  Tom’s  Brook,  that  crosses  the  valley  pike 
and  the  back  road  about  six  miles  south  of  Stras- 
burg.  The  divisions  of  Generals  Custer  and  Merritt 
composed  the  force  under  Torbert’s  orders,  and  at 
seven  in  the  morning  General  Custer,  on  the  right  of 


WOODSTOCK  RACES. 


177 


the  line,  attacked  the  head  of  Rosser’s  column.  Gen- 
eral Merritt  moved  up  rapidly  and,  extending  his  right, 
connected  with  the  other  divisions,  and  in  a short 
time  the  whole  cavalry  force  on  both  sides  was 
closely  engaged. 

The  country  was  level  and  open,  and  the  fighting 
on  both  sides  was  done  in  the  saddle  and  sabers 
were  the  weapons  mainly  used.  For  two  hours  the 
result  of  the  conflict  was  in  doubt,  charges  and 
countercharges  on  both  sides,  sometimes  succeeding, 
and  again  being  repulsed  ; but  at  last,  while  the  Con- 
federate center  held  firm,  the  flanks  began  to  waver, 
and  as  these  receded  a general  charge  along  the 
whole  front  was  made  by  the  Northern  troopers.  This 
resulted  in  a complete  breaking  up  of  the  Confeder- 
ate line,  and  a few  moments  afterward  in  a complete 
rout,  when  every  Southern  trooper  put  spurs  to  his 
horse  and  strove  to  save  himself  as  best  he  could. 
Our  men  pursued  them  hotly,  and  for  more  than 
twenty  miles  this  wild  stampede  continued  without 
a single  effort  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  rally  their 
force  or  check  the  pursuit.  Three  hundred  prison- 
ers, eleven  pieces  of  artillery  with  their  caissons, 
and  every  ambulance  and  wagon  that  the  enemy 
possessed  were  captured  and  brought  into  our  lines. 
This  action — known  as  the  battle  of  Tom’s  Brook,  or, 
as  many  called  it,  the  “ Woodstock  Races  ” — effectu- 
ally checked  the  aggressive  tendencies  of  the  Con- 
federate cavalry  and  cost  them  the  good  opinion  of 
General  Early,  who  reported  to  General  Lee  that  his 
cavalry  was  so  badly  demoralized  that  it  should  be 
immediately  dismounted. 

On  the  day  following  the  cavalry  action  at  Tom’s 
Brook  the  army  continued  its  march,  and  crossing  to 


178 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  north  side  of  Cedar  Creek,  there  went  into  camp  ; 
and  the  Sixth  Corps  was  directed  to  continue  its 
march  to  Front  Royal,  with  the  intention  of  return- 
ing to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  On  the  12th 
the  enemy’s  infantry,  which  had  been  following 
our  troops,  arrived  at  Fisher’s  Hill,  and  sent  out  a 
reconnoissance  to  examine  our  lines.  The  Sixth 
Corps  was  recalled,  and  at  the  same  time  a dispatch 
was  received  from  General  Grant  that  showed  he 
had  not  abandoned  the  idea  of  the  movement  by 
Sheridan’s  army  upon  Charlottesville  and  Gordons- 
ville  that  had  previously  been  discussed,  and,  as  Sheri- 
dan hoped,  abandoned,  and  directed  preparations 
for  this  operation  to  be  made.  At  the  same  time 
General  Sheridan  received  from  the  Secretary  of 
War  a request  to  proceed  to  Washington  for  a con- 
sultation that  was  said  to  be  extremely  desirable,  as 
Secretary  Stanton  intended  in  a few  days  to  visit 
General  Grant. 

As  General  Sheridan  well  knew,  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  General  Halleck  agreed  in  the  main  with 
the  views  of  General  Grant  as  to  the  movement  on 
Charlottesville  and  Gordonsville,  which  had  been 
once  insisted  on,  then  abandoned,  and  were  now  re- 
newed. Fully  satisfied  in  his  own  mind  of  the  inex- 
pediency of  such  an  operation,  and  confident  that 
no  success  could  be  hoped  from  it.  General  Sheridan 
reluctantly  concluded  to, leave  his  troops,  and,  mak- 
ing a brief  trip  to  Washington,  see  what  could  be 
effected  by  presenting  personally  the  strong  opin- 
ions he  had  on  this  important  question. 

The  journey  was  delayed  on  the  13th,  for  the 
enemy,  having  learned  that  the  Sixth  Corps  had  been 
ordered  away,  advanced  from  Fisher’s  Hill,  and  with 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


179 


infantry  and  cavalry  attacked  a division  of  Crook’s 
command  that  had  been  advanced  toward  Stras- 
burg,  and  Custer’s  cavalry  on  the  back  road.  After 
a heavy  skirmish  our  infantry  was  driven  back  to 
the  north  bank  of  Cedar  Creek,  while  Custer  suc- 
cessfully repulsed  the  attack  on  his  front. 

On  the  14th  the  Sixth  Corps  returned  to  the  lines, 
and  the  army  was  found  in  a strong  defensive  po- 
sition on  the  north  bank  of  Cedar  Creek,  Crook’s  two 
divisions  on  the  left  holding  the  ground  from  the 
north  bank  of  the  Shenandoah  to  the  valley  pike, 
the  Nineteenth  Corps  extending  west  of  that  road, 
and  on  its  right  and  rear  the  Sixth  Corps,  the  right 
flank  of  which  was  protected  by  two  divisions  of  cav- 
alry under  General  Torbert.  The  left  of  the  army, 
toward  Front  Royal,  was  guarded  by  Powell’s  divi- 
sion of  cavalry,  formerly  commanded  by  Averill,  and 
it  was  intended  to  attack  the  enemy  on  the  morning 
of  the  15th  ; but  Earl}^  having  found  our  force  much 
stronger  than  he  had  at  first  believed,  had  withdrawn 
his  troops  to  Fisher’s  Hill,  and  appeared  occupied  in 
providing  for  his  own  security. 

General  Sheridan  Anally  concluded  to  make  the 
intended  visit  to  Washington,  and  while  his  absence 
from  the  army  has  been  a subject  of  some  criticism, 
in  the  light  of  subsequent  events  the  importance  of 
the  question  that  he  trusted  to  have  Anally  deter- 
mined justified  his  assuming  some  risk  in  the  hope 
of  reaching  a definite  settlement.  Throughout  the 
campaign  the.  movement  toward  Charlottesville  and 
Gordonsville,  which  he  deemed  a useless  and  waste- 
ful expenditure  of  men  and  material  and  productive 
of  no  possible  favorable  results,  had  been  constantly 
pressed  upon  him,  and  orders  relating  to  such  an 


i8o 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


operation  had  interfered  seriously  with  his  own 
admirable  plans. 

On  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  leaving  General 
Wright  in  command  of  the  army,  General  Sheridan 
began  his  journey  to  Washington.  He  took  with  him 
as  far  as  Front  Royal  all  the  cavalry,  intending  to 
send  it  through  Chester  Gap  on  an  expedition  to  de- 
stroy bridges  on  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  and 
cut  off  Early’s  communications  with  Richmond.  At 
Front  Royal  he  was  overtaken  by  a courier  from 
General  Wright,  who  brought  a copy  of  a Confed- 
erate dispatch  that  had  been  taken  down  as  it  was 
flagged  from  the  Confederate  signal  station  at  Three 
Top  Mountain,  and  translated  by  our  signal  officers, 
who  were  acquainted  with  the  Confederate  code  of 
signals,  and  which  read  as  follows  : 

“ To  Lieutenant-General  Early. 

“'Be  ready  to  move  as  soon  as  my  forces  join  you, 
and  we  will  crush  Sheridan. 

“ Longstreet,  Lieutenant  General.” 

As  the  event  proved,  there  was  no  actual  basis 
for  such  a dispatch,  and  neither  Longstreet  nor  any 
troops  of  his  command  were  on  the  way  to  join 
Early ; but  while  General  Sheridan  was  convinced 
of  these  facts  he  thought  best  to  take  every  precau- 
tion, and  therefore  ordered  the  cavalry  back,  to  the 
end  that  the  whole  force  of  the  army  should  be  in 
the  field  to  meet  any  possible  movement  of  the  ene- 
my. General  Wright  was  at  the  same  time  ordered 
to  strengthen  his  position  in  every  way,  and  be  well 
prepared  for  any  emergency. 

In  the  dispatch  that  General  Wright  sent  inclos- 
ing the  Confederate  signal  message  that  officer  said 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


I8l 

that  he  was  making  every  preparation  for  guarding 
against  and  resisting  an  attack  upon  his  right,  which 
was  the  only  point  at  which  he  apprehended  trouble. 
These  precautions  availed,  however,  but  little,  as  the 
attack  and  surprise  with  which  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Creek  commenced,  and  which  drove  from  the  field  a 
large  part  of  our  force  and  threatened  the  defeat  of 
the  whole  army,  were  made  upon  the  left,  the  flank 
which  was  considered  entirely  secure.  General 
Sheridan  continued  his  journey  and  reached  Wash- 
ington early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  and  at  once 
met  the  Secretary  of  War  and  General  Halleck  at 
the  War  Department.  A full  and  free  consultation 
was  held  as  to  the  future  movements  of  the  Army 
of  the  Shenandoah,  and  especially  concerning  the 
projects  of  operating  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and 
against  Charlottesville  and  Gordonsville ; General 
Sheridan  at  last  succeeded  in  establishing  his  own 
position  against  these  plans,  and  his  views  were  sub- 
stantially agreed  to. 

Much  gratified  with  this  success,  which  to  his 
mind  determined  a successful  issue  of  the  valley  cam- 
paign, he  left  Washington  at  twelve  noon  on  a special 
train  for  Martinsburg,  being  of  course  most  anxious 
to  rejoin  the  army  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
accompanied  by  two  engineer  officers  who  were 
charged  with  the  duty  of  reporting  on  a defensive 
line  in  the  valley  that  could  be  held  securely,  while 
the  bulk  of  the  troops  should  be  transferred  to  the 
army  in  front  of  Petersburg.  Martinsburg  was 
reached  the  same  day  in  the  evening,  and  on  the 
following  morning  General  Sheridan,  with  a cavalry 
escort,  started  to  ride  to  Winchester,  about  twelve 
miles  north  of  Cedar  Creek,  which  he  reached  at 


i82 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


four  in  the  afternoon,  and  devoted  the  rest  of  the 
day  to  examining  the  ground  that  was  proposed  as 
the  site  of  the  position  to  be  properly  fortified  for 
future  occupation. 

About  sunset  a courier  arrived  from  Cedar  Creek 
bringing  word  that  everything  was  all  right,  that  the 
enemy  wms  quiet  at  Fisher’s  Hill,  and  that  a brigade 
of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was  ordered  to  make  a recon- 
noissance  on  the  right  at  daylight  of  the  morning  of 
the  19th.  Thus  reassured.  General  Sheridan  rested 
quietly  at  Winchester,  and  when  toward  six  o’clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  19th  faint  sounds  of  irregular 
firing  w'ere  heard  at  Winchester,  they  were  supposed 
to  result  from  the  movements  of  the  reconnoitering 
party  that  was  expected  to  move  out  at  that  time. 
Later,  however,  as  the  firing  continued  and  the 
sounds  of  cannonading  were  more  distinctly  heard, 
the  general  determined  to  go  at  once  to  the  front, 
and  before  nine  o’clock  was  on  his  wmy  to  the  field. 

While  it  must  be  admitted  “ that  truth  is  mighty 
and  will  prevail,”  it  is  sometimes  a subject  of  regret 
that  historic  facts  often  destroy  the  romance  and 
splendor  with  which  a poetic  imagination  can  invest 
the  realities  of  actual  life,  and  upon  General  Sheri- 
dan’s authority  it  appears  that  the  thrilling  story  of 
Sheridan’s  Ride  is  a poetic  conception,  with  as  little 
foundation  of  truth  as  the  heroic  figure  of  Barbara 
Frietchie,  who,  another  poet  tells  us,  defied  and  re- 
sisted the  power  of  Stonewall  Jackson  and  his  army. 
On  the  morning  of  the  battle  General  Sheridan, 
on  hearing  the  sound  of  the  guns,  rode  from  and 
not  toward  Winchester,  and  at  a moderate  pace, 
until  about  two  miles  south  of  the  town  he  met  on  the 
road  wounded  men,  stragglers,  and  numerous  bag- 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


183 


gage  wagons,  all  making  their  way  toward  Win- 
chester, and  declaring  only  with  too  much  certainty 
that  serious  disaster  had  overtaken  the  troops  in  the 
front.  On  inquiry  he  was  told  that  the  army  had 
been  defeated  and  was  entirely  broken  up  and  in 
full  retreat,  but,  knowing  the  exaggeration  that 
always  marks  the  statements  of  those  who  are  the 
first  to  fly  from  a battlefield,  he  pressed  forward, 
leaving  directions  that  the  troops  at  Winchester 
should  be  deployed  across  the  valley,  and  that  all 
fugitives  should  be  halted  and  driven  back  again  to 
the  front  lines. 

After  traveling  on  the  road  for  a short  distance 
it  became  so  impeded  with  wagons  and  wounded 
men  that  it  was  necessary  to  take  to  the  fields  to 
advance  rapidly.  These  impediments  being  passed, 
the  general  returned  to  the  road,  which  he  found 
lined  on  both  sides  with  uninjured  men,  who,  having 
got  far  enough  to  the  rear  to  be  out  of  danger,  had 
quietly  settled  down  to  rest,  and  were  preparing  their 
coffee  and  taking  the  breakfast  that  the  enemy’s 
attack  at  daylight  had  delayed.  As  General  Sheri- 
dan advanced,  speaking  a few  but  hearty  words  of 
encouragement  and  hope  to  those  he  met,  the  news 
of  his  arrival  spread  through  the  whole  mass  of 
these  retreating  men,  and  without  organization  or 
the  orders  of  any  officers  they  all  rose  and,  turning 
their  faces  to  the  front,  marched  toward  the  enemy. 
After  passing  through  Newtown,  at  a point  about 
eight  miles  south  of  Winchester,  the  first  organized 
troops  were  met,  which  proved  to  be  two  divisions  of 
the  Sixth  Corps  in  line  about  three  quarters  of  a 
mile  west  of  the  turnpike,  and  on  their  right  and 
rear  were  the  two  divisions  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps. 
13 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


184 

Still  farther  to  the  front,  two  miles  in  advance  of 
these  forces,  was  found  Getty’s  division  of  the  Sixth 
Corps,  which  with  the  cavalry  were  acting  as  a rear 
guard,  holding  a barricade  of  rails  and  skirmishing 
slightly  with  the  enemy’s  pickets. 

General  Sheridan,  on  riding  to  the  front  of  the 
line,  was  received  with  cheers ; it  was  at  once  evident 
that  the  courage  and  enthusiasm  of  the  troops  had 
returned,  and  that  they  could  be  relied  on  for  future 
service  as  gallant  and  effective  as  any  they  had  yet 
performed.  As  the  cheers  broke  out  on  the  left  and 
rear  of  these  troops  of  the  Sixth  Corps  a line  of 
regimental  flags  appeared,  which  proved  to  be  the 
colors  of  the  several  regiments  of  the  Eighth  Corps, 
with  most  of  the  superior  officers  and  some  enlisted 
men.  Headquarters  were  established  immediately  in 
rear  of  Getty’s  line,  and  Generals  Wright  and  Crook, 
who  were  now  met,  briefly  described  the  events  of 
the  early  morning.  General  Wright  was  directed  to 
resume  command  of  his  corps,  and  the  divisions  of 
the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Corps  that  had  been  passed 
on  the  road  were  ordered  to  the  front  and  took 
position  on  the  right  and  rear  of  Getty’s  division. 
General  Crook  was  directed  to  hold  what  force  he 
had  on  the  left,  and  collect  and  reorganize  his  men, 
which  he  was  enabled  to  do  from  the  returning  tide 
of  stragglers,  who  were  now  coming  to  the  front 
with  even  greater  rapidity  than  that  which  earlier  in 
the  day  they  had  exhibited  in  going  to  the  rear. 

From  the  moment  of  the  arrival  of  General  Sheri- 
dan on  the  field  the  whole  current  of  movement  was 
changed,  and  the  army,  invigorated  by  his  presence 
and  animated  by  the  confidence  that  was  felt  in  his 
leadership,  was,  by  an  impulse  that  was  almost  spon- 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


185 


taneous,  again  ready  and  eager  to  resume  the  con- 
flict of  the  morning.  The  effect  produced  by  his 
unexpected  and  most  welcome  presence  and  the 
feeling  excited  in  the  troops  have  been  graphically 
described  by  some  who  were  present  on  the  occasion. 

“ Far  away  to  the  rear  was  heard  cheer  after  cheer.  ^ 
What  was  the  cause  ? Were  re-enforcements  com- 
ing ? Yes,  Phil.  Sheridan  was  coming,  and  he  was  a 
host  . . . Dashing  along  the  pike,  he  came  upon 
the  line  of  battle.  ‘ What  troops  are  these  ? ’ shouted 
Sheridan.  ‘ The  Sixth  Corps  ’ was  the  response  from 
a hundred  voices.  ‘We  are  all  right,’  said  Sheridan 
as  he  swung  his  hat  and  dashed  along  the  line  toward 
the  right.  ‘ Never  mind,  boys,  we’ll  whip  them  yet, 
we’ll  whip  them  yet.  We  shall  sleep  in  our  quarters, 
to-night,’  were  the  encouraging  words  of  the  chief  as 
he  rode  along,  while  the  men  threw  their  hats  high 
in  air,  leaped  and  danced,  and  cheered  in  wildest 
joy.”  * Another  writer  says, 

“ One  thing  at  once  struck  me  as  curious — that 
the  stream  of  men  was  now  going  toward  Middle- 
town.  Astonished,  I left  Wheaton  and  galloped  over 
to  the  pike,  where  I learned  that  Sheridan  had  just 
passed  up;  as  well  as  can  be  ascertained,  it  was  half 
past  eleven  o’clock,  and  directly  after,  meeting  Gen- 
eral Forsyth,  chief  of  staff,  I received  orders  to  go 
to  Newtown,  form  a guard,  and  collect  all  the  strag- 
glers I could  and  bring  them  up  to  the  front.  This 
I proceeded  to  do,  and  finally  collected  about  two 
thousand  men  of  all  corps  and  brought  them  up 
and  turned  them  over  to  the  command  of  General 
Crook,  then  on  our  extreme  left  and  rear.  From 


* Three  Years  in  the  Sixth  Corps. 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


1 86 

the  time  the  Sixth  Corps  became  engaged,  at  about 
9 A.  M.,  until  Sheridan  came  up,  about  noon,  the 
attacks  of  the  enemy  were  on  the  whole  feeble  and 
ineffective.  . . . Sheridan  rode  along  his  line,  see- 
ing for  himself  all  his  troops  and  saying  a word  or 
two  as  he  went  along  to  encourage  them,  to  which 
they  responded  with  cheers.”* 

After  reforming  and  arranging  his  lines,  an  op- 
eration that  was  not  completed  until  past  twelve 
o’clock.  General  Sheridan  rode  along  the  whole  front 
of  his  infantry  lines  and  satisfied  himself  by  person- 
al inspection  that  the  tnorale  of  his  troops  was  re- 
stored and  that  they  could  be  relied  on  for  gallant  and 
determined  work.  Custer’s  division  of  cavalry  was 
placed  on  the  right  flank,  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth 
Corps  composed  the  infantry  front.  General  Crook’s 
command  was  placed  in  column  as  a reserve,  and 
Merritt’s  cavalry  on  the  left.  The  ranks  were 
already  comparatively  full,  and  their  strength  was 
being  constantly  increased  by  the  arrival  of  strag- 
glers and  fugitives  returning  from  the  rear. 

By  this  time  General  Early  had  become  alarmed 
at  the  reports  he  received  of  the  restoration  of  the 
Union  lines  and  the  aggressive  attitude  that  the 
enemy  he  had  supposed  defeated  was  assuming. 
With  much  difficulty  he  called  off  his  troops  from 
the  plunder  of  the  Union  camps  and  their  enjoy- 
ment of  the  unwonted  luxuries  they  had  found,  and 
prepared  his  left  for  a fresh  assault.  This  attack 
was  made  upon  the  Nineteenth  Corps  and  the  right 
division  of  the  Sixth,  but  our  men  were  now  pre- 
pared, and  to  some  extent  protected  by  temporary 


* Colonel  Crowninshield’s  Cedar  Creek. 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


187 


breastworks  of  logs  and  rails.  No  difficulty  was 
found  in  repulsing  this  attack,  and  after  a spirited 
but  short  contest  the  Confederates,  who  suffered 
heavily,  fell  back  to  their  lines,  and  made  no  further 
aggressive  movement. 

The  dispatch  already  referred  to,  which  purported 
to  announce  the  arrival  of  Longstreet  with  re-en- 
forcements, was  still  present  in  General  Sheridan’s 
mind,  and  he  was  for  the  first  time  induced  to  put 
some  faith  in  its  authenticity,  as  he  hardly  believed 
that  the  enemy,  unless  heavily  re-enforced,  would 
venture  upon  an  attack  that  risked  the  safety  of  his 
whole  army  if  unsuccessful,  and  it  seemed  as  if  a 
considerably  larger  force  than  that  Early  was  known 
to  have  had  before  these  movements  began  was  re- 
quired to  effect  the  results  that  w’ere  caused  by  the 
engagement  of  the  early  morning.  To  settle  this 
question,  the  cavalry  on  the  left  made  a quick  dash 
upon  an  exposed  battery  of  the  enemy  and  captured 
a number  of  prisoners,  from  whom  it  was  learned 
that  Early  had  received  no  re-enforcements  in  addi- 
tion to  those  which  joined  him  at  Brown’s  Gap  in  the 
latter  part  of  September.  This  question  being  set- 
tled, an  advance  of  the  Union  lines  was  ordered  at 
four  o’clock,  and  was  made  as  promptly  and  cheer- 
fully as  if  the  troops  were  fresh  and  engaging  for 
the  first  time  on  that  day. 

The  enemy  had  improved  the  interval  that  had 
elapsed  since  his  last  unsuccessful  attack  and  the 
advance  of  the  rallied  Union  army  by  establishing 
his  lines  behind  stone  walls  and  making  some  other 
defensive  preparations.  His  dread  of  being  flanked 
by  the  cavalry  had,  however,  caused  him  to  extend 
his  lines  to  such  an  extent  that  they  were  nowhere 


i88 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


of  sufficient  strength  to  successfully  resist  a deter- 
mined assault.  The  attack  on  Early’s  lines  was  be- 
gun by  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  on  the  right  of  our 
army,  under  the  personal  direction  of  General  Sheri- 
dan, and  taken  up  successively  by  the  line  from  right 
to  left,  and,  the  cavalry  on  the  flanks  charging  at  the 
same  time,  the  whole  of  General  Early’s  force  was  at 
once  swept  away,  without  having  been  able  to  check 
our  assaulting  lines  at  any  point,  and  as  *a  whole 
driven  from  the  field  in  a greater  rout  than  had  been 
seen  on  any  battlefield  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

It  was  the  intention  of  General  Sheridan  to  hold 
back  his  left  after  the  enemy  had  been  driven  from 
their  lines,  and,  by  advancing  his  right,  to  throw  the 
Confederates  to  the  east  of  the  valley  pike,  thus  cut- 
ting off  their  retreat  to  Strasburg  and  Fisher’s  Hill ; 
but  the  eagerness  of  the  troops  to  avenge  their  re- 
verses of  the  morning  was  beyond  restraint,  the  left 
advanced  equally  with  the  right,  and  the  whole  line 
pressed  forward  till  the  old  camps  on  Cedar  Creek 
were  regained.  No  better  or  more  reliable  account 
of  this  disastrous  blow  sustained  by  the  enemy  can 
be  given  than  that  contained  in  General  Early’s  ac- 
count of  his  defeat:  “A  portion  of  the  enemy  had 
penetrated  an  interval  which  was  between  Evans’s 
brigade  on  the  extreme  left  and  the  rest  of  the  line, 
when  that  brigade  gave  way,  and  Gordon’s  other 
brigades  soon  followed.  . . . Every  effort  was  made 
to  stop  and  rally  Kershaw’s  and  Ramseur’s  men,  but 
the  mass  of  them  resisted  all  appeals,  and  continued 
to  go  to  the  rear.”  He  adds  that  Ramseur  only  suc- 
ceeded in  retaining  with  him  two  or  three  hundred 
men  out  of  his  whole  division,  and  Major  Goggin,  of 
Kershaw’s  staff,  about  the  same  number  of  Conner’s 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


189 


brigade ; and  when  these  troops  were  overwhelmed 
and  Ramseur  was  mortally  wounded,  Pegram  alone 
got  “a  portion  of  his  command  ” across  Cedar  Creek 
in  an  organized  condition,  “ but  this  small  force  soon 
dissolved.”  A part  of  Evans’s  brigade  had  been 
rallied,  and  held  a ford  above  the  bridge  for  a short 
time,  “but  it  followed  the  example  of  the  rest.” 

At  Cedar  Creek  the  pursuit  by  the  infantry  ceased, 
but  the  cavalry  followed  the  enemy  until  he  found 
refuge  within  the  fortified  lines  on  Fisher’s  Hill. 
The  disorganized  mass  of  fugitives  made  no  at- 
tempt to  check  the  pursuit  or  to  save  any  property 
or  material,  and  the  cavalry  captured  guns,  wagons, 
ambulances,  and  prisoners,  that  fell  into  their  hands 
wnthout  any  effort  for  defense.  Early’s  losses  in  this 
engagement  were  about  eighteen  hundred  killed  and 
wounded,  twelve  hundred  pi^soners,  twenty-four 
guns,  fifty-six  ambulances,  and  a number  of  battle 
flags.  A large  number  of  abandoned  wagons  and 
ambulances  were  burned  for  want  of  animals  to 
bring  them  within  the  lines.  The  guns  and  ambu- 
lances lost  in  the  morning  by  the  Union  troops  were 
all  retaken,  and,  with  the  exception  of  the  loss  sus- 
tained in  men,  our  army  reoccupied  its  old  camp  in 
as  good  condition  as  on  the  previous  day. 

It  was  not  until  the  close  of  the  day  that  General 
Sheridan  was  fully  informed  of  the  events  that  pre- 
ceded his  arrival  on  the  field;  and  in  a description 
of  the  battle  it  is  proper  they  should  be  referred  to 
to  give  a complete  record  of  this  long  and  arduous 
contest.  After  reaching  Fisher’s  Hill,  General  Early 
found  himself  nearly  destitute  of  supplies.  The 
whole  valley  had  been  thoroughly  foraged  by  our 
cavalry,  and  the  nearest  point  from  which  subsist- 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


190 

ence  could  be  procured  was  Staunton — ninety  miles 
in  his  rear,  and  too  distant  to  admit  of  providing  for 
the  army  by  wagon  transportation.  It  therefore 
became  necessary  for  him  to  retreat  or  make  a des- 
perate effort  to  drive  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  he 
determined  upon  the  latter  course,  and,  while  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  was  on  the  way  to  Washington,  our 
lines  were  being  examined  to  select  a point  of  at- 
tack. It  may  be  remembered  that  General  Wright, 
in  the  dispatch  he  forwarded  to  General  Sheridan  at 
Front  Royal,  spoke  of  the  right  of  his  line  as  the 
only  point  at  which  he  apprehended  any  danger,  and 
the  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  sent  back  from  Front 
Royal,  were  used  to  strengthen  that  flank  of  the 
army.  This  fact  became  known  to  the  Confederate 
commander,  and  he  directed  his  efforts  on  the  left  of 
our  army,  which  was  occupied  by  the  two  divisions 
of  General  Crook.  This  force  was  posted  on  high 
ground,  protected  in  the  front  by  Cedar  Creek  and 
on  the  left  by  the  north  fork  of  the  Shenandoah, 
and  was  considerably  in  advance  of  the  other  por- 
tions of  our  line.  From  the  Confederate  signal  sta- 
tion on  Three  Top  Mountain  the  whole  of  our  dis- 
positions could  be  observed,  and  it  was  seen  that  the 
left  flank  of  our  army  was  but  lightly  picketed  and 
that  the  main  reliance  for  safety  at  that  point  was 
based  upon  the  natural  strength  of  the  position. 
General  Early  concluded  that  the  chances  of  success 
by  an  attack  on  the  left  were  greater,  for,  as  he  said 
in  one  of  his  reports,  “the  enemy  would  not  expect 
a move  in  that  direction  on  account  of  the  difficulties 
attending  it  and  the  great  strength  of  their  position 
on  that  flank.”  Unfortunately  for  the  Union  troops, 
the  feeling  of  security  on  the  left  flank  had  on  the 


bSTH  CORPS, 
\ 12  M. 


CREEK 

[Middletown. 


Cedar 


CROOK'S  CAMP 


"MOORE, 


OCT.  19ThI 
Buihton  Fa 


WHARTOt^,y 
5 A.M.5:;,si 

OCT.  19T)4<% 


Str.a^urg 


BATTLEFIELD 

OF 

CEDAR  CREEK 

VIRGINIA 

Oct.  19th,  1801. 

UNION MB 

CONFEDERATE = 


4 


in 


\ 


4mX 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


I9I 

afternoon  of  the  i8th  been  increased  by  the  report 
of  the  officer  who  commanded  a reconnoitering  bri- 
gade sent  out  from  General  Crook’s  front,  that  the 
enemy  had  apparently  retreated  up  the  valley. 

After  dark  on  the  night  of  the  i8th  the  move- 
ment of  the  Confederates  began.  Three  divisions  of 
infantry  commanded  by  General  Gordon,  with  a 
brigade  of  cavalry,  crossed  the  Shenandoah  River 
at  a point  east  of  the  works  on  Fisher’s  Hill  and, 
marching  northerly  along  the  base  of  Massanutten 
Mountain,  recrossed  the  river  at  Bowman’s  ford 
north  of  the  junction  of  Cedar  Creek  and  the  Shen- 
andoah, and  thus  obtained  a position  in  rear  of 
the  left  of  General  Crook’s  troops.  General  Early, 
with  two  divisions  of  his  infantry,  to  be  followed  by 
all  the  artillery  of  his  army,  advanced  directly  to 
Cedar  Creek,  and  there  waited  until  the  commence- 
ment of  Gordon’s  attack.  Some  further  operations 
by  the  cavalry  were  directed,  but  as  none  of  these 
succeeded  they  do  not  require  mention. 

About  five  o’clock  in  the  morning  a light  fire  of 
musketry  on  the  left  and  rear  of  the  Union  army  in- 
formed the  Confederates  in  front  of  Cedar  Creek 
that  Gordon  had  gained  the  position  he  aimed  for 
and  was  driving  in  the  pickets  that  protected  that 
flank,  and  Early,  his  movement  covered  by  a heavy 
fog,  at  once  charged  across  Cedar  Creek  and  fell 
upon  the  camps  of  the  Eighth  Corps,  the  men  of 
which  were  still  sleeping  in  their  tents.  The  ad- 
vanced division  was  swept  away  by  this  assault  and 
driven  in  confusion  upon  the  other  troops,  which,  as 
they  formed  to  resist  the  attack  in  front,  were 
charged  in  flank  and  rear  by  the  force  under  Gor- 
don and  forced  to  retreat  with  heavy  loss. 


192 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


The  Nineteenth  Corps,  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
the  troops  first  attacked  and  defeated,  was,  fortu- 
nately, more  prepared  for  an  attack,  as  a reconnois- 
sance  had  been  ordered  from  that  corps  to  be  made 
at  daybreak,  and  many  of  the  men  were  awake  and 
some  armed  before  the  engagement.  The  enemy, 
however,  constantly  advancing  in  front  and  on  the 
left  flank,  turned  the  entire  position,  and  this  corps 
was  also  forced  backward  and  to  the  right. 

General  Wright,  as  soon  as  the  engagement 
opened,  had  acted  promptly,  and,  appreciating  the 
situation  at  once,  ordered  the  Sixth  Corps,  as  yet  un- 
attacked, to  fall  back  to  the  first  tenable  position  in 
the  rear  and  then  form  line,  while  the  Nineteenth 
Corps,  whose  position  could  not  be  held,  was  directed 
to  retire  and  form  on  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 
These  movements  were  successfully  made  : a good 
defensive  position  taken,  and  the  lines  reformed 
about  four  or  five  miles  north  of  the  Union  camps 
on  Cedar  Creek. 

An  attack  was  at  once  made  upon  these  lines,  but 
the  Confederate  force  had  been  somewhat  broken  by 
the  previous  engagements,  the  hasty  pursuit,  and  the 
loss  of  many  men  who  had  remained  to  plunder  the 
abandoned  camps;  and  though  our  troops  suffered 
severely,  the  enemy  was  driven  back  with  heavy  loss, 
and  for  the  time  desisted  from  further  aggressive 
movement.  Shortly  after  this  repulse  of  the  enemy 
General  Sheridan  came  on  the  field,  and  the  further 
events  of  the  day  and  the  signal  victory  with  which 
it  closed  have  been  already  described. 

This  striking  and  brilliant  culmination  of  opera- 
tions in  the  valley — for  this  was  the  last  action  in 
that  region  in  which  any  considerable  bodies  of 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


193 


troops  were  actively  engaged — closed  a campaign 
that  was  unequaled  for  boldness,  rapidity,  and  un- 
varying success.  Within  thirty  days  from  the  time 
active  operations  were  begun  at  the  battle  of  the 
Opequan  the  army  of  General  Sheridan  had  in  three 
pitched  battles  met,  defeated,  and  driven  in  disorder- 
ly flight  that  of  General  Early.  It  had  marched  up 
and  down  the  valley  more  than  two  hundred  miles, 
and  had  rendered  the  country  through  which  it 
passed  useless  as  a source  of  Confederate  supply. 

The  cavalry  of  the  enemy  had  been  routed  in  the 
open  field  by  that  of  the  Union  army,  and  so  dis- 
organized and  broken  up  as  no  longer  to  be  consid- 
ered a factor  in  hostile  operations.  A loss  of  at  least 
eight  thousand  men — killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners — 
had  been  suffered  by  the  enemy,  in  addition  to  which 
fifty-eight  pieces  of  artillery  had  been  taken  and  a 
great  quantity  of  supplies,  small  arms,  wagons,  and 
ambulances  had  been  captured  or  destroyed. 

When  the  news  of  this  victory,  that  had  been 
snatched  from  what  appeared  to  have  been  a crush- 
ing defeat  by  the  energy  and  courage  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  army,  became  known,  the  public  hon- 
ors and  congratulations  that  were  lavished  upon 
General  Sheridan  even  exceeded  those  that  he  had 
already  received  in  profusion.  From  the  lines  about 
Petersburg  and  Richmond  one  hundred  guns,  with 
shot  and  shell,  told  the  story  of  Early’s  third  defeat; 
and  General  Grant,  communicating  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  in  reference  to  this  last  success,  said  : 
“ Turning  what  had  bid  fair  to  be  a disaster  into  glo- 
rious victory  stamped  Sheridan  what  I have  always 
thought  him — one  of  the  ablest  of  generals.” 

When  a few  weeks  later  the  President  sent  to 


194 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


General  Sheridan  his  well-won  commission  as  major 
general  in  the  regular  army,  he  stated  that  the  ap- 
pointment was  due  to  “the  personal  gallantry,  mili- 
tary skill,  and  just  confidence  in  the  courage  and 
patriotism  of  your  troops  displayed  by  you  on  the 
19th  day  of  October  at  Cedar  Run,  whereby,  under 
the  blessing  of  Providence,  your  routed  army  was  re- 
organized, a great  national  disaster  averted,  and  a 
brilliant  victory  achieved  over  the  rebels  for  the 
third  time  in  pitched  battle  within  thirty  days.” 

Congress  a few  months  later,  when  it  convened, 
passed  a resolution  tendering  its  thanks  to  “ Major- 
General  Philip  H.  Sheridan,  and  to  the  officers  and 
men  under  his  command,  for  the  gallantry,  military 
skill,  and  courage  displayed  in  the  brilliant  series  of 
victories  achieved  by  them  in  the  valley  of  the  Shen- 
andoah, and  especially  for  their  services  at  Cedar 
Run  on  the  19th  day  of  October,  1864,  which  re- 
trieved the  fortunes  of  the  day,  and  thus  averted  a 
great  disaster.”  The  battle  of  Cedar  Creek  is  a 
striking  instance  of  the  uncertainty  of  war,  and  the 
great  effects  that  unexpected  events  and  circum- 
stances, which  the  greatest  prudence  could  not  have 
foreseen  or  provided  for,  have  upon  the  results  of 
military  operations  and  the  decision  of  battles. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  General  Sheridan  from 
the  Southern  valley  the  condition  of  the  country 
was  such  that  it  was  impossible  for  an  army  to  sub- 
sist in  it  for  any  length  of  time,  and  it  was  beyond 
the  scope  of  any  sound  military  policy  to  assume 
that  an  army  ill  supplied  and  that  had  been  twice 
defeated  and  put  to  flight  would  again  try  conclu- 
sions with  the  victors,  flushed  with  success,  well  sup- 
plied, and  in  a strong  position.  So  assured  of  this 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


195 


were  Generals  Grant  and  Sheridan  that  preparations 
for  dismembering  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  had 
begun,  which  included  the  immediate  transfer  of  the 
most  effective  corps  of  infantry  and  a division  of 
cavalry  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  re- 
moval of  other  parts  of  the  force  to  a field  of  opera- 
tions east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  display  made  by 
Early  of  his  force  in  a futile  reconnoissance  on  the 
13th  caused  the  return  of  the  Sixth  Corps  to  the  lines 
at  Cedar  Creek,  and  without  the  presence  of  that 
corps  it  is  evident  that  the  Confederate  attack  would 
have  been  a complete  success. 

The  fictitious  dispatch  professing  to  announce  the 
arrival  of  Longstreet  with  re-enforcements  restored 
to  the  army  the  two  divisions  of  cavalry  that  had 
started  on  an  expedition  to  the  Virginia  Central 
Railway.  For  what  purpose,  or  by  what  authority 
this  information  was  given  from  the  Confederate 
signal  station  has  never  been  ascertained.  That  it 
was  not  official  is  evident,  as  neither  Longstreet  nor 
any  re-enforcements  were  on  the  march,  and  it  could 
not  have  been  displayed  designedly  to  create  a false 
impression  upon  our  commanders,  as  it  was  to  Early’s 
interest,  meditating  as  he  then  did  an  attack,  to  care- 
fully avoid  any  suggestions  that  would  tend  to  in- 
creased watchfulness  by  his  adversaries.  Early  was 
also  much  favored  by  the  chance  that  shrouded  the 
first  movements  of  his  troops  in  a thick  fog  and  per- 
mitted the  surprise  that  was  his  only  hope  of  suc- 
ceeding in  his  attack,  and  by  the  accidental  absence 
of  General  Sheridan,  of  which  he  had  no  knowl- 
edge. The  unexpected  and  opportune  return  of  the 
Union  leader  to  his  troops  at  the  critical  moment 
when  his  presence  was  indispensable,  was  again  one 


196 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


of  those  events  that  no  calculation  or  plan  could 
have  provided  for;  yet  all  these  accidents,  favoring 
now  one  and  now  the  other  combatant,  neutralized 
each  other  in  the  end,  and  as  soon  as  a firm  and  de- 
termined will  and  a steady  hand  controlled  the  situ- 
ation doubt  had  ceased,  and  no  question  of  the  final 
result  existed. 

SHERIDAN’S  RIDE  AND  RIENZI. 

[The  following  is  Thomas  Buchanan  Read’s  extremely  popular 
poem  referred  to  by  the  author  on  page  182.  The  artist-poet 
also  illustrated  the  same  subject  by  a spirited  painting,  which 
was  one  of  the  few  articles  that  General  Grant  retained  at  the 
time  of  his  financial  troubles,  and  which  is  still  in  the  possession 
of  his  family.  The  accompanying  vignette  is  another  representa- 
tion of  Sheridan’s  Ride,  being  a copy  of  a statuette  modeled  by 
James  E.  Kelly,  of  New  York  : 


U p from  the  south  at  break  of  day. 

Bringing  to  Winchester  fresh  dismay. 

The  affrighted  air  with  a shudder  bore, 

Like  a herald  in  haste,  to  the  chieftain’s  door, 
The  terrible  grumble  and  rumble  and  roar, 
Telling  the  battle  was  on  once  more, 

And  Sheridan  twenty  miles  away. 


CEDAR  CREEK. 


197 


And  wider  still  those  billows  of  war 
Thundered  along  the  horizon’s  bar, 

And  louder  yet  into  Winchester  rolled 
The  roar  of  that  red  sea  uncontrolled, 

Making  the  blood  of  the  listener  cold 
As  he  thought  of  the  stake  in  that  fiery  fray, 

W’ith  Sheridan  twenty  miles  away. 

But  there  is  a road  from  Winchester  town, 

A good  broad  highway  leading  down  ; 

And  there  through  the  flash  of  the  morning  light 
A steed  as  black  as  the  steeds  of  night 
Was  seen  to  pass  as  with  eagle  flight. 

As  if  he  knew  the  terrible  need. 

He  stretched  away  with  the  utmost  speed  ; 

Hills  rose  and  fell — but  his  heart  was  gay. 

With  Sheridan  fifteen  miles  away. 

• . . .'  . ... 

Under  his  spurning  feet  the  road 
Like  an  arrowy  Alpine  river  flowed. 

And  the  landscape  sped  away  behind 
Like  an  ocean  flying  before  the  wind  ; 

And  the  steed,  like  a bark  fed  with  furnace  ire. 

Swept  on  with  his  wild  eyes  full  of  Are  ; 

But  lo  ! he  is  nearing  his  heart’s  desire. 

He  is  snuffing  the  smoke  of  the  roaring  fray. 

With  Sheridan  only  five  miles  away. 

The  first  that  the  general  saw  were  the  groups 
Of  stragglers,  and  then  the  retreating  troops  ; 

What  was  done — what  to  do — a glance  told  him  both. 
And,  striking  his  spurs  with  a terrible  oath. 

He  dashed  down  the  line  ’mid  a storm  of  huzzahs, 

And  the  wave  of  retreat  checked  its  course  then  because 
The  sight  of  the  master  compelled  it  to  pause. 

With  foam  and  with  dust  the  black  charger  was  gray  ; 
By  the  flash  of  his  eye  and  his  nostrils’  play 
He  seemed  to  the  whole  great  army  to  say, 

“ I have  brought  you  Sheridan  all  the  way 
From  Winchester  down,  to  save  the  day  ! ” 


198 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Hurrah,  hurrah  for  Sheridan  ! 

Hurrah,  hurrah  for  horse  and  man  ! 

And  when  their  statues  are  placed  on  high. 

Under  the  dome  of  the  Union  sky — 

The  American  soldier’s  Temple  of  Fame — 

Then  with  the  glorious  general’s  name 
Be  it  said  in  letters  both  bold  and  bright  ; 

“ Here  is  the  steed  that  saved  the  day 
By  carrying  Sheridan  into  the  fight. 

From  Winchester — twenty  miles  away  !” 

The  famous  war-horse  Rienzi,  “ that  saved  the  day  ” at  Cedar 
Creek,  was  given  to  General  Sheridan  at  Rienzi,  a small  village 
in  Mississippi,  in  August,  1863,  by  Captain  Campbell,  of  the  Sec- 
ond Michigan  Cavalry  ; hence  the  horse’s  name.  He  was  of  Mor- 
gan stock — ^jet  black,  excepting  three  white  feet  ; about  sixteen 
hands  high  ; strongly  built,  with  great  powers  of  endurance,  and 
could  fairly  walk  over  five  miles  an  hour.  On  this  account  Rienzi 
was  cordially  hated  by  Sheridan’s  staff  and  escort,  because  on  the 
march  their  horses  were  compelled  to  go  on  a “ dog  trot  ” in  order 
to  keep  up.  The  general  rode  him  almost  continuously  in  every 
campaign  and  battle  till  the  close  of  the  war.  Rienzi  was  wounded 
at  Stone  River,  in  the  assault  on  Missionary  Ridge,  to  the  crest 
of  which  he  carried  Sheridan,  and  twice  at  Fisher’s  Hill.  Not- 
withstanding these  four  wounds,  the  famous  horse  lived  until  1878, 
and  he  may  now  be  seen  in  the  Museum  of  the  Military  Service 
Institution  on  Governor’s  Island,  New  York,  having  been  set  up 
soon  after  his  death  by  a skilled  taxidermist. — Editor.] 


CHAPTER  X. 


WINTER  QUARTERS.  — CLEARING  THE  VALLEY. — 

WAYNESBOROUGH. RETURN  TO  ARMY  OF  THE 

POTOMAC. 

The  routed  Confederate  army  made  no  effort  to 
hold  the  lines  at  Fisher’s  Hill,  but  after  a brief  halt 
at  that  point  continued  the  retreat  until  it  arrived  at 
Newmarket.  A small  rear  guard  of  cavalry,  left  with- 
in the  lines,  fled  as  our  troops  prepared  to  attack  on 
the  morning  of  the  20th.  At  Newmarket,  some  forty 
miles  south  of  Cedar  Creek,  it  was  possible  to  supply 
the  Confederate  army,  and  there  Early  did  what  was 
in  his  power  to  reorganize  his  army  and  put  it  in 
condition  for  active  service.  The  same  reasons  that 
prevented  the  Confederate  army  from  maintaining 
itself  in  the  northern  portion  of  the  valley  prohibited 
our  forces  from  following  up  the  success  of  Cedar 
Creek,  as  the  whole  valley  was  now  destitute  of 
supplies.  General  Sheridan  withdrew  his  troops  to 
Kernstown,  three  miles  south  of  Winchester,  where 
supplies  could  be  more  readily  obtained,  and  where 
fortified  lines  were  constructed  that  would  allow  the 
position  to  be  held  by  a comparatively  weaker  force 
than  that  required  for  operations  in  the  open  coun- 
try, and  permit,  as  opportunity  offered,  the  detach- 
14  199 


200 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ing  such  force  as  could  be  spared  to  strengthen  the 
army  under  General  Grant. 

On  the  nth  of  November  General  Early  had  re- 
ceived a considerable  addition  to  his  force  by  the 
return  of  convalescents  and  conscripts  absent  on 
details,  and  a brigade  from  Breckinridge,  now  com- 
manding in  southwest  Virginia;  and  learning  that 
the  Union  army  had  fallen  back  from  Cedar  Creek 
to  Kernstown,  thinking  this  movement  might  be  in- 
tended to  cover  the  detachment  of  troops  to  Peters- 
burg, advanced  from  Newmarket  and  made  a demon- 
stration against  the  lines  about  Kernstown.  Finding 
that  General  Sheridan  was  ready  and  anxious  for 
battle,  after  a brief  reconnoissance  he  withdrew  his 
infantry  on  the  12th  of  November  and  returned  to 
Newmarket,  endeavoring  to  protect  his  rear  with 
cavalry.  Our  own  cavalry  at  once  pursued,  and,  as 
usual,  drove  and  routed  that  of  the  Confederates 
over  all  the  roads  they  endeavored  to  cover,  captur- 
ing two  pieces  of  artillery,  several  caissons  and  am- 
munition wagons,  two  battle  flags,  and  three  hun- 
dred prisoners. 

General  Early,  on  his  return  to  Newmarket  from 
this  expedition,  appeared  at  last  to  have  realized  the 
fact  that  further  attacks  upon  the  enemy  that  so 
often  had  met  and  defeated  him  were  useless,  and  be- 
gan to  detach  troops  to  the  army  of  General  Lee.  In 
the  latter  part  of  November  a cavalry  reconnois- 
sance from  our  lines  ascertained  that  Kershaw’s 
division  had  been  returned  to  Petersburg,  and  later 
it  was  learned  that  the  Second  Corps  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  the  command  that  Early  had  brought 
first  to  the  valley,  was  also  moving  in  the  same 
direction.  This  reduction  of  the  Confederate  forces 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


201 


justified  detachments  from  our  lines,  and  by  the 
middle  of  December  the  whole  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
had  been  transferred  to  the  army  under  Grant. 

While  this  pause  in  the  movements  of  the  main 
armies  occurred  an  opportunity  was  given  to  pay 
some  attention  to  the  bands  of  guerrillas  that  had 
constantly  annoyed  our  troops,  and  by  requiring  the 
presence  of  large  escorts  for  supply  trains  and  offi- 
cers engaged  in  carrying  dispatches  or  on  detached 
duty  had  much  weakened  the  force  available  for 
actual  combat.  Of  these,  the  most  active  and  offen- 
sive was  Mosby,  whose  force  was  recruited  from  the 
country  about  Upperville  and  Leesburg,  on  the  east- 
ern side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  in  which,  as  it  was 
not  occupied  by  our  forces,  he  took  refuge  whenever 
hardly  pressed. 

The  murder  of  Colonel  Tolies,  chief  quarter- 
master, Medical-Inspector  Olchenslager,  Lieutenant 
Meigs,  and  other  officers,  as  well  as  that  of  many 
stragglers,  orderlies,  and  messengers  within  our  lines 
by  these  men,  had  rendered  necessary  some  effort  to 
repress  them  ; and  while  it  was  difficult  to  capture 
them  individually  on  account  of  their  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  country  and  the  disguises  they 
assumed,  it  was  possible  to  break  up  their  places  of 
rendezvous  and  the  source  of  their  supplies.  This 
duty  was  assigned  to  General  Merritt,  who,  with  his 
division,  overran  the  county  of  Loudon  and  de- 
stroyed the  crops,  bringing  in  on  his  return  large 
herds  of  cattle,  hogs,  and  sheep,  which  were  issued 
as  subsistence  to  our  troops,  and  some  five  hundred 
horses,  which  thereafter  did  loyal  service  in  the  ranks 
of  the  Union  cavalry. 

A successful  cavalry  raid  by  the  enemy  on  the 


202 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  at  New  Creek,  in  West 
Virginia,  caused  the  detachment  of  General  Crook 
with  one  of  his  divisions  to  that  place,  and  his  other 
troops  were  sent  to  City  Point.  As  the  season  ad- 
vanced and  the  weather  became  severe.  Early  re- 
tired to  Staunton,  and  there  took  position  with  one 
division  of  infantry,  all  that  remained  to  him  of  that 
arm,  and  his  cavalry,  with  the  exception  of  a small 
force  at  Newmarket,  and  picket  post  immediately 
south  of  Cedar  Creek.  From  the  time  that  Early 
had  retreated  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek  Gen- 
eral Grant,  who  rarely  if  ever  abandoned  a plan  he 
had  once  conceived,  continued  to  suggest  the  ex- 
pedition to  Charlottesville  and  Gordonsville  that  he 
had  formerly  advised. 

General  Sheridan  could  not  perceive  that  any  new 
reasons  existed  to  remove  the  objections  he  had  al- 
ready found  convincing  against  this  movement  of 
his  army,  and  with  a disinterestedness  that  is  rarely 
found  among  officers  who  hold  high  commands,  he 
was  willing  that  his  own  forces  should  be  diminished 
by  their  removal  to  positions  where  he  knew  they 
could  be  of  service  in  preference  to  retaining  the 
whole  under  his  personal  command,  and  employing 
them  in  an  enterprise  of  questionable  value.  The 
uniform  success  of  his  operations  and  the  good  re- 
sults that  had  followed  the  independent  course  he 
had  pursued  had  rendered  his  opinions  of  too  much 
weight  to  be  disregarded,  and  the  policy  of  detach- 
ing troops  to  the  other  armies  as  rapidly  as  they 
could  with  safety  be  moved  prevailed,  and  before 
the  end  of  the  year  the  force  under  his  immediate 
command  had  been  reduced  to  the  Nineteenth  Corps 
and  the  three  divisions  of  cavalry.  Even  after  this 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


203 


large  reduction  of  the  army  had  been  made,  and 
winter  had  set  in  with  exceptional  severity,  General 
Grant  continued  to  urge  the  necessity  of  the  expe- 
dition of  which  he  thought  so  highly,  and  much 
against  his  better  judgment,  Sheridan  at  length  di- 
rected that  the  attempt  should  be  made  by  the  cavalry 
and  this  force  moved  out  on  the  19th  of  December. 

General  Torbert,  with  two  divisions,  moved 
through  Ashby’s  Gap,  in  the  direction  of  Gordons- 
ville,  while  General  Custer  marched  toward  Staun- 
ton, with  the  purpose  of  attracting  the  attention  of 
the  enemy  from  Torbert’s  column.  The  weather 
was  most  unfavorable  for  the  movement  of  troops, 
as  the  roads  were  incumbered  with  snow  and  the 
cold  excessive,  the  temperature  at  night  often  fall- 
ing below  zero.  Neither  of  the  columns  reached 
their  objective  points,  and  both,  after  being  repulsed, 
were  compelled  to  return,  with  slight  loss  of  men 
and  animals,  but  suffering  much  from  the  extreme 
cold  and  from  frostbites,  and  reached  Winchester  on 
the  27th  of  December.  This  expedition  was  the  last 
movement  of  any  importance  during  the  winter,  and 
the  cavalry  was  put  into  winter  quarters  near  "Win- 
chester. At  the  beginning  of  the  new  year  one  of 
the  two  divisions  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was  sent 
on  to  Petersburg,  and  the  effective  force  of  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah  was  thus  reduced  to  one 
division  of  infantry  and  three  of  cavalry.  The 
Aveakness  of  the  force  under  his  command  required 
of  General  Sheridan  increased  vigilance  and  con- 
stant information  of  the  movements  and  resources 
of  the  enemy,  and  this  was  obtained  to  the  full- 
est extent  by  the  excellent  force  of  scouts  that 
had  been  organized  in  the  past  summer.  Dis- 


204 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


guised  as  Confederate  soldiers,  they  rode  through 
all  parts  of  the  enemy’s  country,  and  were  often  in 
the  Confederate  camps,  where  they  procured  accurate 
knowledge  of  all  important  facts,  which  was  quickly 
forwarded  to  headquarters.  In  February,  1865,  a 
party  of  these  men,  led  by  their  commander.  Major 
Young,  representing  themselves  as  Confederate  sol- 
diers pursued  by  Union  cavalry,  penetrated  eighty 
miles  into  the  enemy’s  country,  and  in  their  assumed 
character  entered  the  headquarters  of  Harry  Gilmor, 
a notorious  guerrilla,  who  commanded  for  a long 
time  one  of  the  most  troublesome  partisan  bands 
that  infested  the  rear  of  our  armies.  He  was  cap- 
tured in  his  bed,  and  many  of  his  men  were  also 
taken;  and  the  pursuing  Union  cavalry  quickly  ar- 
riving, the  only  part  of  the  story  that  was  not 
fictitious,  the  prisoners  were  brought  back  to  our 
lines.  Some  other  minor  expeditions  and  scouting 
and  raiding  parties  were  from  time  to  time  sent  out, 
but  no  important  movement  took  place  until  the  end 
of  February.  Advantage  was  taken  of  this  interval 
to  refit  and  equip  the  cavalry,  which  had  become 
much  run  down  after  nearly  twelve  months  of  con- 
tinued activity.  Many  fresh  horses  were  obtained, 
and  the  numerical  force  was  increased  by  the  return 
of  convalescents,  the  re-equipment  of  dismounted 
men,  and  a number  of  recruits  that  were  received  by 
the  several  regiments. 

Toward  the  last  of  February  the  force  imme- 
diately under  General  Early,  who  had  continued  at 
Staunton  through  the  winter,  consisted  of  two  bri- 
gades of  infantry,  which  were  stationed  in  that  town. 
The  remainder  of  his  infantry  had  been  returned  to 
the  other  armies  from  which  it  had  been  detached. 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


205 


The  two  brigades  of  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  cavalry,  which 
had  joined  him  in  the  fall,  had  returned  to  Peters- 
burg. Rosser’s  cavalry  had  been  scattered  through 
the  country  at  such  points  as  most  readily  afforded 
forage,  which  could  not  be  procured  at  Staunton  ; 
and  Lomax  with  his  division  was  encamped  at  Mill- 
borough,  some  thirty  miles  southwest  of  Staunton. 

Through  the  winter  General  Grant,  in  correspond- 
ence, had  frequently  referred  to  the  destruction  of 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  which  it  was  evident 
he  was  still  determined  to  accomplish.  On  the  8th 
of  February  he  wrote;  “There  is  no  enemy  now  to 
prevent  you  from  reaching  the  Virginia  Central  Rail- 
road, and  possibly  the  canal,  when  the  weather  will 
permit  you  to  move  ’’ ; and  on  the  20th  he  contin- 
ued : “As  soon  as  it  is  possible  to  travel,  I think  you 
will  have  no  difficulty  about  reaching  Lynchburg  with 
a cavalry  force  alone.  From  there  you  could  destroy 
the  railroad  and  canal  in  every  direction.” 

The  disintegration  of  Early’s  army  had  made  this 
operation  more  feasible  than  it  had  been  at  any 
previous  time,  and  the  increasing  pressure  that  our 
armies  were  bringing  to  bear  on  Petersburg  and 
Richmond  rendered  it  certain  that  no  troops  could 
be  detached  from  the  defense  of  those  cities  to  assist 
in  preventing  the  movements  of  our  forces  in  this 
direction.  The  advance  of  General  Sherman  north- 
ward through  the  Carolinas  was  also  calling  for  the 
concentration  of  all  available  Confederate  soldiers 
in  the  South  and  East,  and  it  was  evident  that  no 
considerable  force  could  be  gathered  to  defend  the 
objective  points  it  was  proposed  to  assail. 

General  Sheridan,  after  a thorough  examination 
of  all  the  existing  conditions,  believed  that  the  time 


2o6 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


had  arrived  when  this  movement  could  be  made  with 
good  prospect  of  a favorable  result  ; and  though 
he  never  expressed  his  thoughts  on  the  subject,  there 
is  little  doubt  but  that  he  perceived  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah  had  ceased  to  be  a field  for  active  oper- 
ations or  a source  of  future  danger,  and  that  he  was 
anxious  to  take  part  in  the  greater  struggles  in  more 
important  fields  that  were  soon  to  occur  and  finally 
determine  the  result  of  four  years  of  conflict. 

On  receiving  his  orders  he  moved  out  from  Win- 
chester on  February  27,  1865,  taking  with  him  two 
divisions  of  cavalry,  which  were  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Merritt,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  position  of 
chief  of  cavalry,  and  which  at  the  time  comprised 
nearly  ten  thousand  men,  all  in  excellent  condition, 
having  been  well  rested  and  thoroughly  equipped 
during  the  winter’s  repose.  Four  guns  only  accom- 
panied the  column,  as  from  the  condition  in  which 
the  roads  were  expected  to  be  found  it  was  thought 
a greater  number  would  cause  more  delay  and  trou- 
ble than  any  service  they  could  render  would  justify. 
Eight  ambulances,  sixteen  ammunition  wagons,  eight 
pontoon  boats,  and  a small  supply  train  carrying 
only  coffee,  sugar,  and  salt,  accompanied  the  troops, 
who  carried  on  their  horses  rations  and  forage  suffi- 
cient to  subsist  them  on  their  march  through  the 
exhausted  valley,  and  were  afterward  to  depend  upon 
the  country  they  passed  through  for  supplies.  A 
brigade  of  Powell’s  cavalry  division  and  the  remain- 
ing division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  were  left  to  pro- 
tect the  lines  about  Winchester,  and  proved  more 
than  sufficient  for  that  purpose. 

The  orders  of  General  Grant  which  directed  the 
present  movement  required  the  destruction  of  the 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


207 


Virginia  Central  Railroad  and  the  James  River  Canal, 
and  the  capture  of  Lynchburg,  if  practicable.  These 
results  obtained.  General  Sheridan  was  ordered,  if 
the  condition  of  affairs  after  the  capture  of  Lynch- 
burg justified  the  movement,  to  seek  out  and  join 
General  Sherman  in  North  Carolina,  or,  if  he  found 
this  inexpedient,  to  return  to  Winchester. 

As  the  expedition  started  the  weather  was  cold 
and  bleak  and  the  valley  and  the  mountains  were 
covered  with  snow,  but  a warm  and  heavy  rain  that 
began  to  fall  early  in  the  day  soon  caused  this  to  dis- 
appear. Woodstock  was  reached  on  the  first  day’s 
march,  and  on  the  second  the  troops  crossed  the 
north  fork  of  the  Shenandoah  on  their  pontoon 
bridge  and  camped  for  the  night  at  Lacy’s  Springs, 
having  marched  sixty  miles  and  seeing  nothing  of 
the  enemy  but  a few  scouts,  who  appeared  from  time 
to  time  on  the  flanks  of  the  column. 

On  the  ist  of  March  the  expedition  passed 
through  Harrisonburg,  and  at  Mount  Crawford  the 
first  opposition  was  encountered.  At  this  place  Gen- 
eral Rosser  was  met,  who  had  succeeded  in  collect- 
ing some  five  or  six  hundred  of  his  cavalry,  and  he 
made  an  attempt  to  burn  the  bridges  over  the  middle 
fork  of  the  Shenandoah  and  thus  delay  the  advance 
of  our  troops.  Two  regiments  of  West  Virginia  cav- 
alry swam  the  stream,  and,  attacking  Rosser  in  flank, 
forced  him  to  retreat  with  his  accustomed  celerity, 
leaving  behind  him  thirty  prisoners  and  his  ambu- 
lances and  wagons. 

Staunton  was  reached  on  the  morning  of  March 
2d,  and  was  entered  without  opposition.  It  was 
learned  here  that  General  Early  had  on  the  pre- 
vious night  marched  thence  to  Waynesborough  with 


2o8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


his  infantry  and  Rosser’s  cavalry,  thus  leaving  the 
direct  road  to  Lynchburg  open,  and  it  became  a 
question  whether  to  move  upon  that  place,  leaving 
an  enemy  in  the  rear,  or  turn  eastward  and,  after 
disposing  of  this  force,  move  through  Rockfish  Gap 
and  destroy  the  railroad  and  canal,  which  were  the 
primary  objects  of  attack.  As  it  was  known  that 
Early’s  force  did  not  exceed  two  thousand  men, 
and  there  was  every  reason  to  believe  he  would 
make  a stand  at  Waynesborough,  he  having  told  citi- 
zens of  Staunton  that  he  intended  to  fight  at  that 
place,  it  was  decided  to  follow  him,  and  Custer’s 
division  was  given  the  advance. 

The  rains  which  had  fallen  almost  incessantly 
since  leaving  Winchester  had  rendered  the  roads 
very  difficult  and  at  times  almost  impassable  ; men 
and  horses  were  covered  with  mud  from  head  to 
foot,  and  progress  was  toilsome  in  the  extreme. 
Confidence  created  by  past  success  and  the  expecta- 
tions of  inflicting  a new  defeat  upon  an  enemy,  who 
had  been  so  often  overpowered,  stimulated  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  troops  as  no  other  motives  could  have 
done,  and  the  difficulties  of  the  roads  were  cheerfully 
met  and  quickly  passed. 

General  Early  had  kept  his  promise  to  his  friends 
at  Staunton,  for  he  was  found  occupying  a ridge  west 
of  Waynesborough  with  his  two  brigades  of  infantry 
and  his  artillery  posted  behind  a line  of  breastworks, 
and  Rosser’s  cavalry  on  his  flanks.  General  Custer, 
on  examining  the  position,  found  the  left  flank  some- 
what exposed,  and  attacked  that  with  one  of  his  bri- 
gades dismounted,  while  at  the  same  time  the  rest 
of  his  command  assaulted  along  the  whole  line  of 
works.  The  resistance  was  but  slight,  and  the  whole 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


209 


position  was  soon  carried,  with  a loss  so  small  on 
either  side  that  no  record  of  it  has  been  kept.  All 
of  the  supplies,  tents,  ammunition,  and  transportation 
of  the  enemy  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors,  and 
seventeen  battle  flags,  sixteen  hundred  officers  and 
men,  and  eleven  pieces  of  artillery  were  captured  on 
the  field.  Rosser,  with  his  small  force  of  cavalry, 
succeeded  in  escaping  to  the  valley,  and  General 
Early,  in  company  with  Generals  Wharton,  Long, 
and  Lilly,  as  was  reported  at  the  time,  “ took  to  the 
woods,”  and  from  that  time  rendered  no  further 
service  to  the  Southern  Confederacy.  This  engage- 
ment, in  some  respects  of  slight  moment  so  far  as 
the  numbers  engaged  or  the  severity  of  the  action 
are  considered,  is  worthy  of  note  as  illustrating  the 
completeness  with  which-  General  Sheridan  had  ac- 
complished the  duty  he  undertook  when  assuming 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah.  Within 
a period  of  six  months  a Confederate  army  which 
on  many  fields  had  defeated  every  attempt  to  with- 
stand its  advance  or  check  its  operations,  had  pil- 
laged the  fields  and  burned  the  towns  of  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania,  had  besieged  the  capital  of  the 
nation  and  spread  dismay  through  the  whole  North, 
had  been  entirely  defeated,  broken,  and  driven  one 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  the'scene  of  its  antici- 
pated triumph.  At  the  last  desperate  effort  of  resist- 
ance all  that  remained  to  it  of  men,  of  arms,  and  of 
war  material  was  swept  away.  The  commanding  gen- 
eral was  a harmless  and  solitary  fugitive,  and  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  in  the  length  and  breadth  of 
which  no  organized  body  of  Confederate  soldiers  re- 
mained, was  no  longer  a hostile  country.  The  pris- 
oners and  captured  guns  were  sent  to  Winchester 


210 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


under  a sufficient  escort,  which  was  for  a time  an- 
noyed while  on  the  march  by  Rosser  with  the  rem- 
nants of  his  cavalry.  At  Mount  Jackson  he  made  a 
strong  attack  in  the  hope  of  rescuing  the  prisoners, 
but  was  completely  defeated  and  left  some  of  his 
own  force  to  be  numbered  among  the  captives. 

While  a portion  of  his  command  remained  at 
Waynesborough  to  destroy  the  captured  wagons  and 
supplies,  which  from  the  condition  of  the  roads  could 
not  be  removed,  and  to  blow  up  the  railroad  bridge 
at  that  town.  General  Sheridan,  on  the  3d  of  March, 
moved  on  to  Charlottesville,  which  he  reached  the 
same  afternoon.  His  advance  was  met  in  the  out- 
skirts of  the  town  by  the  mayor  and  a deputation  of 
prominent  citizens,  who  appeared  to  offer  a surren- 
der in  due  form  and  according  to  ancient  customs. 
As  Charlottesville  possessed  no  gates  or  walls,  there 
were  no  keys  of  the  city  to  deliver  to  the  conqueror, 
but  as  the  most  available  substitute  the  keys  of  all 
the  public  buildings  were  handed  over,  and  General 
Sheridan  found  himself  in  full  possession  and  control 
of  the  courthouse,  the  jail,  the  University  of  Vir- 
ginia, and  several  taverns  and  churches.  While  this 
interesting  ceremony  was  being  performed.  General 
Custer,  who  in  an  enemy’s  country  was  never  idle 
and  always  inquisitive,  rode  through  the  town  and 
had  the  fortune  to  overtake  and  capture  a small 
force  of  cavalry  and  three  pieces  of  artillery,  for 
whose  escape  it  ■ had  been  hoped  that  the  delay 
caused  by  the  formal  surrender  would  afford  an  ex- 
cellent opportunity. 

At  Charlottesville  the  command  was  for  a time 
divided,  one  division  marching  down  the  Charlottes- 
ville and  Lynchburg  Railroad  as  far  as  Amherst 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


21 1 


Court  House,  thoroughly  destroying  the  road  for 
sixteen  miles,  while  another  force  marched  eastward 
along  the  James  River  Canal,  which  was  also  broken 
up.  The  two  columns  united  at  Newmarket  on  the 
river,  but  the  stream  had  been  so  swollen  by  the  re- 
cent rains  as  to  be  unfordable,  all  the  bridges  had 
been  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  and  the  pontoon  train 
that  had  been  brought  with  the  troops  was  not  suffi- 
cient to  construct  a bridge  of  the  length  required  in 
the  present  state  of  the  river. 

The  impossibility  of  crossing  prevented  the  exe- 
cution of  that  part  of  the  plan  of  movement  that  re- 
lated to  effecting  a junction  with  the  army  of  Gen- 
eral Sherman,  and  as  no  enemy  remained  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  and  a return  to  Winchester 
would  effect  no  useful  purpose  and  would  only  serve 
to  remove  the  troops  to  a greater  distance  than  they 
now  were  from  the  scene  of  future  active  operations 
about  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  General  Sheridan 
decided  to  destroy  more  thoroughly  the  canal  and 
railroad  and  then  make  his  way  to  the  east  and  join 
General  Grant  in  front  of  Petersburg. 

It  was  now  believed  that  this  inability  to  pene- 
trate into  North  Carolina  and  pursue  a long  and 
somewhat  uncertain  search  after  General  Sherman’s 
column  was  a source  of  much  disappointment  to 
General  Sheridan,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  course 
he  did  pursue  when  thus  left  to  exercise  his  own 
judgment  was  the  best  and  wisest  that  could  have 
been  taken.  He  had  always  been  convinced  that  at 
Richmond  and  Petersburg  the  main  strength  and  all 
the  prospects  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  were  con- 
centrated, and  that  a victory  that  should  drive  the 
rebels  from  those  cities  would  virtually  close  the 


212 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


war.  There  he  believed  the  main  strength  of  the 
Northern  army  should  be  gathered,  and  there  the 
heaviest  blows  should  be  struck,  and  he  had  no  cause 
to  regret  that  circumstances  permitted  his  taking  an 
active  part  in  what  he  was  assured  would  be  the  last 
and  decisive  campaign  of  the  civil  war. 

On  the  9th  of  March  the  columns  started  east- 
ward along  the  James  River  and  thoroughly  de- 
stroyed the  locks,  dams,  and  boats  along  the  canal 
as  far  as  Goochland,  a distance  of  more  than  fifty 
miles,  and  at  several  points  the  banks  were  cut  so 
that  the  current  of  the  river,  then  greatly  swollen  by 
the  spring  freshets,  was  turned  into  the  canal.  The 
work  on  the  canal  having  been  completed,  a rest  of 
one  day  was  taken  at  Columbia  to  permit  the  con- 
centration of  the  command  and  to  bring  up  the  de- 
layed wagons.  The  rain  had  continued  almost 
steadily  through  the  whole  march,  and  the  roads 
were  scarcely  passable  for  mounted  men.  The  move- 
ment of  guns  and  wagons  was  an  almost  impossible 
task,  and  could  not  have  been  accomplished  but  for 
the  large  captures  of  mules  from  Early’s  trains,  which 
furnished  animals  to  replace  those  that  became  worn 
out  or  exhausted,  and  the  assistance  of  some  two 
thousand  negroes  who  followed  the  column  and  who 
gave  all  the  help  in  their  power  to  the  troops  that 
were  furnishing  them  the  opportunity  of  escape 
from  slavery. 

From  Columbia,  which  General  Sheridan  reached 
on  the  loth,  dispatches  were  sent  to  General  Grant  re- 
porting the  events  of  the  campaign  and  the  intended 
march  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  White 
House  landing,  on  the  Pamunkey  River,  had  been  de- 
termined on  as  the  place  to  which  the  column  would 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


213 


move  to  open  communication  with  General  Grant’s 
forces,  and  a request  was  made  that  forage  and  sup- 
plies, with  a pontoon  bridge  of  sufficient  length  to 
span  the  Pamunkey  River,  be  sent  to  that  point.  As 
it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  this  message 
should  safely  reach  General  Grant,  duplicates  were 
sent,  each  copy  confided  to  two  scouts  of  Young’s 
force.  The  risks  assumed  by  these  men  and  the  dar- 
ing nature  of  their  enterprises  may  be  judged  from 
the  routes  they  took.  Two  of  them  were  ordered  to 
go  overland  direct  to  City  Point,  a journey  of  more 
than  one  hundred  miles  through  the  enemy’s  coun- 
try, by  the  shortest  possible  line;  the  others  were  to 
float  down  the  James  River  in  a small  boat  to  Rich- 
mond, from  there,  representing  themselves  as  Con- 
federate soldiers,  to  join  the  troops  in  the  trenches 
at  Petersburg,  and  at  the  first  opportunity  desert  to 
the  Union  lines  and  deliver  their  dispatch  to  General 
Grant.  It  is  gratifying  to  know  that  all  of  these 
daring  adventurers  succeeded  in  their  perilous  task 
and  safely  reached  the  lines  of  our  army,  those  sent 
overland  to  City  Point  arriving  first. 

From  Columbia  the  troops  moved  northward  to 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  and  the  road  was  torn 
up  and  destroyed  from  Louisa  Court  House  to  Beaver 
Dam.  At  a telegraph  station  on  the  railroad  a dis- 
patch was  found  from  General  Early,  who  it  was 
learned  was  in  the  neighborhood  with  about  two  hun- 
dred men  and  proposing  to  harass  the  flanks  of  our 
column.  A regiment  of  General  Custer’s  was  sent 
out  after  this  last  remnant  of  the  Army  of  the  Val- 
ley, and  it  was  soon  overtaken,  captured,  and  dis- 
persed. General  Early  was  closely  pursued,  but  as 
usual  succeeded  in  effecting  a retreat,  and  on  the  fol- 


214 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


lowing  day,  accompanied  by  a single  orderly,  he  rode 
into  Richmond  to  report  to  his  superiors  as  best  he 
could  his  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

While  this  work  on  the  railroad  was  going  on,  it 
was  learned  through  the  scouts  and  captured  dis- 
patches that  a force  was  being  assembled  at  Rich- 
mond to  prevent  the  junction  of  General  Sheridan’s 
troops  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  A movement 
of  one  division  toward  Ashland,  threatening  an  at- 
tack on  Richmond,  concentrated  the  enemy  in  this 
direction ; under  cover  of  this  demonstration  the 
command  was  marched  northward,  and  by  the  morn- 
ing of  the  i6th  the  whole  column  had  crossed  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Pamunkey  River.  On  the  i8th 
the  whole  force  reached  White  House,  and  there 
found  in  abundance  the  supplies  that  had  been  called 
for  and  an  opportunity  to  rest  and  refit. 

While  the  loss  of  men  in  this  expedition  had  been 
slight,  not  in  all  exceeding  one  hundred,  the  severity 
of  the  weather  and  the  fearful  condition  of  the  roads 
had  greatly  impaired  the  strength  of  the  command 
by  the  loss  of  horses  that  resulted  from  these  condi- 
tions. A great  number  had  fallen  exhausted  on  the 
march,  and  many  more  reached  the  camp  at  White 
House  so  worn  out  by  toil  and  disease  as  to  be  in- 
capable of  further  service.  They  suffered  not  only 
from  hardships  and  the  fatigue  of  the  march,  but  a 
contagious  disease  had  broken  out  among  them 
known  as  “ hoof  rot,”  which  had  on  several  previous 
occasions  caused  great  loss  of  animals  among  our 
cavalry  forces.  From  all  these  causes  the  services 
of  not  less  than  three  thousand  effective  men  were 
lost  in  these  two  divisions. 

A great  and  important  work  had,  however,  been 


WINTER  QUARTERS. 


215 


well  and  thoroughly  performed.  No  enemy  could 
now  be  found  in  Virginia  north  of  the  James  River 
and  east  of  the  Alleghanies;  two  important  lines  of 
supply  connecting  the  Confederate  capital  with  the 
West  had  been  completely  destroyed,  and  the  army 
besieging  Richmond  and  Petersburg  had  been  re-en- 
forced by  more  than  seven  thousand  veteran  troops 
accustomed  to  victory  in  the  past  and  confident  of 
future  success. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. FIVE  FORKS. PURSUIT 

OF  I-EE. sailor’s  CREEK. APPOMATTOX. — SUR- 

RENDER. 

The  transfer  of  the  cavalry  column  under  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  to  the  armies  on  the  James  River  was 
not  expected  by  General  Grant,  who  first  learned  of 
it  on  the  arrival  of  the  scouts  who  brought  the  re- 
quest that  supplies  be  sent  to  White  House,  but  he 
at  once  appreciated  the  wisdom  of  the  movement 
and  the  importance  to  him  of  so  large  an  addition  to 
his  cavalry  force  in  the  active  operations  that  were 
soon  to  begin. 

General  Sheridan  remained  at  White  House  until 
the  25th  of  March,  and  the  time  was  occupied  in  rest- 
ing and  refitting  the  men  and  horses,  and  especially 
m reshoeing  the  latter,  but  it  was  not  possible  to  pro- 
cure animals  to  supply  the  place  of  those  which  had 
been  lost  or  disabled,  and  a large  body  of  dismounted 
men  was  sent  by  boat  to  the  camps  at  City  Point. 
When  the  mounted  portion  of  the  force  had  been 
prepared  to  move  it  was  marched  to  Hancock  Sta- 
tion, on  the  military  railroad  in  front  of  Petersburg, 
and,  reaching  there  on  the  27th  of  March,  took  a po- 
sition adjoining  the  camps  of  the  Second  Division  of 
the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This 

216 


DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


217 


division,  when  the  others  were  transferred  to  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  had  remained  with  the 
main  army  at  Petersburg,  and  had  seen  much  and 
hard  service  through  the  fall  and  winter,  though  it 
was  not  of  a character  as  brilliant  or  striking  as  that 
of  its  comrades  in  the  valley.  The  character  of  the  ' 
country,  which  was  such  as  generally  to  require  the 
men  to  fight  dismounted,  and  the  necessity  of  so  lim- 
iting their  movements  as  to  keep  within  constant 
touch  of  an  army  that  was  engaged  in  the  slow 
operations  of  a siege,  had  prevented  any  enterprises 
of  great  moment ; and  the  exactions  of  the  heavy 
picket  duty,  always  required  by  General  Meade  for 
the  protection  of  his  infantry  lines,  had  kept  a large 
part  of  the  force  inactive. 

The  division  was  well  equipped,  supplied,  and 
mounted,  though  the  same  disease  that  had  de- 
stroyed many  of  General  Sheridan’s  horses  had, 
under  different  conditions,  broken  out  in  this  divi- 
sion, and  since  the  ist  of  March  nearly  one  thou- 
sand horses  had  been  disabled  and  rendered  useless. 
The  division  at  the  time  General  Sheridan  returned 
numbered  about  three  thousand  five  hundred  effect- 
ive mounted  men,  under  the  command  of  Major- 
General  Crook,  who  had  been  ordered  from  West 
Virginia  to  take  command,  replacing  General  Gregg, 
who  had  been  compelled  by  failing  health  to  resign 
from  the  service  in  February. 

The  three  cavalry  divisions  were  now  by  orders 
reunited  under  the  command  of  General  Sheridan, 
and  the  corps  thus  formed  no  longer  continued  at- 
tached to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  entered  on 
the  campaign  as  a separate  army,  its  commander  re- 
porting directly  to  General  Grant,  who  had  recog- 


2i8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


nized  the  sacrifice  that  Sheridan  had  made  in  volun- 
tarily abandoning  his  position  in  the  valley  as  a 
department  commander  and  the  general  of  an  inde- 
pendent army  and  coming  with  a force  of  two  divi- 
sions only  to  seek  such  service  as  he  might  be  called 
upon  to  perform  at  the  scene  of  active  operations. 

Sheridan  did  not  accompany  his  troops  on  the 
march  from  White  House,  but  rode  directly  to 
Grant’s  headquarters  at  City  Point.  After  some 
conversation  on  the  events  of  the  expedition  which 
had  resulted  in  bringing  the  cavalry  to  Peters- 
burg, General  Grant  unfolded  his  plans  for  the  in- 
tended movement  which  was  to  commence  on  the 
29th,  and  while  handing  to  Sheridan  a copy  of  the 
general  instructions  for  the  army  that  had  been 
prepared,  explained  in  detail  the  service  that  he  ex- 
pected from  the  cavalry.  These  were  that  after  mov- 
ing out  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
Sheridan  was  to  break  off  his  connection  with  those 
troops,  and,  moving  southward  along  the  Danville 
Railroad,  cross  the  Roanoke  River  and  join  General 
Sherman,  whose  army  was  at  this  time  at  Goldsbor- 
ough,  in  North  Carolina,  one  hundred  and  forty-five 
miles  south  of  Petersburg. 

To  that  part  of  these  instructions  which  involved 
a separation  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  a 
long  march  to  unite  with  Sherman’s  army  General 
Sheridan  took  the  liberty  of  dissenting,  and  expressed 
very  fully  his  objections  to  such  a course  and  his  rea- 
sons for  thinking  it  prejudicial  to  the  success  of  any 
operation  looking  to  the  ultimate  defeat  of  Lee  and 
a speedy  termination  of  the  war.  As  had  been  thor- 
oughly proved,  General  Sherman’s  army  was  not  only 
strong  enough  to  maintain  itself,  but  was  so  superior 


DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


219 


to  that  which  confronted  it,  under  Johnston,  that 
there  was  no  doubt  of  our  success  in  the  event  of  a 
battle.  That  if  Johnston  should  attempt  to  move 
north  to  Lee’s  assistance,  Sherman’s  army,  which 
was  in  light  marching  order  and  accustomed  to  swift 
movement,  could  pursue  with  sufficient  rapidity  to  be 
present  and  effective  when  the  Confederate  armies 
met.  That  if  Lee  should  attempt  to  evacuate  his 
lines  and  unite  with  Johnston,  while  the  infantry  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  pursue,  it  would  be 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  prevent  his  movement 
or  delay  his  progress  without  the  aid  of  a numerous 
and  efficient  cavalry  force,  and  that  the  immediate 
and  most  harmful  result  of  this  proposed  transfer  of 
the  cavalry  would  be  to  take  ten  thousand  effective 
and  veteran  mounted  troops  from  the  field  of  active 
operations  and  render  them  useless  for  any  practical 
purpose  with  either  army  during  whatever  time  might 
be  occupied  in  their  march  into  North  Carolina. 

In  addition  to  these  purely  military  reasons.  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  contended  that  it  w'ould  be  a great 
wrong  and  injustice  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — 
- that  for  four  years  had  contended  in  varying  fortune, 
but  always  with  signal  bravery  and  heroic  endurance, 
against  theArmy  of  Northern  Virginia — to  call  in  other 
troops  to  their  assistance  at  a time  when  their  long- 
continued  efforts  had  placed  their  antagonist  in  their 
power  and  they  were  able  with  one  well-directed  ef- 
fort to  obtain  unaided  the  victory  for  which  they  had 
toiled  so  long;  that  the  cavalry  he  commanded  had 
always  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
had  the  right  to  fight  with  and  assist  it  in  the  coming 
strife  and  share  any  honors  it  might  gain. 

These  arguments,  which  w'ere  earnestly  urged,  evi- 


220 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


dently  made  a strong  impression  upon  General  Grant, 
and  much  to  General  Sheridan’s  satisfaction  he  inti- 
mated that  the  orders  as  given  were  but  provisional, 
and  could  be  varied  or  changed  upon  due  occasion. 
As  will  be  seen,  however,  this  suggestion  of  uniting 
with  General  Sherman’s  army  was  not  then  entirely 
abandoned  by  General  Grant,  and  on  future  occa- 
sions he  still  believed  it  to  be  advisable  and  was 
inclined  to  insist  upon  it. 

General  Sheridan  was  somewhat  disturbed  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  next  day  by  receiving  an  invitation 
to  visit  headquarters  and  there  meet  General  Sher- 
man, who  had  come  up  from  North  Carolina  to  con- 
sult about  future  movements,  and,  as  he  says,  know- 
ing the  zeal  and  emphasis  with  which  that  officer 
could  present  his  views,  he  feared  that  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  cavalry  corps  which  had  been  agreed  to 
might  again  be  changed.  At  the  earliest  possible 
moment  he  reached  headquarters  and  found  the  sub- 
ject he  had  so  much  at  heart  under  discussion.  Gen- 
eral Sherman  at  once  entered  upon  his  plans  and  ex- 
plained in  detail  how  he  would  move  his  army  up 
from  North  Carolina  and  join  the  troops  besieging 
Petersburg  and  Richmond,  when  these  cities  must  at 
once  fall  into  our  hands,  and  assumed  as  a matter  of 
course  that  General  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry  would 
be  ordered,  after  destroying  the  South  Side  and  Dan- 
ville Railroads,  to  join  his  forces.  General  Sheridan 
made  no  remarks  upon  such  movements  as  were  con- 
fined to  the  army  of  General  Sherman,  but  strenu- 
ously renewed  his  objections  to  the  suggestions  of 
the  course  to  be  taken  by  the  cavalry,  and  General 
Grant  finally  closed  the  conversation  by  stating  that 
the  plans  previously  agreed  on  remained  unchanged. 


DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


221 


On  the  following  morning,  before  General  Sheridan 
had  left  his  bed,  General  Sherman  came  to  his  tent 
and  renewed  the  subject  of  a junction  between  the 
cavalry  and  his  army,  but  was  at  last  compelled  to 
abandon  the  subject,  becoming  satisfied  that  his 
views  would  under  no  circumstances  be  concurred  in. 

Hoping  this  disagreeable  subject  was  at  last  dis- 
posed of,  the  necessary  preparations  for  the  march 
were  made,  but  on  the  night  of  the  28th,  when  final 
instructions  were  received,  it  was  apparent  that  this 
much-vexed  question  had  not  yet  been  finally  deter- 
mined in  the  mind  of  the  commanding  general. 
These  instructions  in  the  first  instance  directed  that 
the  cavalry  should  move  out  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  and,  keeping  on  the  left  flank  of  the  advan- 
cing infantry  columns,  pass  near  to  or  through  Din- 
widdle Court  House,  and  reach  the  right  and  rear  of 
the  enemy  as  soon  as  possible.  It  was  not  the  inten- 
tion of  General  Grant,  as  he  stated  in  these  instruc- 
tions, to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  intrenched  position, 
but,  if  possible,  to  force  him  out.  If  the  enemy  should 
move  out  of  his  works  and  attack  our  forces,  or 
place  himself  in  a position  where  he  could  be  at- 
tacked, General  Sheridan  was  ordered  to  move  in 
with  his  whole  force  in  his  own  way,  and  assured 
that  the  army  would  engage  or  pursue  the  enemy  as 
circumstances  might  dictate.  If  General  Sheridan 
should  find  that  the  enemy  persisted  in  keeping  with- 
in his  intrenched  lines,  he  was  then  to  cut  loose  from 
the  main  army  and  devote  his  efforts  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  South  Side  and  Danville  Railroads.  Hav- 
ing accomplished  this  work,  it  was  left  to  his  discre- 
tion to  return  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  or  to  join 
the  army  of  General  Sherman. 


222 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


While  from  these  orders  it  was  apparent  that 
General  Grant,  with  the  characteristic  tenacity  with 
which  he  clung  to  any  idea  that  he  had  once  ma- 
tured, still  had  in  his  mind  the  plan  of  using  his  cav- 
alry force  to  destroy  these  railroads  and  then  co- 
operate with  Sherman,  a very  wide  discretion  was 
left  to  Sheridan,  and  as  the  first  day’s  march  that  he 
was  ordered  to  make  would  bring  him  close  to,  if  not 
in  actual  touch,  with  the  enemy’s  lines,  he  began  his 
movement  with  a hopeful  expectation  that  circum- 
stances would  occur  to  prevent  his  complying  with 
those  portions  of  the  order  that  tended  to  separate 
his  forces  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  That  his 
expectation  was  well  founded  appeared  in  the  course 
of  the  following  campaign,  as  the  only  orders  re- 
ceived from  headquarters  that  required  to  be  com- 
plied with  or  in  any  way  affected  his  movements 
were  those  directing  the  first  day’s  march  to  Din- 
widdie  Court  House,  and  from  that  day  until  the 
surrender  of  the  Confederate  army  every  operation 
of  the  cavalry  force  and  of  the  several  corps  of 
infantry  that  from  that  time  were  associated  with 
it  was  suggested  and  carried  out  by  Sheridan,  of 
course  with  the  sanction  and  approval  of  General 
Grant,  which  on  all  occasions  was  willingly  given. 

The  cavalry  marched  with  but  eight  guns  in  all 
and  a small  train  of  ambulances,  ammunition,  and 
supply  wagons,  but  at  times  even  these  were  found 
a most  annoying  incumbrance.  For  miles  about 
Petersburg  the  country  is  low  and  everywhere 
abounding  in  swamps  and  quicksands,  and  in  the 
driest  weather  water  can  be  found  by  digging  to  a 
depth  of  ten  feet  or  less.  The  roads  at  this  early 
season  were  scarcely  passable,  and  in  the  fields  it 


DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


223 


was  impossible  to  move  horses  and  wagons.  It  was 
necessary  to  make  a wide  sweep  to  the  left  to  avoid 
the  better  roads  on  which  the  infantry  was  march- 
ing, and  the  country  cross  roads  that  the  cavalry  was 
obliged  to  use  were  the  worst  to  be  found  in  that  hope- 
less region.  In  spite  of  these  obstacles,  the  column 
was  pressed  forward,  and  about  five  in  the  after- 
noon General  Sheridan,  with  two  divisions,  reached 
Dinwiddie  Court  House  after  a march  of  twenty- 
five  miles.  The  third  division,  that  of  General  Cus- 
ter, was  left  on  the  road  to  bring  up  the  wagons, 
which  in  various  conditions  of  almost  hopeless  em- 
barrassment were  mired  at  intervals  along  the  line  of 
march,  and  which  the  men  in  charge  had  frequently 
to  unload  and  lift  bodily  out  of  the  mud  before  they 
could  be  moved.  At  Dinwiddie  Court  House  some 
pickets  of  the  enemy  were  found  and  a few  prisoners 
made.  From  the  prisoners  and  our  scouts  it  was 
learned  that  the  cavalry  of  Lee’s  army,  which  for 
convenience  of  obtaining  forage  had  been  stationed 
at  some  distance  to  the  right,  was  marching  within  a 
few  miles  of  our  front  to  unite  with  the  main  body 
of  their  forces. 

The  Court  House  was  a most  important  point  to 
occupy  in  the  proposed  campaign,  as  five  main  roads 
centered  there,  which  gave  access  to  the  left  of  our 
infantry,  the  right  of  Lee's  army,  and  also  opened 
routes  to  the  south  and  west  available  for  the  sug- 
gested movements  against  the  railroads.  During 
the  night  a heavy  rain  began,  which  continued 
through  the  whole  of  the  next  day,  and  this  rendered 
the  already  miry  roads  for  the  time  perfectly  impas- 
sable to  wagons  or  artillery.  During  the  night  of 
the  29th  and  the  morning  of  the  30th  General  Lee, 


224 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


to  meet  the  movement  of  our  troops  toward  his 
right,  established  the  right  flank  of  his  infantry  line 
at  a point  known  as  Five  Forks,  five  miles  north- 
west from  Dinwiddle  Court  House,  where  it  was 
protected  by  strong  earthworks,  and  also  massed 
his  cavalry  under  command  of  General  Fitzhugh  Lee 
at  the  same  place. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  a division  of 
our  cavalry  was  sent  out  from  Dinwiddle  Court 
House  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  toward  Five  Forks 
and  a force  placed  in  position  to  protect  the  left  of 
the  cavalry  position.  Soon  after  the  troops  moved 
out  a dispatch  from  General  Grant  was  received 
which  indicated  that  he  was  inclined  to  suspend  ac- 
tive operations  on  account  of  the  adverse  weather 
and  which  directed  the  withdrawal  of  the  bulk  of  the 
cavalry.  General  Sheridan,  who  possibly  had  better 
information  of  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  of  the 
possibilities  of  success  from  continued  aggressive 
movement  than  was  possessed  at  army  headquarters, 
at  once  rode  over  to  General  Grant,  who  was  en- 
camped some  eight  miles  to  the  rear. 

He  found  that  although  no  orders  except  the  dis- 
patch he  had  received  had  been  issued  directing  a 
suspension  of  operations.  General  Grant  was  strong- 
ly impressed  by  the  unfavorable  condition  of  affairs 
resulting  from  the  storm  and  the  state  of  the  roads 
and  inclined  to  consider  a suspension  of  operations 
necessary.  General  Sheridan,  who  in  his  last  expe- 
dition had  satisfied  himself  that  troops  could  march, 
fight,  and  win  battles  under  most  disheartening  con- 
ditions of  weather,  objected  strongly  to  this  course, 
urging  that  to  fall  back  after  so  threatening  an  ad- 
vance upon  the  enemy’s  position  would  have  a bad 


DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE. 


225 


moral  effect  upon  the  troops,  and  would  by  the  pub- 
lic be  considered  as  a repulse,  and  that  neither  the 
army  nor  its  general  could  afford  to  again  be  exposed 
to  such  criticism  as  followed  General  Burnside’s  un- 
fortunate movement  in  1863.  That  the  roads  were 
not  impassable  to  those  who  were  determined  to  ad- 
vance was  apparent  from  the  fact  that  at  this  very 
moment  his  cavalry  was  engaged  in  active  move- 
ments. These  arguments  were  at  last  convincing, 
and  General  Grant  concluded  that  the  movement 
should  proceed,  and  from  that  day  on  no  backward 
step  was  taken  and  the  campaign  proceeded  without 
a single  check. 

On  returning  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House  the  cav- 
alry reconnoissance  toward 'Five  Forks  was  still  fur- 
ther pressed  and  the  enemy  driven  within  their  line 
of  works.  It  was  clear  that  the  position  was  strong 
and  one  that  the  enemy  intended  to  hold,  and,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  cavalry  force  gathered  there,  it  had 
been  re-enforced  by  Pickett’s  division  of  infantry. 
These  facts  were  reported  to  General  Grant,  and 
in  reply  he  informed  General  Sheridan  that,  if  he  de- 
sired, the  Fifth  Corps  should  report  to  him  to  assist 
in  an  attack  on  these  works.  This  offer  was  declined 
and  a request  made  for  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  had 
done  such  good  service  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley; 
but  that  corps  was  occupying  an  important  position 
in  the  line  from  which  it  could  not  at  the  time  be  re- 
moved, and  pending  the  discussion  of  this  question 
circumstances  had  changed  and  no  infantry  corps 
was  sent  for  the  time  being. 

On  the  morning  of  March  31st  the  First  Division 
of  cavalry  and  one  brigade  of  the  Second  Division 
were  in  position  on  the  Five  Forks  road,  about  two 


226 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


miles  in  front  of  Dinwiddie,  and  two  brigades  of  the 
Second  Division  were  covering  the  crossings  on  Cham- 
berlain’s Creek,  a small  stream  running  north  and 
south  about  a mile  west  of  the  Court  House.  The 
Third  Division  was  still  engaged  in  the  uncongenial 
labor  of  dragging  the  trains  through  the  miry  roads 
along  which  the  column  had  passed.  The  three 
divisions  at  this  time  had  in  their  ranks  nine  thou- 
sand mounted  and  effective  men,  five  thousand  seven 
hundred  of  whom  were  in  the  First  and  Third,  and 
three  thousand  three  hundred  in  the  Second.  At 
Five  Forks  the  enemy  had  continued  to  increase  his 
force,  and  on  this  day  had  there  five  brigades  of 
infantry  under  command  of  General  Pickett  with 
two  divisions  and  a brigade  of  cavalry.  To  the 
great  relief  of  all,  the  rain  had  ceased,  and  before 
the  end  of  the  day  the  roads  had  very  perceptibly 
improved. 

At  an  early  hour  orders  to  make  reconnoissances 
preparatory  to  an  attack  on  Five  Forks  were  given, 
and  General  Merritt  pushed  out  the  First  Division 
and  the  brigade  he  had  of  the  Second  in  that  direc- 
tion, while  the  remainder  of  the  Second  Division 
guarded  the  crossings  on  Chamberlain’s  Creek.  The 
advance  toward  Five  Forks  was  slow,  as  the  troops 
were  obliged  to  advance  dismounted  through  the 
heavy  roads  and  almost  impassable  fields,  and  a 
strong  skirmish  line  of  the  enemy  disputed  every 
foot  of  the  way.  While  this  movement  was  going 
on  General  Pickett  determined  on  a flank  attack  on 
General  Sheridan’s  force  with  his  infantry  and  the 
greater  part  of  his  cavalry.  After  a sharp  contest 
and  a repulse  of  his  cavalry  he  succeeded  in  crossing 
Chamberlain’s  Creek  with  his  infantry,  occupying 


FIVE  FORKS. 


227 


and  driving  back  a brigade  of  the  Second  Division 
that  for  some  time  opposed  him.  Driving  this  force 
before  him,  he  fell  upon  the  hank  of  the  troops  ad- 
vancing toward  Five  Forks,  and  three  brigades  were 
driven  eastward  and  separated  from  the  remainder 
of  General  Sheridan’s  command.  These  troops  fell 
back  fighting  as  they  retired,  and  at  last  reached  the 
Boydton  plank  road  at  a point  about  four  miles 
north  of  the  Court  House  and  were  there  reformed, 
though  in  very  poor  condition  for  further  resistance, 
as  they  had  been  while  fighting  dismounted  separated 
from  their  led  horses,  which  had  been  taken  back  to- 
ward the  Court  House,  and  the  ammunition  carried  by 
the  men  on  their  persons  had  been  nearly  exhausted 
in  the  long  struggle  against  heavy  odds  that  they  had 
sustained.  It  was  now  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon, 
and  the  situation,  which  involved  not  only  the  sepa- 
rate command  of  General  Sheridan,  but  the  left 
flank  of  the  whole  army,  was  a critical  one,  as  not 
only  had  the  cavalry  lines  been  cut,  but  the  three 
brigades  that  had  retreated  to  the  Boydton  plank 
road  were  the  only  force  that  protected  the  Fifth 
Corps  from  an  attack. 

The  danger,  however,  was  averted  by  prompt  and 
vigorous  action.  The  three  brigades  remaining  that 
guarded  the  fords  on  Chamberlain’s  Creek  and  held 
the  front  of  Dinwiddle  Court  House  were  quickly 
united,  and  as  Pickett  in  advancing  in  pursuit  of  our 
defeated  men  had  exposed  his  right  flank  and  rear,  a 
vigorous  attack  compelled  him  to  halt  and  face  to 
the  right  to  meet  this  unexpected  demonstration. 
As  preparations  were  made  for  this  movement  or- 
ders were  sent  to  General  Custer  to  abandon  tem- 
porarily his  work  with  the  trains  and  move  rapidly 


228 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


to  Dinwiddie,  which  he  reached  with  two  brigades  in 
time  to  render  efficient  service. 

When  the  attack  was  made  on  his  flank,  Pickett 
ceased  his  movement  toward  the  Boydton  plank 
road  and  with  his  whole  force  turned  to  meet  the 
new  adversary  he  had  encountered,  thus  abandoning 
all  he  had  gained  by  his  hitherto  successful  move- 
ment. His  infantry  force,  largely  outnumbering  the 
troops  with  General  Sheridan,  gradually  advanced 
toward  Dinwiddie,  though,  as  the  ground  was  favor- 
able for  defense,  our  men,  flghting  dismounted  and 
throwing  up  barricades  at  different  points,  fell  back 
slowly  and  in  good  order,  and  time  was  given  to  se- 
lect a line  for  defending  the  Court  House.  This  was 
chosen  on  a commanding  rise  of  ground  about  three 
quarters  of  a mile  in  front  of  the  Court  House,  and 
the  advance  of  General  Custer’s  troops  now  reach- 
ing the  ground,  they  took  position  on  the  left  of  the 
proposed  line  and  at  once  began  throwing  up  barri- 
cades. A little  later  the  force  that  had  been  resist- 
ing Pickett’s  infantry  fell  slowly  back  and  occupied 
their  positions  in  the  new  line,  and  the  artillery, 
which  until  this  time  had  been  slowly  struggling  to 
the  front,  at  last  reached  our  troops  and  was  put  in 
position.  Finding  that  the  Union  lines  had  been 
strengthened  and  were  now  occupying  a strong  de- 
fensive line.  General  Pickett  halted  his  infantry  and 
reformed  his  lines  for  a general  attack.  It  was  now 
near  sunset,  and  while  the  infantry  was  preparing 
for  the  assault  the  Confederate  cavalry  made  a dash 
upon  the  left  of  our  lines,  but  were  met  with  a heavy 
fire  from  the  breastworks,  which  at  once  stopped  the 
movement  and  in  a few  moments  drove  them  from  the 
field,  where  they  were  no  more  seen  during  the  day. 


FIVE  FORKS. 


229 


As  sunset  approached,  the  infantry  lines,  which  by 
this  time  had  been  formed,  were  moved  out  from  the 
woods  and  advanced  for  the  final  struggle  of  the  day, 
but  sufficient  time  had  been  given  to  complete  the 
defensive  works  in  front  of  the  Union  position  and 
post  the  men  and  artillery  to  the  best  advantage. 

As  the  enemy  advanced.  General  Sheridan  rode 
along  the  front  of  his  lines,  and  his  men,  animated 
by  his  presence  and  encouraged  by  the  success  of 
their  previous  efforts,  united  in  a ringing  cheer.  As 
the  enemy  approached  on  the  open  ground,  our  artil- 
lery poured  on  them  a destructive  fire,  and  a few 
moments  later  they  were  within  reach  of  the  carbines 
of  the  cavalry,  many  of  whom  were  armed  with  re- 
peating weapons,  which  were  most  effectively  used. 
The  enemy  fought  hard,  and  for  a time  kept  up  a 
heavy  fire,  but  the  losses  were  severe  and  the  move- 
ment in  advance  could  not  be  maintained.  At  dark 
the  repulse  was  complete,  the  enemy  fell  back  to  a 
position  beyond  the  reach  of  the  Union  arms,  and 
there  bivouacked  for  the  night. 

The  close  of  this  day  put  an  end  to  one  of  the 
hardest  and  severest  actions  that  the  cavalry  had 
ever  been  engaged  in,  and  that  tested  to  the  fullest 
extent  the  skill  and  resources  of  the  commander  and 
the  courage  and  endurance  of  the  troops.  The  battle 
had  continued  from  dawn  until  night,  and  during  all 
these  hours  some  part,  if  not  all,  of  the  force  had 
been  constantly  engaged  against  largely  superior 
numbers,  among  which  were  counted  the  choicest 
infantry  of  Lee’s  army,  acting  on  ground  peculiarly 
suitable  for  the  operations  of  that  arm  and  unfavor- 
able for  cavalry.  Some  severe  reverses  had  been 
sustained  with  a considerable  loss  in  killed  and 


230 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


wounded,  and  the  advanced  positions  held  in  the 
morning  had  been  abandoned.  The  enemy  had,  how- 
ever, entirely  failed  in  the  purpose  for  which  his 
strong  and  well-organized  movement  had  been  de- 
signed. The  design  of  defeating  the  cavalry  force 
and  driving  it  from  Dinwiddie  Court  House  had 
failed.  Ihe  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  main  army, 
which  was  the  point  to  gain  and  for  which  the  opera- 
tion had  been  undertaken,  had  not  been  reached. 

The  Confederate  general,  after  a long  and  hard 
day’s  fighting,  in  which  he  had  suffered  a loss  much 
greater  than  that  inflicted  on  his  adversary,  and  had 
sustained  a decisive  defeat,  found  himself  in  an  ex- 
posed and  untenable  position,  from  which  his  only 
escape  was  to  retreat  to  his  works  at  Five  Forks 
with  defeated  and  discouraged  troops  and  resume 
his  old  position.  Soon  after  the  final  repulse  of  the 
Confederates  the  three  brigades,  which  earlier  in  the 
day  had  been  driven  back  to  the  Boydton  plank 
road,  marched  down  to  the  Court  House,  where  their 
horses  were  met,  and,  being  resupplied  with  ammuni- 
tion, were  placed  on  the  lines. 

A report  of  the  action  of  the  day  and  the  present 
position  of  the  cavalry  and  of  the  enemy’s  forces  was 
at  once  sent  to  General  Grant,  in  which  General 
Sheridan  expressed  his  intention  and  ability  to  hold 
his  position  at  Dinwiddie.  The  positions  that  had 
resulted  from  the  action  of  the  day  were  favorable 
' to  the  success  of  an  active  movement  on  the  left  of 
the  Union  army,  as  the  force  in  front  of  Dinwiddie 
was  completely  isolated  and  nearly  five  miles  beyond 
its  fortified  lines  at  Five  Forks.  A comparatively 
small  force  of  our  infantry  thrown  in  its  rear  could, 
with  the  aid  of  the  cavalry,  have  succeeded  in  rout- 


FIVE  FORKS. 


231 


ing  and  probably  capturing  a large  part  of  it,  and 
General  Grant  at  once  appreciated  the  position  and 
took  steps  to  utilize  the  advantage  we  possessed. 
The  Fifth  Corps  was  in  camp  on  the  Boydton  plank 
road,  not  more  than  five  miles  from  Dinwiddle,  and 
before  eleven  at  night  was  ordered  to  move  at  once 
to  the  support  of  General  Sheridan,  sending  one 
division  down  the  Boydton  plank  road  and  two 
others  to  the  left  by  the  Crump  road  to  take  posi- 
tion in  rear  of  Pickett’s  force  and  to  co-operate  at 
daylight  with  an  advance  of  General  Sheridan  from 
Dinwiddle.  A march  not  exceeding  six  miles  would 
have  placed  each  of  these  bodies  of  troops  in  the 
positions  they  were  ordered  to  occupy,  and,  as  the 
night  was  clear  and  the  moon  shining  brightly,  there 
did  not  appear  to  be  any  substantial  reasons  for  de- 
laying the  movement,  and  the  necessity  of  immediate 
and  swift  action  was  impressed  upon  the  command- 
ing officer.  Hours,  however,  were  wasted  in  getting 
these  troops  in  motion  and  in  their  march  to  the 
designated  points.  It  is  needless  to  go  over  a con- 
troversy that  has  been  exhaustively  considered  in 
military  histories  and  before  a court  of  inquiry  as  to 
the  reasons  of  these  delays  and  the  responsibility  of 
the  several  officers  to  whom  they  were  charged.  It 
unfortunately,  however,  is  necessary  to  say  here  that 
no  part  of  the  Fifth  Corps  reached  the  positions  that 
were  to  be  occupied  in  sufficient  time  to  be  of  any 
service  for  the  important  movement  intended  to  be 
made  at  daylight. 

At  early  dawn  of  April  ist  General  Pickett,  who 
had  doubtless  received  through  his  scouts  some  inti- 
mation of  a movement  that  might  cut  him  off  from 
his  line  of  retreat,  fell  back  from  the  line  he  had  oc- 
16 


232 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


cupied  during  the  night  and  moved  his  troops  on  the 
road  to  Five  Forks,  closely  pursued  by  the  First  and 
Third  cavalry  divisions,  which  were  followed  by  one 
division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  which,  moving  down  the 
Boydton  plank  road,  had  reached  General  Sheridan 
at  the  time  the  enemy  commenced  to  retreat.  Be- 
tween seven  and  eight  in  the  morning,  as  the  cavalry 
were  pressing  on  after  Pickett’s  retreating  column, 
the  advance  of  the- two  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
that  had  been  ordered  to  take  position  the  night  be- 
fore in  rear  of  the  Confederates  was  met,  of  course 
too  late  to  be  of  immediate  use,  and  the  whole  plan 
of  intercepting  and  defeating  the  exposed  and  iso- 
lated force  of  the  enemy  outside  of  the  intrenchments 
had  entirely  failed,  and  in  place  of  an  attack  by  su- 
perior forces  in  selected  positions  in  the  open  field  it 
was  now  necessary  to  assault  the  strong  and  well- 
manned  works  at  Five  Forks,  which  were  well  sup- 
plied with  artillery. 

Greatly  disappointed,  but  not  discouraged.  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  at  once  formed  his  plans  to  meet  this 
new  emergency,  and,  knowing  the  importance  of  the 
Five  Forks  as  the  key  of  the  Confederate  right  wing, 
he  determined  at  once  to  attack  this  point  with  his 
combined  infantry  and  cavalry  force.  The  First 
and  Third  cavalry  divisions,  under  General  Merritt, 
were  therefore  continued  in  the  pursuit,  and  by  two 
o’clock  in  the  day  had  driven  the  enemy  within  his 
intrenchments.  At  one  o’clock  the  Fifth  Corps, 
which  had  been  massed  about  two  miles  from  the 
lines  at  Five  Forks,  was  ordered  to  move  up  and 
take  position  on  the  right  of  the  cavalry,  the  plan  of 
attack  being  that  the  extreme  left  of  the  line  should 
be  held  by  the  cavalry,  who  were  to  threaten  the 


FIVE  FORKS. 


233 


right  flank  of  the  enemy  and  demonstrate  vigorously, 
while  the  infantry  was  taking  position  on  the  right 
and  forming  its  columns  for  assaulting  the  works. 
The  lines  being  formed,  the  assault  was  to  be  com- 
menced by  an  advance  of  the  infantry,  and  the  cavalry, 
on  hearing  the  firing  of  the  infantry,  were  to  attack 
the  lines  m their  front.  The  Second  Division  of  cav- 
alry was  held  in  reserve  and  guarded  the  trains  and 
the  left  flank  and  rear,  and  the  cavalry  division  of 
General  Mackenzie,  from  the  Army  of  the  James, 
which  had  been  assigned  temporarily  to  duty  with 
General  Sheridan,  was  placed  on  the  right  of  the  in- 
fantry line. 

The  cavalry  on  the  left  soon  took  up  its  position 
and  began  skirmishing  with  the  enemy,  but  the  Fifth 
Corps  was  slow  to  move,  and  three  hours  were  con- 
sumed in  marching  two  miles  and  making  the  neces- 
sary formations;  and  though  frequent  suggestions 
for  more  rapid  movement  were  made  to  the  com- 
manding officer,  it  was  not  formed  and  ready  to  at- 
tack until  four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  but  two 
hours  of  daylight  remained  in  which  the  coming  bat- 
tle must  be  fought.  The  Confederate  intrenchments 
at  Five  Forks  extended  east  and  west  along  the 
White  Oak  road  for  some  distance  and  on  the  left 
turned  northwardly  at  a right  angle,  and  the  Fifth 
Corps  was  directed  to  assault  this  force,  while  the 
cavalry  attacked  the  front  on  the  road.  The  advance 
of  the  infantry  was  to  be  made  to  the  White  Oak 
road,  when  the  two  leading  divisions  were  to  wheel 
to  the  left  and  move  down  to  the  work  to  be  attacked, 
while  the  Third  Division  moved  in  support  of  the 
other  two.  As  the  attack  was  made  the  division  of  Gen- 
eral Ayres  on  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Corps  wheeled  to 


234 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


the  left  as  ordered  and  promptly  attacked  the  enemy’s 
line;  the  division  on  the  right  did  not,  however, 
change  direction,  but  continued  moving  northwardly, 
exposing  the  right  of  Ayres’s  line,  and  drawing  after 
it  the  supporting  division. 

The  enemy  took  advantage  of  the  gap  thus  formed 
and  succeeded  in  throwing  part  of  General  Ayres’s 
division  in  confusion.  This  was  remedied,  however, 
by  bringing  into  this  interval  the  rear  division  of  the 
corps,  and  a moment  later  the  infantry  charged  over 
the  works  on  the  flank  as  the  cavalry  carried  those 
of  the  front,'  and,  without  halting  the  infantry  and 
dismounted  cavalry,  swept  westward  inside  the  line 
of  intrenchments,  driving  the  enemy  beyond  Five 
Forks  and  capturing  all  who  did  not  seek  safety  in 
immediate  flight.  Two  efforts  to  make  a stand  were 
attempted,  but  without  success,  and  the  enemy  was 
driven  in  disorderly  rout  westward  along  the  White 
Oak  road  until  night  put  an  end  to  the  pursuit.  A 
very  great  success  had  been  obtained,  and  the  force 
under  Pickett  was  entirely  broken  up  and  routed,  the 
strongest  position  on  the  right  of  the  Confederate 
army  had  been  captured,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery, 
thirteen  battle  flags,  and  nearly  six  thousand  prison- 
ers fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Union  troops. 

While  the  battle  had  been  gained,  our  troops  oc- 
cupied at  its  close  a precarious  position,  for  they  were 
now  remote  from  the  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  within  three  miles  of  the  present  right  of  the 
Confederate  army,  which  occupied  an  intrenched  po- 
sition at  the  intersection  of  the  White  Oak  and  Clai- 
borne roads,  directly  in  the  rear  of  General  Sheridan, 
as  his  troops  were  now  formed.  Apprehending  an 
attack  from  this  quarter  during  the  night  or  early 


FIVE  FORKS. 


235 


the  next  morning,  preparations  were  made  for  resist- 
ance, and,  in  view  of  the  necessity  of  prompt  and  vig- 
orous action.  General  Sheridan  relieved  General  War- 
ren, with  whose  conduct  on  the  march  and  in  the 
action  he  had  become  dissatisfied,  and  turned  the 
command  of  the  Fifth  Corps  over  to  General  Griffin. 

So  much  discussion  has  already  been  had  upon 
this  action  of  General  Sheridan  that  it  would  be  a 
needless  waste  of  time  to  renew  the  subject  in  these 
pages.  It  is  sufficient,  in  justification  of  General 
Sheridan,  to  say  that  before  the  battle  he  had  re- 
ceived instructions  from  General  Grant  to  relieve 
General  Warren  at  any  time  such  a course  would 
be  for  the  interests  of  the  service,  that  his  so  doing 
was  at  the  time  approved  by  General  Grant,  and 
subsequently  by  General  Sherman,  who  reviewed 
the  proceedings  of  a court  of  inquiry  held  on  this 
subject  in  after  years,  and  that  for  the  remainder  of 
the  time  that  the  Fifth  Corps  continued  under  his 
command  during  the  campaign  he  had  no  exception 
to  take  to  the  promptness,  celerity,  and  vigor  of  its 
many  movements. 

General  Grant,  having  learned  on  the  night  of 
April  ist  of  the  success  of  the  attack  at  Five  Forks, 
had  caused  the  Second  Army  Corps  to  extend  its  left 
toward  the  White  Oak  road,  and  one  division — that 
of  General  Miles — was  sent  to  General  Sheridan,  and 
joined  him  early  in  the  morning  of  April  2d.  Ar- 
rangements were  at  once  made  to  advance  on  the 
enemy’s  works  at  the  White  Oak  and  Claiborne  roads, 
and  as  our  troops  approached,  the  Confederates  re- 
treated, moving  north  on  the  Claiborne  road  and, 
after  crossing  Hatcher’s  Run,  occupied  a new  posi- 
tion. An  intended  movement  against  this  was  frus- 


236 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


trated  by  orders  remanding  the  division  of  General 
Miles  to  the  Second  Corps.  General  Sheridan,  with 
the  Fifth  Corps,  then  struck  northward,  and  reached 
the  South  Side  Railroad  at  Sutherland  Station,  cut- 
ting the  only  remaining  railway  that  led  from  Peters- 
burg, while  General  Merritt  with  his  cavalry  drove 
the  enemy’s  mounted  troops  before  him,  and  reached 
the  railroad  at  Ford’s  Station,  five  miles  west  of 
Sutherland.  The  enemy  on  the  retreat  were  over- 
taken at  dusk,  but  continued  to  avoid  a combat,  and 
retired  on  the  river  road,  which  is  parallel  to  and 
south  of  the  Appomattox. 

As  soon  as  the  lines  at  Five  Forks  had  been 
stormed,  it  was  clear  that  General  Lee  could  no 
longer  maintain  himself  at  Petersburg  and  Rich- 
mond, and  would  be  compelled  to  abandon  those 
cities  if  he  hoped  to  save  his  army.  This  necessity 
was  as  apparent  to  the  Confederate  commander  as 
it  was  to  his  opponents,  and  he  had  already  made 
preparations  for  this  movement  if  such  should  by 
necessity  be  required.  At  daylight  of  the  2d  of 
April  a general  assault  was  made  by  the  infantry  on 
the  works  that  defended  Petersburg,  and  after  a 
severe  conflict,  and  with  considerable  loss,  some  of 
the  outer  works  were  carried,  though  none  were 
occupied  that  directly  compelled  the  surrender  or 
evacuation  of  the  place.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
same  day,  however,  Petersburg  and  Richmond  were 
evacuated,  and  the  Confederate  army  moved  west- 
ward, south  of  the  Appomattox  River,  directing  its 
march  to  Amelia  Court  Flouse,  on  the  Richmond  and 
Danville  Railroad. 

On  the  3d  of  April  General  Sheridan,  with  his 
cavalry  and  the  Fifth  Corps,  continued  his  march  to 


RETREAT  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


237 


the  west,  closely  following  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy 
and  such  infantry  as  had  accompanied  it,  and  during 
the  day  hundreds  of  prisoners  were  taken,  w'ho  were 
unable  to  keep  up  in  the  retreat,  with  five  pieces  of 
artillery  and  many  wagons.  At  Deep  Creek,  just  at 
dusk,  the  rear  guard  of  the  enemy  turned  and  re- 
sisted the  further  advance  of  our  troops  until  night 
put  an  end  to  the  engagement. 

Having  foreseen  that  General  Lee  in  his  retreat 
would  endeavor  to  reach  Amelia  Court  House,  where 
his  separate  columns  coming  from  Petersburg  and 
Richmond  could  unite,  and  where  there  was  a possi- 
bility of  his  obtaining  supplies  by  the  railroad  run-  , 
ning  through  that  place.  General  Sheridan  deter-  I 
mined,  if  possible,  to  gain  a position  that  would  place 
his  force  in  advance  and  west  of  the  Confederate 
army,  and,  holding  the  railroad,  prevent  any  supplies 
being  obtained,  and  he  hoped  to  so  delay  the  enemy 
that  our  infantry  in  the  rear  could  have  time  to 
overtake  the  retreating  forces. 

Before  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  the 
Second  Division  of  cavalry  and  the  Fifth  Corps  were 
sent  forward  on  a forced  march,  and  ordered  to 
make  every  effort  to  reach  Jetersville,  a station  on 
the  Danville  Railroad  six  miles  southwest  of  Amelia 
Court  House,  and  on  gaining  that  place  to  hold  the 
ground,  no  matter  what  force  might  be  encountered. 
Making  a detour  to  the  left,  to  avoid  interruption 
by  the  rear  guard  of  the  force  that  had  been  pursued 
on  the  previous  day,  these  troops  moved  out,  and, 
meeting  no  serious  opposition,  reached  Jetersville  at 
five  o’clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  were  at  once  put 
in  position  across  the  railroad  and  intrenched  as 
strongly  as  was  possible.  General  Sheridan  had  de- 


238 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


termined  to  hold  this  point  at  all  hazards  until  the 
main  body  of  the  army  should  come  up,  and  had 
good  reason  to  expect  that  Lee  might  be  forced  to 
surrender  at  Amelia  Court  House  if  these  operations 
were  promptly  supported,  as  the  Confederate  army 
was  now  cut  off  from  Burksville  Junction  and  de- 
prived of  any  source  of  supply  so  long  as  the  posi- 
tion at  Jetersville  could  be  maintained. 

General  Sheridan,  accompanied  only  by  his  es- 
cort, arrived  at  Jetersville  in  advance  of  his  troops, 
and  hardly  had  he  reached  the  ground  when  a Con- 
federate courier  was  captured,  making  his  way  to 
Burksville,  on  whose  person  the  following  telegram 
in  duplicate  was  found,  signed  by  the  Confederate 
commissary  general  and  addressed  one  to  the  Supply 
Department  at  Danville,  and  the  other  to  that  at 
Lynchburg:  “The  army  is  at  Amelia  Court  House, 
short  of  provisions.  Send  three  hundred  thousand 
rations  quickly  to  Burksville  Junction.” 

As  the  telegraph  lines  west  of  Amelia  Court 
House  had  been  cut  by  our  scouts  and  foraging 
parties,  these  dispatches  had  been  forwarded  by  the 
messenger  who  was  directed  to  send  them  from  the 
first  station  he  could  reach  whence  communication 
could  be  had  with  Danville  and  Lynchburg.  The 
dispatches,  after  their  contents  were  ascertained, 
were  delivered  to  two  of  the  most  reliable  of  the 
scouts  at  headquarters,  who  were  instructed  to  ride 
westward  to  the  first  open  telegraph  station  and  send 
them  forward  with  the  expectation  that  was  after- 
ward realized  that  whatever  supplies  might  be  sent 
would  fall  into  the  hands  of  our  advanced  troops 
when  opportunity  of  procuring  regular  issues  of  ra- 
tions from  the  Union  commissariat  was  exceedingly 


RETREAT  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


239 

slight  while  they  were  so  constantly  moving  away 
from  the  depots. 

This  dispatch,  and  information  gained  from  pris- 
oners  and  scouts,  proved  that  the  supposition  as  to 
Lee’s  intentions  w'hich  had  been  acted  on  was  cor- 
rect, and  that  as  his  previous  experience  had  not 
taught  him  to  expect  so  rapid  and  vigorous  a pur- 
suit, he  was  now  concentrating  his  troops  at  Amelia 
Court  House  and  calmly  awaiting  supplies,  while  a 
corps  of  infantry  and  a large  cavalry  force  were 
already  in  his  front  and  occupying  the  line  on  which 
he  proposed  to  continue  his  retreat.  Intelligence  of 
these  important  facts  was  at  once  sent  to  the  main 
army  and  to  the  other  divisions  of  the  cavalry.  The 
cavalry  sent  for  reached  Jetersville  the  same  night, 
but  no  more  of  the  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  arrived  on  the  ground  until  three  o’clock 
of  the  next  day,  when  the  Second  Corps,  followed 
by  the  Sixth,  reached  Jetersville.  During  the  night 
the  enemy  was  constantly  feeling  the  lines  and  dis- 
playing signs  of  activity,  and  in  the  early  morning 
of  the  5th  a force  from  General  Crook’s  cavalry 
division  was  sent  out  to  the  left  to  ascertain  what 
movements,  if  any,  were  being  made,  and  gain  infor- 
mation of  the  Confederate  position.  These  troops, 
on  reaching  Paine’s  crossroads,  about  eight  miles 
north  of  Jetersville,  discovered  the  Confederate 
wagon  trains  moving  westwardly  through  that  place 
and  at  once  attacked  the  escort  by  which  they  were 
protected.  After  a sharp  contest  the  escort  was 
driven  off,  losing  many  prisoners  and  five  guns; 
an  attempt  was  made  to  bring  off  the  wagons,  but, 
a new  and  heavier  force  coming  up,  this  could  not 
be  done,  and,  the  teams  being  cut  loose,  the  wag- 


240 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ons  were  set  on  fire  and  destroyed.  Among  them, 
as  was  subsequently  learned,  were  the  headquar- 
ter wagons  of  General  Lee,  containing  most  of  his 
records  and  official  papers,  and  those  of  other  Con- 
federate officers  of  high  rank.  The  reconnoitering 
force,  though  closely  pursued  by  cavalry  and  in- 
fantry, returned  to  Jetersville,  having  destroyed 
two  hundred  w'agons  and  bringing  in  the  cap- 
tured guns,  a thousand  prisoners,  and  the  same 
number  of  mules  taken  from  wagons  that  had  been 
burned,  as  not  being  worth  saving. 

The  information  obtained  by  this  reconnoissance 
and  from  other  sources  showed  that  General  Lee  had 
at  last  discovered  the  fact  that  his  retreat  had  been 
cut  off,  and  was  endeavoring  to  pass  around  the  left 
flank  of  General  Sheridan’s  force,  sending  his  trains 
in  advance.  This  was  further  proved  by  a strong 
attack  made  by  his  cavalry  on  that  of  General  Crook, 
evidently  to  cover  this  flank  march,  and  a cavalry 
engagement  commenced  about  twelve  in  the  day 
that  continued  until  night,  in  which  the  Second 
Division  suffered  severely.  General  Sheridan,  who 
foresaw  that  if  this  movement  on  our  left  was  al- 
lowed to  proceed  our  army  would  again  be  in  the 
rear  and  compelled  once  more  to  follow  a flying 
enemy,  was  most  anxious  to  attack  as  soon  as  the 
Second  Corps  came  on  the  field;  but  General  Meade, 
who  had  formed  a plan  of  attack  by  which  he  in- 
tended to  advance  his  right  flank  on  Amelia  Court 
House,  objected  to  making  any  offensive  movement 
until  all  his  troops  had  been  brought  up,  and  thus 
the  whole  day  was  wasted  in  destructive  and  fruit- 
less cavalry  combats,  while  the  main  body  of  the 
Confederates  was  hurrying  past  the  left  flank  of  our 


RETREAT  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


241 


army  and  escaping  from  the  almost  fatal  position  it 
had  occupied  on  the  night  before. 

On  the  morning  of  April  6th  General  Meade,  who 
had  requested  that  the  Fifth  Corps  be  returned  to 
him,  adhering  strictly  to  his  plan  of  battle,  marched 
his  three  corps  of  infantry  east  toward  Amelia  Court 
House,  and  after  a march  of  four  miles  in  that  direc- 
tion discovered  that  General  Lee  had  improved  the 
afternoon  and  night  of  the  previous  day  in  marching 
away  from  that  dangerous  position  with  all  the  speed 
to  which  he  could  incite  his  troops,  and  was  then  well 
out  of  reach,  and  all  that  remained  for  our  infantry 
to  do  was  to  face  about  and  follow  the  enemy  in 
whose  front  they  had  stood  the  day  before. 

General  Lee,  wLo  intended  when  he  abandoned 
Petersburg  and  Richmond  to  proceed  south  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  on  the  line  of  the  Richmond  and 
Danville  Railroad  and  unite  his  forces  with  those 
of  Johnston,  was  obliged,  in  consequence  of  the  new 
line  of  retreat  that  he  was  compelled  to  adopt,  to 
leave  the  line  of  that  railroad  and  march  west  across 
the  country  to  Farmville,  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Appomattox,  a station  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad, 
where  he  might  possibly  receive  supplies,  and  whence 
a good  turnpike  road  extended  to  Danville. 

General  Sheridan,  who  was  well  assured  that 
Amelia  Court  House  was  not  the  place  in  which 
General  Lee  or  any  other  Confederate  soldier  who 
still  possessed  the  power  to  march  would  be  found, 
started  early  with  his  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  and, 
taking  a road  parallel  with  the  Confederate  line  of 
march,  followed  that  for  some  hours,  making  con- 
tinuous attacks  upon  the  flanks,  and  dashes  at  the 
trains  whenever  opportunity  offered.  As  one  division 


242 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


halted  and  formed  for  an  attack  the  others  passed 
in  its  rear,  and  then,  pressing  to  the  front,  a new  at- 
tack was  made,  and  the  whole  Confederate  line,  both 
of  combatants  and  of  trains,  was  continuously  form- 
ing to  resist  an  unexpected  enemy  or  seeking  shelter 
from  some  new  danger.  These  continued  attacks  and 
the  wearied  condition  of  the  Confederates,  who  had 
been  traveling  the  greater  part  of  the  night  and  who 
for  several  days  had  been  suffering  from  want  of 
food,  made  the  march  very  slow,  and  gained  time 
for  our  infantry  to  come  up  with  the  rear  of  the  re- 
treating column  of  the  enemy. 

At  a point  near  Rice’s  Station  a break  w’as  made 
in  the  Confederate  line,  and  the  cavalry  destroyed 
several  hundred  wagons  and  captured  sixteen  guns 
and  a large  number  of  prisoners.  This  attack,  of 
itself  producing  valuable  results,  was  the  more  im- 
portant as  it  interrupted  the  line  of  retreat  and 
closed  the  road  to  Ewell’s  corps  that  was  endeavor- 
ing to  follow  that  of  Longstreet,  which  had  reached 
Rice’s  Station,  and  was  then  waiting  for  the  troops 
in  its  rear  to  close  up.  At  the  same  time  a similar 
cavalry  attack  at  the  rear  of  Ewell’s  column  had 
broken  off  his  connection  with  that  of  Gordon,  and 
had  forced  that  officer  to  change  the  direction  of  his 
march  and  take  a road  to  the  right  of  that  on  which 
the  other  bodies  of  Confederate  troops  had  marched. 
This  separation  of  Ewell’s  corps  from  the  troops  in 
his  front  and  rear  gave  opportunity  for  the  battle  of 
Sailor’s  Creek,  which  immediately  followed.  The 
cavalry  commands  of  Generals  Merritt  and  Crook 
W’ere  thrown  beyond  Sailor’s  Creek,  a small  stream 
running  northwesterly  that  intersected  the  road  to 
Rice’s  Statioji,  and  so  formed  as  to  hold  that  road. 


RETREAT  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


243 


Not  wishing  to  delay  his  march  by  an  engagement  at 
this  point,  as  it  was  now  late  in  the  afternoon,  Gen- 
eral Ewell  posted  Anderson’s  division  in  front  of  the 
cavalry  lines  on  a rising  ground  and  protected  by 
barricades,  intending  that  he  should  there  hold  the 
cavalry  in  his  front,  while  the  rest  of  the  corps  pass- 
ing in  his  rear  could,  by  taking  roads  through  the 
woods,  make  its  escape  to  Farmville.  The  cavalry 
at  once  attacked  Anderson’s  position.  General  Crook 
assaulting  in  front  with  two  dismounted  and  one 
mounted  brigade,  while  General  Merritt  attacked  on 
the  right  flank. 

As  this  part  of  the  engagement  opened,  the  Sixth 
Corps,  which  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  General 
Sheridan,  came  up,  and  under  his  personal  direction 
attacked  the  enemy’s  rear,  which  had  not  yet  com- 
menced its  movement  toward  Farmville.  The  Con- 
federates formed  to  meet  this  new  enemy,  and  for  a 
short  time  resisted  with  vigor  the  attack  of  the  head 
of  the  column,  and  even  made  a countercharge  on 
the  left  of  our  line  that  met  with  a momentary  suc- 
cess. This  was,  however,  at  once  driven  back  by  the 
artillery  of  the  Sixth  Corps  that  had  now  reached  the 
field,  and  our  infantry  pressed  steadily  forward.  AC 
the  same  time  the  cavalry  attack  on  Anderson’s  front 
proved  successful,  and  the  different  brigades,  mount- 
ed and  dismounted,  as  they  had  been  formed,  charged 
over  the  barricades.  These  simultaneous  operations 
on  the  front  and  rear,  so  happily  coinciding,  entirely 
broke  up  Ewell’s  force,  and  nearly  the  whole  corps 
surrendered  on  the  field.  General  Anderson,  with 
about  two  thousand  men,  succeeded  in  effecting  an 
escape,  but  General  Ewell,  with  six  other  general 
officers,  about  nine  thousand  rank  and  file,  and  what- 


244 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ever  of  guns  and  wagons  had  not  been  previously 
taken,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Sheridan’s  command. 
It  was  night  when  the  action  ceased,  but  such 
small  force  as  escaped  was  pursued  for  some  two 
miles  from  the  field,  and  found  to  be  making  the 
utmost  speed  in  a forced  retreat,  with  no  intention 
of  checking  the  pursuit  or  making  further  resist- 
ance to  our  forces. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  the  corps  of  General 
Gordon  had  been  cut  off  from  that  of  Ewell,  and 
had  taken  a line  of  march  to  the  right.  This  force 
was  hotly  pursued  for  more  than  fourteen  miles  by 
the  Second  Corps  until  after  nightfall,  and  lost 
heavily  in  killed,  wounded,  prisoners,  and  material. 
The  Fifth  Corps,  which  had  been  taken  from  General 
Sheridan’s  command  at  the  beginning  of  the  day, 
had  no  part  in  the  engagements  that  have  been  de- 
scribed, as  it  was  directed  to  move  on  the  right  of 
the  army,  and  was  kept  at  such  a distance  from  the 
enemy  that  in  a march  of  thirty-two  miles  it  encoun- 
tered no  hostile  force. 

General  Longstreet,  who  had  the  advance  of  the  ’ 
Confederate  army,  had  reached  Rice’s  Station  early 
in  the  day,  and  had  there  waited  to  allow  Anderson, 
Ewell,  and  Gordon,  who  were  charged  with  the  pro- 
tection of  the  trains,  to  overtake  him.  At  night  he 
learned  of  the  defeat  of  these  forces  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  greater  part  of  the  trains.  These  disas- 
ters, and  the  position  that  was  held  by  the  Union 
army,  deprived  the  Confederates  of  their  last  hope 
of  reaching  the  Danville  turnpike  and  using  that 
road  as  a means  of  uniting  with  the  army  in  North 
Carolina,  and  their  only  hope  of  escape  now  lay  in 
an  effort  to  reach  Lynchburg. 


RETREAT  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 


245 


As  soon  as  night  set  in  General  Longstreet 
marched  to  Farmville,  and  there  crossed  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Appomattox  River,  burning  the 
bridges  after  him.  Gordon  also  crossed  the  river 
higher  up,  and,  uniting  with  Longstreet,  such  of  Lee’s 
army  as  still  remained  was  once  more  together.  At 
Farmville  the  Confederates  found  rations  which  had 
been  sent  there  to  await  their  arrival,  and  obtained 
the  first  food  that  many  of  their  soldiers  had  received 
in  three  days. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th  General  Crook’s  di- 
vision of  cavalry  marched  to  Farmville  in  advance 
of  the  infantry,  and  found  the  place  abandoned  and 
the  bridges  over  the  river  destroyed.  A ford  was 
found  that  was  practicable  for  cavalry  but  impassa- 
ble to  infantry;  the  mounted  troops  crossed  the 
river  while  the  infantry  was  concentrating  at  Farm- 
ville, and,  meeting  the  Confederate  cavalry,  which 
had  been  brought  together,  attacked  it  in  the  hope 
of  reaching  the  trains  which  it  was  protecting.  The 
force  which  was  met,  consisting  of  cavalry  and  in- 
fantry, was  too  strong  to  be  driven  by  that  of  Gen- 
eral Crook,  and  he  was  repulsed  with  some  loss  and 
compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  river. 

While  these  movements  were  being  made  General 
Sheridan  had  taken  the  two  divisions  of  cavalry  un- 
der General  Merritt  and  that  of  Mackenzie,  which 
was  again  under  his  orders,  and  had  marched  west 
to  Prince  Edward  Court  House,  ten  miles  south  of 
Farmville,  on  the  Danville  turnpike,  to  intercept  any 
force  that  might  attempt  to  take  that  road  and  es- 
cape into  North  Carolina,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  was 
directed  to  the  same  place. 

On  learning  from  General  Crook  that  the  whole 


246 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


army  of  the  enemy  had  crossed  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  Appomattox,  General  Sheridan  at  once  perceived 
that  Lee  had  abandoned  all  hope  of  escaping  by  the 
way  of  Danville,  and  was  evidently  intending  to 
march  on  Lynchburg.  It  was  again  possible  to 
throw  the  cavalry  across  this  new  line  of  retreat  and 
delay  the  enemy  until  he  could  be  overtaken  by  our 
infantry,  and  every  effort  was  at  once  made  to  accom- 
plish this  purpose.  Orders  were  sent  to  General  Crook 
to  recross  the  river  at  Farmville  and  march  to  Pros- 
pect Station,  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad,  six  miles 
west  of  Farmville,  and  the  cavalry  at  Prince  Edward 
Court  House  moved  in  the  same  direction.  At  day- 
light on  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  April  the  whole 
cavalry  force  was  brought  together  at  Prospect  Sta- 
tion, and  at  once  took  the  road  for  Appomattox 
Station,  on  the  Lynchburg  Railroad,  twenty-five  miles 
to  the  west. 

While  on  the  march  the  general  was  informed  by 
one  of  his  scouts  that  at  this  station,  which  he  had 
visited,  were  four  trains  of  cars  loaded  with  supplies 
for  Lee’s  army  which  had  been  forwarded  from 
Lynchburg  in  response  to  the  telegram  of  the  Con- 
federate commissary  general  which  had  been  cap- 
tured at  Jetersville  on  the  4th  and  afterward  sent  on 
to  Lynchburg.  So  rapid  and  complete  had  been  the 
series  of  disasters  to  the  Confederate  army  that  no 
accurate  intelligence  of  its  condition  had  been  re- 
ceived at  Lynchburg,  and  while  it  was  there  known 
to  be  in  retreat  and  to  have  suffered  reverses,  no  idea 
existed  of  its  actual  position  or  of  the  fact  that  any 
part  of  the  Union  army  could  be  in  its  front.  This 
scout,  who  had  sent  the  dispatch  and  had  ever  since 
been  on  the  watch  for  trains  that  might  be  sent  in 


DEFEAT  AND  SURRENDER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  247 

compliance  with  it,  had  retained  the  original,  and  by- 
showing  this  and  representing  the  suffering  condi- 
tion of  the  Confederate  army,  which  he  said  was  on 
the  march  along  the  railroad,  had  persuaded  the  men 
in  charge  to  bring  the  trains  some  distance  east  of 
the  station  and  there  remain  until  the  arrival  of  the 
troops  for  whom  they  were  intended.  There  was,  of 
course,  the  chance  of  the  true  condition  of  affairs 
being  learned  at  any  moment,  and  General  Custer, 
who  was  in  advance,  was  directed  to  press  forward 
as  speedily  as  possible  and  effect  this  important 
capture.  On  nearing  the  station  he  sent  two  regi- 
ments at  the  gallop  to  circle  round  the  trains  to 
the  south,  and  then,  striking  the  railroad,  to  de- 
stroy the  track  sufficiently  to  prevent  any  move- 
ment of  the  cars  westward.  This  was  successfully 
done,  and  General  Custer  without  trouble  seized  the 
trains  and  the  railway  station.  Hardly  had  this 
been  done  when  the  advance  of  General  Lee’s  army, 
eager  with  the  hope  of  for  once  receiving  an  ample 
supply  of  rations,  advanced  upon  the  station,  and,  to 
their  astonishment,  were  fiercely  attacked  by  Gen- 
eral Custer  before  they  had  become  aware  of  the 
presence  of  an  enemy. 

After  a spirited  fight  the  Confederates  were 
driven  back  in  confusion  on  the  road  by  which  they 
had  advanced,  and  their  defeat  was  completed  by 
the  capture  of  twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery  and  a 
large  wagon  train,  which  General  Lee,  profiting  by 
his  losses  on  the  6th,  had  now  for  greater  security 
placed  in  the  front  of  his  army.  The  rem.ainder  of 
the  cavalry  force  came  rapidly  up,  and  by  night  was 
strongly  posted  in  the  front  of  the  Confederate  army 
and  held  the  last  road  by  which  it  could  have  the 
17 


248 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


faintest  hope  of  further  retreat.  The  enemy  was 
forced  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Appomattox  Court 
House,  and,  to  prevent  rest  or  offensive  demonstra- 
tions, continued  skirmishing  was  kept  up  by  our 
troops  during  the  night. 

For  the  second  time  during  the  pursuit  General 
Sheridan  had  overtaken  the  retreating  army,  and, 
placing  the  force  at  his  disposal  directly  in  the  front, 
stood  as  a bar  to  further  progress.  During  the  night 
he  felt  assured  that  his  position  could  be  held,  but 
knew  that  after  daylight  his  force  would  be  insuffi- 
cient to  withstand  the  desperate  assault  he  must  ex- 
pect from  an  enemy  whose  last  and  only  hope  re- 
mained in  forcing  a passage  to  the  west.  Everything 
depended  upon  the  arrival  of  additional  troops  in  time 
to  resist  the  attack  that  would  surely  be  made  the  fol- 
lowing morning,  and  courier  after  courier  was  sent 
back  to  urge  greater  speed  upon  the  commanders  of 
the  infantry,  still  far  in  the  rear. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  the  Twenty-fourth 
Corps  had  marched  from  Farmville  and  the  Fifth 
from  Prince  Edward  Court  House,  and,  uniting  at 
Prospect  Station,  had  diligently  followed  the  roads 
taken  by  the  cavalry.  Though  for  the  past  ten  days 
they  had  fought  hard,  marched  far,  and  fared  poorly, 
the  victories  of  those  days  and  the  knowledge  that 
the  adversary  who  for  four  long  years  had  held  them 
at  bay,  and  at  whose  hands  they  had  sustained  toil, 
trial,  suffering,  and  sometimes  defeat,  was  now  flying 
before  them,  inspired  their  courage  and  gave  an  en- 
durance that  no  other  source  could  have  supplied. 
Through  the  day  and  through  the  long  night  that 
toilsome  march  continued,  and  just  as  day  broke  the 
welcome  news  was  brought  that  the  infantry  col- 


DEFEAT  AND  SURRENDER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  249 

umns  were  within  reach  and  would  soon  be  on  the 
ground  to  aid  the  cavalry. 

During  the  night  a consultation  of  the  Confeder- 
ate commanders  was  held,  and  it  was  arranged  among 
them  that  in  the  morning  an  effort  should  be  made 
to  cut  their  way  through  the  force  in  their  front, 
which,  as  it  then  consisted  of  cavalry  alone,  it  was 
thought  would  not  be  an  impossible  task.  The  re- 
mains of  General  Gordon’s  corps  and  the  cavalry 
were  selected  to  take  the  advance  in  this  movement, 
and,  these  arrangements  made,  daylight  was  anx- 
iously expected. 

When  the  morning  light  of  the  9th  of  April  was 
sufficient  to  permit  the  movement  of  troops,  the 
Confederate  line  advanced.  Not  caring  to  incur 
more  loss  than  was  absolutely  needful,  and  learning 
that  the  infantry,  which  had  just  reached  the  ground, 
was  forming  in  his  rear.  General  Sheridan  directed 
the  cavalry  lines  to  fall  back  slowly,  skirmishing 
sufficiently  to  prevent  a rapid  advance  by  the  enemy, 
and  these  orders  being  complied  with,  the  enemy  ad- 
vanced confidently.  The  infantry  formation  being 
completed.  General  Sheridan  ordered  that  two  divi- 
sions of  the  cavalry  be  moved  by  the  flank  to  the 
right,  and  at  this  movement  the  rebel  lines  cheered 
wildly  and  redoubled  their  fire,  for  to  them  it  ap- 
peared that  the  troops  opposing  their  march  had  been 
driven  off,  and  that  at  last  the  road  to  Lynchburg  lay 
open  and  clear  before  them.  But  for  one  instant  did 
this  exultation  last,  for  as  the  cavalry  disappeared 
from  their  front  Lee’s  troops  saw  massed  before  them 
the  heavy  lines  of  two  strong  corps  of  infantry  pre- 
pared for  and  waiting  an  attack.  Not  another  sound 
was  heard  nor  another  shot  fired  ; the  advancing  line 


250 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


wavered,  halted,  and  then,  without  an  order  given, 
faced  about  and  fell  back  on  the  disorderly  mass  of 
Confederate  troops  that  were  huddled  in  confusion 
about  Appomattox  Court  House. 

Our  infantry  continued  to  advance,  and  the  cav- 
alry swept  round  to  the  right  and  was  forming  for  a 
flank  attack  when  the  first  signal  of  the  Confederate 
surrender  was  made  and  a white  flag  sent  into  the  cav- 
alry lines,  the  bearer  of  which  asked  for  a suspension  of 
hostilities,  as  General  Lee  was  then  making  arrange- 
ments for  surrendering  his  entire  army.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  General  Grant  no  definite  arrangement  could 
be  made,  but  after  some  negotiations  with  Generals 
Longstreet  and  Gordon  the  troops  were  halted  in 
commanding  positions,  and  from  that  moment  it  may 
be  said  that  the  war  had  closed.  The  long  pursuit 
had  ended  with  the  capture  of  all  that  was  left  to 
General  Lee  after  a series  of  defeats  and  reverses  of 
the  powerful  army  that  for  four  years  had  firmly 
held  Virginia  and  had  resisted  the  strongest  and  best 
of  the  Northern  troops. 

With  the  arrival  of  General  Grant  upon  the  field, 
which  he  reached  about  one  o’clock,  the  final  nego- 
tiations for  the  surrender  were  soon  arranged;  but 
as  General  Sheridan  took  no  active  part  in  these, 
and  they  have  been  frequently  and  fully  described  in 
other  pages,  there  is  no  need  to  enlarge  upon  them 
here.  The  long  pursuit  which  General  Sheridan  had 
advised,  planned,  directed,  and  led  was  closed  with 
triumphant  success  when  the  white  flag  of  surrender 
was  displayed  in  the  front  of  his  advancing  lines,  and 
the  mighty  task  he  had  assumed  in  the  last  days  of 
March  had  been  so  thoroughly  performed  that  noth- 
ing could  be  added  to  render  it  more  complete  or 


DEFEAT  AND  SURRENDER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.  251 

perfect,  and  on  that  night  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
after  four  long  and  weary  years  of  strife  and  toil, 
rested  in  peace,  knowing  that  for  them  no  foe  ex- 
isted against  whose  attack  it  was  necessary  to  guard 
or  with  whom  in  the  future  it  would  be  called  on  to 
contend. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS. — RECONSTRUC- 
TION.  ADMINISTRATION  OF  CIVIL  AFFAIRS. 

The  surrender  at  Appomattox  Court  House  closed 
the  active  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  proved  to  be  the  actual,  though  possibly  not  the 
formal,  termination  of  the  civil  war.  A portion  of 
the  infantry  force  remained  for  a short  time  to  com- 
plete the  details  of  the  surrender,  while  the  other 
troops  marched  back  to  Petersburg.  General  Sheri- 
dan led  his  cavalry  column  to  that  city  by  easy 
marches,  and  after  remaining  there  a few  days  re- 
ceived orders  to  march  southward  into  North  Caro- 
lina and  aid  General  Sherman,  who  had  been  directed 
to  continue  active  operations  against  General  John- 
ston, whose  offer  to  surrender  his  army  had  not 
proved  acceptable.  The  troops  which  were  placed 
under  his  orders  for  this  movement  were  the  three 
divisions  of  the  cavalry  corps  and  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  had  been  ordered  to  unite  with  him  at  Danville. 

At  this  time  no  objection  could  be  or  was  made 
to  uniting  with  the  army  of  General  Sherman,  for 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had,  unaided,  accomplished 
the  work  to  which  from  the  commencement  of  the 
war  it  had  been  devoted,  and  was  now  well  pleased 
to  lend  aid  to  its  comrades  of  the  West  in  place  of 

252 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  253 

being  dependent  upon  them  for  assistance,  as  had 
been  suggested  at  the  opening  of  the  last  campaign. 
A pleasant  march  of  four  days  brought  the  cavalry 
corps  which  General  Sheridan  led  to  the  border  of 
North  Carolina,  and  there  the  news  was  received 
that  General  Johnston  had  accepted  the  inevitable 
and  surrendered  his  army  upon  the  same  terms  which 
had  been  granted  to  General  Lee.  This  rendered 
the  presence  of  additional  troops  unnecessary ; the 
cavalry  returned  to  Petersburg,  and  thence  marched 
by  easy  stages  to  Washington,  where  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  that  of  General  Sherman  were  brought 
together  to  be  reviewed  by  the  President  before  their 
disbandment.  General  Sheridan  went  by  water  from 
Petersburg  to  Washington  to  await  the  arrival  of  his 
troops,  but  was  to  his  lasting  regret  prevented  from 
ever  again  meeting  the  men  who  on  many  fields  had 
followed  him  so  faithfully  and  served  him  so  gallantly. 

By  May  15,  1865,  all  organized  bodies  of  Confed- 
erate troops  had  surrendered  or  had  been  disbanded 
with  the  exception  of  a considerable  force  still  re- 
maining in  western  Louisiana  and  in  the  State  of 
Texas  under  the  command  of  General  Kirby  Smith. 
These  troops  had  occupied  the  territory  of  the  State 
of  Texas  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  their 
remote  position  had  not  permitted  them  to  see  much 
hard  service  or  given  them  an  opportunity  to  appre- 
ciate the  strength  and  force  of  the  Northern  army 
when  actively  exerted.  Their  numbers  had  been  in- 
creased by  many  refugees  from  the  other  armies,  who 
had  determined  that  death  in  the  last  ditch  was  pref- 
erable to  a surrender  to  the  Northern  invader,  and 
had  consequently  fled  to  Texas,  as  may  be  supposed, 
to  find  the  means  of  fulfilling  their  purpose.  The 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


254 

commander  of  this  force  had  loudly  and  at  great 
length  proclaimed  the  unsubdued  condition  of  his 
army  and  of  the  State  of  Texas,  and  expressed  in 
the  usual  terms  his  intention  of  continuing  the  con- 
flict for  independence  and  Southern  rights  so  long 
as  one  man  survived  to  resist  those  who  should  dare 
to  assail  those  sacred  institutions. 

General  Sheridan  was  selected  as  the  person  best 
fitted  to  extend  the  blessings  of  peace  to  this  still 
rebellious  section  of  the  country,  and  on  May  17th 
he  received  orders  to  assume  command  of  all  the 
territory  west  of  the  Mississippi  that  was  still  held 
by  Confederate  troops.  He  was  instructed  “that  his 
duty  was  to  restore  Texas  and  that  part  of  Louisiana 
held  by  the  enemy  to  the  Union  in  the  shortest  prac- 
ticable time  in  a way  most  effectual  for  securing  per- 
manent peace.” 

He  was  not  trammeled  with  specific  instructions, 
but  was  told  that  if  General  Smith  continued  to  re- 
sist our  forces  without  even  an  ostensible  govern- 
ment to  which  he  was  responsible,  he  and  his  men 
were  not  to  be  regarded  as  legitimate  belligerents, 
but  as  outlaws;  that  if  an  immediate  surrender  was 
offered  these  men  could  receive  the  same  terms  as 
those  accorded  to  Lee  and  Johnston,  but  in  that 
event  only.  Further  instructions  as  to  the  opera- 
tions in  the  event  of  an  active  campaign  were  given, 
and  a force  of  fifty  thousand  men  was  placed  under 
his  orders,  to  be  used  as  required. 

General  Sheridan  inquired  if  these  orders  were  so 
pressing  as  to  demand  his  immediate  departure  for 
his  new  command,  which  would  prevent  his  presence 
with  the  troops  that  had  lately  served  under  him  at 
the  review  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  had 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  255 


been  ordered  for  May  23,  1865,  as  he  had  a strong 
desire  to  be  present  on  this  last  occasion  in  which 
they  would  appear  together.  He  was  told  by  Gen- 
eral Grant  that  it  was  of  great  importance  that  he 
should  assume  his  new  duties  immediately.  In  the 
first  place,  to  enforce  the  surrender  of  the  recalci- 
trant Confederates  and  to  organize  the  territory  over 
which  he  was  placed  in  command  in  such  a manner 
that  he  could  control  the  management  of  all  civil 
affairs  until  Congress  took  some  action  for  restor- 
ing the  States  lately  in  rebellion. 

At  the  same  time  General  Grant  mentioned  that 
an  additional  motive  existed  for  creating  this  new 
command  besides  those  mentioned  directly  in  the  in- 
structions, and  this  resulted  from  the  occupation  of 
Mexico  by  a French  army  and  the  present  subjection 
of  that  country  to  the  Emperor  Maximilian  by  the 
aid  of  foreign  troops.  He  went  on  to  say  that  he 
had  always  regarded  the  invasion  of  Mexico  as  a 
subordinate  feature  in  the  rebellion  itself,  as  it  had 
been  encouraged  and  abetted  by  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy, and  that  in  his  judgment  a complete  suc- 
cess in  putting  down  the  rebellion  would  not  be  ac- 
complished until  Mexico  was  freed  from  foreign 
control  and  restored  to  its  original  position  as  a re- 
public. It  was  a well-known  fact  that  many  defeated 
Southern  leaders  and  soldiers  looked  to  Mexico  as  a 
place  of  refuge,  and  that  they  had  been  invited  and 
were  welcomed  to  join  the  party  of  the  Emperor  and 
support  his  authority  by  arms;  and  if  this  condition 
of  affairs  was  continued  there  was  a prospect  that 
for  an  indefinite  period  a large  force  of  armed  and 
hostile  rebels  would  be  maintained  in  the  southern 
boundaries  of  the  United  States  which  would  be  a 


256 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


source  of  much  trouble  and  annoyance,  if  not  of 
danger  to  our  Government. 

It  was  therefore  necessary  to  prevent  the  passage 
of  armed  Southerners  into  Mexico  who  had  not  in 
good  faith  surrendered,  and  to  maintain  on  the  boun- 
dary a considerable  force  that  would  serve  not  only 
to  protect  our  own  territory,  but  have  some  moral 
effect  in  encouraging  those  Mexicans  who  were  still 
struggling  to  maintain  their  national  independence. 
These  reasons  were,  of  course,  controlling,  and  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  at  once  left  Washington  to  assume  his 
new  duties.  While  traveling  by  steamer  from  St. 
Louis  to  New  Orleans  he  received  intelligence  that 
General  Kirby  Smith  had  reconsidered  his  determi- 
nation to  remain  forever  unconquered,  and  had  sur- 
rendered his  command  to  General  Canby  upon  the 
same  terms  that  had  been  extended  to  the  other  Con- 
federate armies.  ' 

This  surrender,  though  proposed  by  the  Confed- 
erate commander,  was  not  carried  out  in  good  faith, 
particularly  by  the  Texas  troops,  who  were  permit- 
ted by  their  officers  to  disband  without  complying 
with  the  obligations  they  had  bound  themselves  to 
observe,  and  several  organized  bodies  of  these  men 
marched  to  the  interior  of  the  State,  carrying  with 
them  their  camp  equipage,  arms,  ammunition,  and 
some  artillery,  with  the  design  of  reaching  Mexico 
and  there  joining  the  Imperial  army.  Their  leader 
evaded  our  troops  and  fled  to  Mexico,  but  the  main 
part  of  a scheme  that  had  been  formed  previous  to 
the  surrender  of  organizing  a column  of  fifteen  thou- 
sand men  for  the  invasion  of  Mexico  failed,  though 
numerous  detached  parties  of  Confederate  soldiers, 
numbering  in  all  about  four  thousand,  found  their 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  257 


way  into  Mexico,  and,  having  fought  for  four  years 
to  establish  an  independent  Southern  republic  in  the 
territory  of  the  Union,  devoted  what  of  combative 
energy  still  remained  to  them  in  the  effort  to  impose 
a despotic  and  imperial  government  upon  the  repub- 
lic of  Mexico. 

While  the  troops  were  being  collected  that  were 
intended  to  act  in  Texas,  a singular  incident  recalled 
to  General  Sheridan  the  campaign  in  which  he  be- 
gan his  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Some 
of  his  cavalry  while  crossing  to  the  west  bank  of  the 
Mississippi  below  Vicksburg  observed  a suspicious- 
looking  party  of  men  crossing  the  river  in  a row- 
boat and  leading  two  horses.  Some  of  the  troopers 
gave  chase  and  succeeded  in  capturing  the  horses, 
but  failed  to  secure  the  men,  who  were  possibly 
not  very  actively  pursued,  for  while  Confederate 
horses  yet  maintained  a value,  the  supply  of  prison- 
ers was  far  in  excess  of  the  demand,  and  in  those 
days  they  were  little  sought  for.  It  was  afterward 
learned  that  the  fugitives  were  General  Early  and 
two  or  three  companions,  and  that  the  general,  hav- 
ing successfully  effected  a masterly  retreat  from 
Waynesborough  to  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi,  was 
on  his  way  to  join  the  Confederate  troops  in  Texas, 
of  whose  surrender  he  had  not  been  informed.  Some 
days  afterward  General  Sheridan  received  from  him 
a letter  referring  to  the  affair  and  the  capture  of  the 
horses,  for  which  he  demanded  pay,  they  being,  as 
he  asserted,  his  private  property,  as  they  had  been 
taken  in  battle  from  the  United  States  forces  in  his 
former  aggressive  days.  This  wms  the  final  and  last 
appearance  of  General  Early  in  the  history  of  the 
civil  war,  and  there  is  no  record  that  the  claim  he 


258 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


SO  modestly  urged  has  ever  been  acknowledged  and 
paid  by  the  United  States  Treasury. 

Two  columns  of  cavalry,  each  about  five  thousand 
strong,  were  sent,  the  one  to  Austin  and  the  other 
to  San  Antonio,  and  a corps  of  infantry  was  placed  at 
San  Antonio  and  another  at  Brownsville,  on  the  Rio 
Grande  River,  opposite  the  Mexican  town  of  Mata- 
moras,  which  was  then  held  by  the  Imperial  troops. 
From  this  point  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande  was 
patrolled  to  prevent  the  escape  of  Confederate  sol- 
diers into  Mexico,  and  the  force  was  from  time  to 
time  increased  as  greater  facilities  for  supplying  it 
could  be  furnished. 

In  June  General  Sheridan  visited  the  troops  in 
camp  at  Brownsville,  and  while  much  activity  was 
displayed  in  preventing  Confederate  soldiers  from 
crossing  the  frontier  into  Mexico,  a demand  was 
made  upon  the  Imperial  general  commanding  on  this 
line  for  the  return  of  Confederate  war  material  that 
should  at  the  time  of  Smith’s  surrender  have  been 
delivered  to  the  representatives  of  the  United  States, 
but  which  had  been  carried  to  Mexico  and  turned 
over  to  the  invading  army  in  that  country. 

This  act  of  the  Imperial  forces  and  the  constant 
harboring  of  enemies  of  the  United  States,  in^  the 
opinions  of  Generals  Grant  and  Sheridan,  were  a 
sufficient  reason  for  crossing  the  frontier  and  inter- 
vening in  the  Mexican  struggle,  but  the  artillery  that 
had  been  spirited  away  was  returned  with  profuse 
apologies,  and  the  interference  of  the  Department  of 
State,  which  insisted  upon  a settlement  of  all  ques- 
tions in  dispute  by  diplomatic  negotiation,  prevented 
any  active  movements  by  our  troops.  Later  in  the 
summer  preparations  were  again  made  that  bore  the 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  259 

appearance  of  an  intended  movement  by  our  army 
to  cross  the  Rio  Grande  into  Mexico,  but  renewed 
interference  by  the  State  Department  at  the  request 
of  the  French  minister  prevented  any  action. 

Affairs  on  the  Mexican  border  continued  much 
in  this  condition  until  the  early  part  of  1867.  Our 
people  on  the  border  and  the  troops  sympathized 
strongly  with  the  Republican  party  in  Mexico,  but 
were  not  permitted  to  afford  active  assistance. 
Efforts  of  bands  of  Confederate  adventurers  to  cross 
into  Mexico  were  frustrated,  and  the  party  of  inde- 
pendence was  strengthened  in  tone  and  feeling  by 
the  presence  of  the  force  that  was  kept  on  the  bor- 
der, and  if  union  and  good  feeling  could  have  always 
prevailed  among  the  Mexican  leaders  the  contest  in 
that  country  would  not  have  continued  so  long  as  it 
did.  The  insistence  by  our  State  Department  upon 
a strict  neutrality  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
gave  some  confidence  to  the  Imperialists,  and  also 
tended  to  prolong  the  struggle.  In  the  summer  of 
1866  the  Republican  forces,  which  had  succeeded  in 
obtaining  considerable  supplies  of  arms  and  ammu- 
nition from  the  United  States,  became  sufficiently 
strong  to  undertake  aggressive  operations  in  the 
northern  part  of  the  country,  and  gradually  drove 
the  Imperial  troops  to  the  south  and  east.  In  Janu- 
ary, 1867,  as  was  learned  at  General  Sheridan’s 
headquarters  through  an  intercepted  telegram,  the 
Emperor  of  France  ordered  that  his  troops  should 
evacuate  the  Mexican  territory.  The  Emperor  Maxi- 
milian was  thus  abandoned  in  the  country  he  had 
invaded,  with  no  force  to  depend  on  but  a few  Mexi- 
cans who  remained  faithful  to  his  cause.  The  small 
force  that  stood  by  him  was  soon  defeated,  and  the 


26o 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


unfortunate  Emperor  was  captured  and  executed  at 
Queretaro.  When  it  was  too  late,  the  Department  of 
State — which  had  prevented  any  action  being  taken 
which  at  an  earlier  period  would  have  resulted  in  a 
comparatively  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Mexican 
troubles  and  saved  the  lives  of  the  Emperor  and  of 
hundreds,  if  not  thousands,  of  others  who  fell  in  this 
fruitless  struggle — made  an  effort  to  save  the  cap- 
tured Emperor,  and  forwarded  to  General  Sheridan 
for  transmittal  a request  that  the  prisoner’s  life  be 
spared.  A special  steamer  was  dispatched  with  this 
petition,  and  it  reached  the  Mexican  authorities  in 
time;  but  no  attention  was  paid  to  the  request,  and 
the  sentence  of  death  which  had  been  passed  upon 
Maximilian  was  executed. 

While  no  active  movement  was  made  by  our  army 
or  countenanced  by  the  authorities  of  our  Govern- 
ment, there  is  no  doubt  that  the  overthrow  of  the  re- 
bellion, and  the  consequent  presence  of  a large 
force  of  our  troops  on  the  Mexican  frontier,  did 
much  to  dishearten  the  Imperialists  and  animate 
and  encourage  the  Liberal  party.  The  Emperor  of 
France  would  never  have  sanctioned  or  aided  such 
an  enterprise  as  the  invasion  of  Mexico  had  not  the 
United  States  been  engaged  in  a civil  war  of  such 
magnitude  as  for  the  time  to  absorb  the  whole  power 
and  resources  of  the  people,  and  had  he  not  been 
confidently  assured  that  his  attempt  would  receive 
the  encouragement  and  ultimate  support  of  that 
part  of  the  country  which  expected  to  succeed  in 
maintaining  itself  as  a separate  and  independent 
Southern  Confederacy.  When  the  integrity  of  the 
United  States  was  finally  established  and  the  north- 
ern boundary  of  Mexico  was  held  by  a powerful  and 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  261 

well-armed  nation,  flushed  with  a recent  triumph  in 
one  of  the  greatest  wars  that  history  records,  the 
character  of  whose  institutions  and  the  traditions 
of  whose  people  were  utterly  opposed  to  such  a gov- 
ernment as  had  been  established  in  Mexico,  or  to 
foreign  intervention  of  any  nature  with  the  domestic 
affairs  of  any  part  of  the  North  American  continent, 
there  was  but  one  result  of  this  invasion  to  be  looked 
for,  and  the  attempt  to  maintain  it  for  a single  day 
after  the  breaking  up  of  the  rebellion  became  a use- 
less sacrifice  of  life  and  treasure. 

The  labors  of  General  Sheridan  in  his  new  com- 
mand were  not  confined  to  the  direction  of  military 
affairs  and  the  protection  and  control  of  the  Mexi- 
can frontier,  but,  in  the  inevitable  state  of  confusion 
and  absence  of  all  regular  and  effective  civil  porver 
that  resulted  from  the  sudden  breaking  up  of  the 
Confederate  Government,  and  the  condition  in  which 
the  territory  that  had  lately  been  subject  to  its  rule 
was  placed  by  that  event,  it  became  necessary  that 
he  should  assume  a supervision,  and  at  times  a direct 
control,  of  the  action  of  such  provisional  authorities 
as  were  permitted  for  the  time  being  to  have  juris- 
diction of  civil  affairs  until  a settled  form  of  admin- 
istration could  be  legally  provided. 

Throughout  the  Southern  States  at  this  time  it 
was  difficult  to  find  any  reliable  class  or  body  of 
citizens  to  whom  the  direction  of  civil  affairs  or  the 
responsibilities  of  forming  and  carrying  on  a govern- 
ment that  would  conform  to  the  laws  and  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  afford  freedom,  equal- 
ity, and  justice  to  all  citizens  could  be  intrusted. 
The  citizens  of  intelligence,  character,  and  means, 
and  those  who  by  past  experience  and  the  customs 


262 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


prevailing  in  the  South  had  been  familiar  with  the 
responsibilities  of  maintaining  an  organized  civil 
government,  had  almost  universally  taken  part  in 
the  rebellion  and  had  forfeited  their  civil  rights, 
which  could  only  be  restored  by  accepting  the  con- 
ditions imposed  by  the  Amnesty  Proclamation  of 
President  Johnson,  issued  on  May  29,  1865. 

This  was,  however,  so  framed  that  citizens  of  in- 
fluence, education,  or  means,  who  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances would  have  been  prominent  in  a com- 
munity organized  according  to  law  and  recognized 
social  customs,  were  excluded  from  the  benefits  it 
extended.  The  few  whites  who  could  be  found 
through  the  Southern  States  who  professed  to  have 
been  loyal  to  the  Union  throughout  the  war,  and  who 
claimed  that  their  rights  of  citizenship  had  not  been 
forfeited,  were  generally  men  without  character  or 
influence  and  unworthy  of  respect  or  confidence.  In 
the  majority  of  instances  their  fidelity  to  the  United 
States  and  freedom  from  any  connection  with  Con- 
federate interests  resulted  from  the  fact  that  for  the 
reasons  given  it  had  been  out  of  their  power  to  ob- 
tain office  or  position  of  any  kind  from  fellow-citizens 
by  whom  they  were  generally  distrusted.  The  ne- 
groes, who  formed  the  third  of  the  incongruous  ele- 
ments from  which  civilized  governments  were  to  be 
constructed,  had  been  just  released  from  slavery, 
were  entirely  illiterate,  and  for  the  time  possessed 
no  greater  conception  of  the  rights,  duties,  and  obli- 
gations of  a citizen  in  a free  and  self-governed  state 
than  the  dumb  cattle  with  which  they  had  labored  in 
the  fields. 

From  these  widely  differing  classes  of  resident 
population — to  which  a fourth  may  be  added,  com- 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  263 

posed  of  Northern  men  who  soon  began  to  settle  in 
the  Southern  States,  some  for  purposes  of  business 
and  attracted  by-the  prospects  that  a comparatively 
new  community  offered  to  the  enterprising  and  ad- 
venturous, and  others  who  expected  to  obtain  polit- 
ical power  and  preferment  in  the  general  overthrow 
that  had  destroyed  the  institutions  of  the  past  and 
excluded  former  leaders  from  the  control  of  public 
affairs — were  now  communities  to  be  formed  and  sys- 
tems of  political  government  organized  that  of  ne- 
cessity must  differ  widely  from  any  that  had  previ- 
ously existed  there.  The  various  methods  attempted 
or  adopted  to  this  end,  and  the  difficulties  encoun- 
tered in  the  slow  progress  of  events  which  finally 
after  great  effort  and  incidentally  much  suffering, 
form  an  interesting  chapter  in  the  political  history 
of  the  country,  but  will  be  referred  to  briefly  only  so 
far  as  particular  events  were  connected  with  or  con- 
trolled by  General  Sheridan  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duties  as  military  commander. 

The  command  to  which  General  Sheridan  was 
assigned  in  1865,  after  the  close  of  active  military 
operations  in  the  East,  was  designated  as  “ The  Mili- 
tary Division  of  the  Gulf,”  and  contained  within  its 
limits  the  States  of  I.ouisiana,  Texas,  and  Florida. 
The  latter  of  these  States,  which  was  thinly  settled 
and  remote  from  the  centers  of  political  activity,  pre- 
sented no  question  of  difficulty  or  importance,  and 
was,  soon  after  the  creation  of  the  military  division, 
removed  from  the  command  of  General  Sheridan, 
and  his  authority,  so  far  as  it  bore  upon  the  questions 
of  reconstruction  of  State  governments  and  military 
control  of  the  population,  was  confined  to  the  terri- 
tories of  Louisiana  and  Texas.  The  State  of  Texas 
18 


264 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


did  not  at  first  present  any  serious  questions  or  call 
for  more  than  the  exercise  of  sufficient  military  power 
to  repress  occasional  local  disturbances  or  repress 
individual  instances  of  wrong  or  oppression  of  the 
blacks  when  the  civil  authorities  were  too  weak  to 
perform  this  duty. 

The  Governor  of  the  State  who  was  in  office  at 
the  time  of  the  breaking  up  of  the  Confederate 
States  had  assumed  that  his  powers  as  Governor  still 
continued,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  existing  Legislature 
had  assumed  to  undertake  a reconstruction  of  the 
State  government,  and  had  called  for  the  election  of 
delegates  to  a State  convention  to  be  convened  for 
that  object,  who  were  to  be  selected  by  all  inhabitants 
of  the  State  who  had  theretofore  enjoyed  the  right  of 
suffrage.  This  assumption  of  authority  was  deter- 
mined by  the  arrival  in  the  State  of  a provisional 
Governor,  A.  J.  Hamilton,  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, who,  supported  by  the  military  power,  took 
control  of  the  government  and  put  an  end  to  exer- 
cise of  executive  power  by  the  former  Governor  and 
prohibited  the  assembling  of  the  convention  he  had 
called.  This  action  and  his  subsequent  public  acts 
in  preparing  for  a reconstruction  of  the  State  govern- 
ment, in  which  none  should  take  part  who  were  not 
qualified  to  vote  under  the  Amnesty  Proclamation, 
caused  much  discontent  and  serious  opposition  was 
threatened  ; but  the  Governor,  who  was  an  energetic 
and  courageous  man,  persevered  in  the  course  he  had 
determined  on  and  called  on  the  military  authorities 
for  support.  This  was  granted,  and,  sufficient  troops 
being  available,  detachments  were  placed  at  every 
point  where  trouble  was  feared.  This  display  of 
force,  which  was  recognized  to  be  sufficient  to  re- 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  265 

press  any  attempt  at  an  outbreak,  preserved  peace 
throughout  the  State,  and  no  riots  or  disturbances  of 
any  moment  occurred  during  the  administration  of 
Governor  Hamilton,  which  continued  until  August, 
1866.  At  that  time  a new  Governor  and  other  State 
officials  assumed  office,  who  had  been  elected  under 
the  authority  of  a convention  which  had  been  called 
by  Governor  Hamilton,  and  the  President,  who  by 
this  time  had  greatly  changed  the  views  with  which 
on  his  accession  to  power  he  had  regarded  those  who 
had  been  in  armed  rebellion  against  the  United  States, 
was  prevailed  upon  to  direct  that  the  military  authori- 
ties should  no  longer  take  any  part  in  the  control  of 
civil  affairs,  and  that  these  should  be  left  to  the  sole 
direction  of  the  newly  elected  State  officials.  The 
results  of  this  change  of  policy  were  soon  apparent 
in  the  passage  and  enforcement  of  laws  favoring  the 
former  rebel  element  and  oppressive  to  the  blacks 
and  those  who  had  been  prominent  as  loyal  citizens 
and  supporters  of  the  previous  administration,  and 
the  military  power  being  now  checked  by  the  orders 
of  the  President,  a long  period  of  disturbance  and 
oppression  followed,  that  continued  until  Congress 
in  the  year  1867,  through  the  reconstruction  laws, 
assumed  the  duty  of  controlling  and  reducing  to 
order  the  seceded  States  and  restored  to  the  military 
power  authority  to  act  in  cases  where  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  were  resisted  or  not  observed. 

The  State  of  Louisiana  was  the  most  difficult  and 
trying  to  control  and  that  portion  of  his  command 
which  called  upon  General  Sheridan  for  the  exercise  of 
his  fullest  powers  and  presented  questions  of  the  most 
importance.  Many  causes  combined  for  this  condi- 
tion : The  State  was  one  of  the  most  populous  of  the 


266 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


South,  and  before  the  war  one  of  the  most  wealthy 
and  enterprising;  the  city  of  New  Orleans  was  the 
largest  in  the  Southern  country,  and  its  inhabitants 
had  always  been  largely  interested  in  public  affairs 
and  an  important  element  in  the  political  control  of 
the  State;  the  country  had  been  much  exposed  to 
the  ravages  of  the  war;  a general  disturbance  of 
social  relations  occurred  from  the  breaking  up  of 
homes  and  the  necessary  changes  in  life  and  habits 
that  followed.  The  constant  presence  and  move- 
ments of  troops  through  the  State  had  disturbed  the 
relations  of  the  negroes  with  their  masters,  and  many 
who  had  escaped  from  slavery  were  idle  and  vagrant, 
with  no  occupation  or  habits  of  industry  that  would 
assist  in  providing  for  their  own  support ; and  these, 
as  well  as  those  who  remained  upon  the  plantations 
at  the  close  of  the  war,  were  the  most  ignorant  and 
uncultivated  of  the  blacks  throughout  the  South, 
having  been  for  the  most  part  employed  in  agri- 
cultural labor  on  large  plantations,  where  they  were 
worked  in  large  gangs  and  had  little  or  no  oppor- 
tunity of  development  by  association  or  intercourse 
with  the  whites. 

The  city  of  New  Orleans  contained  at  this  time  a 
population  that  for  venality  and  want  of  principle 
could  not  be  equaled  in  any  other  part  of  the  coun- 
try. Since  the  month  of  April,  1862,  it  had  been  in 
the  possession  of  our  armies,  and  had  so  continued 
under  the  successive  administrations  of  Generals 
Butler,  Banks,  and  Hurlburt  until  the  close  of  the 
war,  and  had  not  been  the  scene  of  any  active  mili- 
tary operations.  During  this  period  of  comparative 
quiet  large  numbers  of  speculators,  camp  followers, 
traders,  smugglers,  blockade  runners,  gamblers,  and 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  267 


adventurers  of  all  kinds  had  been  attracted  to  the 
place,  to  whom  the  opportunities  afforded  for  dealing 
in  Government  supplies,  furnishing  contraband  goods 
to  the  enemy,  bringing  from  within  the  rebel  lines 
the  accumulated  crops  of  cotton  and  sugar,  for  which 
no  other  market  existed,  and  the  plunder  derived 
from  the  numerous  confiscations  of  the  property  of 
wealthy  Confederates,  offered  a rich  harvest. 

When  the  sudden  close  of  the  war  put  an  end  to 
the  methods  by  which  these  men  had  existed  and 
prospered,  their  attention  was  turned  to  the  political 
field  as  the  remaining  opportunity  through  which 
they  could  hope  to  live  without  labor  and  continue 
to  thrive  upon  public  plunder,  and  in  the  further 
troubles  of  the  State  many  of  them  were  conspicuous 
as  officeholders  and  as  influential  directors  in  political 
troubles  and  controversies. 

The  political  difficulties  in  Louisiana  were  further 
complicated  by  the  existence  of  an  irregular  though 
recognized  government  which  had  been  established 
under  the  sanction  of  President  Lincoln,  in  1864, 
through  a convention  called  in  that  year,  the  pro- 
ceedings of  which  had  been  ratified  by  the  votes  of 
so-called  loyal  citizens  in  those  portions  of  the  State 
that  at  the  time  were  subject  to  the  military  power 
of  the  United  States.  This  existing  system  of  civd 
government,  having  already  been  recognized  by  the 
highest  authority,  could  not  be  disregarded,  and  was 
suffered  to  continue  for  the  time  being,  and,  having 
power  to  hold  elections  and  distribute  offices,  soon 
fell  into  hands  that  used  it  in  the  interests  of  those 
who  had  been  interested  in  or  taken  part  with  the 
Southern  Confederacy,  who,  being  the  most  numer- 
ous, were  the  party  whose  votes  and  influence  were 


268 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


of  the  greatest  value  to  those  who  sought  to  control 
public  affairs. 

By  the  early  part  of  the  year  1866  the  Legislature 
and  most  of  the  State  and  municipal  offices  were  oc- 
cupied by  or  controlled  by  men  who  were  known  to 
be  devoted  to  the  interests  of  those  who  had  been 
recently  engaged  in  the  rebellion,  and  determined  to 
protect  their  interests  and  keep  them  in  power  as 
the  ruling  party  in  the  State.  A system  of  legisla- 
tion was  inaugurated  that  would  carry  out  this  policy, 
and  that  was  also  directed  to  the  purpose  of  restrict- 
ing the  rights  of  the  freed  blacks  and  of  reducing 
them  again  to  a condition  of  actual,  if  not  nominal 
servitude,  and  that  was  productive  of  many  risings, 
outrages,  and  murders  that  were  perpetrated  against 
this  class  of  the  community.  It  was  also  evident  that 
among  those  who  now  controlled  public  affairs  there 
was  a violent  prejudice  against  Northern  men  and  all 
who  were  known  to  have  been  in  the  past  loyal  to  the 
United  States  or  who  were  now  disposed  to  oppose  a 
State  government  that  was  controlled  by  the  rebel 
element  and  carried  on  exclusively  in  that  interest. 

The  State  Convention  of  1864,  by  which  the  ex- 
isting government  was  created,  had  at  the  time  of 
adjournment  provided  for  future  meetings  to  be 
called  by  its  president,  if  such  should  be  needed  to 
secure  the  formation  of  a civil  government  in  Louis- 
iana, and  this  Convention  was  thus  called  to  meet  on 
July  30th,  at  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  and  this  action 
was  recognized  and  sanctioned  by  the  Governor  in  a 
public  proclamation.  The  public  officials  and  the 
party  in  power  were  strongly  opposed  to  the  reassem- 
bling of  this  Convention,  and  it  was  denounced  as 
illegal  and  revolutionary  by  the  press  and  some 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  269 


officers  of  the  courts,  and  by  the  time  fixed  for  the 
meeting  a bitter  feeling  of  hostility  to  those  engaged 
in  the  movement  prevailed. 

General  Sheridan  had  taken  no  part  in  this  pro- 
posed action  of  the  old  Convention,  either  by  coun- 
sel, advice,  or  consent  ; and  in  this,  as  in  all  other 
political  affairs,  had  carefully  abstained  from  any 
personal  participation,  and  his  feeling  concerning  it 
and  the  course  he  proposed  to  take,  if  any  proceed- 
ings were  had  that  would  injuriously  affect  public 
affairs,  is  shown  in  the  report  he  made  of  the  circum- 
stances that  attended  and  followed  the  meeting. 

On  the  30th  of  July,  the  day  fixed  for  holding  the 
Convention,  some  thirty  of  the  members  assembled, 
a number  insufficient  for  a quorum,  and  no  action  of 
any  kind  was  taken.  The  meeting,  which  was  held 
in  a public  building  of  the  city,  was  attended  by  a 
number  of  colored  men  as  spectators,  who  had  been 
led  to  expect  from  it  some  relief  from  the  hardships 
they  suffered  under.  In  the  early  part  of  the  day 
the  civil  authorities  had  conferred  with  General  Baird, 
who  was  temporarily  in  command  of  the  city.  General 
Sheridan  at  the  time  being  absent,  as  he  was  return- 
ing from  Texas,  where  he  had  been  called  by  affairs 
on  the  Rio  Grande. 

Fears  were  expressed  that  the  meeting  of  the 
Convention  would  cause  public  excitement,  and 
might  result  in  tumult  or  riot.  General  Baird  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  put  down  any  disturb- 
ance of  the  public  peace,  and  had  troops  prepared 
to  act  as  soon  as  the  mayor  or  other  municipal  offi- 
cers should  request  assistance.  No  call  was  made 
for  military  aid,  but  in  the  course  of  the  day  a dis- 
turbance occurred  between  the  police  and  some  ne- 


2/0 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


groes  assembled  in  front  of  the  building  when  the 
Convention  was  in  session,  which  soon  resulted  in 
an  attack  by  the  armed  police  and  white  citizens 
upon  the  Convention  itself,  and  those  who  were 
present  at  the  meeting.  A savage  riot  followed, 
and  two  hundred  persons  were  killed  and  wounded, 
some  of  whom  were  members  of  the  Convention, 
and  other  unarmed  spectators.  This  riot,  which  the 
civil  authorities  made  no  attempt  to  repress,  was 
put  down  by  troops  which  were  brought  to  the  scene 
of  conflict,  and  General  Baird  immediately  pro- 
claimed martial  law  and  placed  the  city  under  mili- 
tary control.  General  Sheridan  reached  the  city  on 
the  ist  of  August  and,  upon  investigation,  ascertained 
the  facts  and  approved  the  action  of  General  Baird, 
reporting  the  circumstances  to  General  Grant  in  the 
following  dispatch  : 

“ Headquarters,  Military  Division  of  the  Gulf, 

“ New  Orleans,  La.,  August  /,  i8b6. 

“ General  U.  S.  Grant. 

“ You  are  doubtless  aware  of  the  serious  not  which 
occurred  in  this  city  on  the  30th.  A political  body 
styling  themselves  the  Convention  of  1864  met  on  the 
30th  for,  as  it  is  alleged,  the  purpose  of  remodeling 
the  present  constitution  of  the  State.  The  leaders 
were  political  agitators  and  revolutionary  men,  and 
the  action  of  the  Convention  was  liable  to  produce 
breaches  of  the  public  peace.  [I  had  made  up  my 
mind  to  arrest  the  head  men  if  the  proceedings  of 
the  Convention  were  calculated  to  disturb  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  department,  but  I had  no  cause  for 
action  until  they  committed  the  overt  act.  In  the 
meantime  official  duty  called  me  to  Texas,  and  the 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  27 1 

mayor  of  the  city  during  my  absence  suppressed  the 
Convention  by  the  use  of  the  police  force,  and  in  so 
doing  attacked  the  members  of  the  Convention  and 
a party  of  two  hundred  negroes  with  firearms,  clubs, 
and  knives  in  a manner  so  unnecessary  and  atrocious 
as  to  compel  me  to  say  it  was  murder.]  About  forty 
whites  and  blacks  were  thus  killed,  and  about  one 
hundred  and  sixty  wounded.  Everything  is  now 
quiet,  but  I deem  it  best  to  maintain  a military  su- 
premacy in  the  city  for  a few  days,  until  the  affair  is 
fully  investigated.  I believe  the  sentiment  of  the 
general  community  is  great  regret  at  this  unneces- 
sary cruelty,  and  that  the  police  could  have  made 
any  arrest  they  saw  fit  without  sacrificing  lives. 

“ P.  H.  Sheridan, 

'•'•Major  Getter al  Conwiatiding.” 

This  dispatch  was  submitted  by  General  Grant  to 
the  President,  and  as  public  attention  at  the  North 
had  been  called  to  this  riot  in  a Southern  city,  and 
much  feeling  had  been  excited,  a general  demand 
was  made  through  the  press  for  the  publication  of 
the  official  dispatches  that  related  to  the  affair. 
This  the  President  professed  to  comply  with,  and 
furnished  to  the  press  a portion  of  the  dispatch  of 
General  Sheridan,  which  has  been  cited,  but  excluded 
those  paragraphs  which  in  the  full  dispatch  as  here 
copied  are  included  between  brackets. 

The  important  facts  were  thus  omitted  that  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  had  determined  to  break  up  the  Con- 
vention and  arrest  the  leaders  if  any  acts  were  com- 
mitted that  tended  to  disturb  the  peace  ; that  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  was  absent  from  New  Orleans  upon 
necessary  official  duty  at  the  time  the  Convention 


272 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


met  and  the  riot  occurred  ; and  the  description  of 
the  action  of  the  mayor  and  the  conduct  of  the  men 
who  directly  participated  in  the  outrage. 

General  Sheridan  strongly  protested  against  this 
mutilation  of  his  official  report,  which  was  found  to 
have  been  made  through  the  personal  direction  of 
the  President,  and  insisted  upon  the  publication  of 
the  dispatch  in  complete  form,  which  was  at  last  re- 
luctantly conceded,  and  from  this  circumstance,  in 
his  judgment,  the  personal  hostility  which  President 
Johnson  on  all  occasions  afterward  plainly  mani- 
fested arose. 

The  action  of  General  Sheridan  was  approved  at 
the  time,  and  on  the  3d  of  August  he  received  from 
General  Grant,  pursuant  to  the  direction  of  the 
President,  a dispatch  instructing  him  to  continue  to 
enforce  martial  law  so  far  as  necessary  to  preserve 
the  peace,  and  not  to  allow  any  of  the  civil  authori- 
ties to  act  if  he  deemed  such  action  dangerous  to  the 
public  safety  ; also  to  fully  investigate  and  report 
the  causes  that  led  to  the  riot,  and  the  facts  which 
had  occurred. 

On  the  4th  of  August  the  President  personally 
requested  a full  report  of  all  that  related  to  the 
causes  of  the  riot  and  the  circumstances  attending 
it,  and  General  Sheridan  replied  on  the  6th  in  a dis- 
patch which  gave  a full  account  of  the  meeting  of 
the  Convention,  the  circumstances  preceding  the 
riot,  and  all  that  occurred  during  its  progress.  In 
conclusion,  referring  to  the  causes  that  provoked  the 
outbreak  and  the  existing  condition  of  affairs,  he 
said  : 

“The  immediate  cause  of  this  terrible  affair  was 
the  assemblage  of  this  Convention  ; the  remote  cause 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  273 


was  the  bitter  and  antagonistic  feeling  which  has 
been  growing  in  this  community  since  the  advent  of 
the  present  mayor,  who  in  the  organization  of  his 
police  force  selected  many  desperate  men  and  many 
of  them  known  murderers.  People  of  clear  views 
were  overawed  by  want  of  confidence  in  the  mayor 
and  fear  of  the  thugs,  many  of  which  he  had  selected 
for  his  police  force.  I have  frequently  been  spoken 
to  by  prominent  citizens  on  this  subject,  and  have 
heard  them  express  fear  and  want  of  confidence  in 
Mayor  Monroe.  Ever  since  the  intimation  of  this 
last  convention  movement  I must  condemn  the 
course  of  several  of  the  city  papers  for  supporting 
by  their  articles  the  bitter  feeling  of  bad  men.  As 
to  the  merciless  manner  in  which  the  convention  was 
broken  up  I feel  obliged  to  confess  strong  repug- 
nance. 

“ It  is  useless  to  disguise  the  hostility  that  exists 
on  the  part  of  a great  many  here  toward  Northern 
men,  and  this  unfortunate  affair  has  so  precipitated 
matters  that  there  is  now  a test  of  what  shall  be  the 
status  of  Northern  men — whether  they  can  live  here 
without  being  in  constant  dread  or  not,  whether  they 
can  be  protected  in  life  and  property  and  have  jus- 
tice in  the  courts.  If  this  matter  is  permitted  to  pass 
over  without  a thorough  and  determined  prosecu- 
tion of  those  engaged  in  it,  we  may  look  out  for  fre- 
quent scenes  of  the  same  kind  not  only  here,  but  in 
other  places.  No  steps  have  as  yet  been  taken  by 
the  civil  authorities  to  arrest  citizens  who  were  en- 
gaged in  this  massacre  or  policemen  who  perpetrated 
such  cruelties.  The  members  of  the  Convention 
have  been  indicted  by  the  grand  jury,  and  many  of 
them  arrested  and  held  to  bail.  As  to  whether  the 


274 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


civil  authorities  can  mete  out  ample  justice  to  the 
guilty  parties  on  both  sides,  I must  say  it  is  my 
opinion  unequivocally  that  they  can  not.  Judge 
Abell,  whosecourse  I have  closely  watched  for  near- 
ly a year,  I now  consider  one  of  the  most  dangerous 
men  that  we  have  here  to  the  peace  and  quiet  of  the 
city.  The  leading  men  of  the  Convention — King, 
Cutler,  Hahn,  and  others — have  been  political  agita- 
tors and  are  bad  men.  I regret  to  say  that  the 
course  of  Governor  Wells  has  been  vacillating,  and 
that  during  the  late  trouble  he  has  shown  very  little 
of  the  man.” 

The  receipt  of  this  dispatch  was  mentioned  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  who  on  the  7th  of  Au- 
gust sent  by  telegraph  the  following  communi- 
cation ; 

“The  President  directs  me  to  acknowledge  your 
telegram  of  the  sixth  (6th)  in  answer  to  his  inquiries 
of  the  fourth  (4th)  instant.  On  the  third  (3d)  in- 
stant instructions  were  sent  you  by  General  Grant  in 
conformity  with  the  President’s  directions,  authoriz- 
ing you  to  ‘ continue  to  enforce  martial  law  so  far  as 
might  be  necessary  to  preserve  the  public  peace,  and 
ordering  you  not  to  allow  any  of  the  civil  authori- 
ties to  act  if  you  deem  such  action  dangerous  to  the 
public  safety,  and  also  that  no  time  be  lost  in  inves- 
tigating the  causes  that  led  to  the  riot  and  the  facts 
which  occurred.’  By  these  instructions  the  President 
designed  to  invest  in  you,  as  the  chief  military  com- 
mander, full  authority  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
public  peace  and  safety,  as  he  does  not  see  that  any- 
thing more  is  needed  pending  the  investigation  with 
which  you  are  intrusted;  but  if  in  your  judgment 
your  powers  are  inadequate  to  preserve  the  peace 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  275 


until  the  facts  connected  with  the  riot  are  ascer- 
tained, you  will  please  report  to  this  department  for 
the  information  of  the  President.” 

It  thus  appears  that  all  the  acts  of  General  Sher- 
idan in  connection  with  the  events  that  followed  the 
riot  were  not  only  directed  by  the  President  himself 
and  approved  by  him,  but  that  General  Sheridan  was 
invited  to  suggest  if  further  power  should  be  given 
to  enable  him  to  preserve  the  public  peace.  The 
suspension  of  officials  who  had  been  connected  with 
the  outrage  either  by  inciting  or  failing  to  put  it 
down  and  the  declaration  of  martial  law  throughout 
the  city,  which  were  subsequently  by  the  President 
and  his  supporters  asserted  to  be  an  unwarrantable 
and  tyrannical  exercise  of  military  power,  as  will  be 
seen,  were  approved  at  the  time  and  authorized  by 
the  official  chief  to  whom  supreme  control  of  the 
conduct  of  military  officers  is  committed. 

While  at  first  satisfied  that  his  action  had  been  in 
accord  with  the  intentions  and  policy  of  the  Presi- 
dent, General  Sheridan  had  reason  soon  to  learn  that 
he  could  not  depend  upon  good  faith  or  genuine  sup- 
port, and  that  at  the  time  he  was  receiving  these  ex- 
pressions of  confidence  and  approval  measures  were 
already  contemplated  to  impair  his  authority  and 
place  him  in  the  position  of  exercising  illegal  pow- 
ers and  making  an  unjustifiable  use  of  the  forces 
confided  to  him.  The  first  evidence  of  this  appeared 
in  the  excision  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the 
dispatch  of  August  ist,  which  was  given  to  the  pub- 
lic in  such  form  that  the  material  facts  stated  which 
made  the  exercise  of  military  power  a necessity  were 
not  presented. 

It  was  soon  after  learned  that  the  President  was 


2/6 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


in  personal  correspondence  with  the  leaders  of  the 
disloyal  faction  and  receiving  from  them  and  credit- 
ing statements  that  were  prejudicial  to  the  good  faith 
and  propriety  of  conduct  of  the  officer  in  whom  he 
affected  to  place  confidence  and  intrust  with  absolute 
power  to  repress  disorder  and  maintain  the  public 
peace.  All  this  was  soon  publicly  known  when  in 
the  latter  part  of  August  the  President  began  a tour 
through  the  Northern  States  and  in  a series  of 
speeches,  delivered  in  the  principal  cities  that  he  vis- 
ited, openly  declared  the  policy  that  he  had  been  se- 
cretly maturing  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  seceded 
States.  This,  as  he  announced,  was  a restoration  of 
these  States  to  the  Union  under  the  same  conditions 
that  existed  before  they  had  rebelled,  without  any 
provisions  to  insure  the  safety  or  rights  of  citizenship 
of  the  enfranchised  slaves  or  protection  to  the  lives 
and  property  of  those  who  had  remained  loyal  to 
their  country  during  the  war.  He  declared  that  the 
existing  troubles  in  the  Southern  States  were  due  to 
the  action  of  Congress  in  continuing  sectional  differ- 
ences that  the  war  had  settled,  and  to  the  oppressive 
and  unwarranted  powers  exercised  by  military  com- 
manders through  the  South. 

From  this  time  General  Sheridan  was  much  em- 
barrassed in  the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  his 
division.  He  received  at  all  times  the  approval  and 
cordial  support  of  General  Grant,  but  the  persons 
who  so  long  had  opposed  him  in  the  States  of  Texas 
and  Louisiana,  and  who  had  done  all  in  their  power 
to  continue  disloyal  feeling  and  incite  resistance  to 
the  authorities  of  the  United  States,  were  well  re- 
ceived by  the  President  and  recognized  as  his  advis- 
ers in  the  affairs  of  those  States,  and,  so  far  as  possi- 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  277 


ble,  supported  in  their  schemes  and  maintained  in 
office  by  his  authority. 

A committee  of  Congress,  appointed  for  that  pur- 
pose, subsequently  investigated  the  subjects  of  the 
riot,  and  the  action  of  General  Sheridan  with  regard 
to  it,  and  verified  the  correctness  of  the  reports  he 
made  and  fully  approved  the  action  he  took.  In 
their  report  the  committee  said  : 

“ That  the  meeting  of  July  30th  was  a meeting  of 
quiet  citizens,  who  came  together  without  arms,  and 
with  intent  peaceably  to  discuss  questions  of  public 
concern.  . . . There  has  been  no  occasion  in  our  na- 
tional history  when  a riot  has  occurred  so  destitute  of 
justifiable  cause,  resulting  in  a massacre  so  inhuman 
and  fiendlike,  as  that  which  took  place  at  New  Or- 
leans on  the  30th  of  July  last.  This  riotous  attack 
upon  the  Convention,  with  its  terrible  results  of  mas- 
sacre and  murder,  was  not  an  accident.  It  was  the 
determined  purpose  of  the  mayor  of  the  city  of 
New  Orleans  to  break  up  this  Convention  by  armed 
force.”  The  committee  also  reported  that  no  legal 
government  e.xisted  in  Louisiana,  and  recommended 
that  a provisional  government  be  established,  saying 
that  “in  the  meantime  the  safety  of  all  Union  men 
within  the  State  demands  that  such  government  be 
formed  for  their  protection,  for  the  well-being  of  the 
nation,  and  the  permanent  peace  of  the  republic.” 

The  position  taken  by  the  President  and  the 
recognition  and  support  he  began  at  this  time  to 
afford  to  the  representatives  of  the  disloyal  element 
in  the  Southern  States  had  caused  at  the  North 
great  apprehension  of  renewed  disturbance  in  the 
South,  and  had  encouraged  resistance  and  diso- 
bedience to  law  in  much  of  the  conquered  territory. 


2/8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


When  Congress  met  in  December,  1866,  these 
grave  questions  were  felt  to  be  of  the  highest  im- 
portance, and  demanding  a prompt  and  effectual 
remedy.  A thorough  consideration  of  the  subject 
resulted  in  the  passage  in  March,  1867,  over  the  veto 
of  the  President,  of  the  so-called  Reconstruction 
Laws,  under  the  operation  of  which  the  governments 
of  the  seceded  States  were  subsequently  organized, 
and  they  were  finally  readmitted  to  the  Union. 

Under  these  laws  such  governments  as  were  then 
existing  in  the  former  Confederate  States  were  de- 
clared to  be  illegal,  and  to  be  maintained  only  pro- 
visionally and  subject  to  military  control,  until  by  a 
convention  selected  by  voters  who  were  qualified  as 
loyal  citizens  to  exercise  the  right  of  suffrage,  and 
who  had  taken  the  oath  of  loyalty  and  allegiance 
prescribed  in  the  lav/s,  a constitution  had  been 
framed  conforming  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  a State  government  organized  under  such 
a constitution. 

The  seceded  States  were  divided  into  military  dis- 
tricts under  the  command  of  officers  of  the  army,  who 
were  given  power  to  supervise  and  enforce  the  exe- 
cution of  the  laws,  and  under  whose  direction  the 
election  of  delegates  to  the  conventions  to  be  called 
was  placed.  For  this  purpose  a registration  of  all 
qualified  voters  was  required  to  be  made  under  mili- 
tary supervision,  and  no  person  could  vote  who  had 
not  been  duly  registered. 

In  July,  1867,  a further  law  was  passed  giving  to 
the  commanders  of  districts  the  power  to  suspend  or 
remove  any  civil  officer  or  magistrate  if  such  action 
should  be  necessary  to  secure  the  proper  administra- 
tion of  these  laws,  and  ratifying  all  removals  or  sus- 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  279 

pensions  previously  made  for  such  cause,  this  power, 
however,  to  be  exercised  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  general  commanding  the  army,  and  to  extend 
the  periods  fixed  in  the  first  act  as  those  in  which 
registration  must  be  accomplished  if  they  should 
consider  such  action  advisable. 

The  States  of  Louisiana  and  Texas  were  desig- 
nated as  the  Fifth  Military  District,  and  General 
Sheridan  was  placed  in  command.  From  this  time 
he  was  able  to  proceed  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties 
with  less  embarrassment  and  more  freedom  than  in 
the  past.  An  election  of  municipal  officers  had  been 
arranged  to  take  place  in  New  Orleans  on  the  nth 
of  March,  but  such  well-grounded  reasons  for  appre- 
hending riot  and  disturbance  if  it  were  allowed  to 
occur  existed  that  orders  were  given  that  it  be  post- 
poned, and  it  consequently  did  not  occur. 

In  assuming  his  command  under  these  new  laws. 
General  Sheridan  announced  his  intention  of  not  in- 
terfering with  the  provisional  State  governments  as 
they  existed  or  with  their  administrations  except  in 
such  matters  as  were  directly  placed  under  his  con- 
trol by  the  recent  legislation,  and  in  cases  where 
absolute  necessity  required  his  action  to  prevent  the 
commission  of  wrong  or  to  secure  rights  which  the 
present  authorities  would  not  protect. 

Such  necessities  arose  from  time  to  time,  and  the 
removal  of  the  mayor  of  New  Orleans,  the  Attorney- 
General  of  the  State,  and  one  of  the  judges  of  the 
district  court  was  effected,  these  officials  having  pro- 
nounced the  Reconstruction  Laws  unconstitutional, 
and  advised  resistance  to  them.  In  addition  to  this, 
their  conduct  in  connection  with  the  riot  of  the  past 
July  had  shown  them  to  be  unworthy  of  confidence, 
19 


28o 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


and  unfit  to  occupy  any  position  of  trust  where  loy- 
alty to  the  Government  and  respect  for  law  were 
necessary  qualifications.  The  reasons  for  these  re- 
movals were  asked  for  by  the  President  through  Gen- 
eral Grant,  and  were  given  in  detail  and  were  found 
satisfactory  by  the  latter.  The  President  did  not 
approve,  but  he  had  not  the  courage,  in  face  of  the 
facts  presented,  to  rescind  the  step  that  had  been 
taken.  He  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  removal 
of  these  men  from  office  was  commended  by  the 
better  class  of  the  community,  and  that  they  had  no 
defense  to  the  charges  of  misconduct  made  against 
them,  for  he  was  kept  well  informed  of  affairs  in 
Louisiana  and  Texas  and  of  every  act  of  General 
Sheridan  by  persons  in  those  States,  some  of  whom 
were  open  and  active  supporters  of  the  presidential 
policy,  and  others  who  were  employed  and  acted  as 
spies.  So  thoroughly  and  secretly  was  this  work 
performed  that  frequently  the  President  received  in- 
formation of  official  acts  in  the  Fifth  Military  District 
before  the  regular  reports  had  reached  the  head- 
quarters of  General  Grant.  From  the  time  of  the 
passage  of  the  Reconstruction  Laws  General  Sheridan 
was  able  to  administer  successfully  the  affairs  of  his 
district,  and  from  that  period,  so  long  as  he  continued 
in  command,  no  further  instance  of  armed  resistance 
to  the  law  occurred,  or  of  attempts  to  control  political 
offices  by  violence. 

The  boards  of  registration  for  the  enrollment  of 
voters  to  elect  delegates  to  the  constitutional  con- 
ventions called  for  by  the  new  laws  were  selected, 
all  the  members  of  which  were  required  to  be  men  of 
unquestioned  loyalty,  and  their  proper  action  and 
full  compliance  with  the  instructions  under  which 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  28 1 


they  acted  was  secured  by  the  supervision  of  officers 
of  the  army. 

For  some  time  past  the  negroes  had  been  subject 
to  m^ny  wrongs  and  outrages,  and  the  public  senti- 
ment that  had  been  encouraged  by  the  apparent 
prospect  of  a return  to  political  power  of  the  men 
who  had  been  active  in  inciting  and  carrying  on  the 
rebellion  was  such  that  it  was  not  possible  for  a 
negro  to  obtain  justice  in  a civil  court,  or  to  punish 
a white  man  for  any  offense,  no  matter  how  grave, 
committed  against  a black.  The  trial  and  punish- 
ment of  a few  offenders  of  this  class  by  military 
commissions  soon  put  a stop  to  crimes  of  this  de- 
scription, and  the  civil  rights  of  the  colored  race 
were  thereafter  respected. 

The  police  force  of  New  Orleans  had  been  craftily 
organized  under  the  law  of  1866,  by  which  it  was 
created,  in  such  manner  as  to  exclude  from  appoint- 
ment to  membership  of  the  force  any  persons  who 
had  not  been  for  the  past  five  years  residents  of  that 
city,  and  thus  few  or  none  were  eligible  but  those 
who  had  been  in  the  service  of,  or  in  sympathy  with, 
the  Southern  Confederacy.  This  system  was  broken 
up,  and  under  that  which  took  its  place  about  one 
half  of  the  members  of  the  new  force  were  selected 
from  men  who  had  served  in  the  Union  army  and 
had  since  settled  in  the  city.  Officials  who  neglected 
or  refused  to  properly  perform  their  duties  were  re- 
moved, and  their  successors  selected  from  those 
who  could  be  depended  on  for  loyalty  and  faithful 
service — among  others,  the  Governors  of  Louisiana 
and  Texas. 

The  action  of  General  Sheridan  in  enforcing  the 
Reconstruction  Laws,  providing  for  the  safety  of 


282 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


those  under  his  control,  securing  the  due  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  and  removing  dishonest  and  un- 
faithful officials,  was  throughout  approved  by  Gen- 
eral Grant,  his  immediate  superior,  but  displeasing 
in  the  extreme  to  the  President,  whose  individual 
policy  and  efforts  to  extend  his  personal  power  and 
influence  in  opposition  to  the  laws  as  passed  by  Gon- 
gress  were  seriously  affected  by  these  measures.  He 
could,  however,  openly  manifest  his  displeasure  with 
an  officer  who  obeyed  the  law,  or  revoke  the  action 
that  had  been  taken,  as  he  had  been  advised  by  one 
of  his  own  trusted  supporters,  who  was  maintained 
at  New  Orleans  to  keep  watch  upon  the  official  con- 
duct of  the  district  commander,  that  the  character  of 
the  principal  officials  who  had  been  removed  was  too 
bad  to  justify  an  attempt  at  their  reinstatement. 

There  remained,  however,  to  the  President,  as 
commander  in  chief  of  the  army,  the  power  to  assign 
officers  to  command  at  his  pleasure,  and  he  therefore 
determined  to  exercise  this  ; and,  without  giving  any 
reason  for  his  action,  he  informed  General  Grant  of 
his  intention  to  relieve  General  Sheridan  from  com- 
mand of  the  Fifth  Military  District,  and  to  assign 
him  to  duty  in  the  Department  of  the  Missouri. 

Against  this  proposed  change  General  Grant  pro- 
tested strongly,  and  at  length,  when  invited,  as  he 
was  by  the  President,  to  make  any  suggestion  he 
might  deem  necessary  respecting  this  subject,  in  the 
remarks  he  made  observed  am  pleased  to 

avail  myself  of  this  invitation  to  urge — earnestly 
urge — urge  in  the  name  of  a patriotic  people  who 
have  sacrificed  hundreds  of  thousands  of  loyal  lives 
and  thousands  of  millions  of  treasure  to  preserve 
the  integrity  and  union  of  this  country — that  this 


IN  COMMAND  OF  LOUISIANA  AND  TEXAS.  283 

order  be  not  insisted  on.  It  is  unmistakably  the  ex- 
pressed wish  of  the  country  that  General  Sheridan 
should  not  be  removed  from  his  present  command. 
This  is  a republic,  where  the  will  of  the  people  is 
the  law  of  the  land.  I beg  that  their  voice  may  be 
heard.  General  Sheridan  has  performed  his  civil  du- 
ties faithfully  and  intelligently.  His  removal  will 
only  be  regarded  as  an  effort  to  defeat  the  laws  of 
Congress.  It  will  be  interpreted  by  the  unrecon- 
structed element  in  the  South — those  who  did  all 
they  could  to  break  up  this  Government  by  arms, 
and  now  wish  to  be  the  only  element  consulted  as 
to  the  method  of  restoring  order — as  a triumph.  It 
will  embolden  them  to  renewed  opposition  to  the 
will  of  the  loyal  masses,  believing  they  have  the 
Executive  with  them.” 

This  earnest  and  vigorous  expression  of  con- 
fidence and  approval,  given  by  the  chief  under  whom 
General  Sheridan  had  immediately  served  and  by 
whom  his  every  important  action  had  been  ratified, 
and  these  pressing  reasons  for  his  retention  in  the 
command  he  had  exercised,  important  alike  to  present 
and  future  public  interests,  urged  by  the  man  who  at 
that  time  stood  first  in  the  esteem  and  confidence  of 
the  people,  and  who  was  so  soon  to  occupy  the  high- 
est office  in  the  land,  had  no  effect  upon  the  mind  of 
the  President.  On  the  26th  of  August  the  proposed 
change  was  made,  and  General  Hancock  was  assigned 
to  command  the  Fifth  Military  District  and  General 
Sheridan  to  the  Department  of  the  Missouri. 

Apart  from  the  natural  disappointment  that  is 
felt  by  every  earnest  man  at  being  interrupted  in 
the  full  completion  of  an  important  duty  to  which 
his  best  thoughts  and  energies  have  long  been  de- 


284 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


voted,  the  change  resulting  from  this  order  was  not 
unacceptable  to  General  Sheridan.  The  hostile  feel- 
ing toward  him  that  the  President  had  long  enter- 
tained was  well  known,  and  this,  together  with  the  fact 
that  in  this  order,  involving  public  interests  of  such 
importance,  it  was  not  found  possible  to  assign  any 
cause  for  the  action  taken,  were  sufficient  reasons  to 
demonstrate  that  it  resulted  from  personal  feeling 
only.  None  of  the  officials  who  had  been  removed 
from  office  by  General  Sheridan  were  reinstated  by 
those  who  succeeded  him,  and  in  but  one  instance 
of  secondary  importance  were  any  of  his  orders  or 
official  acts  reversed.  The  position  he  held  was  try- 
ing and  thankless,  and  offered  no  attractive  features 
to  one  whose  experience  and  ambitions  had  been  ob- 
tained and  gratified  on  the  field  of  battle  and  in 
open  and  manly  conflict  with  a declared  foe.  Not 
only  did  enemies  exist,  concealed  but  watchful  and 
ever  ready  to  act,  among  those  over  whom  he  was 
placed  in  control,  but  at  the  seat  of  Government  and 
in  high  office  were  other  and  powerful  foes  only  too 
ready  to  work  his  destruction  by  any  means  that 
political  opposition  or  personal  hostility  could  sug- 
gest. He  left  his  command  in  the  South  with  the 
consciousness  that  he  had  labored  earnestly  and  dili- 
gently for  the  public  interests  and  the  full  discharge 
of  the  important  duties  committed  to  his  charge 
without  regard  to  political  interests  or  the  personal 
fortunes  of  any  individual,  and  that  his  course  and 
conduct  had  merited  and  received  the  fullest  ap- 
proval from  the  illustrious  military  chief  to  whom 
he  was  responsible. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. INDIAN  CAM- 
PAIGN.  LIEUTENANT  GENERAL. FRANCO  - PRUS- 
SIAN WAR. COMMANDER  IN  CHIEF. DEATH. 

In  the  beginning  of  September,  1867,  General 
Sheridan  left  New  Orleans  and  repaired  to  the  com- 
mand to  which  he  had  been  assigned — the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Missouri — -headquarters  of  which  were 
at  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  and  which  included 
the  States  of  Missouri  and  Kansas,  the  Indian  Ter- 
ritory, and  New  Mexico.  In  the  past  two  or  three 
years,  while  no  actual  hostilities  had  existed,  there 
had  been  constant  trouble  with  Indians  in  this  terri- 
tory, small  parties  of  the  savages  attacking  isolated 
settlements  and  making  raids  upon  parties  engaged 
in  laying  out  and  constructing  the  Pacific  Railroad. 

At  the  time  General  Sheridan  assumed  command 
these  troubles  had  for  the  moment  ceased  and  the 
Government  was  engaged,  through  the  medium  of 
a Peace  Commission,  in  pacifying  the  hostile  tribes 
by  offers  of  rations,  annuities,  and  other  bribes 
which  might  incline  them  to  refrain  from  active  war 
against  the  people  of  the  United  States.  AVhile  a 
treaty  was  pending,  and  a prospect  of  gain  held  out 
to  the  Indians,  there  was  no  reason  to  expect  from 
them  any  hostile  movement ; and  as  the  winter  was 

285 


286 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


coming  on,  in  which  the  savages  never  attempt 
offensive  action,  General  Sheridan  took  the  oppor- 
tunity of  enjoying  the  second  leave  of  absence  from 
active  duty  that  he  had  taken  since  graduating  from 
West  Point,  in  1853. 

He  spent  the  time  from  October,  1867,  until  the 
following  spring  in  taking  rest  and  in  visiting  differ- 
ent parts  of  his  own  country  with  which  he  was  yet 
unacquainted.  He  was  everywhere  received  with 
the  greatest  kindness  and  hospitality,  and,  though 
he  declined  to  receive  any  public  demonstration  of 
welcome,  became  personally  known  to  the  best  citi- 
zens in  all  the  places  he  visited,  and  also  by  the 
people  of  the  country,  as  one  of  the  great  leaders  in 
the  civil  war.  A pleasant  season  of  rest  and  recre- 
ation was  thus  passed,  and  in  March,  1868,  he  re- 
turned to  Fort  Leavenworth  and  again  assumed 
command  of  his  department. 

The  Peace  Commission  had  concluded  its  work 
and  a treaty  had  been  made  with  the  hostile  Indians, 
duly  executed,  which  bound  them  to  perpetual  peace 
with  the  white  men,  to  permit  settlements  in  territory 
previously  used  as  Indian  reservations,  and  to  allow 
the  construction  of  the  Pacific  railroads  through  their 
country.  These  treaties  and  arguments  had  been,  in 
the  usual  course,  made  with  the  chiefs  and  head 
men  of  the  several  tribes,  but  in  the  following  spring 
of  1868  it  was  found  that  the  young  men  and  war- 
riors were  strongly  opposed  to  the  agreements  made, 
and  claimed  that  they  had  been  procured  by  personal 
bribes  offered  to  those  unworthy  chiefs  by  whom  they 
had  been  signed. 

General  Sheridan  in  his  early  years  of  service 
had  had  some  experience  with  Indians  on  the  Pacific 


DEPARTMENT  OE  THE  MISSOURI. 


287 


coast,  but  was  now  brought  in  contact  with  thou- 
sands of  a new  and  different  class.  These,  being 
nearer  to  civilization  and  possessing  the  power  of 
being  more  annoying  to  the  progress  of  settlement 
and  development  of  the  western  country,  had  for 
many  years  been  bribed,  flattered,  and  petted  by 
that  department  of  the  national  Government  that  is 
charged  with  the  conduct  of  their  affairs  until  they 
believed  their  will  supreme,  and  that  whatever  they 
asked  for  would  be  granted. 

In  this  condition  of  Indian  affairs  General  Sheri- 
dan returned  to  his  command  in  March,  1868,  and 
soon  found  that  the  work  of  the  Peace  Commission 
had  been  of  no  effect,  and  that  he  must  expect  In- 
dian hostilities  throughout  his  whole  command.  The 
Indian  chiefs  who  sought  to  confer  with  him  said 
that  they  had  been  deceived  in  signing  the  treaty 
they  had  made,  and  had  never  understandingly 
agreed  to  the  stipulations  it  contained. 

With  these  statements  of  course  he  could  not 
agree,  and  could  do  nothing  but  insist  that  the 
treaty  as  it  existed  should  be  fully  complied  with. 
This  treaty,  which  was  known  as  that  of  Medicine 
Lodge,  provided  that  the  Indian  tribes  with  whom  it 
had  been  concluded  should  consent  to  unrestricted 
settlement  by  the  whites  of  the  country  between  the 
Arkansas  and  Platte  Rivers,  should  not  interfere  with 
the  construction  of  the  Pacific  railroads  through 
the  same  territory,  and  that  the  Indians  themselves 
should  thenceforward  occupy  reservations  in  the 
Indian  Territory  south  of  the  Arkansas  River  which 
had  been  designated  for  their  use.  In  return  for 
these  concessions  the  Government  was  to  furnish 
arms,  ammunition,  and  supplies,  and  to  pay  certain 


288 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


sums  as  annuities  toward  the  support  of  the  several 
tribes  of  Indians. 

The  savages  had  been  collected  about  Forts 
Dodge  and  Lamed,  whence  it  was  expected  they 
would  proceed  during  the  summer  to  their  reserva- 
tions in  the  Indian  Territory;  but  as  the  season  ad- 
vanced it  became  evident  that  they  had  no  intention 
of  complying  with  the  treaty  and  were  only  awaiting 
a favorable  opportunity  for  an  outbreak. 

As  many  settlers  had  already  established  them- 
selves in  middle  and  western  Kansas  who  were  great- 
ly exposed  in  the  event  of  an  Indian  war,  and  as  it 
was  of  great  importance  that  work  on  the  Pacific 
railroads  should  progress  without  interruption,  Gen- 
eral Sheridan,  while  refusing  to  hold  any  council 
with  the  chiefs  or  to  enter  upon  any  formal  negotia- 
tions with  them,  endeavored  by  temporizing  and  per- 
suasion to  retain  sufficient  control  to  prevent  hos- 
tilities. For  this  purpose  he  furnished  an  abundant 
supply  of  rations  and  used  the  services  of  white  men 
who  as  scouts  or  interpreters  had  for  many  years  lived 
on  the  plains  in  constant  communication  with  the 
Indians  and  who  knew  and  had  the  confidence  of  the 
principal  chiefs  and  head  men.  These  measures  and 
the  expectation  of  receiving  the  arms,  ammunition, 
and  annuities  provided  for  in  the  treaty  for  some 
time  secured  quiet,  but  early  in  August  small  bands 
of  Indians  appeared  in  different  parts  of  the  Terri- 
tory and  committed  fearful  atrocities  upon  isolated 
settlements.  The  encampments  of  the  tribes  about 
the  forts  were  broken  up  and  the  Indians  moved  away 
to  new  locations  north  of  the  Arkansas  River  instead 
of  proceeding  to  the  new  reservations  in  the  Indian 
Territory,  which  under  the  treaty  they  had  accepted. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI.  289 


From  these  circumstances  it  was  evident  that  the 
Indians  had  openly  refused  compliance  with  the 
agreements  they  had  made  and  that  a general  out- 
break was  to  be  expected  which  could  only  be 
quelled  by  forcibly  compelling  the  different  tribes  to 
occupy  and  remain  on  the  reservations  selected  for 
them  by  the  treaty  of  Medicine  Lodge.  To  accom- 
plish this  was  a difficult  task  and  many  serious  ob- 
stacles were  to  be  overcome,  and  General  Sheridan 
soon  decided  that  methods  hitherto  unused  in  Indian 
warfare  must  be  adopted. 

The  savages  to  whom  he  was  opposed  could 
bring  into  the  field  a force  of  about  six  thousand 
warriors  and  had  at  their  disposal  in  which  to  op- 
erate a vast  region  of  country  extending  from  the 
Platte  River  in  Nebraska  to  the  Red  River  in  the 
Indian  Territory,  through  any  part  of  which  they 
could  move  freely  either  for  attack  or  for  retreat, 
and  in  the  summer  and  fall,  when  these  plains  were 
covered  with  herds  of  buffalo  and  well  furnished 
with  grass,  all  supplies  for  their  subsistence  w'ere 
abundant.  They  had  large  herds  of  ponies  to  mount 
the  warriors  and  transport  the  women  and  children 
and  their  tepees  and  other  property,  and,  through 
traders  and  the  bounty  of  the  Government,  were  well 
provided  with  arms  and  ammunition.  . 

In  view  of  these  facts,  General  Sheridan  deter- 
mined to  confine  his  operations  - during  the  grazing 
and  hunting  season  to  protecting  the  people  of  the 
new  settlements  and  those  on  overland  routes,  and 
to  begin  his  active  campaign  after  the  winter  had  set 
in,  at  which  time  the  savages  Would  be  settled  in 
their  villages,  and  their  ponies  being  thin  and  weak 
from  want  of  grazing  and  little  game  to  be  had,  they 


290 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


would  be  incapable  of  active  or  effective  movement 
and  readily  overtaken  by  our  troops.  Pursuant  to 
these  plans,  headquarters  were  established  at  Fort 
Hays,  Kansas,  then  on  the  extreme  western  line  of 
settlement  and  the  terminus  of  the  Pacific  Railroad, 
a desirable  point  for  establishing  a depot  for  supplies 
and  from  which  communications  could  be  maintained 
with  the  other  posts  in  the  command.  The  whole 
force  at  General  Sheridan’s  orders  east  of  New 
Mexico  and  available  for  the  protection  of  the  set- 
tlements and  the  intended  active  operations  was  but 
two  thousand  six  hundred  men  at  the  commencement 
of  this  campaign,  and  about  twelve  hundred  were 
added  to  this  force  by  the  time  the  troops  took  the 
field  against  the  red  men. 

The  labor  of  procuring  supplies  and  providing 
sufficient  transportation  for  even  this  small  force 
was  great,  as  food,  forage,  and  ammunition  were  re- 
quired for  a campaign  of  six  months  that  was  to  be 
pursued  in  a country  destitute  of  all  resources  for 
the  supply  of  civilized  man,  extending  over  great 
distances  through  regions  destitute  of  roads  and 
where  everything  must  be  transported  by  wagons; 
but  the  commanding  general  devoted  himself  with 
energy  to  the  task,  and  by  November  his  prepara- 
tions were  made  and  proved  sufficient  for  the  pur- 
pose. Before  this  it  was  learned  that  the  hostile 
Indians  had  virtually  abandoned  active  movement 
for  the  season  and  that  the  greater  number  had 
moved  southward  and  had  established  themselves  in 
their  winter  villages,  which  were  scattered  through 
the  northwestern  corner  of  the  Indian  Territory  or 
in  that  vicinity,  the  nearest  more  than  two  hundred 
miles  from  any  position  held  by  the  United  States 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI.  291 

forces,  and  had  settled  down  for  a winter’s  repose, 
which  they  had  no  reason  from  previous  experience 
to  believe  would  be  disturbed. 

By  the  ist  of  November  preparations  were  com- 
pleted and  the  different  bodies  of  troops  were  mov- 
ing, the  main  column,  which  General  Sheridan  in- 
tended to  accompany,  being  ordered  to  unite  at  a 
point  subsequently  known  as  Camp  Supply,  some 
two  hundred  miles  south  of  Fort  Hays,  while  two 
smaller  forces  moved  on  the  same  point  from  posts 
in  Colorado  and  New  Mexico. 

On  the  15th  of  November  General  Sheridan  left 
Fort  Hays  and  proceeded  southward  to  Camp  Sup- 
ply, which  was  reached  after  a very  trying  journey 
of  six  days,  during  which  storms  of  snow  and  sleet 
prevailed  and  at  times  winds  so  severe  that  tents 
could  not  be  erected.  At  this  point  a portion  of  the 
troops  he  expected  to  meet  were  found,  but  one 
regiment  of  about  one  thousand  men — the  Nine- 
teenth Kansas  Cavalry,  which  in  numbers  comprised 
nearly  one  half  his  effective  force — had  not  ap- 
peared and  no  intelligence  of  any  kind  concerning  it 
could  be  obtained. 

Notwithstanding  this  disappointment,  the  troops 
were  too  near  the  enemy  to  remain  inactive  and  to 
allow  opportunity  for  their  escape.  General  Cus- 
ter, commanding  the  Seventh  Cavalry,  was  at  once 
dispatched  to  follow  up  a trail  that  had  been  discov- 
ered and  that  evidently  led  to  a large  Indian  encamp- 
ment. This  expedition  was  successfully  carried  on 
during  a heavy  snowstorm,  and  at  daybreak  on  the 
27th  of  November  the  village  was  attacked  and,  after 
a severe  struggle — in  which  many  Indians,  including 
their  chief,  “ Black  Kettle,”  were  killed — was  captured 


292 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


and  destroyed,  the  survivers  flying  in  confusion  and 
losing  an  immense  herd  of  ponies,  their  most  valu- 
able possession,  the  loss  of  which  rendered  them 
incapable  of  further  hostile  movements.  General 
Custer  returned  with  his  command  to  Camp  Supply, 
but  further  movements  were  delayed  until  tidings 
were  obtained  of  the  missing  Kansas  regiment,  which 
was  at  last  found  at  a distance  of  some  fifty  miles, 
having  lost  the  direction  in  which  it  should  have 
marched,  being  entirely  without  supplies.  Nothing 
can  better  illustrate  the  severity  of  the  weather  dur- 
ing these  operations  than  the  fact  that  more  than 
eight  hundred  of  the  horses  of  this  regiment  per- 
ished from  cold  and  want  of  forage,  and  that  the 
men  were  thus  compelled  during  the  remainder  of 
the  campaign  to  serve  on  foot. 

From  this  time  on  no  engagement  of  any  conse- 
quence occurred  with  the  hostile  Indians,  though  a 
few  conflicts  of  minor  importance  took  place  from 
time  to  time.  The  Indians  were  overwhelmed  with 
alarm  at  the  severe  loss  they  had  suffered  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign,  and  demoralized  by  attacks 
made  upon  them  at  a season  when  they  were  entirely 
unprepared  for  war  and  unable  to  carry  it  on  in  the 
manner  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed. 

The  troops  moved  through  the  Indian  country 
suffering  greatly  from  the  severity  of  the  weather 
and  occasional  privations  from  want  of  supplies,  but 
everywhere  with  success.  Whenever  they  approached 
an  Indian  village  in  any  force  it  was  abandoned  and 
the  inhabitants  took  flight,  and,  encumbered  as  they 
were  with  women,  children,  and  household  goods, 
and  the  ponies  being  unprovided  with  forage  and 
consequently  too  weak  for  work,  they  suffered  great- 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


293 


ly  and  sustained  heavy  loss.  Their  spirits  were  soon 
broken  by  these  hardships,  and  from  time  to  time 
different  bands  came  in  and  offered  to  submit  to 
such  terms  as  should  be  imposed.  This  continued 
until  the  spring,  and  before  May  all  the  tribes  that  in 
the  past  year  had  been  engaged  in  hostilities  had  been 
gathered  in  and  peaceably  located  on  their  assigned 
reservations  in  the  Indian  Territory. 

General  Sheridan  did  not  personally  conduct  this 
campaign  to  its  conclusion,  as  he  received  a dispatch 
from  General  Grant  on  the  2d  of  March  directing 
him  to  report  immediately  at  Washington.  On  reach- 
ing that  city  he  received  the  commission  of  lieutenant 
general  of  the  army,  to  which  office  he  had  been  ap- 
pointed March  4,  1869,  the  day  of  the  inauguration 
of  General  Grant  as  President.  The  President  of- 
fered to  him,  and  indeed  desired  that  he  should  re- 
assume command  at  New  Orleans  in  charge  of  the 
Fifth  Military  District,  from  which  he  had  been  re- 
moved by  President  Johnson.  To  this  duty,  how- 
ever, he  had  no  inclination,  greatly  preferring  a 
command  which  would  be  exclusively  of  a mili- 
tary character,  and  he  was  therefore  assigned  to 
the  Division  of  the  Missouri,  succeeding  General 
William  T.  Sherman,  who  had  been  promoted  as  gen- 
eral in  chief. 

This  large  command  embraced  the  region  east  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains  and  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River  from  the  British  possessions  on  the  north  to 
the  State  of  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory  on 
the  south,  and  was  continuously  held  by  General 
Sheridan  from  the  date  of  his  assignment  to  it  until 
he  assumed  the  command  of  the  army  upon  the  re- 
tirement of  General  Sherman ; and  fixing  his  head- 


294 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


quarters  in  Chicago,  he  resided  in  that  city  while  in 
charge  of  the  division. 

While  engaged  in  a tour  of  inspection  of  his  com- 
mand in  the  spring  of  1870,  General  Sheridan  learned 
of  the  probability  of  war  between  France  and  Prus- 
sia, and,  desiring  to  witness  the  operations  of  Euro- 
pean armies,  he  returned  to  Chicago  and  applied  for 
leave  to  go  abroad  for  this  purpose,  which  was  freely 
granted,  and  he  at  once  prepared  for  his  journey. 
He  had  occasion  to  visit  General  Grant  before  sail- 
ing, and  received  from  him  a warm  commendation 
to  the  good  offices  of  all  representatives  of  our  Gov- 
ernment in  foreign  countries,  and  authority  to  remain 
absent  for  such  a period  as  he  should  find  desirable, 
unless  orders  for  his  return  should  be  issued. 

When  asked  by  the  President  which  one  of  the 
contending  armies  he  intended  to  visit,  he  replied 
that  it  was  his  wish  to  be  with  that  of  the  Germans, 
as  in  view  of  his  belief  they  would  be  successful ; he 
knew  that  more  could  be  obtained  and  learned  by 
following  the  movements  and  witnessing  the  opera- 
tions of  the  victorious  side.  This  opinion,  and  one 
in  which  the  President  concurred,  was  not  that  of 
Americans  at  that  day,  as  the  general  opinion  was 
favorable  to  French  success — a judgment  possibly 
founded  to  some  extent  on  the  prestige  of  the  name 
of  Napoleon  and  the  French  success  against  Austria 
in  the  Italian  war  of  1859. 

It  was  well  for  General  Sheridan’s  object  in  this 
journey  that  his  intention  of  repairing  directly  to 
Germany  was  formed  at  this  early  date,  for,  as  he 
subsequently  learned,  the  Minister  of  the  United 
States  at  Paris,  having  unofficially  heard  of  his  in- 
tention to  visit  Europe,  and  thinking  it  possible  he 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


295 

might  wish  to  see  the  war  from  the  French  side,  had 
applied  for  the  necessary  authority.  This,  however, 
was  met  with  such  evident  intention  to  finally  refuse 
the  request  that  the  matter  was  not  pressed,  and 
such  a result  was  to  be  expected,  as  the  French  mili- 
tary authorities  have  always  shown  a reluctance  to 
allow  any  examination  of  the  conduct  or  movements 
of  their  armies  by  foreign  officers.  It  may  be  re- 
membered that  during  the  Crimean  War  a commis- 
sion of  officers  of  our  army,  of  which  General  (then 
Captain)  McClellan  was  a member,  was  sent  by  the 
Government  to  Sebastopol ; and  while  courteously 
received  by  the  English  authorities,  was  not  per- 
mitted to  enter  the  French  camps,  or  allowed  to  ob- 
tain any  information  concerning  their  troops. 

General  Sheridan,  taking  with  him  Colonel  James 
W.  Forsyth,  of  his  staff,  sailed  from  New  York  in  the 
latter  part  of  July  and  passed  through  England  to 
Brussels,  which  he  left  for  Cologne  on  the  9th  of  Au- 
gust. Arrangements  had  been  made  by  the  American 
Minister  at  Berlin  that  he  should  proceed  directly 
from  Cologne  to  the  headquarters  of  the  German 
army,  but  by  some  mistake  of  the  officials  in  charge 
of  the  railroads,  which  were  then  under  military  con- 
trol, these  were  not  carried  out,  and  he  was  com- 
pelled to  make  the  long  journey  to  Berlin  and  return 
from  that  city  before  the  object  of  his  journey  could 
be  attained.  These  delays  were  such  that  he  did 
not  reach  headquarters,  which  were  found  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson,  until  the  17th  of  August,  the  day  preceding 
the  battle  of  Gravelotte.  During  the  evening  he 
was  presented  to  Count  Bismarck,  who  received  him 
with  great  courtesy  and  attention,  and  promised  that 
he  should  have  every  facility  to  fully  accomplish  his 
20 


296 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


purpose  of  carefully  observing  the  operations  of  the 
German  armies. 

On  the  morning  of  the  i8th  he  accompanied  the 
Count  in  his  carriage  to  the  front,  and  on  the  field 
was  presented  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  who  welcomed 
him  cordially,  and  invited  him  to  accompany  his 
headquarters  throughout  the  campaign.  General 
Sheridan  remarked,  with  some  surprise,  that  even 
while  oppressed  with  the  anxieties  that  naturally 
attend  the  approach  of  an  important  engagement 
both  the  King  and  his  Chancellor  appeared  to  be 
much  interested  in  the  public  opinion  that  prevailed 
in  the  United  States  concerning  the  existing  war, 
and  which  side  was  there  held  responsible  for  pro- 
voking it.  The  beginning  of  the  action  soon  inter- 
rupted their  discussion,  and  for  the  remainder  of  the 
day  General  Sheridan  was  fully  occifpied  in  observ- 
ing the  movements  of  the  opposing  armies  and  the 
skillful  tactics  that  resulted  in  the  German  success. 
From  this  time  on  General  Sheridan  accompanied 
the  headquarters  of  the  German  army,  receiving 
from  the  King  and  his  highest  officials  every  cour- 
tesy and  attention.  He  was  present  at  the  battles 
of  Beaumont  and  Sedan,  and,  after  the  latter,  saw 
the  defeated  Emperor  of  France  arriving  from  that 
city  to  surrender  his  army  and  himself,  and  was  a 
witness  of  the  first  interview  between  him  and  Count 
Bismarck,  who  had  been  deputed  to  open  negotia- 
tions. From  Sedan,  General  Sheridan  was  with  the 
German  army  on  its  unopposed  march  to  Paris,  and 
remained  with  it  until  the  investment  of  the  city  was 
completed.  He  examined  the  various  works  as  they 
were  constructed,  and  had  the  opportunity  of  wit- 
nessing the  repulse  of  several  attacks  made  by  the 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


297 


French  upon  the  besieging  army ; but,  finding  that 
future  operations  would  be  confined  to  a protracted 
siege  of  the  city,  determined  to  occupy  the  time  at 
his  disposal  in  a tour  of  Europe,  returning  to  Paris 
at  such  time  as  the  German  army  should  resume 
active  movements. 

He  therefore  made  through  the  winter  an  ex- 
tended journey,  visiting  Belgium,  Austria,  Hungary, 
and  closing  his  journey  eastward  at  Constantinople. 
In  all  these  countries  he  was  received  with  great  at- 
tention and  hospitality,  was  entertained  by  the  high- 
est in  rank,  and  afforded  every  opportunity  of  grati- 
fying the  inclinations  and  wishes  of  a distinguished 
and  welcome  guest.  At  Constantinople  a review  of 
the  Turkish  troops  was  tendered  him,  and  he  speaks 
of  them  as  in  appearance  and  physique  equaling  any 
soldiers  he  had  observed. 

Returning  through  Greece  and  Italy,  at  Florence, 
which  was  then  the  capital  of  the  recently  created 
Kingdom  of  Italy,  he  was  presented  to  King  Victor 
Emmanuel,  who  was  greatly  interested  in  hearing  of 
the  large  game  to  be  found  in  North  America,  and 
particularly  of  the  buffalo  on  the  AVestern  plains, 
and  who  complained  greatly  that  his  royal  position 
would  forever  prevent  his  having  the  opportunity  of 
enjoying  such  sport  as  the  country  of  his  guest 
afforded.  He  extended  an  invitation  to  a hunting 
party  on  one  of  his  estates,  where  extensive  pre- 
serves of  game  were  kept.  This  General  Sheridan 
gladly  accepted,  but  found  neither  the  game  nor  the 
methods  of  hunting  there  adopted  much  to  his  taste 
as  a sportsman  who  had  been  accustomed  to  con- 
sider skill,  labor,  and  sometimes  danger,  as  necessary 
to  the  full  enjoyment  of  this  sport ; and  after  shoot- 


298 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ing  a few  half-tame  deer  that  had  been  driven  up  to 
the  muzzle  of  his  gun,  he  ended  his  hunt  and  returned 
to  Florence.  Fie  returned  to  Paris  in  time  to  witness 
the  surrender  of  the  city  and  the  formal  occupation 
of  it  by  the  German  army,  and  then  took  leave  of 
his  German  friends,  who  were  returning  as  conquer- 
ors to  their  homes. 

In  summarizing  his  observations  upon  what  he 
had  seen  of  foreign  armies  and  warfare.  General 
Sheridan  speaks  highly  of  the  discipline,  physique, 
morale,  and  equipment  of  the  German  troops.  He 
had,  of  course,  no  opportunity  of  comparing  the 
French  with  them  in  these  respects,  but  their  inferi- 
ority to  their  adversaries  from  the  very  beginning  of 
the  struggle  shows  them  to  have  been  over-matched. 
Of  the  cavalry  he  saw  little,  and  it  was  only  once 
engaged  during  the  battles  he  witnessed,  when  at 
Gravelotte  a division  of  cavalry  was  made  to  charge 
against  a strong  position  held  by  French  infantry, 
protected  by  stone  walls,  houses,  and  a sunken  road, 
and  was  of  course  repulsed  with  great  loss,  though 
exhibiting  great  bravery,  dash,  and  discipline.  He 
considered  the  organization  of  the  cavalry,  however, 
as  defective,  as  it  did  not,  as  with  us,  form  an  inde- 
pendent corps  capable  of  individual  action,  but  was 
broken  up  in  small  commands,  none  larger  than  a 
division,  and  primarily  occupied  in  guarding  the 
front  and  flanks  of  the  different  bodies  of  infantry  to 
which  it  was  attached.  In  these  respects  the  French 
cavalry  system  was  even  more  defective  than  the 
German  and  of  no  actual  value  whatever.  He  was 
well  satisfied  that  if  the  French  had  collected  and 
maintained  a large  and  independent  corps  of  cavalry 
under  a capable  leader  the  Germans  could  not  have 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


299 


made  their  rapid  and  unopposed  march  upon  Paris, 
nor  could  they  have  so  peaceably  maintained,  in  the 
heart  of  a hostile  country  and  at  a distance  from 
their  base,  the  lines  they  held  around  the  city. 

The  excellent  roads,  abundant  supplies,  and  op- 
portunity for  sheltering  troops  everywhere  found  in 
a country  so  thickly  settled  as  France,  permitted 
rapid  movements  and  long  marches  that  in  a coun- 
try such  as  ours  would  be  impossible,  and  almost 
eliminated  the  question  of  transportation  that  was 
frequently  a controlling  element  in  the  movements 
of  American  armies.  He  saw  no  new  military  prin- 
ciples developed  either  of  strategy  or  grand  tactics, 
the  movements  which  he  observed  being  governed 
by  the  same  laws  that  have  long  prevailed.  General 
Sheridan  left  Paris  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Com- 
mune, and,  after  passing  through  England,  Scotland, 
and  Ireland,  returned  to  America  in  the  summer  of 
1871,  having  in  his  year’s  absence  accomplished  a 
tour  that  for  variety,  interest,  and  incident  has  been 
rarely  if  ever  equaled. 

Returning  to  Chicago,  he  resumed  charge  of  his 
military  division,  and  was  in  that  city  at  the  time  of 
the  disastrous  fire  by  which  a considerable  portion 
was  destroyed.  While  his  private  residence  escaped, 
the  military  headquarters  building  was  burned,  and 
with  it  the  records,  journals,  and  maps  that  he  had 
collected  for  the  purpose  of  describing  and  illustrat- 
ing the  part  he  had  borne  in  the  civil  war.  Many 
of  these  could  not  be  replaced,  and  it  was  only  by 
great  labor,  patience,  and  care  that  he  was  able  to 
obtain  sufficient  of  this  material  upon  which  to  con- 
struct the  Personal  Memoirs  which  he  prepared  in 
the  later  years  of  his  life. 


300 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


The  career  of  an  American  soldier  who  has  at- 
tained high  rank  offers  little  matter  of  public  inter- 
est or  which  properly  belongs  to  history  during 
peaceful  times.  The  administrative  duties  which 
limit  his  sphere  of  activity,  while  of  importance  to 
the  service  and  to  those  directly  interested  in  their 
proper  execution,  can  display  no  striking  incident  or 
call  for  marked  attention.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said 
that  such  duties  are  best  performed  when  no  public 
interest  is  attached  to  them,  and  that  the  best  and 
most  efficient  officers  are  frequently  those  of  whom 
the  least  is  heard. 

By  a career  such  as  this  was  the  remainder  of 
General  Sheridan’s  life  occupied.  The  vast  extent 
of  country  which  was  included  in  his  command  re- 
quired frequent  and  extended  journeys  to  allow  of 
his  giving  proper  attention  to  the  condition  of  the 
different  posts  and  garrisons,  to  learn  from  personal 
inspection  the  character  of  the  country  and  the 
measures  to  be  adopted  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
settlers  who  were  in  ever-increasing  numbers  occu- 
pying it,  and  the  preservation  of  quiet  and  peace 
among  the  large  numbers  of  barbarous  and  roving 
Indians,  from  whom  hostilities  must  ever  be  ex- 
pected and  guarded  against. 

These  expeditions  gave  occupation  to  him  both 
of  body  and  mind,  and  also  opportunity  for  indulg- 
ing the  taste  for  hunting,  which  he  had  formed  in  his 
early  days  in  the  plains  of  Texas  and  the  hills  of 
Oregon.  He  was  an  excellent  shot  and  an  untiring, 
vigilant,  observing  hunter,  and  enjoyed  no  pleasure 
more  highly  than  a severe  and  successful  chase  after 
game  whose  capture  required  the  exertion  of  skill, 
labor,  and  courage.  Whenever  it  was  possible  he  in- 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


301 


vited  friends  to  accompany  him  on  these  expeditions, 
and  many  of  them  to-day  have  no  pleasanter  mem- 
ories than  of  happy  days  passed  in  hunting  with  him 
on  the  plains  of  Kansas  or  the  Rocky  Mountain  hills 
and  of  nights  passed  about  the  camp  fires  when  rest- 
ing after  these  heavy  toils. 

He  cordially  remembered  and  maintained  the 
friendships  that  had  been  formed  during  the  days  of 
his  active  service  in  the  field,  and  every  friend  and 
comrade  who  had  shared  in  the  perils  of  the  war  was 
sure  to  receive  from  him  a cordial  welcome  and,  in 
case  of  need,  to  command  his  services  and  help.  He 
took  pleasure  in  keeping  up  these  associations,  and 
was  an  interested  and  welcome  guest  at  all  the  meet- 
ings and  reunions  of  the  soldiers  of  the  civil  war 
which  it  was  within  his  power  to  attend. 

In  1876  occurred  the  outbreak  of  the  Sioux  Indi- 
ans in  Montana,  and  General  Sheridan  was  called  on 
to  assume  a duty  that  was  most  trying  to  a soldier  of 
his  personal  vigor  and  energy — that  of  directing  and 
supervising  to  some  extent  a campaign  fought  by 
soldiers  of  his  own  command  in  which  the  necessi- 
ties of  his  position  forbade  him  to  take  an  active 
part.  Beyond  general  directions  to  officers  com- 
manding in  the  field  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
act,  and  for  the  first  time  his  soldiers  fought  without 
the  inspiration  of  his  personal  presence.  A great 
disaster  marked  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  but 
all  knew  it  was  not  incurred  through  the  orders  or 
directions  of  the  commanding  general  ; and  from 
that  time  on,  through  a long,  arduous,  and  severe 
campaign,  the  forces  of  the  Government  succeeded. 
Before  winter  the  hostiles  were  completely  over- 
come, and  the  survivors,  surrendering  their  arms  and 


302 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


horses,  were  driven  in  to  their  reservations,  -where 
they  have  since  remained  subdued  and  quiet. 

While  residing  in  Chicago,  General  Sheridan  met 
and  married  in  the  year  1875  the  daughter  of  General 
Rucker,  afterward  Quartermaster  General.  At  his 
pleasant  home  in  that  city  grew  up  about  him  the  in- 
teresting family  to  which  he  was  fondly  attached  and 
which  mourns  his  loss.  Sheridan  left  four  children  ; 
three  girls  and  a boy — the  youngest — who  was  born 
in  July,  1880,  and  bears  his  famous  father’s  name. 

In  Februaiy,  1884,  General  Sherman  had  attained 
the  age  of  sixty-four  years,  and,  though  still  in  vigor 
of  life,  w'as  obliged,  under  the  laws  that  make  that 
age  the  limit  of  active  service  in  the  army,  to  go 
upon  the  retired  list.  Lieutenant-General  Sheridan 
was  called  to  succeed  him  in  command  of  the  army ; 
but  this  important  change  of  duty  and  responsibility 
brought  with  it  no  increase  of  rank,  as  the  law  which 
had  created  in  the  army  the  grade  of  general  pro- 
vided that  that  office  should  lapse  upon  the  death  or 
retirement  of  General  Sherman.  His  new  duties  re- 
quired that  his  headquarters  and  residence  should 
from  that  time  forth  be  fixed  in  Washington,  and  to 
that  city  he  removed  with  great  regret,  abandoning 
his  pleasant  home  in  Chicago,  the  first  he  had  known 
since  his  boyhood,  where  he  had  lived  for  fifteen 
years  with  a large  circle  of  attached  friends,  where 
he  had  met  and  won  his  wife,  and  where  his  children 
had  first  seen  the  light. 

This,  however,  he  accepted  as  he  had  done  all 
other  trials  and  hardships  that  inevitably  attach  to  a 
soldier’s  life,  and  entered  upon  his  new  duties  with 
the  same  energy  and  interest  that  he  had  displayed 
in  all  the  varied  positions  he  had  occupied.  He 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


303 


soon  established  a pleasant  home  in  Washington, 
and  there  found  congenial  friends  and  a social  life 
that  is  to  a man  engaged  in  public  affairs  the  most 
agreeable  that  our  country  affords,  and  here  the  re- 
mainder of  his  life  was  passed. 

Those  who  knew  him  best  were  not  slow  to  per- 
ceive that  his  new  duties  were  not  so  congenial,  nor 
did  they  afford  him  the  same  interest  and  occupation 
that  he  had  found  in  his  former  sphere  of  duty. 
Though  an  apparent  anomaly,  it  is,  notwithstanding, 
the  fact  that  the  highest  position  in  the  army  of  the 
United  States  is  that  in  which  the  duties,  responsi- 
bilities, and  powers  are  in  time  of  peace  fewer  and 
of  less  importance  than  those  confided  to  many  offi- 
cers of  a lower  rank  and  the  least  suited  to  a man 
who  has  been  accustomed  to  exercise  personal  com- 
mand and  whose  habits  and  instincts  are  purely  those 
of  the  soldier.  This  may  be  largely  accounted  for 
by  the  fact  that  the  administration  of  army  affairs  at 
the  seat  of  Government  is  confided  to  different  bu- 
reaus, which  are  independent  of  the  general  in  chief 
and  subordinate  to  no  direct  authority  but  that  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and  still  more  to  the  instinct- 
ive and  ever-existing  jealousy  of  military  power  that 
at  all  periods  of  our  history  except  those  of  immi- 
nent peril  has  animated  the  men  who  have  controlled 
the  administration  of  public  affairs.  But  of  this  no 
one  ever  heard  General  Sheridan  complain,  and  he 
faithfully  and  diligently  devoted  his  time  and  labor 
to  whatever  work  fell  in  his  way  to  do,  and  did  it 
thoroughly  and  well. 

He  greatly  missed  the  warm  and  closer  associa- 
tion with  fellow-officers  and  troops  that  his  present 
position  involved,  and,  above  all,  the  long  excur- 


304 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


sions,  the  hunting  parties,  and  the  opportunities  for 
exercise  and  camp  life  that  he  enjoyed  while  com- 
manding the  Division  of  Missouri.  The  change  of 
climate  from  the  cool  and  bracing  air  of  the  North- 
west to  that  of  Washington  seriously  affected  his 
health,  and  in  a few  years  symptoms  of  the  illness 
that  ultimately  proved  fatal  appeared.  But  none  of 
these  depressing  circumstances  impaired  the  cheer- 
fulness and  kindliness  of  his  disposition,  his  mental 
vigor,  or  his  indomitable  energy,  and  to  the  very  close 
he  exhibited  to  the  world  the  same  enduring  and  un- 
conquerable character  he  had  ever  displayed.  He 
collated  and  prepared  for  publication  while  at  Wash- 
ington the  two  volumes  of  his  Personal  Memoirs 
which  have  so  modestly  told  the  story  of  his  active 
life  as  a soldier,  and  to  the  regret  of  all  his  friends 
have  left  reserved  what  relates  to  his  later  life. 
Thus  occupied,  his  last  days  passed,  until  suddenly 
the  blow  that  had  been  so  long  threatened  fell  upon 
and  prostrated  him.  His  immense  vitality  and  un- 
daunted courage  rendered  the  struggle  between  life 
and  death  long  and  painful,  but  at  last  he  was  van- 
quished and  yielded  to  the  foe  to  which  all  men 
must  at  last  submit. 

The  Legislature  of  his  country,  mindful  at  last  of 
great  services  when  his  life  was  but  a question  of 
days,  conferred  upon  him  the  rank  of  the  office  he 
had  held,  and  when  death  came  it  was  to  General 
Philip  H.  Sheridan,  commanding  the  army  of  the 
United  States.  This  great  loss  to  his  country  oc- 
curred at  Nonquitt,  Massachusetts— where  he  had 
gone  with  his  family  in  July,  with  the  hope  of  im- 
proving his  failing  health — on  August  5,  1888,  when 
he  had  attained  the  age  of  fifty-seven,  and  in  the 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 


305  ' 


ordinary  course  of  events  could  have  looked  forward 
to  many  more  years  in  which  hS  could  peacefully 
repose  from  the  labors  of  his  early  days  ; but  the 
exposure,  fatigue,  and  cares  of  his  active  career,  it 
was  found,  had  made  serious  inroads  upon  a frame 
and  constitution  which  had  always  depended  more 
upon  mental  vigor  and  activity  than  upon  physical 
strength,  and  which  had  been  thus  laid  open  to  the 
attacks  of  disease. 

His  funeral  took  place  at  Washington,  where  his 
last  home  had  been  and  his  last  work  accomplished. 
Every  tribute  of  honor  and  respect  that  the  national 
capital  and  the  rulers  of  the  country  could  extend 
was  paid  to  his  memory,  and  no  soldier  was  ever 
laid  to  rest  around  whose  grave  were  gathered  more 
friends  who  came  to  testify  to  their  personal  regard 
and  devotion.  For  a soldier  no  more  appropriate 
grave  could  have  been  chosen  than  that  where  he 
reposes  in  the  beautiful  cemetery  at  Arlington,  Vir- 
ginia, within  sight  of  the  nation’s  capital,  and  on  the 
banks  of  the  river  that  gave  a name  to  the  army 
with  which  his  fame  is  most  nearly  allied,  surrounded 
by,  and  the  chief  of,  thousands  of  brave  and  gallant 
men  who  in  life  loved  and  served  their  country,  and 
the  memory  of  whom  is  loved  and  honored  by  that 
country  for  the  welfare  of  which  they  died. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS. 

In  reviewing  the  life  and  career  of  General  Sheri- 
dan, two  circumstances  strongly  arrest  the  attention 
of  those  who  examine  the  subject  with  any  degree  of 
attention,  and  these  are  the  rapid,  continuous,  and 
unvarying  success  that  marked  every  step  of  his 
progress  during  those  years  of  the  civil  war  in  which 
he  exercised  the  different  commands  that  were  suc- 
cessively committed  to  his  charge,  and  the  fact  that 
through  the  same  period,  from  its  beginning  to  the 
close,  he  was  entirely  unaided  by  the  help  or  assist- 
ance of  friends  who  might  be  able  to  aid  or  influence 
his  advancement  or  present  his  claims  for  promotion 
or  high  command  to  those  by  whom  such  distinctions 
could  be  conferred. 

His  continued  service  in  the  army  from  the  time 
he  left  West  Point,  and  constant  duty  at  remote  posts 
beyond  the  limits  of  civilization,  had,  of  course,  pro- 
hibited him  from  forming  any  friendships  with  men 
in  civil  life  who  possessed  position,  influence,  or  the 
power  of  aiding  his  promotion  ; nor  did  he  while  serv- 
ing in  Texas  and  Oregon  meet  or  become  associated 
with  any  officers  who  then  or  subsequently  held  high 
rank  and  who  could  have  aided  a deserving  comrade 
by  recommending  him  for  promotion  or  affording 

306 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS. 


307 


him  opportunities  for  service  through  which  he  could 
gain  distinction.  From  early  youth  he  had  been 
absent  from  his  home  in  Ohio,  and  the  few  acquaint- 
ances and  kindred  he  there  possessed  had  neither  the 
power  nor  the  opportunity  to  further  his  prospects. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war  there  were  prob- 
ably few  officers  in  the  army  whose  chances  of  ob- 
taining high  command  and  future  distinction  were 
so  remote  as  those  of  the  solitary  and  friendless 
young  second  lieutenant  of  foot  then  occupying  a 
lonely  and  remote  post  in  Oregon.  His  subsequent 
promotion  to  a captaincy  in  a yet  unorganized  regi- 
ment of  infantry,  and  his  detail  and  efficient  service 
as  an  officer  of  the  supply  departments,  were  again 
obstacles  to  his  obtaining  an  opportunity  for  that 
active  service  in  the  field  which  he  so  much  desired 
and  for  which  he  proved  so  well  fitted  ; and  the  strong 
objection  made  by  General  Halleck  to  his  accept- 
ance of  the  first  active  command  that  was  offered 
him  shows  both  his  value  as  a staff  officer  and  the 
narrow  escape  he  had  from  remaining  permanently 
on  such  service  during  the  war. 

His  appointment  as  colonel  of  the  Second  Michi- 
gan Cavalry  may  be  termed  the  one  accident  of  Gen- 
eral Sheridan’s  military  life,  as  he  never  knew  to 
what  circumstances  it  was  due ; he  had  made  no 
application  for  the  position,  he  knew  nothing  of  the 
regiment  or  the  officers,  and  possessed  no  friends  or 
acquaintances  whom  he  could  have  supposed  had 
recommended  his  appointment  to  the  Governor  by 
whom  it  was  conferred.  Accidental  as  it  may  have 
been,  this  opening  afforded  a future,  and,  eagerly  em- 
bracing it,  Sheridan  began  the  career  the  coming 
steps  in  which  were  gained  by  arduous  service  that 


3o8 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


fairly  won  for  him  every  successive  honor  that  he 
subsequently  attained.  The  command  of  this  regi- 
ment was  also  the  only  position  to  obtain  which  he 
made  any  personal  effort,  as  all  his  future  assign- 
ments to  higher  duties  were  made  by  superior  offi- 
cers without  his  solicitation,  and  in  few  cases  did  he 
know  that  any  such  were  contemplated  before  they 
reached  him. 

A striking  feature  in  his  character,  and  one  that 
must  have  largely  contributed  to  his  success,  was  the 
intensity  and  earnestness  with  which  he  devoted  him- 
self to  whatever  duty  might  be  that  in  which  he  was 
immediately  engaged  and  the  unflagging  industry 
and  perseverance  that  he  gave  to  it  until  fully  ac- 
complished. In  all  the  varied  phases  of  his  life  this 
was  most  apparent,  and  in  the  Indian  combats  of 
1868,  after  he  had  commanded  armies  in  civilized 
warfare  and  administered  the  affairs  of  large  terri- 
tories, he  is  found  in  the  field  conducting  a winter’s 
campaign  at  the  head  of  a few  hundred  troopers 
with  the  same  energy  and  interest  that  he  dis- 
played as  a young  lieutenant  in  his  first  Indian  cam- 
paign in  Oregon,  or  as  a general  commanding  an 
army  in  Virginia. 

He  was  not  an  ambitious  man  in  the  sense  in 
which  that  word  is  frequently  used  to  signify  one 
who  aims  at  or  performs  great  deeds  with  the  wish 
or  hope  that  from  them  personal  distinction,  honor, 
or  advancement  may  result,  but  his  aim  and  constant 
purpose  was  to  do  thoroughly  and  completely  the 
work  he  found  before  him  for  the  time  being,  what- 
ever that  work  might  be  and  regardless  of  what  ef- 
fect it  might  have  upon  his  personal  fortunes.  The 
rule  that  had  controlled  his  action  during  life  he  ex- 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS.  309 

pressed  on  one  of  the  very  few  occasions  when  he 
publicly  spoke  of  himself  or  his  career,  when  at  a 
reunion  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  in  an  ad- 
dress then  made,  he  had  been  complimented  upon 
his  brilliant  record  and  reference  was  made  to  the 
high  and  far-reaching  ambition  that  must  have  in- 
spired him  in  the  beginning  of  his  military  life  and 
directed  him  to  the  great  success  he  had  obtained. 
In  reply  he  entirely  disclaimed  that  he  had  been  con- 
trolled by  such  a motive  or  had  considered  the  ques- 
tion of  what  results  personally  advantageous  to  him- 
self would  follow  his  conduct,  but  said  that  in  all  the 
various  positions  he  had  held,  some  of  which  he  ad- 
mitted were  in  the  early  days  of  the  war  unsatisfac- 
tory and  distasteful,  his  sole  and  only  aim  had  al- 
ways been  to  be  the  best  officer  in  the  grade  he  might 
at  the  time  be  occupying,  and  let  the  future  take  care 
of  itself. 

Those  who  knew  him  best  and  were  most  inti- 
mately associated  with  him  during  his  active  career 
well  remember  these  marked  traits  of  his  character, 
and  it  was  noted  that  he  seldom  if  ever  spoke  of  the 
past,  and  never  of  the  future,  as  connected  with  his 
personal  interests  or  as  subjects  of  reflection,  but 
that  his  mind  was  ever  intent  upon  the  present  and 
the  work  then  in  hand.  That  fidelity  to  duty  and 
the  best  interests  of  the  service  in  which  he  was  en- 
gaged was  his  controlling  motive  appears  in  some 
conspicuous  instances  of  his  career,  where  this  quality 
was  exhibited  in  a manner  that  apparently  worked 
injury  to  his  personal  interests.  When,  soon  after 
the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  he  was  relieved  from 
duty  in  Oregon  and  had  the  opportunity  of  going 
to  the  East,  where  active  service  was  to  be  found 


310 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


and  the  prospect  of  promotion  and  distinction  ex- 
isted, he  found  that  the  officer  who  was  ordered 
to  relieve  him  in  command  of  the  post  he  occupied 
was  unworthy  of  trust  and  confidence  by  reason  of 
sympathy  with  the  rebellion,  he  refused  to  surrender 
the  command  or  the  property  in  his  charge,  and  re- 
mained inactive  for  more  than  three  months,  until  a 
suitable  successor  to  him  could  be  found. 

In  February,  1865,  knowing  that  a great  struggle 
about  Petersburg  and  Richmond  was  approaching, 
he  voluntarily  abandoned  the  command  of  a terri- 
torial division  and  of  an  independent  army,  and  with 
two  divisions  of  cavalry  made  his  way  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  where  he  felt  that  he  and  his  troops 
could  be  of  the  greatest  value.  In  command  at  New 
Orleans  he  remained  true  to  his  own  convictions  of 
duty  and  the  orders  of  his  immediate  superior,  in 
spite  of  the  offers  of  favor  or  threats  of  punishment 
that  alternately  were  used  to  win  him  over  to  sup- 
port designs  the  President  had  formed  concerning 
the  course  to  be  pursued  by  him,  and  rather  than 
surrender  his  convictions  of  what  he  believed  to  be 
right,  preferred  to  be  relieved  of  an  important  and 
honorable  command. 

As  a soldier.  General  Sheridan  possessed  to  an 
eminent  degree  the  qualities  that  are  indispensable 
in  a commander  who  is  called  on  to  lead  troops  to 
battle,  and  who  has  the  right  to  expect  success  and 
victory.  He  had  the  ability  to  think  and  act  prompt- 
ly and  energetically,  and,  if  need  were,  independently 
of  instructions,  and  to  assume  and  support  with  ease 
whatever  responsibdities  his  situation  might  require  ; 
he  had  the  power  to  impress  his  will  and  personal 
influence  upon  all  who  were  under  his  command. 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS.  311 

He  was  not  a martinet,  nor  what  would  be  called  a 
rigid  disciplinarian,  though  he  exacted  and  obtained 
of  all  under  his  command,  from  the  highest  to  the 
lowest,  implicit  obedience  to  orders,  and  not  only  a 
prompt,  but  an  energetic  performance  of  duty  ; and 
his  mind  was  broad  enough  to  perceive  that  in  the 
exigencies  of  active  service  and  the  constantly 
changing  emergencies  of  a campaign  a wider  scope 
of  action  is  required  than  can  be  found  in  the  direc- 
tions of  a manual  of  tactics  or  obtained  from  the 
experience  of  a drill  ground.  He  also  fully  recog- 
nized the  reciprocal  relations  that  should  ever  exist 
between  a commander  and  his  troops,  and  that  while 
the  former  has  the  right  to  demand  implicit  obe- 
dience and  thorough  performance  of  every  duty,  he 
is  bound  to  take  every  care  to  secure  the  health,  wel- 
fare, and  comfort  of  those  over  whom  he  is  placed  ; 
and  knowing  that  abundant  supplies,  occupation,  and 
success  are  all  requisite  to  render  soldiers  healthy, 
contented,  confident,  and  zealous,  he  used  every  ex- 
ertion to  provide  these  for  his  men,  and  seldom  if 
ever  failed  in  so  doing. 

Early  in  the  war  he  realized  the  necessity  and 
value  of  obtaining  all  possible  information  of  the 
positions,  forces,  and  movements  of  any  enemy  to 
whom  he  might  be  opposed,  and  gave  great  per- 
sonal attention  to  this  object,  often  selecting,  and 
always,  when  possible,  conferring  directly  with  the 
men  employed  for  this  purpose,  instead  of  dele- 
gating this  important  duty  to  a staff  officer,  accord- 
ing to  general  custom.  His  careful  attention  to  this 
detail  of  service  produced  results  of  great  value,  es- 
pecially in  the  campaign  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
and  that  which  resulted  in  the  surrender  of  Lee’s 


21 


312 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


army,  during  which  the  efficiency  of  the  scouts  em- 
ployed and  the  accuracy  and  extent  of  information 
obtained  far  surpassed  any  similar  work  performed 
in  the  other  armies. 

While  he  did  not  devote  much  time  to  details, 
and  so  long  as  duty  properly  performed  did  not  in- 
terfere with  the  work  of  his  subordinates,  he  was  a 
master  of  every  branch  of  the  service,  and  was  care- 
ful to  observe  that  all  duties  were  faithfully  and 
thoroughly  fulfilled.  Wherever  he  served,  the  troops 
under  his  command  were  remarked  for  their  excel- 
lent condition  and  the  abundant  supplies  with  which 
they  were  provided,  never  having  to  complain  of 
privation,  suffering,  or  want  that  could  be  avoided 
by  the  care  and  attention  of  their  commander.  Wide 
experience  as  quartermaster  and  commissary  before 
and  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  had  made  him  fa- 
miliar with  the  questions  of  transportation  and  sup- 
ply, and  thus  rendered  it  easy  to  observe  that  these 
important  requisites  for  the  welfare  of  troops  were 
properly  attended  to. 

In  all  operations  he  was  deliberate  and  prudent 
in  forming  plans,  and  always  had  a definite  objective 
in  view,  but  never  limited  himself  to  a single  method 
of  accomplishing  the  result  he  desired,  but  allowed 
to  subordinates  and  to  himself  a wide  discretion  in 
executing  the  required  duty.  A check,  or  even  a 
decided  repulse  at  any  one  point,  never  disheartened 
or  discouraged  him,  and  he  was  always  prepared  with 
resources  and  expedients  to  overcome  the  one  or 
avoid  the  consequences  of  the  other,  and  to  pursue 
upon  new  lines  the  enterprise  that  could  not  be  ac- 
complished upon  those  first  devised. 

Sheridan  was  exceedingly  reticent  concerning 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS.  313 

plans  and  operations  to  be  undertaken,  and  while 
availing  himself  of  all  information  that  he  could  ob- 
tain from  every  source,  never  sought  the  counsel  or 
advice  of  his  subordinates  or  endeavored  to  divide 
the  responsibility  for  whatever  action  he  might  take. 
His  courage  was  moral  to  as  great  a degree  as  it 
was  physical,  and  in  the  most  adverse  circumstances 
his  mind  worked  as  clearly  and  his  untiring  energy 
was  displayed  as  promptly  to  change  reverse  into 
victory  as  though  Fortune  had  smiled  upon  him  from 
the  first. 

Confident  always  in  himself  and  the  troops  he  com- 
manded, he  was  decided  and  firm  in  the  execution  of 
his  own  plans,  and  determined  to  carry  them  out  by 
every  means  within  his  power.  Believing  his  own 
views  to  be  correct,  and  warranted  in  so  believing 
by  past  success,  he  never  hesitated  to  impart  them 
to  his  superiors,  and  not  unfrequently  succeeded  in 
having  his  own  plans  concurred  in  in  place  of  others 
that  had  been  suggested,  and  generally,  if  not  always, 
to  the  advantage  of  the  service  to  be  performed. 

To  his  subordinate  officers  he  was  considerate 
and  eminently  just.  He  recognized  and  appreciated 
faithful  service,  and  especially  that  which  was  ener- 
getically and  promptly  rendered,  and  never  blamed 
or  harshly  criticised  any  who  met  defeat  or  repulse 
from  causes  that  were  beyond  their  own  control ; 
but  to  those  whose  failures  might  result  from  neg- 
lect, carelessness,  or  want  of  energy  and  effort,  he 
was  severe,  and  never  overlooked  or  pardoned  con- 
duct of  this  character,  and  neither  personal  friend- 
ship nor  previous  good  records  would- prevent  the 
just  consequences  of  such  faults. 

In  some  sketches  of  General  Sheridan’s  life  that 


314 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


were  made  public  at  the  time  of,  and  soon  after  the 
war,  great  stress  was  laid  upon  what  was  termed  his 
“ dash,”  and  to  many  the  impression  was  given  that 
he  was  but  a hard-riding,  hard-fighting,  and  reckless 
soldier,  whose  fame  and  success  were  due  to  desper- 
ate personal  courage  and  impulsive  combativeness, 
which,  aided  by  exceptional  good  fortune,  had  ob- 
tained for  him  rank  and  distinction.  No  estimate  of 
his  character  could  be  more  erroneous  than  this,  for 
his  earlier  service  was  in  the  hotly  contested,  bloody, 
and  indecisive  battles  of  the  Western  army  under 
Buell  and  Rosecrans,  where  his  duties  were  generally 
those  of  holding  a defensive  position  and  offering  a 
stubborn  resistance  under  discouraging  circumstances 
to  an  advancing  and  partially  successful  enemy  ; and 
his  further  operations,  especially  when  possessing  an 
independent*  command,  resulted  from  well-prepared 
and  carefully  executed  plans,  varied,  of  course,  by 
the  changing  necessities  of  a campaign.  The  same 
erroneous  impression  apparently  existed  in  the  mind 
of  an  eminent  English  military  critic,  who,  while 
commending  his  career,  refers  to  him  as  a mere  cav- 
alry officer,  knowing  so  little  of  his  subject  as  to  be 
unaware  that  during  the  three  years  of  active  service 
that  General  Sheridan  passed  in  the  civil  war  he 
was  engaged  but  eight  months  as  a commander  of 
mounted  troops  alone. 

That  he  did  possess  energy  and  dash  is  unques 
tionable  and  was  often  proved,  and  it  would  have 
been  well  for  the  country  that  at  times  other  officers 
in  high  commands  had  displayed  these  to  the  same 
degree.  These  qualities  were  not  alone  those  that 
fitted  him  for  the  service  he  performed,  but,  added  to 
judgment,  patience,  industry,  and  full  knowledge  of 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS.  315 

all  the  duties  of  a commander  and  a soldier,  rendered 
him  deserving  of  the  distinction  he  won.  On  the 
field  of  battle  and  in  the  pursuit  of  a retreating 
enemy  he  was  conspicuous  for  untiring  aggressive- 
ness, and  never  lost  an  opportunity  of  success  by 
failing  to  fight  hard  when  needed,  or  follow  up  an 
advantage  that  had  been  gained.  The  troops  he 
commanded  always  fought  with  good  hope  of  suc- 
cess, for  they  were  assured  that  their  chief  was 
actively  sharing  in  their  dangers,  and  that  every 
movement,  if  not  immediately  led,  was  personally 
directed  and  carefully  observed  by  him. 

He  was  never  a pedantic  student  of  so-called 
military  science,  nor  one  who  believed  that  cam- 
paigns were  to  be  conducted  with  a close  adherence 
to  fixed  rules — as  a game  in  which  skill  and  intel- 
lectual attainment  are  the  only  requirements  of  suc- 
cess. He  was  familiar  with  the  few  important  prin- 
ciples that  are  of  primary  importance  in  all  military  | 
operations,  but  natural  ability  and  experience  in  the  | 
field  had  shown  him  that  these  were  not  to  be  used  1 
as  a limitation  of  action,  but  as  a means  of  obtaining  \ 
results,  and  to  be  used,  developed,  or  modified  as  the  I 
circumstances  attending  their  application  might  re-  j 
quire.  Two  rules  he  adhered  to  strictly  and  under  ! 
all  circumstances,  and  these  were,  always  to  act  of- 
fensively and  to  be  the  attacking  party,  and  to  follow 
to  the  utmost  extent  any  advantage  that  might  be 
gained,  and  never  to  relax  or  abandon  a pursuit  so 
long  as  a beaten  enemy  was  within  reach  and  no 
new  conditions  of  relative  force  had  occurred,  for  he 
always  insisted  that  after  a hard-fought  battle,  no 
matter  how  great  the  loss  or  extreme  the  exhaustion, 
the  victors  were  and  must  always,  both  physically 


3i6 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


and  morally,  be  the  superiors  of  the  conquered,  and 
to  a far  greater  degree  than  they  were  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  engagement. 

Of  the  personal  character  of  General  Sheridan  it 
may  well  be  said  that  any  reader  can  form  a just 
conception  of  it  by  studying  attentively  the  story  of 
his  career.  While  he  was  prudent,  reserved,  and  reti- 
cent to  a marked  degree  on  all  subjects  connected 
with  his  official  duties,  in  all  other  respects  he  was 
singularly  frank,  open,  and  undisguised  in  express- 
ing his  opinions  and  feelings.  Throughout  his  whole 
career  he  was  genial,  cordial,  and  kind  to  all  who 
merited  his  esteem,  and  at  all  tirhes  eager  to  serve 
and  assist  any  friend  or  comrade  who  might  appeal 
to  him  for  aid.  He  possessed  the  power  of  winning 
and  retaining  the  confidence  and  attachment  of  those 
with  whom  he  was  brought  into  close  association, 
and  of  the  thousands  whom  he  commanded  or  with 
whom  he  was  associated  during  the  war,  there  were 
very  few  of  any  degree  who  did  not  ever  regard  him 
with  respect  and  personal  devotion.  When  the  close 
of  the  war  permitted  him  to  travel  and  opened  a 
wider  circle  of  acquaintance,  he  was  everywhere,  in 
this  country  and  abroad,  cordially  received  and  wel- 
comed, and  many  who  were  first  attracted  to  him  as 
a distinguished  soldier,  to  know  whom  was  an  honor, 
soon  observed  his  personal  worth,  and  learned  to 
value  him  as  a friend.  Few,  if  any,  men  of  this  coun- 
try have  left  a larger  circle  of  attached  friends  to 
mourn  their  loss. 

Like  all  men  who  have  through  their  own  efforts 
attained  great  success  and  power  over  others,  his 
will  was  strong  and,  when  once  determined,  inflexi- 
ble, but  never  to  the  point  of  obstinacy  or  against 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS.  317 

the  dictates  of  reason.  On  all  subjects  he  was  eager 
for  information,  and  willing  to  receive  and  act  upon 
it  if  valuable,  from  whatever  source  it  might  come, 
even  though  it  might  cause  a change  in  views  he  had 
previously  entertained.  His  feelings  and  passions 
were  also  strong,  but  he  had  carefully  trained  him- 
self to  use  and  not  to  be  mastered  by  them,  and  very 
rarely  displayed  intensity  of  feeling  upon  any  sub- 
ject in  which  he  might  be  interested.  His  manner 
and  speech  were  quiet  and  restrained,  and  especially 
so  on  occasions  of  peculiar  trial  and  responsibility, 
and  in  the  hottest  or  most  critical  period  of  an  en- 
gagement he  was  remarkable  for  the  calm,  concise, 
and  accurate  manner  in  which  his  instructions  were 
given  and  his  personal  movements  made  ; but  if  oc- 
casion required  him  to  exhibit  personal  activity  or 
excite  enthusiasm  in  others,  this  was  done  to  the 
fullest  extent,  but  never  permitted  to  cause  loss  of 
self-control.  He  rarely,  if  ever,  displayed  bad  temper, 
and  the  severest  censure  or  rebuke  that  he  might  be 
called  upon  to  give  was  delivered  in  a few  well-cho- 
sen words  and  with  no  evidence  of  passion  or  per- 
sonal feeling.  The  same  quietness  of  manner  marked 
the  achievement  of  the  greatest  successes  that  he 
obtained,  and  he  was  never  observed  on  these  occa- 
sions to  display  any  feeling  of  exultation  or  self- 
consciousness,  nor  did  he  ever  issue  congratulatory 
orders  to  his  troops  upon  the  favorable  results  of  an 
action  or  a campaign.  He  considered  that  the  de- 
feat of  an  enemy  was  but  the  simple  and  legitimate 
duty  of  a soldier,  and  that  no  particular  commenda- 
tion was  due  to  men  who  had  performed  the  service 
for  which  they  had  enlisted.  Especial  instances  of 
gallantry  and  good  conduct,  however,  he  was  quick 


318 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


to  recognize  and  reward,  and  did  his  utmost  to  ob- 
tain promotion  and  secure  distinction  to  all  who  were 
remarked  for  meritorious  service. 

After  the  war  had  closed  and  a peaceful  future 
put  an  end  to  all  prospect  of  further  activity  or  dis- 
tinction in  his  profession,  General  Sheridan  remained 
in  temperament,  disposition,  and  habit  the  same  as 
he  had  been  in  the  days  of  more  active  service,  per- 
forming thoroughly  and  with  perfect  satisfaction 
such  work  as  fell  to  him  to  do,  neither  seeking  other 
and  more  distinguished  labors  nor  dissatisfied  with 
those  that  occupied  his  time.  He  had  no  desire  to 
obtain  or  accumulate  money,  and  had  as  little  inter- 
est as  experience  in  affairs  of  business  in  which  he 
was  never  concerned.  He  took  no  other  interest  in 
politics  than  that  which  is  natural  to  every  patriotic 
citizen  who  is  interested  in  the  welfare  and  proper 
government  of  his  country,  and  his  utter  indifference 
to  the  honors  or  rewards  of  public  office,  outside  of 
his  chosen  profession,  was  so  well  known  that  his 
name  was  never  discussed  or  even  suggested  as  that 
of  a candidate  for  the  high  office  that  has  tempted 
other  distinguished  soldiers  to  abandon  the  expe- 
rience and  training  of  a lifetime  and  assume  labo- 
rious and  trying  duties  of  a nature  differing  as  widely 
as  possible  from  those  they  had  previously  performed 
with  honor  and  credit. 

In  person  Sheridan  was  of  low  stature,  and  early 
in  life  of  slight  physique.  He  describes  himself,  in 
1864,  when  he  came  from  the  West  to  take  command 
of  the  cavalry  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  at  the 
age  of  thirty-three,  as  being  five  feet  five  inches  in 
height  and  weighing  but  one  hundred  and  fifteen 
pounds.  Slight,  however,  as  he  appeared,  he  pos- 


CHARACTER  AND  PERSONAL  TRAITS.  315 

sessed  great  bodily  strength,  and  a remarkable  abil- 
ity to  support,  without  strain  or  fatigue,  continued 
and  severe  physical  labor  and  the  constant  cares 
and  anxieties  that  resulted  from  the  duties  to  which 
he  was  devoted.  He  was  an  excellent  horseman  and 
always  well  mounted,  and  when  in  the  field  and 
aroused  by  the  excitement  of  combat  his  presence 
was  commanding  and  inspiring.  In  his  later  years, 
and  especially  after  his  removal  to  Washington  had 
condemned  him  to  a somewhat  inactive  life,  he  be- 
came quite  stout,  but  never  lost  the  air,  the  bearing, 
or  the  presence  of  a soldier,  and  no  stranger  who 
might  see  him  could  even  entertain  a doubt  concern- 
ing his  profession. 

He  w’as  an  excellent  shot  and  a skilled  and  per- 
severing huntsman,  and  found  in  field  sports  his 
highest  enjoyment ; and  these,  with  the  pleasures  he 
found  in  his  happy  domestic  circle  and  the  society 
of  his  many  and  warm  friends,  occupied  the  time 
that  he  could  spare  from  official  duty,  and  he  had 
every  reason  to  look  forward  to  a long,  prosperous, 
and  happy  life  as  a reward  of  the  labors  and  dan- 
gers through  which  he  had  gained  his  well-earned 
repose.  These  hopes  were,  however,  dispelled  when 
he  was  struck  down  by  the  blow  that  assailed  him 
when  he  was  in  what  to  a man  of  his  exceptional 
vigor  may  be  called  the  prime  of  life,  and  he  passed 
away  lamented  with  inexpressible  sorrow  by  his  fam- 
ily and  friends,  and  mourned  for  by  the  nation  to 
whose  service  his  life  had  been  devoted. 


INDEX. 


Allen’s  Station,  io3. 

Amelia  Court  House,  236-240. 

Amherst  Court  House,  210,  21 1. 

Anderson’s  Crossing,  106. 

Anderson, General,  148,  243,  244. 

Appomattox,  236,  246. 

Appomattox  Court  House,  252. 

Appomattox  River,  236. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  offi- 
cially known  as,  and  General 
Rosecrans  placed  in  com- 
mand, 38  ; instructing  troops, 
39  ; selecting  scouts,  40  ; ad- 
vance on  and  battle  of  Mur- 
freesborough,  40-50  ; close  of 
the  campaign,  50,  51  ; an  in- 
terval of  rest,  52  ; encamped 
south  of  Murfreesborough,  53  ; 
scout  captured  and  executed 
by  guerrillas,  54 ; attack  on 
supply  depots,  54  ; an  amus- 
ing incident,  55  ; operations 
at  Franklin,  55,  56  ; General 
Rosecrans  urged  to  advance, 
57 ; circular  issued  to  corps 
commanders  and  division  gen- 
erals and  their  replies,  58  ; the 
army  advances,  59  ; abandon- 
ment of  Hoover’s  Gap,  60 ; 


march  to  Winchester,  61  ; ad- 
vance on  Chattanooga,  62,  63. 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  movements 
of,  32  ; Captain  Gilbert,  First 
Infantry,  appointed  a major 
general,  32  ; court  of  inquiry, 
and  Captain  Gilbert  returaed 
to  his  former  position,  34  ; en- 
gagement at  Doctor’s  Creek, 
34 ; skirmish  at  Chaplin’s 
Heights,  35  ; battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  35,  36  ; placed  in  a posi- 
tion for  a general  engagement, 
37  ; marched  to  Bowling 
Green,  37  ; General  Buell  re- 
lieved from  command,  38. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  command 
of  the  cavalry,  89  ; reorganiza- 
tion of  the  cavalry,  gi  ; serv- 
ices of  General  Pleasonton, 
92  ; difference  of  opinion  be- 
tween Generals  Meade  and 
Pleasonton,  93  ; result  of  in- 
spection of  cavalry,  95  ; dis- 
cussions between  Generals 
Meade  and  Sheridan,  g6  ; ef- 
fective cavalry  force  of,  in 
1864,  97  ; crossing  the  Rapi- 
dan,  98  ; battles  of  the  Wilder- 


322 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ness,  Todd's  Tavern,  and 
Spottsylvania  Court  House, 
99  ; serious  discussion  be- 
tween Generals  Meade  and 
Sheridan,  lOl  ; ordered  to 
Haxall’s  Landing,  io2  ; con- 
ference of  division  command- 
ers, 104  ; cavalry  corps  expe- 
dition, 105  ; rescue  of  prison- 
ers and  capture  of  property 
by  General  Custer,  106  ; en- 
gagement with  the  enemy  at 
Beaver  Dam  Station,  107  ; 
march  to  and  skirmish  at 
Ashland  Station,  108  ; en- 
gagement at  Yellow  Tavern, 
109  ; battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  in; 
end  of  first  cavalry  expedition, 
1 14  ; further  movement  or- 
dered, 115  ; ordered  toward 
and  engagement  at  Mechan- 
icsville,  ir6;  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor,  118  ; beginning  the 
siege  of  Petersburg,  126  ; re- 
viewed by  the  President,  253. 

Ashby’s  Gap,  151,  203. 

Ashland  Station,  108. 

Augur,  General,  136. 

Austin,  258. 

Averill,  General,  141,  146,  172. 

Ayres,  General,  233,  234. 

Barbara  Frietchie,  182. 

Bardstown,  34. 

Baird,  General,  269. 

Beaumont,  296. 

Beaver  Dam  Station,  107. 

Bermuda  Hundred,  113. 

Berryville,  151,  157. 

Bismarck,  Count,  295. 


Black  Kettle,  291. 

Boonesville,  ordered  to  advance 
on,  26  ; battle  of,  27. 

Bowling  Green,  37. 

Boydton  Plank  Road,  227,  228, 
231. 

Bradley,  Colonel,  65. 

Bragg,  General,  29,  34,  41,  43, 
50. 

Brandy  Station,  90. 

Breckinridge,  122,  123,  146,  200. 

Brook  Turnpike,  no. 

Brownsville,  258. 

Buell,  General,  29,  32-34,  38. 

Bunker  Hill,  151. 

Burksville  Junction,  238. 

Burnside,  General,  83,  85,  225. 

Butler,  General,  29,  34,  50. 

Canby,  General,  256. 

Camp  Supply,  291. 

Card,  James,  40  ; captured  and 
executed,  54. 

Carpenter’s  Ford,  125. 

Cedar  Creek,  165,  168,  169 ; 
crossing  and  reconnoissance 
from  Fisher’s  Hill,  178  ; skir- 
mish at,  179  ; Sheridan  leaves 
for  Washington  with  cavalry 
to  Front  Royal  to  destroy 
bridges,  180  ; a Confederate 
signal  message,  180 ; guard- 
ing against  an  attack,  181  ; 
Sheridan  arrives  in  Washing- 
ton and  consults  with  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  General  Hal- 
leck,  181  ; Sheridan’s  ride  to 
Winchester,  181  •,  a courier 
from  Cedar  Creek,  182  ; Sher- 
idan meets  troops  in  retreat. 


INDEX. 


323 


183 ; he  rides  to  the  front, 

184  ; defeat  turned  to  victory, 

185  ; the  enemy  routed,  186, 
193  ; transfer  of  troops,  193  ; 
Sheridan’s  ride  (a  poem),  196. 

Chamberlain’s  Creek,  226,  227. 
Chancellorsville,  91. 

Chapman,  General,  109. 
Character  and  personal  traits — 
Sheridan,  unaided  by  friends, 
secures  rapid  promotion,  306, 
307  ; devotion  to  duty,  30S  ; 
not  ambitious,  308  ; refuses  to 
surrender  a command,  310  ; as 
a soldier,  31 1 ; deliberate  in 
forming  plans,  312  ; reticent 
concerning  plans,  313  ; con- 
siderate and  just  to  subordi- 
nate officers,  313  ; his  “dash,” 

314  ; not  a pedantic  student, 

315  ; personal  character,  316. 
Charles  City  Court  House,  127, 

128. 

Charlottesville,  120,  123,  174, 
210. 

Chattanooga,  operations  at,  73  ; 
General  Rosecrans  relieved 
and  replaced  by  General 
Thomas,  74  ; General  Grant 
assigned  to  command  troops 
in  Tennessee,  75  ; arrival  of 
General  Sherman,  75  ; battle 
of,  76-82. 

Chesterfield  Station,  114. 
Chester  Gap,  148,  149,  180. 
Chickahominy,  in,  127. 
Chickamauga,  advance  on,  64  ; 

battle  of,  64-70. 

Chickamauga  Creek,  64. 

City  Point,  202,  213,  216,  218. 


Claiborne  Road,  234,  235. 

Clearing  the  Valley,  retreat  of 
the  enemy  from  Fisher’s  Hill, 
199  ; attack  and  rout  of  the 
enemy  at  Kernstown,  200  ; 
General  Early  detaches 
troops,  200  : Mosby’s  guerril- 
las, 201  ; raid  by  the  enemy 
on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad  at  New  Creek,  202  ; 
Early  retires  to  Staunton, 
202  ; reducing  the  forces,  202  ; 
expedition  to  Gordonsville 
and  Staunton,  203  ; opera- 
tions of  scouts,  204  ; refitting 
and  equipping  the  cavalry, 
204  ; correspondence  from 
General  Grant,  205  ; moving 
in  force  from  Winchester, 

206  ; expedition  against  Vir- 
ginia Central  Railroad  etc.,, 

207  ; skirmish  at  Mount  Craw- 
ford, 207  ; engagement  and 
rout  of  the  enemy  at  Waynes- 
borough,  208  ; moving  on 
Charlottesville  and  operations 
at,  210. 

Cold  Harbor,  117. 

Colonel  of  cavalry,  appointed 
colonel  of  the  Second  Mich- 
igan Cavalry,  20  ; assumes 
command,  21  ; expedition 
against  Corinth,  22  ; ordered 
to  Booneville,  26 : battle  of 
Booneville,  27  ; thanked  by 
General  Rosecrans,  28. 

Columbia,  212. 

Command  of  Louisiana  and 
Texas,  General  Sheridan  se- 
lected, 254  ; motive  for  creat- 


324 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


ing  a new  command,  255  ; 
Kirby  Smith  surrenders,  256  ; 
bad  faith  of  the  Confederates, 

256  ; General  Early  in  Texas, 

257  ; troops  sent  to  Austin, 

258  ; trouble  on  the  Mexican 
border,  259  ; riot  at  New  Or- 
leans and  martial  law  pro- 
claimed, 270  ; General  Sheri- 
dan to  General  Grant,  270 ; 
affairs  at  New  Orleans,  271- 
277  ; Sheridan  placed  in 
command  of  the  Fifth  Mili- 
tary District,  279  ; adminis- 
tration of  laws,  280. 

Commander  in  Chief,  General 
Sherman  retired  and  General 
Sheridan  appointed,  302  ; his 
duties  not  congenial,  303  ; his 
death  and  funeral,  305. 
Corinth,  expedition  against,  22  ; 

evacuation  of,  23. 

Court  House,  227,  228. 

Crawfish  Springs,  64. 

Crittenden,  General,  41,  65, 
74- 

Crump  Road,  231. 

Crook,  Major-General,  146, 157, 
190,  191,  202,  217,  239-241, 
243,  245,  246. 

Culpeper  Court  House,  148. 
Curtis,  General,  18. 

Custer,  General,  106,  109,  116, 
122,  176,  203,  208,  210,  213, 
228. 

Dana,  Charles  A.,  136. 

Danville,  238,  246. 

Davenport’s  Bridge,  106. 

Davis,  General,  66,  67. 


Deep  Bottom,  engagement  at, 
128. 

Deep  Creek,  237. 

Defeat  and  surrender  of  Lee, 
consultation  of  Confederate 
commanders  and  advance  and 
repulse  of  the  enemy,  249 ; 
surrender  of  General  Lee,  ar- 
rival of  General  Grant,  and 
negotiations  for  surrender  ar- 
ranged, 250. 

Department  of  the  Missouri, 
General  Sheridan  assigned  to 
command,  285  ; trouble  with 
the  Indians,  285  ; General 
Sheridan’s  second  leave  of  ab- 
sence, 286  ; Peace  Commis- 
sion concludes  its  work  and 
makes  a treaty,  286  ; return 
of  General  Sheridan,  287  ; 
trouble  about  the  treaty,  287. 

Department  of  the  Susque- 
hanna, 137. 

Department  of  Washington,  137, 

Department  of  West  Virginia. 
137- 

Dinwiddie  Court  House,  trans- 
fer of  cavalry,  216  ; General 
Sheridan  at  General  Grant’s 
headquarters  at  City  Point, 
General  Grant’s  plans  and 
General  Sheridan’s  objections, 
218,  219  General  Sherman 
consulted,  220  ; an  advance 
begun,  221,  223. 

Doctor’s  Creek,  engagement  at, 
34- 

Douthard’s  Landing,  128. 


Early  life,  born,  2 ; appointed 


INDEX. 


325 


to  West  Point,  3 ; graduated 
from  West  Point,  4 ; ordered 
to  Newport  Barracks,  4 ; or- 
dered to  Fort  Duncan,  4 ; or- 
dered to  Fort  Reading,  5 ; 
expedition  of  Lieutenant 
Williamson,  6 ; expedition 
of  Major  Raines,  7 ; expedi- 
tion of  Colonel  Wright,  8 ; 
relief  at  Middle  Cascade,  9 ; 
mentioned  for  gallantry,  ii  ; 
ordered  to  Coast  Indian  Res- 
ervation, 12  ; duties  per- 
formed, 13  ; promoted,  14  ; 
completion  of  record,  14. 

Early,  General,  134,  135,  138, 
177,  188,  igg,  200,  202,  204, 
207,  209,  257. 

Elk  River,  60. 

Elliott,  Colonel,  22,  24. 

Emory,  General  W.  H.,  146. 

Ewell,  General,  243,  244. 

Fairfield,  60. 

Fair  Oaks,  log,  ill. 

Farmville,  241,  243,  245,  246, 
24S. 

Fisher’s  Hill,  148,  165  ; ad- 
vance on,  167  ; reconnoiter- 
ing,  168  ; General  Crook 
crosses  Cedar  Creek,  i6g  ; 
battle  of,  170-178,  igg. 

Five  Forks,  reconnoissance  to- 
ward, 224  ; the  enemy  in 
force,  225  ; cavaliy  in  posi- 
tion, 226  ; advance  and  attack, 
226  ; battle  and  defeat  of  the 
enemy,  226-234 ! General 
Warren  relieved  by  General 
Griffin,  235. 


Ford’s  Station,  236. 

Forsyth,  Colonel  James  W.,  295. 

Fort  Duncan,  4. 

Fort  Hays,  29T. 

Fort  Leavenworth,  285. 

Fort  Reading,  6. 

Fort  Vancouver,  7. 

Franco-Prussian  War,  General 
Sheridan  receives  leave  of  ab- 
sence to  witness  operations  of 
European  armies,  294 ; sails 
from  New  York,  295  ; arrives 
at  the  front,  296  ; presented 
to  Bismarck  and  the  King  of 
Prussia,  295,  296  ; battle  of 
Gravelotte,  296  ; battle  of 
Beaumont  and  Sedan,  296  ; 
German  army  marches  to 
Paris,  296  ; observations,  297, 
298. 

Franklin,  Major-General,  138. 

Fredericksburg,  106. 

Front  Royal,  148,  149,  168,  178, 
179,  180. 

Gaines’s  Mill,  112. 

Gainesville,  113. 

Gilbert,  Captain  Charles  C.,  ap- 
pointed major  general,  32  ; 
assigned  to  a command,  33  ; 
operations  at  Perryville,  34. 

Goggin,  Major,  188. 

Goochland,  212. 

Gordon,  General,  109,  igi,  245. 

Gordonsville,  123,  174. 

Granger,  General,  55,  74,  83,  85. 

Grant,  General,  i,  58,  75,  83, 
102,  136,  138,  148,  167,  178, 
193,  206,  212,  213,  216,  218, 
222,  225,  231,  235,  255,  293. 


326 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


Gregg,  General,  97,  109,  112, 
117,  127,  217. 

Griffin,  General,  235. 

Ground  Squirrel  Bridge,  109, 
19T,  245. 

Halleck,  General,  i,  17,  19,  55, 
93,  136,  139,  178. 

Halltown,  141,  149. 

Hamilton,  A.  J.,  Governor,  264. 

Hampton,  121,  122,  124,  127. 

Hancock,  General,  130,  131. 

Hancock  Station,  216. 

Hanovertovvn,  116. 

Hardee,  General,  44,  46. 

Harper’s  Feny,  141. 

Harrington,  Colonel,  47. 

Harrisonburg,  174,  207. 

Elatcher’s  Run,  235. 

Haxall’s  Landing,  102,  113. 

Hopewell  Church,  128. 

Hood,  Lieutenant,  6. 

Hooker,  General,  91. 

Hoover’s  Gap,  60. 

Hunter,  General,  120,  123,  124, 

134,  137.  141- 

Indian  campaign— trouble  with 
the  Indians,  285  ; treaty  with 
the  Indians,  286  ; deceived  in 
signing  it,  287  ; no  intention 
of  complying,  and  the  treaty 
broken,  288  ; hostilities,  289  ; 
procuring  supplies,  290 ; 
troops  at  Camp  Supply,  291  ; 
engagements  with  the  In- 
dians, 292. 

Jackson,  “Stonewall,”  146,  182. 

James  River,  no,  127. 


Jefferson  Barracks,  14. 
Jettersville,  237-240. 

Johnston,  General,  219;  offer  to 
surrender,  252. 

Johnson,  President,  262,  293. 

Kanawha  Valley,  124. 
Kernstown,  199. 

Kershaw,  131,  200. 

King  of  Prussia,  296. 

King  and  Queen  Court  House, 
126. 

Lee,  General  Fitzhugh,  in, 
121-123,  148. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  131, 
177,  219,  240,  241. 

Lee  and  Gordon’s  Mills,  65. 
Leesburg,  201. 

Lieutenant  - General  Sheridan 
ordered  to  report  to  Washing- 
ton, 293  ; assigned  to  the  Di- 
vision of  the  Missouri,  293. 
Lilly,  General,  209. 

Light  House  Point,  129. 
j Lincoln,  Mr.  (President),  140. 
j Lomax,  General,  146. 

Long,  General,  209. 

Longstreet,  General,  85,  244, 
245- 

Lookout  Mountain,  64. 

Lookout  Valley,  76. 

Loudoun,  86. 

Louisa  Court  House,  122,  123. 
Lower  Cascades,  9. 

Luray  Valley,  171. 

Lynchburg,  123,  124,  134,  246. 
Lyttle,  General,  67. 

McClellan,  General,  i. 


INDEX. 


McCook,  General,  35,  36,  74, 
136. 

McKenzie,  General,  233,  245. 
Mallory’s  Ford,  124. 

Malvern  Hill,  127. 

Manchester,  60. 

Martinsburg,  1.^1,  156,  181. 
Massanutten,  148,  i63,  171,  175, 
rgi. 

Mattapony  River,  125. 
Matamoras,  258. 

Maximilian  (Emperor),  255. 
Meade,  General,  93,  gS,  100, 
loi,  102,  ir6,  117,  138,  240, 
241. 

Meadow  Bridges,  in. 
Mechanicsville,  in. 

Medicine  Lodge,  287. 

Meigs,  Lieutenant,  murder  of, 

2ZI. 

Merritt,  General,  109,  112,  113, 
146,  149,  176,  177,  201,  2c6, 
226,  232,  236,  242,  243, 

245- 

Mexico,  255. 

Middle  Cascades,  operations 
at,  g. 

Middle  Department,  137. 

Miles,  General,  235,  236. 
Milford,  171. 

Missionary  Ridge,  67-75. 
Monocacy  Junction,  135-140. 

Nelson,  Major-General,  32. 
Newcastle  Ferry,  121. 
Newmarket,  130,  igg. 

New  Orleans,  266. 

Newport  Barracks,  4. 

North  Anna  River,  106. 

North  Mountains,  148. 

22 


327 

Olchenslager  (Medical  Inspec- 
tor), murder  of,  201. 

Opequan  Creek,  151,  154. 

Paine’s  Cross  Roads,  239. 
Pamunkey  River,  113,  116, 

127. 

Perryville,  battle  of,  35,  36. 
Petersburg,  beginning  of  the 
siege  of,  126 ; march  to 
White  House,  126  ; depot  at 
White  House  broken  up,  127  ; 
a mine  constructed,  130  ; 
engagement  at  Newmarket, 
130  ; disastrous  repulse,  132  ; 
Sheridan  relieved  from  com- 
mand, 132  ; Sheridan  at 
Petersburg,  252. 

Pickett,  General,  225,  226,  228, 
231,  232. 

Pleasonton,  General,  92. 
Portland,  Ore.,  6. 

Port  Republic,  174. 

Powell’s  cavaliy,  206. 

Powell,  Colonel  William  PL, 
172. 

Prince  Edward  Court  House, 

. 245,  248. 

Prospect  Station,  246,  248. 

Rains,  Major,  expedition,  7. 
Reams’s  Station,  engagement  at, 

128. 

Reconstruction,  261,  264-266  ; 
laws  passed  by  Congress, 
278. 

Relief  of  Knoxville  — General 
Burnside  reports  troops  in  a 
state  of  siege,  83  ; re-enforce- 
ments  ordered,  83  ; opera- 


328 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


tions  at,  84,  85  ; General 
Sherman  visits  Knoxville, 
85  ; in  camp  at  Loudon,  86  ; 
Sheridan  ordered  to  Wash- 
ington, 86. 

Retreat  of  General  Lee — re-en- 
forcements sent  to  General 
Sheridan,  236 ; assault  on  the 
enemy’s  works  at  Petersburg, 
and  Petersburg  and  Rich- 
mond evacuated,  236  ; pur- 
suit of  General  Lee,  237  ; a 
Confederate  courier  captured, 
238  ; General  Lee  concentrat- 
ing troops  and  an  attack  at 
Amelia  Court  Plouse,  239 ; 
General  Lee’s  retreat  cut  off, 
he  makes  an  attack,  240  ; Gen- 
eral Meade  advances  toward 
Amelia  Court  House,  241  ; 
destruction  of  the  enemy’s 
wagons  and  capture  of  guns 
and  prisoners,  242  ; cavalry 
attack  and  defeat  of  the  ene- 
my, 243  ; pursuit  of  the  ene- 
my, 244  ; General  Longstreet 
joins  General  Lee,  245  ; 
Farmville  abandoned,  245  ; 
General  Sheridan  advances  on 
Prince  Edward  Court  House, 
245  ; the  enemy  crosses  the 
Appomattox,  246 ; General 
Crook  ordered  to  Prospect 
Station,  246 ; rout  of  the 
enemy  and  capture  of  artil- 
lery, 247  ; re-enforcements  ar- 
rive, 248. 

Rice’s  Station,  242. 

Richmond,  107-110,  236. 

Ritchie,  Mr.  M.  C.,  3. 


Roberts,  Colonel,  47. 

Rockfish  Gap,  209. 

Rood’s  Hill,  173. 

Rosecrans,  General,  28,  38,  55, 
67. 

Rosser’s  cavalry,  205,  208. 

Rosser,  General,  176. 

Rossville,  67. 

Round  Top  Mountain,  176. 

Runn’s  Gap,  173. 

Russell,  Captain  D.  A.,  12. 

Russell,  General,  160. 

Sailor’s  Creek,  242. 

“Savior  of  the  Valley,’’  176. 

Scott,  General,  i,  ii,  90. 

Schaefer,  Colonel,  48. 

Sedan,  battle-field,  296. 

Services  in  Texas  and  Oregon. 
Ordered  to  report  for  service 
at  Fort  Duncan,  4. 

Shenandoah  campaign.  (See 
Valley.) 

Shepherdstown,  150. 

Sheridan,  Philip  H.,  born,  2 ; 
appointed  to  West  Point,  3 ; 
incident  at  West  Point,  4 ; 
graduated  from  West  Point,  4 ; 
ordered  to  Nev/port  Barracks, 
4 ; ordered  to  Fort  Duncan, 
4 ; ordered  to  Fort  Reading, 
6 ; in  command  of  mounted 
force  of  Lieutenant  William- 
son’s expedition,  6 ; Major 
Rains’s  expedition  against  the 
Yakima  Indians,  7 ; ordered 
to  the  relief  and  operations  at 
the  block-house  at  the  Middle 
Cascade,  9 ; specially  men- 
tioned for  gallanti'y,  ii;  or- 


INDEX. 


329 


dered  to  the  Coast  Indian 
Reservation,  12  ; various  du- 
ties at  the  Coast  Indian  Res- 
ervation, 12  ; promoted  cap- 
tain of  the  Thirteenth  Infan- 
try, 14  ; selected  as  president 
of  board  of  officers  to  audit 
accounts,  17 ; assigned  as 
Chief  Commissary  of  the  Ar- 
my of  Southwest  Missouri,  17  ; 
differences  with  General  Cur- 
tis and  application  to  be  re- 
lieved from  staff  duty,  18  ; 
ordered  to  report  to  General 
Halleck  for  staff  duty,  ig ; 
appointed  colonel  of  cavalry, 
20 ; expedition  against  Cor- 
inth, 22  ; ordered  to  Boone- 
ville,  26 ; battle  of  Boone- 
ville,  27  ; thanked  in  general 
orders,  28  ; ordered  to  pro- 
ceed to  Louisville  or  Cincin- 
nati, 30 ; assigned  to  com- 
mand a division,  31  ; meets 
an  old  antagonist,  37  ; battle 
of  Stone  River,  40  ; commis- 
sioned a major  general  of 
volunteers,  53  ; advancing 
through  Tennessee,  59  ; bat- 
tle of  Chickahominy,  64-70  ; 
battle  of  Chattanooga,  77-82 ; 
in  camp  at  Loudon,  86  ; ob- 
tains leave  of  absence,  86 ; 
ordered  to  Washington,  86  ; 
leaves  his  command,  87  ; in 
command  of  cavalry  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  8g  ; re- 
organization of  cavalry  serv- 
ice, gi  ; inspection  of  cavalry, 
95  ; discussion  with  General 


Meade,  101  ; conference  with 
division  commanders,  104  ; 
engagement  at  Cold  Harbor, 
117  ; engagement  at  Trevilian 
Depot,  124 ; engagement  at 
Deep  Bottom,  128  ; in  front 
of  Petersburg,  131  ; relieved 
from  the  command  of  cavalry 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
132  ; assigned  to  a new  com- 
mand, 133  ; selected  to  com- 
mand troops  to  operate  against 
General  Early,  158  ; ordered 
to  report  to  General  Grant, 
139  ; calls  on  the  President, 
reports  to  General  Grant,  140  ; 
operations  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  145-149  ; battle  of 
Opequan,  157-162;  tries  to 
correct  omissions,  165  ; en- 
gagement at  Fisher’s  Plill, 
167-178  ; visits  Washington, 
179  ; consults  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  18 1 ; rides  to 
Winchester,  182  ; battle  of 
Winchester,  183-193  ; com- 
missioned as  major  general 
and  thanked  by  Congress, 
194  ; Sheridan’s  Ride  (a  po- 
em), ig6,  197 ; clearing  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  200  ; re- 
pulsed at  Gordonsville,  203  ; 
ordered  to  join  General  Sher- 
man, 207 ; moves  on  Char- 
lottesville, 210  ; joins  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  212  ; at  Diii- 
widdie  Court  House,  216-223  J 
at  Five  Forks,  224-230  ; pur- 
suing General  Lee,  236-248  ; 
selected  to  command  Louis- 


330 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


iana  and  Texas,  254;  visits 
camp  at  Brownsville,  258  ; as- 
signed to  command  the  hlili- 
tary  Division  of  the  Gulf,  263  ; 
at  New  Orleans,  270  ; in  com- 
mand of  Fifth  Military  Dis- 
trict, 279 ; assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Department 
of  Missouri,  285  ; leave  of  ab- 
sence, 286  : at  Camp  Supply, 
2gl  ; appointed  lieutenant 
general,  293  ; assigned  to  the 
Division  of  the  hlissouri,  293  ; 
visits  Europe,  294  ; presented 
to  Count  Bismarck  and  the 
King  of  Prussia,  295,  296  ; 
visits  European  countries, 
297 ; observations,  298  ; re- 
turns to  the  United  States, 
299  ; career  of,  300  ; appointed 
general  of  the  army,  302  ; his 
death,  304. 

Sherman,  General,  l,  85,  175, 
205,  235,  252,  293,  302. 

Sigel,  General,  134. 

Smith,  General  Kirby,  253,  256. 

Snell’s  Bridge,  99. 

South  Anna  River,  107. 

Spottsylvania  Court  House,  gg, 
126. 

Staff  duty,  selected  as  president 
of  board  of  officers  to  audit 
accounts,  17 ; assigned  as 
chief  commissary  of  the  Army 
of  Southwest  Missouri,  17  ; dif- 
ferences with  General  Curtis 
and  application  to  be  relieved 
from,  18 ; ordered  to  report 
to  General  Halleck  for  staff 
duty,  19. 


Stanton,  Mr.  Edwin  M.  (Secre- 
tary of  War),  8g,  140. 

Stephenson’s  Depot,  156,  158, 
161. 

St.  Mary’s  Church,  127. 

Stone  River,  40. 

Strasburg,  168. 

Stuart,  General,  106,  107. 

Summit  Point,  157,  158. 

Sutherland,  236. 

Ta  River,  106. 

Terrill,  General,  37. 

Thomas,  General,  41,  66-68. 

Thornburg,  106. 

Three  Top  Mountain,  169,  180, 
190. 

Todd’s  Tavern,  engagement  at, 
98. 

Tolies,  Colonel  (chief  quarter- 
master), murdered,  201. 

Tom’s  Brook,  176,  177. 

Torbert,  General,  97,  146,  149, 
160,  161,  171,  176,  179,  203. 

Trevilian  expedition,  cavalry 
divisions  ordered,  121  ; en- 
gagement at  Louisa  Court 
House,  122  ; Sheridan’s  con- 
clusions, 123  ; engagement  at 
Trevilian’s  Depot,  124  ; troops 
fall  back,  125 ; passing 
through  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  126 ; engagement  at 
Deep  Bottom,  127  ; engage- 
ment at  Reams’s  Station,  128  ; 
suffering  of  the  troops,  129; 
active  movements  suspended, 
130. 

Trevilian’s  Depot,  121,  122 ; 
engagement  at,  124. 


INDEX. 


331 


Upperville,  201. 

Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  assigned  to  the 
command  of,  advance  and  re- 
pulse of  General  Sigel,  134  ; 
General  Sigel  succeeded  by 
General  Hunter,  134;  opera- 
tions at  Lynchburg,  134,  135  ; 
General  Early  advances  into 
INIaryland,  135,  136  ; General 
Augur  in  command  of  the  de- 
fenses of  Washington,  136  ; 
troops  in  different  depart- 
ments, 137  ; General  Grant 
suggests  General  Franklin  as 
commander,  138  ; General 
Meade  named  by  the  Presi- 
dent, 138  ; General  Sheridan 
selected  and  ordered  to  report 
to  General  Grant  at  Monoc- 
acy  Junction,  138,  139;  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  calls  on  the 
President  and  reports  to  Gen- 
eral Grant,  140  ; consolidation 
of  departments,  141  ; troops 
concentrated  at  Halltown, 

141  ; instructions  received, 

142  ; description  of  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley,  144,  145  ; op- 
erations begun,  145,  146  ; an 
advance,  148  ; a movement  to 
the  rear,  149  ; General  Tor- 
bert  ordered  to  destroy  stores, 
150 ; the  army  continues  to 
fall  back,  150;  an  attack  by 
the  enemy,  150,  151  ; General 
Sheridan  criticised,  152  ; Gen- 
eral Sheridan  disappointed  at 
reports  from  scouts  and  volun- 


teers asked  for,  153;  an  at- 
tack determined  on,  154  ; plan 
of  attack,  155  ; battle  of  Ope- 
quan,  157-162;  losses,  163; 
congratulations  received,  163  ; 
the  victory  of  great  value, 
164 ; General  Sheridan  tries 
to  correct  omissions  in  duty, 
165  ; battle  of  Fisher’s  Hill, 
167-178  ; General  Sheridan 
visits  Washington,  179,  180; 
consultation  with  Secretary  of 
War  and  General  Halleck, 
18 1 ; ride  to  and  battle  of 
Winchester,  182,  183,  185- 
193. 

Van  Dorn,  General,  56. 

Wallace,  General,  135,  136. 

Warren,  General,  235. 

Waynesborough,  165  ; engage- 
ment and  rout  of  the  enemy, 
208. 

West  Point,  generals  educated, 
I ; General  Sheridan  appoint- 
ed to,  3 ; life,  studies,  and  in- 
cident at,  4 ; General  Sheri- 
dan graduates  at,  4. 

West  Point  (No.  2),  126. 

Wharton,  General,  2og. 

White  House,  114,  117,  126, 
212,  216. 

White  Oak,  233-235. 

Wilcox  Landing,  127. 

Wilderness,  gg. 

Williamson,  Lieutenant,  expe- 
dition of,  6. 

Wilson,  General,  97,  98,  146, 
148,  157- 

Winchester,  149,  150,  156. 


332 


GENERAL  SHERIDAN. 


“Winchester,”  or  “ Rienzi,” 
Sheridan’s  war-horse,  de- 
scribed, 198  ; preserved  in  Mil- 
itary Service  Institution,  ig8. 
Wood,  General,  48. 

Woodstock,  173. 

Woodstock  Races,  177. 


Wright,  Colonel,  Ninth  Infan- 
try, expedition  of,  8. 

Wright,  Major-General,  32,  33, 
136,  146,  180,  192. 

Yakima  Indians,  7. 

Yellow  Tavern,  108,  no. 


THE  END. 


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